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Pols 426 Lecture 1

R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics

Claim: International Relations is a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy --- realist but a bit different than Waltz

Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

States are assumed to act as if they are guided by cost benefit calculations

Definition of equilibrium -- an international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, and economic arrangements – such that not powerful state believes that a change in the system will yield additional benefits that are greater than the costs required to make the change

System equilibrium ->
diff growth in power -> redistribution of power
^
|
  
|
\/
Resolution of System crisis
(War)
 <-------- system disequilibrium

 

System disequilibirum --- economic, political, and technological developments help create differential rates of growth on these dimensions for states – at some point this differential growth changes the cost/benefit calculations for one or more major powers concerning changing the structure of the system

What is at stake in changing the system – the existing structure (prestige, division of territory, international division of labor, and rules of behavior in the system) reflect the interests of the dominant power or powers

If the relative power in the system changes, then other powers may see it in their interest to change the system so that the above features more reflect their interests

The disjuncture between the existing structure and the interests of the new more powerful nation or nations, creates a crisis and requires resolution –

Gilpin claim based on historical experience – War is the mechanism for system crisis resolution.

State Objectives

  1. Territorial gain to advance, security, economic and other interests.
  2. Increase influence over the behavior of other states (threats, coercion, alliances, spheres of influence)
  3. To control and exercise influence over the world economy

International System - an aggregation of diverse entities (essentially states) united by regular interaction (diplomatic, economic, and military relations) according to some form of control (claims anarchic but high degree of order due to the distribution of power among states)

Dominant states organize and maintain the international system --Dist of power principal form of control.

Types of international Change

Systems change – change in the nature of the actors that compose the system – change in the state system

Systemic change –change in the form of control or governance of an international system – new leader, new hierarchy or form of control

Stability and Change

Repeated Assumptions

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
Imperfect information – uncertainty
Assessments of costs and benefits are subjective
Actions can lead to unanticipated consequences
What creates change
Technology – transportation, communication, information, production
Military Innovation
Social, political, economic organization of a society
Demographic change

Economic Factors -- means of production and changes in the means of production - factors which tend states in expand and to attempt the change the international system

  1. developments that increase economics of scale that effect the production of a collective or public good – public goods like protection of an enlarged area
  2. internalization of externalities – externalities are conferred on political actors for which payment or compensation is not made -- expansion to force parties to pay for positive externalities (free trade) or be responsible for negative externalities (pollution)
  3. expansion due to diminishing rate of returns -- fi factors of production (land, labor, capital) then growth rates decline – (Lenninism)

Gilpin’s take on the role (effects) of the international structure on state behavior -- like oligopolistic market – interdependent decision-making and sufficiently few competitors so that behavior of one effects others -- expand due to relative power concerns -- same set of alliance counterbalancing alliance notions as Waltz

Gilpin – System stability and political chance is less a function of the static distribution of power and more a function of uneven and differential growth in rates of power among states

Final claim -- whether or not change will take place is ultimately indeterminant

Pols 426 Lecture 2


R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics - Continued

Growth and Expansion

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

Territorial, political, and economic expansion of the state increases economic surplus and ability to control - rise and decline of dominant states and empires is a function of the generation and dissipation of economic surplus

The logistic (S-curve Thesis) first increasing then decreasing returns to scale

And the attendant "relative capability curve"

The modern pattern - cycles of hegemonic nation-states

a. The triumph of the nation-state
b. Modern economies - industrial, capital accumulation - solves temporarily diminishing returns to scale of territorial state
c. World market economy - efficiency, gains from trade - rise in importance of economic competitiveness

Expansion by territorial conquest and economic expansion

S-curve and relative capability curve dynamics create new equilibria - succession of hegemonic powers
Equilibrium and Decline

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

Running an empire or leading the world economy is costly - At some point the costs overtake the benefits of leading and establishing and at that point the leader goes into decline

Running the "empire" - costs - military, financing allies, costs with maintaining the world economy

The costs of maintaining the status quo increase faster than the capacity to finance the status quo

The classic struggle between consumption, protection and investment strain the leader -- consumption rises (the good life), protection costs rise, and investment is reduced - reducing long term competitiveness

Military, technological, economic, or organizational advantages "created" and employed by the leading state eventually are copied or imitiated by other states and the advantages are lost Followers free ride

All this gives rising states the advantage on the growth curve and relative capability curve - till a point where there is a disequilibrium

Hegemonic War and International Change

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

Hegemonic war the historic mechanism for systemic change

Others -
1. Internal rejuvenation and restructuring
2. preemptive war on rising challenger
3. Reducing costs by expanding further - defies logic of argument
4. reduction of foreign commitments - retrenchment

Pols 426 Lecture 3
Gilpin and War and Trade Simulation Discussion

Recall Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. – by hegemonic war

 

OK --- Lets do a translation to the Game of War and Trade Simulation

Power -- MUs and endowments – high endowments allow one to make more MUs and to reach high prosperity levels so spending capital (economic growth allows for increasing power)

Status – PUs -- the reflection of status achieved from power and economic growth – via trades, endowments and economic growth

States with high PUs are benefiting from the system and are the ascribed leaders of the game – they become the targets -- States with high levels of PUs and low MUs want things to stay as is

States with high levels of MUs and low PUs seek to change the game

The system is in equilibrium when leading states and leading challengers and/or most states have equal ascribed and achieved status – that is there is a balance between their PUs and MUs. –

The system is in disequilibrium when there is not a balance in PUs and MUs for leading and challenging states

If there is a balance in the PU/MU ratio for leading and challenging states then marginal costs to change the system (war) will exceed marginal benefits

When there is a significant enough imbalance in the PU/MU ratio, then perceived marginal costs will be less than perceived benefits -- and war is likely.

Leading states – those with large PUs are targets if their PU/MU ratio gets too large -- Gilpin claims that leading states have a difficult time running the system and that there is a drain on their resources so that challengers have an advantage catching up -- In thegame, it is hard to increase both MUs and PUs at the same time. PUs can accumulate but MUs do not increase as fast and as the leader becomes a target, challengers increase the costs by fighting attrition wars that wear down MUs increasing the ratio – till things finally tip

Evidence from the simulation -- Group B

Group B played nine (9) rounds – There were wars in 7 of the rounds -- rounds 2-8. Below is an analysis of those conflicts –following that is some data about alliances and trading relations

Round 2 War Pak,Rus,Ch vs. US, UK

Targets US PU 40 MU 5 8/1 ratio
  UK 25 10 2.5/1
Key attacker Pak 15 20 1.5/2
War gains Pak 30 Ch 29

At end PUs Ch 79, Pak 65, Rus 55, US 20, UK 12 big winner Ch, big loser US

Round 3

same coalitions -- no winners war losses 34 – key in all this is that India stays out of war and gains -- 2nd place PUs and 1st place MUs -- nice balance -- new targets China 64PU 34 MUs and Russia 80 PU and 44 MUs

Round 4:War – UK,US,Ind vs Rus, Pak, Ch

Ind 65 PU 55 Mu Rus 80 PU 44 MU
UK 22 37 CH 64 34
US 30 52 Pak 5 24

 

The have nots UK, US vs the haves Russia and China -- no winners -- India aligns to protect the US and UK and itself and to block and hurt the leaders

War losses 72

Round 5 UK,US,Ind vs. Rus, Pak, Ch
Ind 40 PU 58 MU Ch 104 PU 42 MU 2/1
US 0 70 Pak 55 22 2/1
UK 52 55 Rus 0 52  

No winners – war of attrition – war losses 90 all groups lose 14 – again the have nots with power vs the haves who have imbalances with dangerous ratios

This war does not make sense -- Russia in the wrong place

Round 6 --- The big shuffle - India wants out of war and accomplishes that . US and UK correctly decide to gang up on Pak -- plump target -- everyone trys to disentangle China and Russia but forget about a defensive alliance so its again a war with almost everyone – only India stays out

US, UK vs. Pak, Ch, Rus

US 25 PU 90 MU Pak 90 PU 22MU 3/1
UK 22 60 Rus 40 57  
CH  139  52  2.5/1

 

War losses at 62

Round 7 Singling our the leader

US,UK,RUS, IND vs. China, Pak

US 10 PU 99 MU CH 189 PU 52 MU 3/1
UK 10 56 Pak 25 32  
Rus 20 77        
Ind 110 63 2/1      

 

305 MUs vs 84 MUs almost victory war losses 64 --- India the free rider

Round 8 One more time to knock off the leader

US,UK,RUS, IND vs. China, Pak

US 70 PU 106 MU CH 224 PU 36 MU 5/1
UK 50 58 Pak 65 31 2/1
Rus 53 94        
Ind 160 45 4/1      

Coalition wins -- sack China and Pak War gains 92 war losses 143 – China converted 100 PUs to raise endowment keeping 50 PUS out of the hands of its rivals

Round nine – endgame no war -- but at the end of round nine here is the data --

  PUs MUs Ratio
China 107 55 2/1
UK 193 39 4/1
US 218 97 2/1
Pak 63 80 1/1
Ind 253 46 5/1
Rus 183 110 2/1

 

Prediction -- diequilibrium --- war – India the target

US,Rus, Pak at least vs Ind – can they get help? UK should because they are the next target

Some interesting patterns in trading, alliances, wars, and system structure

Round 1 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Rus, Pak 3 0
UK Ind , US 5 0
US Ind, UK 4 0
Pak Ch, 4 0
Ind US,UK 3 0
Rus Ch 3 0
Total --- 22  

 

Round 2 – Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak, Rus 4 Pak, Rus
UK US, Ind 5 0
US Ind, UK 4 0
Pak Ch 4 Ch, Rus
Ind US, UK 3 0
Rus Ch 3 Ch, Pak
Total   22  

 

Round 3 – Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak , Rus 2 Pak, Rus
UK US, Ind 2 US
US UK, Ind 2 UK
Pak Ch, Rus 2 Ch, Rus
Ind US, UK 3 0
Rus Ch, Pak 3 Ch, Pak
Total   14  

Round 4 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak , Rus 2 Pak, Rus
UK US, Ind 2 US, Ind
US UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Pak Ch, Rus 2 Ch, Rus
Ind US, UK 2 UK, US
Rus Ch, Pak 2 Ch, Pak
Total   12  
Round 5 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak , Rus 2 Pak, Rus
UK US, Ind 2 US, Ind
US UK, Ind 2 UK, Ind
Pak Ch, Rus 3 Ch, Rus
Ind US, UK 3 UK, US
Rus Ch, Pak 2 Ch, Pak
Total   14  
Round 6 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak, Rus 3 Pak, Rus
UK US, Ind 3 US
US UK, Ind 3 UK
Pak Ch 2 CH, Rus
Ind US, UK 4 0
Rus Ch 3 Ch, Pak
Total   18  

Round 7 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak 1 Pak
UK US 2 US,Rus,Ind
US UK, Ind 3 Uk,Rus,Ind
Pak CH 3 CH
Ind US 2 UK,US,Rus
Rus - 1 UK,US,Ind
Total   12  

Round 8 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak 1 0
UK US 2 US,Rus,Ind,
US UK, Ind 2 Uk,Rus,Ind
Pak CH 2 0
Ind US 2 UK,US,Rus
Rus - 1 UK,US,Ind
Total   10  

Round 9 Group B      
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China Pak 1 0
UK US 2 0
US UK, Ind 2 0
Pak CH 3 Ind
Ind US 3 Pak
Rus - 1 0
Total   12  

Group A – Data and Analysis

Group A played nine (9) rounds – There were wars in 6 of the rounds -- rounds 3-4, 6-9. Below is an analysis of those conflicts –following that is some data about alliances and trading relations

Round 3

China, Rus vs. Pak

China 45 PUs 40 MU 1/1 Pak 40 PU 15 MU 2.5/1
Rus 30 40 1/1        

Other targets UK PU/MU ratio 2/1, US >2/1,

Ind >3/1

Pak the only target that can be "had" and defeated – not a big war – just a raid

War gains – 26 war losses for winners 20

Round 4

Ch, Rus, US vs. Pak

  PUs MUs     PUs MUs  
Ch 98 40 2/1 Pak 20 13 2/1
Rus 71 50 1.5/1        
US 105 45 2/1        

The haves against the weakest --- but note that India escapes Ind – 59, 25 >2/1 margin -- could have been had

UK the only state in the system with more MUS than PUs

War gains 46 war losses for the winners 14

Round 6 Rus, UK, Ind vs. US

Rus 73 84 <1/1 US 122 84 1.5/1
UK 65 95 1/1.5        
Ind 37 65 ½        

 

Other targets – China 130 59 >2/1 and Pak 34 10 >3/1

**not clear with the US was attacked rather than China – China had fewer MUS and more PUs – an easier target – less war losses and more PUs to gain

No war gains – war losses US 61 attackers 20 each

Note if China were attacked by the same group China would have been defeated and the attackers would have had smaller losses and would have split 110 PUS three ways rather than nothing

Round 7

Ind, UK, Pak vs. US, CH

Ind 71 75 1/1 CH 155 89 2/1
UK 85 105 1/1 US 167 38 4/1
Pak 9 10 1/1        

 

Have nots vs the haves

Note Russia was supposed to be part of the attacking group but had a defensive alliance with CH – Russia with 103 94 would have helped and with 1/1 ratio has right profile to attack – no war gains losses 45 for attackers and 46 for defenders

Round 8

Rus, UK, Ind, Pak vs. CH, US

Rus 93 114 1/1 CH 180 96 2/1
UK 115 110 1/1 US 47 45 (dumped
Ind 111 90 1/1       150 PUs)
Pak 29 5          

 

Going after the leaders -- Russia made itself less of an attractive target by dumping 50 PUs in prior round would have been 143 114

No winners – war losses of 25 each for attackers and 40 each for defenders

Round 9

Rus, UK, Ind, Pak vs. CH

Rus 138 114 1/1 Ch 205 76 3/1
UK 155 95 1.5/1        
Ind 141 85 1.5/1        
Pak 79 15 5/1 - --easy pickings    

 

China loses -- dumps PUs - ends up with zero PUs

Winners each get only 12 PUs -- endgame effects at war cost of 19 Mus to each attacker

What happens next -- quite interesting situation probably created by US and China endgame effects of dumping PUs

Ind 223 66 4/1

Rus 220 95 3/1

UK 217 71 3/1

Pak 119 0 --- You are dead
US 187 5 --- Dead again
China 5 0  

 

Note US and China and Pak would have converted to MUs if they knew the game was being played longer but there is really a haves and total have not with no power world -- The prediction -- UK and Rus would hook up with others to get the most vulnerable leader – India

Round 1
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China UK, US 4 -
UK Ch, Ind 3 -
US Rus, Ch 3 -
Pak - 3 -
Ind UK, Rus 4 -
Rus Ind 3 -
Total   20 -

 

Round 2
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus 2 -
UK - 3 -
US Ch 4 -
Pak Ind 3 -
Ind Rus, Pak 3 -
Rus Ind 3 -
Total   18  
Round 3
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus, UK 3 Rus
UK Ind, Ch 4  
US CH, Rus 4  
Pak Ind 3  
Ind Rus, UK, Pak 4  
Rus Ind 4 Ch
Total   22  
Round 4
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus 2 Rus, US
UK - 3  
US Ch 3 CH, Rus
Pak Ind 3  
Ind Rus, Pak 3  
Rus Ind 4 CH, US
Total   18  

Round 5
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus, Uk 3  
UK Ind, Ch 2  
US Rus, CH 2  
Pak Ind 1  
Ind Rus, UK, Pak 3 Rus
Rus Ind 3 Ind
Total   14  
Round 6
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, Rus, UK 3  
UK Ind, CH 2 Rus, Ind
US Rus, CH 2  
Pak - 0  
Ind UK, Rus 2 UK, Rus
Rus Ind 3 UK, Ind
Total   12  

Round 7
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US, UK 2 US
UK CH, Ind 4 Ind, Pak
US CH 3 CH
Pak Ind 4 UK, Ind
Ind Rus, Pak, UK 3 Uk, Pak
Rus Ind 3  
Total   18  
Round 8
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US 1 US
UK Ind 4 Rus, Ind, Pak
US CH 3 CH
Pak Ind 4 UK, Ind, Rus
Ind Rus, Pak, UK 3 UK, Pak, Rus
Rus Ind 3 UK, Ind, Pak
Total   18  

Round 9
Group A
     
Nation Key trade partners # of trade partners War allies
China US 1  
UK Ind 4 Ind, Pak, Rus
US Ch 4  
Pak Ind 4 UK, Ind, Rus
Ind Rus, Pak, UK 3 UK, Pak, Rus
Rus Ind 4 UK, Pak, Ind
Total   20  

 

A little hypothetical argument --- There are 6 nations and each needs 20AUs and 20IUs for subsistence which comes up to 120 of each per round -- Now it is possible then for each to have 30 AUs and 30 Ius generate prosperity – or for all six nations that 180 of each for a total of 360 PUs --- in addition all states can gain 10PUs for gains from trade for a total of a potential of 420 PUs -- the hypothetical maximum before any state reaches 200 PUs

Now the system starts with 190 AUs and 240 Ius

That leaves on 70AUs and 120 IUs above subsistence to generate PUs – There is a severe shortage – a structural situation that increases the likelihood of conflict – the system could "use 110 more AUs and 60 more IUs – Even with a more severe shortage of AUs, it is IUs that can be converted to MUs

At the start of the game and until state’s cash in 50PUs or more to raise their endowments, there is the potential for 250 PUs – 60 from gains from trade and 190 (70AUs and 120IUs) –

  Actual G B G A Hyp
For round 1 total PUs   150 140 250
Round 2   271 280 500
Round 3   246 373 750

And so on – You get the picture – This assumes everyone is nice – no MUs are converted and no wars and everyone shares fairly and evenly -- such is not life when the object is to get the most PUs

The graph below is of China – a state that rose to leadership and then fell – It graphs China’s relative PUs – that is its percentage of total PUs – kind of fits the relative capability curve that is expected

 

Raw data --- for War and Trade Simulations

Group B

Nation Round 1 PUs MUs
China 20 20
U.K. 25 10
U.S. 40 5
Pak 15 20
India 30 10
Russia 20 20
Total 150 85

 

Nation Round 2 PUs MUs
China 79 30
U.K. 12 15
U.S. 20 20
Pak 65 20
India 40 40
Russia 55 35
Total 271 160

Nation Round 3 PUs MUs
China 64 34
U.K. 22 37
U.S. 30 52
Pak 5 24
India 65 55
Russia 80 44
Total 246 246

Nation Round 4 PUs MUs
China 104 42
U.K. 52 55
U.S. 0 70
Pak 55 22
India 40 58
Russia 0 52
Total 251 299
Nation Round 5 PUs MUs
China 139 52
U.K. 22 60
U.S. 25 90
Pak 90 22
India 70 63
Russia 40 57
Total 386 344
Nation Round 6 PUs MUs
China 189 52
U.K. 10 56
U.S. 10 99
Pak 25 32
India 110 63
Russia 20 77
Total 414 379
Nation Round 7 PUs MUs
China 224 36
U.K. 50 58
U.S. 70 106
Pak 65 31
India 160 45
Russia 55 94
Total 624 370
Nation Round 8 PUs MUs
China 62 25
U.K. 133 39
U.S. 148 97
Pak 33 35
India 213 46
Russia 113 110
Total 702 352

Nation Round 9 PUs MUs
China 107 (5) 55
U.K. 193 (3) 39
U.S. 218 (2) 97
Pak 63 (6) 80
India 253 (1) 46
Russia 183 (4) 110
Total 1017 427

Group A raw data

Nation Round 1 PUs MUs
China 20 15
U.K. 20 10
U.S. 25 15
Pak 30 0
India 35 5
Russia 10 25
Total 140 70

Nation Round 2 PUs MUs
China 45 40
U.K. 40 25
U.S. 65 30
Pak 40 15
India 60 20
Russia 30 40
Total 280 170
Nation Round 3 PUs MUs
China 98 40
U.K. 20 35
U.S. 105 45
Pak 20 13
India 59 25
Russia 71 50
Total 373 208
Nation Round 4 PUs MUs
China 85 49
U.K. 45 65
U.S. 92 54
Pak 10 10
India 41 45
Russia 53 54
Total 336 277
Nation Round 5 PUs MUs
China 130 59
U.K. 65 95
U.S. 122 84
Pak 34 10
India 31 65
Russia 73 84
Total 455 397
Nation Round 6 PUs MUs
China 155 89
U.K. 85 105
U.S. 107 38
Pak 9 10
India 71 75
Russia 103 94
Total 590 411
Nation Round 7 PUs MUs
China 180 96
U.K. 115 110
U.S. 47 45
Pak 29 5
India 111 90
Russia 93 114
Total 575 460
Nation Round 8 PUs MUs
China 205 76
U.K. 155 95
U.S. 117 5
Pak 79 15
India 141 85
Russia 138 114
Total 835 390

Nation Round 9 PUs MUs
China 5 (6) 0
U.K. 217 (3) 76
U.S. 187 (4) 5
Pak 131 (5) 0
India 223 (1) 66
Russia 220 (2) 95
Total 983 242

 

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