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Curriculum Vitae

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cadolph at uw dot edu

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Refereed Articles

State Government Organization of Health Services,
1990–2009: Correlates and Consequences
 

Journal of Public Health Management and Practice, Published Ahead of Print

with Paula M. Lantz, Jeffrey A. Alexander, and JoLynn P. Montgomery



Government organizational structure related to health varies greatly across states and is somewhat dynamic. When Medicaid and public health functions are consolidated in the same stage agency, public health does not “lose” in terms of its share of the state budget. However, this could change as Medicaid costs continue to grow and with the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.





Aligning Rights and Interests:
Why, When and How to Uphold Labor Standards
 

Background Paper to World Development Report 2013: Jobs

with Margaret Levi, Daniel Berliner, Aaron Erlich, Anne Greenleaf, Milli Lake, and Jennifer Noveck



To establish what we do and do not know about how the protection of labor rights contributes to the developmental value of jobs (through living standards, productivity and social cohesion), we review the available literature and evidence. We provide available quantitative and qualitative evidence on how improvements in rights contribute positively to economic development; on the whole, our conclusion is that they do.





Allocation of Authority in European Health Policy  

Social Science and Medicine, 2012, Vol. 75(9): 1595—1603.

with Scott L. Greer and Elize Massard da Fonseca



Although many study the effects of different allocations of health policy authority, few ask why countries assign responsibility over different policies as they do. We test two broad theories: fiscal federalism, which predicts rational governments will concentrate information-intensive operations at lower levels, and redistributive and regulatory functions at higher levels; and “politicized federalism,” which suggests a combination of systematic and historically idiosyncratic political variables interfere with efficient allocation of authority. Drawing on the WHO Health in Transition country profiles, we present new data on the allocation of responsibility for key health care policy tasks (implementation, provision, finance, regulation, and framework legislation) and policy areas (primary, secondary and tertiary care, public health and pharmaceuticals) in the 27 eu member states and Switzerland. We use a Bayesian multinomial mixed logit model to analyze how different countries arrive at different allocations of authority over each task and area of health policy, and find the allocation of powers broadly follows fiscal federalism. Responsibility for pharmaceuticals, framework legislation, and most finance lodges at the highest levels of government, acute and primary care in the regions, and provision at the local and regional levels. Where allocation does not follow fiscal federalism, it appears to reflect ethnic divisions, the population of states and regions, the presence of mountainous terrain, and the timing of region creation.

Replication:  Data and code to reproduce the main results can be found here.





Getting Ahead in the Communist Party:
Explaining the Advancement of
Central Committee Members in China
 

American Political Science Review, 2012, Vol. 106 (1): 166—187.

with Victor Shih and Mingxing Liu



Spectacular economic growth in China suggests the ruling Chinese Communist Party (ccp) has somehow gotten it right. A key hypothesis across both economics and political science is that the ccp’s cadre evaluation system, combined with China’s geography-based governing logic, has motivated local administrators to compete with one another to generate high growth. We raise a number of theoretical and empirical challenges to this claim. Using a new biographical database of Central Committee members, a previously overlooked feature of ccp reporting, and a novel Bayesian method which can estimate individual-level correlates of partially observed ranks, we find no evidence strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party ranks at any of the post-reform party congresses. Instead, factional ties with various top leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection played substantial roles in elite ranking, suggesting promotion systems served the immediate needs of the regime and its leaders, rather than encompassing goals like economic growth.

Replication:  Data and code to reproduce the main results can be found here.





Mobilizing Bias in Europe:
Lobbies, Democracy and eu Health Policy-Making
 

European Union Politics, 2008, Vol. 9 (3): 403—433.

with Scott L. Greer and Elize Massard da Fonseca

Sage Award for Best Article in European Union Politics in 2008



What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (eu)? Interest groups can democratize the eu only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the eu member states? Are some member states’ lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of eu lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and well-resourced groups.

Replication:  Underlying data can be found here.





A Consensus on Second Stage Analyses
in Ecological Inference Models
 

Political Analysis, 2003, Vol. 11 (1): 86—94.

with Gary King and with Michael C. Herron and Kenneth W. Shotts



Since Herron and Shotts (2003a), Adolph and King (2003), and Herron and Shotts (2003b), the four of us have iterated many more times, learned a great deal, and arrived at a consensus on this issue. This paper describes our joint recommendations for how to run second-stage ecological regressions, and provides detailed analyses to back up our claims.





Analyzing Second Stage Ecological Regressions:
Comment on Herron and Shotts
 

Political Analysis, 2003, Vol. 11 (1): 65—76.

with Gary King



We take this opportunity to comment on Herron and Shotts (2003) because of its interesting and productive ideas and because of the potential to affect the way a considerable body of practical research is conducted...





Other Articles

Visual Interpretation and Presentation of Monte Carlo Results  

The Political Methodologist, 2003, Vol. 11 (2): 31—35.

Monte Carlo experiments test models on artificial datasets with known properties to assess the likely performance of an estimator in empirical work. Although the increasing savvy of political methodology has brought more and better Monte Carlo work, it is not always presented clearly or thoroughly. In particular, Monte Carlo results often appear in unwieldy tables rather than elegant graphics. I propose five guidelines for Monte Carlo graphics. I also define five graphic styles which help show the comparative performance of models over the parameter space, even when the models and parameters are many.





Party Schools  

American Prospect, December 18, 2000, 16—17.

A comparison of the parties' school finance record in the states reveals stark differences.







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