Conor Mayo-Wilson

Phil 401B: Decision Theory

Blackwell, Savage, Sen, and Bar-Hillel
Banner image: Blackwell, Savage, Sen, and Bar-Hillel.

Course Mechanics

Course Files

Schedule

Date Topic Readings Assignment
Mon. 3/30 Course Introduction

Lecture Slides 		Syllabus

Reading Schedule		 None
Wed. 4/1 Decision-making under ignorance 1

Discussion Questions 		Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory (Sections 1–3.1) Reading Assignment 1
Mon. 4/6 Decision-making under ignorance 2

Discussion Questions 		Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory (Sections 3.2–3.6) Reading Assignment 2
Wed. 4/8 Decision-making under risk and expected utility

Lecture Slides 		Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory (Chapter 4) Reading Assignment 3
Mon. 4/13 Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theorem Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory (Chapter 5)

Recommended: Steele and Stefánsson, “Decision Theory” (Sections 1–2)		 Reading Assignment 4
Tues. 4/14 Problem Set 1 (Decisions under ignorance)
Wed. 4/15 Money Pump Arguments Selections from Gustafsson, Money-Pump Arguments (Chapters 1–4) Reading Assignment 5
Mon. 4/20 Decisions under uncertainty and Pascal’s wager Hájek, “Pascal’s Wager” (Sections 1-5) Reading Assignment 6
Tues. 4/21 Problem Set 2 (Decisions under risk)
Wed. 4/22 Probability: Axioms and Interpretations (subjective vs. objective) Instructor’s notes

Kadane, Principles of Uncertainty (pp. 1–5) 		Reading Assignment 7
Mon. 4/27 Dutch Book Argument Vineberg, “Dutch Book Arguments” (Sections 1–3) Reading Assignment 8
Wed. 4/29 Anscombe and Aumann’s theory Anscombe and Aumann, “A Definition of Subjective Probability”

You may skip the proof of the theorem. Concentrate on understanding what the theorem says.		 Reading Assignment 9
Mon. 5/4 Savage’s Theory 1 Steele and Stefánsson, “Decision Theory” (Section 3; stop at the sentence beginning “Savage’s own proof is rather complicated ...”)

Recommended: Introduction and Sections 1–2.		 Reading Assignment 10
Tues. 5/5 Paper 1 (Arguments for probabilism)
Wed. 5/6 Savage’s Theory 2 Briggs, “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility” (Sections 1–2) Reading Assignment 11
Mon. 5/11 Descriptive Deviations from Utility Theory and Objections to SEU as a Normative Theory Briggs, “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility” (Section 3)

Finish Section 3.1 of Steele and Stefánsson, “Decision Theory”.

Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Section 1.1.1)		 Reading Assignment 12
Tues. 5/12 Problem Set 3 (Subjective Expected Utility)
Wed. 5/13 Prospect Theory 1 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory” (Sections 1-2) Reading Assignment 13
Mon. 5/18 Prospect Theory 2 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory”(Sections 3-4) Reading Assignment 14
Tues. 5/19 Paper 2 (Expected Utility)
Wed. 5/20 Prospect Theory 3 Tversky and Kahneman, “Advances in Prospect Theory” Reading Assignment 15
Mon. 5/25 Memorial Day (No class) Get ahead on readings! None
Wed. 5/27 Buchak’s Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory (REU) Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Sections 1–1.3; 36 pages) Reading Assignment 16
Mon. 6/1 REU 2 Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Sections 1.4–2.1; 24 pages) Reading Assignment 17
Wed. 6/3 REU 3 Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Sections 2.2–2.3 and 3–3.1; 30 pages) Reading Assignment 18
Fri. 6/5 Problem Set 4 (Risk-Weighted Expected Utility)

Bibliography (Reading Schedule)

  1. M. Peterson. An Introduction to Decision Theory. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  2. K. Steele and H. O. Stefánsson. “Decision Theory”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman.
  3. J. E. Gustafsson. Money-Pump Arguments. Oxford University Press, 2022.
  4. A. Hájek. “Pascal’s Wager”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman.
  5. C. Mayo-Wilson. Instructor’s notes on probability and Dutch book arguments. Unpublished course notes, 2026.
  6. J. B. Kadane. Principles of Uncertainty. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2011.
  7. S. Vineberg. “Dutch Book Arguments”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman.
  8. F. J. Anscombe and R. J. Aumann. “A Definition of Subjective Probability”. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 34.1 (1963), pp. 199–205.
  9. R.A. Briggs. “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman.
  10. L. Buchak. Risk and Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2013.
  11. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”. Econometrica 47.2 (1979), pp. 263–291.
  12. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5.4 (1992), pp. 297–323.