CAMELIA  BEJAN

 

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RESEARCH


Published and forthcoming papers

The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition

Economic Theory, vol. 37(1), 2008.  //  Working paper version

Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)

International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 38(1), 2009  //   Working paper version

No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems (with Geoffroy de Clippel)   

Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 146(5), 2011 //   Working paper version

Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies (with Florin Bidian)

Economic Theory, vol. 50(3), 2012  //   Working paper version

Axiomatizing core extensions (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)

International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 41(4), 2012//  Working paper version

Using the aspiration core to predict coalition formation (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)   

International Game Theory Review, vol. 14(1), 2012  //   Working paper version

A market interpretation of the proportional extended core (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)   

Economics Letters, vol. 117(3), 2012 //   Working paper version

Bubbles and trading in incomplete markets (with Florin Bidian)   

Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 53, August 2014//   Working paper version

Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt (with Florin Bidian)   

Economic Theory, vol. 60(1), 2015//   Working paper version  //   (Supplemental material)

Employment lotteries, endogenous firm formation and the aspiration core (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)   

accepted by the Economic Theory Bulletin //   Working paper version

 

Working papers

Equal treatment without large numbers (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)    --submitted

Investment and financing under uncertainty    (under revision)   

On the shareholder versus stakeholder debate   

Performance-based contracts, monitoring and fraud (with Maria Bejan and Pradyot Sen)   

Location constraints and competitive non-linear pricing (with Juan Camilo G˛mez)   

Risk aversion, task uncertainty and "pay-to-quit" as an optimal contract (with Sandeep Krishnamurthy)