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Pols 426 Lecture 1

R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics

Claim: International Relations is a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy --- realist but a bit different than Waltz

Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

States are assumed to act as if they are guided by cost benefit calculations

Definition of equilibrium -- an international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, and economic arrangements – such that not powerful state believes that a change in the system will yield additional benefits that are greater than the costs required to make the change

System equilibrium ->
diff growth in power -> redistribution of power
^
|
 
|
\/
Resolution of System crisis
(War)
 <-------- system disequilibrium

 

System disequilibirum --- economic, political, and technological developments help create differential rates of growth on these dimensions for states – at some point this differential growth changes the cost/benefit calculations for one or more major powers concerning changing the structure of the system

What is at stake in changing the system – the existing structure (prestige, division of territory, international division of labor, and rules of behavior in the system) reflect the interests of the dominant power or powers

If the relative power in the system changes, then other powers may see it in their interest to change the system so that the above features more reflect their interests

The disjuncture between the existing structure and the interests of the new more powerful nation or nations, creates a crisis and requires resolution –

Gilpin claim based on historical experience – War is the mechanism for system crisis resolution.

State Objectives

  1. Territorial gain to advance, security, economic and other interests.
  2. Increase influence over the behavior of other states (threats, coercion, alliances, spheres of influence)
  3. To control and exercise influence over the world economy

International System - an aggregation of diverse entities (essentially states) united by regular interaction (diplomatic, economic, and military relations) according to some form of control (claims anarchic but high degree of order due to the distribution of power among states)

Dominant states organize and maintain the international system --Dist of power principal form of control.

Types of international Change

Systems change – change in the nature of the actors that compose the system – change in the state system

Systemic change –change in the form of control or governance of an international system – new leader, new hierarchy or form of control

Stability and Change

Repeated Assumptions

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
Imperfect information – uncertainty
Assessments of costs and benefits are subjective
Actions can lead to unanticipated consequences
What creates change
Technology – transportation, communication, information, production
Military Innovation
Social, political, economic organization of a society
Demographic change

Economic Factors -- means of production and changes in the means of production - factors which tend states in expand and to attempt the change the international system

  1. developments that increase economics of scale that effect the production of a collective or public good – public goods like protection of an enlarged area
  2. internalization of externalities – externalities are conferred on political actors for which payment or compensation is not made -- expansion to force parties to pay for positive externalities (free trade) or be responsible for negative externalities (pollution)
  3. expansion due to diminishing rate of returns -- fi factors of production (land, labor, capital) then growth rates decline – (Lenninism)

Gilpin’s take on the role (effects) of the international structure on state behavior -- like oligopolistic market – interdependent decision-making and sufficiently few competitors so that behavior of one effects others -- expand due to relative power concerns -- same set of alliance counterbalancing alliance notions as Waltz

Gilpin – System stability and political chance is less a function of the static distribution of power and more a function of uneven and differential growth in rates of power among states

Final claim -- whether or not change will take place is ultimately indeterminant


Pols 426 Lecture 2


R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics - Continued

Growth and Expansion

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

Territorial, political, and economic expansion of the state increases economic surplus and ability to control - rise and decline of dominant states and empires is a function of the generation and dissipation of economic surplus

The logistic (S-curve Thesis) first increasing then decreasing returns to scale

And the attendant "relative capability curve"

The modern pattern - cycles of hegemonic nation-states

a. The triumph of the nation-state
b. Modern economies - industrial, capital accumulation - solves temporarily diminishing returns to scale of territorial state
c. World market economy - efficiency, gains from trade - rise in importance of economic competitiveness

Expansion by territorial conquest and economic expansion

S-curve and relative capability curve dynamics create new equilibria - succession of hegemonic powers
Equilibrium and Decline

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

Running an empire or leading the world economy is costly - At some point the costs overtake the benefits of leading and establishing and at that point the leader goes into decline

Running the "empire" - costs - military, financing allies, costs with maintaining the world economy

The costs of maintaining the status quo increase faster than the capacity to finance the status quo

The classic struggle between consumption, protection and investment strain the leader -- consumption rises (the good life), protection costs rise, and investment is reduced - reducing long term competitiveness

Military, technological, economic, or organizational advantages "created" and employed by the leading state eventually are copied or imitiated by other states and the advantages are lost Followers free ride

All this gives rising states the advantage on the growth curve and relative capability curve - till a point where there is a disequilibrium

Hegemonic War and International Change

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

Hegemonic war the historic mechanism for systemic change

Others -
1. Internal rejuvenation and restructuring
2. preemptive war on rising challenger
3. Reducing costs by expanding further - defies logic of argument
4. reduction of foreign commitments - retrenchment


Pols 426 Lecture 3
Gilpin and War and Trade Simulation Discussion

Recall Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. – by hegemonic war

 

OK --- Lets do a translation to the Game of War and Trade Simulation

Power -- MUs and endowments – high endowments allow one to make more MUs and to reach high prosperity levels so spending capital (economic growth allows for increasing power)

Status – PUs -- the reflection of status achieved from power and economic growth – via trades, endowments and economic growth

States with high PUs are benefiting from the system and are the ascribed leaders of the game – they become the targets -- States with high levels of PUs and low MUs want things to stay as is

States with high levels of MUs and low PUs seek to change the game

The system is in equilibrium when leading states and leading challengers and/or most states have equal ascribed and achieved status – that is there is a balance between their PUs and MUs. –

The system is in disequilibrium when there is not a balance in PUs and MUs for leading and challenging states

If there is a balance in the PU/MU ratio for leading and challenging states then marginal costs to change the system (war) will exceed marginal benefits

When there is a significant enough imbalance in the PU/MU ratio, then perceived marginal costs will be less than perceived benefits -- and war is likely.

Leading states – those with large PUs are targets if their PU/MU ratio gets too large -- Gilpin claims that leading states have a difficult time running the system and that there is a drain on their resources so that challengers have an advantage catching up -- In thegame, it is hard to increase both MUs and PUs at the same time. PUs can accumulate but MUs do not increase as fast and as the leader becomes a target, challengers increase the costs by fighting attrition wars that wear down MUs increasing the ratio – till things finally tip

Evidence from the simulation -- Group B

Group B played ten (10) rounds - There were wars in 5 of the rounds -- rounds 3-6 and 8. Below is an analysis of those conflicts -following that is some data about alliances and trading relations

Round 3 War UK IND, Rus vs. Pak, US, China

Target was Pak PU 40 MU 5 8/1 ratio

Key attacker UK 25 50 1/2

No war gain because Pak had defensive alliance with U.S. and China so war inclusive

Round 4 War UK, Ind, Rus, vs Pak, US, China

same two coalitions and these two were known to the participants -- no winners war losses 54. This war did not make sense since most states had a positive PU/MU ratio with the exception being the UK -- Note at the start of the round the total Pus were 300 and the total Mus were 126. The UK was the only state where it would seem to be in its interest to seek to change the system. China with 100 Pus and 26 Mus was the leader and was the most imbalanced and thus the most likely target - But like many other nations in this simulation it cashed in Pus to raise endowment levels (5 nations in all this round) - China cased in 100 thus making it really neither the leader or much of a target for the next round -- at the end of round 4 its PU/MU ratio was ½ rather than essentially 4/1 at the start of this round

War loses 54 - war gains 0

 

 

 

Round 5 -- Same war coalitions same result --

War - UK,Ind, RUs vs US, Ch, Pak

The key here is that the UK was the most imbalanced and unhappy state PU/MU ratio was 1/9

But Pak and Ind the only real targets - all others have more Mus and Pus

Pak the plumpest target -- ratio at 4/.15

Coalitions frustrates UK and protect Pak

War loses 84 - war gains 0

Round 6 War - same coalitions -- same results

Again UK the most imbalanced with a desire to change the system - ratio 1 to 2.25

 

Most other states had a moderately favorable PU/MU ratio - about 1.5/1-no big target - this is the case because in Round 5 Pakistan cashed in 100 Pus to raise endowments -- otherwise it would have been a real target - at about 2.25/1

No winners - war of attrition - war losses 101 Everybody is losing from war with no clear way to get gains in sight. Cummulative war loses for all nations at 296 with no war gains

Round 7 No War - An interesting and subtle shift Two defensive alliances form altering the strategic terrain --- Russia shifts and joins the US, Ch, and Pak alliance--- This is an odd shift since Russia along with UK are the only states with revisionist PU/MU imbalances -- All other states have more Pus than Mus. Indeed the juciest target is India at close to 3/1 - the ally of the state with the most to gain from war UK at 1/1.25. China and the US are also potential targets.

 

Round 8 Singling our the leader and hitting the juiciest target - India -- UK betrayal and getting would be potential leaders (US and CH) to join and take down the leader -- Pak stays out of the fray

Rus, US, UK, CH vs. Ind

US 165 PU 96 MU IND 150 PU 68 MU 3/1
UK 95 123
Rus 90 88
CH 135 81

Victory - India wiped out -- War losses 172 - War gains 52 - This would have been greater but India seeing the handwriting on the war dumps 100 Pus into endowments - War gains could have been 100 and war loses for the winning coalition would have been 104.

Rounds 9 and 10 - No war a return to two balanced defensive alliances

US, CH, Pak vs UK, Ind, Rus

Why? -- Well China, the US and Pak are the leading states - actually Pak is 4 but Ch and the US are 1 and 2. - all three have positive PU/MU ratios - all are targets Ch at almost 5/1, US at 3/1 and Pak at 2/1

UK, Ind and Rus also all have positive ratios -- UK at 2/1, Ind at 3/1 and Russia at 3/1. While these are trailing in the game, it is really not in anyone's interest in terms of marginal gains to try to change the system via fighting and so war does not ensue

In round 10 there are endgame effects - no one generates Mus and everyone creates Pus

Place ordering remains the same - US first, China second, Russia, third, Pak 4, UK 5, Ind 6.

 

At the end, everyone is pretty "happy"

CH - 5/1
UK 2.5/1
US 4/1
Pak 3/1
Ind 5/1
Rus 3/1
Prediction -- down the road - China and India potential targets - high ratios and weak military - could disrupt the system equilibrium

 

Some interesting patterns in trading, alliances, wars, and system structure

 

 

Round 1 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China 5 0
UK 5 0
US 4 0
Pak 5 0
Ind 5 0
Rus 4 0
Total --- 28

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Round 2 - Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China 5 0
UK 3 0
US CH, Pak 2 0
Pak 4 0
Ind 4 0
Rus 4 0
Total 22

 

Round 3 - Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China 3 Pak, US
UK Ind, Rus 2 Ind, Rus
US 4 Pak, CH
Pak 3 US, CH
Ind 3 UK, Rus
Rus 3 Ind, UK
Total 19

 

 

 

Round 4 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Pak 2 US, Pak
UK Rus, Ind 2 Ind, Rus
US Ch, Pak 2 CH, Pak
Pak Ch, US 2 Ch, US
Ind Rus, UK 2 Rus, Uk
Rus Ind, UK 2 Ind, UK
Total 12

Round 5 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak , US 2 Pak, US
UK Rus, Ind 2 RUs, Ind
US CH, Pak 2 CH, Pak
Pak Ch, US 2 Ch, US
Ind Rus, UK 2 Rus, US
Rus UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Total 12

Round 6 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak, US 2 Pak, US
UK Rus, Ind 2 Rus, Ind
US Ch, Pak 2 Ch, Pak
Pak US, Ch 2 CH, US
Ind Rus, UK 2 Rus, UK
Rus UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Total 12

 

Round 7 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak, US 2 Pak, US, Rus
UK Ind, Rus 2 US, Ind
US Ch, Pak 2 CH, Pak, Rus
Pak CH, US 2 CH, US, RuS
Ind Rus, UK 2 UK
Rus Ind, UK 2 CH, US, Pak
Total 12

 

 

Round 8 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak, US 2 Rus, UK, US
UK Ind, US 2 US,Rus,CH
US UK,CH, Pak, Rus 4 Uk,Rus,CH
Pak CH, Rus, US 3 0
Ind Rus, UK 2 0
Rus US, Ind,Pak 3 UK,US,CH
Total 16

 

Round 9 Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners Defensive allies
China Pak, US 2 Pak, US
UK Ind, Rus 2 Ind, Rus
US CH, Pak 2 CH, Pak
Pak CH, US 2 CH, US
Ind UK, Rus 2 UK, Rus
Rus UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Total 12

Round10
Group B
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners Defensive allies
China Pak, US 2 Pak, US
UK Ind, Rus 2 Ind, Rus
US CH, Pak 2 CH, Pak
Pak CH, US 2 CH, US
Ind UK, Rus 2 UK, Rus
Rus UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Total 12

 

Group A - Data and Analysis

Group A also played ten (10) rounds - There were wars in 8 of the rounds -- rounds 2,4,5-10. Below is an analysis of those conflicts -following that is some data about alliances and trading relations

Round 2

China, UK, and US vs. Ind, Rus
Ind 1/1.5 US 3.5/1
Rus 1/5 CH 2/1
UK 1.5/1
Have nots -- vs haves

 

Round 4

Ind, Rus, US, UK vs. Pak

Ind 2/1 Pak 4/1
Rus 1/1
US 1/1.5
UK 1/1

Ganging up to nail a rich but weak nation -- Pak an easy target

Pak loses war - war loses 68 war gains 44

The haves against the weakest --- but note that India escapes 2/1 margin -- could have been had and would not have been quite as rich a prize and cost more to defeat - Note that from this point until the last round of the game this coalition of four nations continued to defeat Pakistan and take all its prosperity. Pakistan remained in a "colonial" destitute position for the remainder of the game

The imperialists or colonialists - US, UK, Ind, Rus

In rounds 5 and 6 the same coalition launched successful "wars" against Pakistan

In round 5 the same coalition of four attacked the other nation, China as well - China was attacked to but it probably saw the attack coming and dumped most of its prosperity into raising endowments - In so doing it transformed itself from from the end of round 4 as a possible target 1/1 (in reality it was ¼) to clearly not much of a target at all 0 PU to 75 Mus - This case was confused by the late recognition by the Game Master (?) that China had dumped 50 Pus at the end of round 4 so many countries thought it was a good target ie 1/1

Round 6 Rus, UK, Ind US vs. Pak

Again just grinding Pakistan War gains 44 war loses 33 of which 17 were by Pakistan

China had made itself a totally unattractive target and the coalition was getting fat but not uniformly fat
UK also by using 100 Pus to raise endowments avoided being an attractive target

Round 7 --

Targets - US - 203 Pus 2+/1
Rus - 1.5/1 Pus 158

Dissatisfied States - UK ½, China no pus 100 Mus, India 1/2

CH, UK, Rus, Ind vs US and Pak

US and Pak defeated - war gains 164 war losses 185 - US had 93 of that

 

Round 8

CH, UK, Rus, Ind vs US and Pak

CH - 1+/1 US 2/1
UK 1.5/1
Ind 1.5/1
Rus 2+/1

Coalition goes after US and Pak again and wins - but get only 8 Pus since US dumps 100 PUS to prosperity and Pak has essentially nothing - Coalition thought that US was easy (correct) and valuable - wrong when they dumped PUS

Russia was a more potentially valuable target and the new leader with 229 Pus but it could not have been defeated

Round 9

Same coalition against US and Pak

CH, UK, Rus, Ind vs US and Pak

CH - 2/1 US and Pak have almost no PUs
UK 2/1
Ind 2/1
Rus almost 3/1

Interesting - The frontrunners don't start to go after each other with the obvious choice Russia - the leader with the most Pus. Instead just pick on the losers.
War gains 16 per winning coalition member with losses at 12 per member
Note Russia dumps 50 Pus into endowments - attempting to look like less of a target since they know the game will end soon so really not much value from increasing endowments

Round 10

No real war - All nations invest in new military units - I guess I convinced everyone that this round might not be the last - 120 MUS added this round

All nations raise prosperity levels significantly - China attacks Pakistan alone and gains 15 PUS - It also invest the least in Mus -- only 5 - It ends up winning the game having 52 more Pus than Russia. Even if Russia had invested in no MUS and if China had not defeated Pak and gained some Pus, China still would have passed Russia in the final round and won.

Now at the end of round 10 - here are the numbers

China 354 104 3.5/1
UK 273 117 2+/1
US 65 25 2/1
Pak 1 15
Ind 269 120 2+/1
Rus 302 134 2+/1

Now a grand coalition of all five againt China would have enough Mus to defeat China in the next round - but would defeated and abused nations US and Pak help??? - Only if they did would China tumble - Note China is the only nation that could be defeated the next round by a grand coalition - at least one of the leaders

Round 1
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China UK, US, Ind 3 -
UK Ch, Ind 4 -
US Ch, Pak 2 -
Pak - 3 -
Ind UK, Rus 4 -
Rus Ind, UK 2 -
Total 18 -

 

Round 2
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus 4 UK, US
UK -Pak, CH, US 3 CH, US
US Ch, UK 2 UK, CH
Pak IUK, CH, Rus 3 -
Ind Rus, Ch 2 Rus
Rus Ind, Pak 1 Ind
Total 16

Round 3
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Ins, Pak 3
UK Ind, US, Pak 3
US CH, UK 2
Pak Rus, Ind, Ch, 3
Ind Rus, UK, Pak, CH 4
Rus Ind, Pak 2
Total 17

Round 4
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Ind 3
UK Pak, Ch, US 3 US, Ind, Rus
US UK, Rus 2 UK, Ind Rus
Pak UK, Rus 2
Ind Rus, Ch 3 Rus, US, UK
Rus Ind, Pak, US 3 Ind, US, UK
Total 14

 

 

Round 5
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Pak, Ind 3
UK US, Rus, Ind, Pak 4 US, Ind, Rus
US UK, CH, Rus 3 UK, Ind, Rus
Pak Ch, UK, Rus 3
Ind Rus, UK, Ch 3 UK, US, Rus
Rus Ind, US, UK, Pak 4 UK, US, Ind
Total 20

Round 6
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus, UK 3
UK Ind, CH, RUS, US 4 Rus, Ind, US
US Rus, CH, UK 3 Rus, UK, Ind
Pak Ind, UK 2
Ind UK, Rus, Pak 3 UK, Rus, US
Rus Ind, CH, UK, US 4 UK, Ind, US
Total 19

 

Round 7
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Rus, Ind 2 UK, Rus, Ind
UK US, Ind 2 Ind, CH, Rus
US UK, Ind 2
Pak Ind 4
Ind CH, UK, US, Pak 4 Ch, UK, Rus
Rus CH 1 CH, UK, Ind
Total 11

Round 8 Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Ind 1 US
UK Ind, Rus 2 Rus, Ind, Pak
US 0 CH
Pak 0 UK, Ind, Rus
Ind Rus, Ch, UK 3 UK, Pak, Rus
Rus Ind, UK 2 UK, Ind, Pak
Total 9

 

 

Round 9
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Ind, UK 2 UK, Ind, Rus
UK Ind, CH, Rus 3 Ind, CH, Rus
US 0
Pak 0
Ind Rus, Ch, UK 3 UK, Ch, Rus
Rus Ind, UK 2 UK, CH, Ind
Total 10

Round 10
Group A
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Ind, 1
UK Rus, Pak 2
US Pak, Rus 2
Pak Rus, Ch 2
Ind Rus, Ch, 2
Rus Ind, UK, US 3
Total 12

 

Clear interaction between war and trade - war coalitions and trade coalitions overlap dramatically

A little hypothetical argument --- There are 6 nations and each needs 20AUs and 20IUs for subsistence which comes up to 120 of each per round -- Now it is possible then for each to have 30 AUs and 30 Ius to generate prosperity - for all six nations that generates 180 of each for a total of 360 PUs --- in addition all states can gain 10PUs for gains from trade for a total of a potential of 420 PUs -- the hypothetical maximum before any state reaches 200 PUs

Now the system starts with 190 AUs and 240 Ius
That leaves 70AUs and 120 IUs above subsistence to generate PUs - There is a severe shortage - a structural situation that increases the likelihood of conflict - the system could "use 110 more AUs and 60 more IUs - Even with a more severe shortage of AUs, it is IUs that can be converted to MUs

At the start of the game and until state's cash in 50PUs or more to raise their endowments, there is the potential for 250 PUs - 60 from gains from trade and 190 (70AUs and 120IUs) -
Actual G B G A Hyp
For round 1 total PUs 180 115 250
Round 2 245 275 500
Round 3 300 319 750


And so on - You get the picture - This assumes everyone is nice - no MUs are converted and no wars and everyone shares fairly and evenly -- such is not life when the object is to get the most PUs

The graph below is of China - a state that rose to leadership and then fell - It graphs China's relative PUs - that is its percentage of total PUs - kind of fits the relative capability curve that is expected

 

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