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Pols 426 Lecture 2

R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics

Claim: International Relations is a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy --- realist but a bit different than Waltz

Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

States are assumed to act as if they are guided by cost benefit calculations

Definition of equilibrium -- an international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, and economic arrangements – such that not powerful state believes that a change in the system will yield additional benefits that are greater than the costs required to make the change

System equilibrium ->
diff growth in power -> redistribution of power
^
|
 
|
\/
Resolution of System crisis
(War)
 <-------- system disequilibrium

 

System disequilibirum --- economic, political, and technological developments help create differential rates of growth on these dimensions for states – at some point this differential growth changes the cost/benefit calculations for one or more major powers concerning changing the structure of the system

What is at stake in changing the system – the existing structure (prestige, division of territory, international division of labor, and rules of behavior in the system) reflect the interests of the dominant power or powers

If the relative power in the system changes, then other powers may see it in their interest to change the system so that the above features more reflect their interests

The disjuncture between the existing structure and the interests of the new more powerful nation or nations, creates a crisis and requires resolution –

Gilpin claim based on historical experience – War is the mechanism for system crisis resolution.

State Objectives

  1. Territorial gain to advance, security, economic and other interests.
  2. Increase influence over the behavior of other states (threats, coercion, alliances, spheres of influence)
  3. To control and exercise influence over the world economy

International System - an aggregation of diverse entities (essentially states) united by regular interaction (diplomatic, economic, and military relations) according to some form of control (claims anarchic but high degree of order due to the distribution of power among states)

Dominant states organize and maintain the international system --Dist of power principal form of control.

Types of international Change

Systems change – change in the nature of the actors that compose the system – change in the state system

Systemic change –change in the form of control or governance of an international system – new leader, new hierarchy or form of control

Stability and Change

Repeated Assumptions

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
Imperfect information – uncertainty
Assessments of costs and benefits are subjective
Actions can lead to unanticipated consequences
What creates change
Technology – transportation, communication, information, production
Military Innovation
Social, political, economic organization of a society
Demographic change

Economic Factors -- means of production and changes in the means of production - factors which tend states in expand and to attempt the change the international system

  1. developments that increase economics of scale that effect the production of a collective or public good – public goods like protection of an enlarged area
  2. internalization of externalities – externalities are conferred on political actors for which payment or compensation is not made -- expansion to force parties to pay for positive externalities (free trade) or be responsible for negative externalities (pollution)
  3. expansion due to diminishing rate of returns -- fi factors of production (land, labor, capital) then growth rates decline – (Lenninism)

Gilpin’s take on the role (effects) of the international structure on state behavior -- like oligopolistic market – interdependent decision-making and sufficiently few competitors so that behavior of one effects others -- expand due to relative power concerns -- same set of alliance counterbalancing alliance notions as Waltz

Gilpin – System stability and political chance is less a function of the static distribution of power and more a function of uneven and differential growth in rates of power among states

Final claim -- whether or not change will take place is ultimately indeterminant


 


R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics

Growth and Expansion

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

Territorial, political, and economic expansion of the state increases economic surplus and ability to control - rise and decline of dominant states and empires is a function of the generation and dissipation of economic surplus

The logistic (S-curve Thesis) first increasing then decreasing returns to scale

And the attendant "relative capability curve"

The modern pattern - cycles of hegemonic nation-states

a. The triumph of the nation-state
b. Modern economies - industrial, capital accumulation - solves temporarily diminishing returns to scale of territorial state
c. World market economy - efficiency, gains from trade - rise in importance of economic competitiveness

Expansion by territorial conquest and economic expansion

S-curve and relative capability curve dynamics create new equilibria - succession of hegemonic powers
Equilibrium and Decline

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

Running an empire or leading the world economy is costly - At some point the costs overtake the benefits of leading and establishing and at that point the leader goes into decline

Running the "empire" - costs - military, financing allies, costs with maintaining the world economy

The costs of maintaining the status quo increase faster than the capacity to finance the status quo

The classic struggle between consumption, protection and investment strain the leader -- consumption rises (the good life), protection costs rise, and investment is reduced - reducing long term competitiveness

Military, technological, economic, or organizational advantages "created" and employed by the leading state eventually are copied or imitiated by other states and the advantages are lost Followers free ride

All this gives rising states the advantage on the growth curve and relative capability curve - till a point where there is a disequilibrium

Hegemonic War and International Change

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

Hegemonic war the historic mechanism for systemic change

Others -
1. Internal rejuvenation and restructuring
2. preemptive war on rising challenger
3. Reducing costs by expanding further - defies logic of argument
4. reduction of foreign commitments - retrenchment


Pols 426 Lecture 3

Waltz, Gilpin and the War and Trade Simulation

Features
Waltz (Realism) War and Trade World Real IR
Anarchic Environment/Self help Yes Usually or at least often
Undifferentiated actors/ Only resource power Yes No
Non-hierarchical Mostly No
Goal - ensure survival/ Maximize Power/universal Domination Yes sometimes
Essential system feature - Distribution of power Yes important
Behavior
Trust Yes and No Yes and No
Alliance-balancing Yes Sometimes
Bandwagoning Yes sometimes
System constrain actor Behavior and disposes of Those who fail to act in Appropriate ways Yes usually/sometimes
Structure selects and rewards Behavior and punishes others Yes usually

 

 

1) undifferentiated agents ? - Were there skill differences among the groups? how well did each group play, socialization and leaning - do you think people would play differently if they played again? How important was negotiation? Did it matter who talked with whom? Was there any evidence of altruism or did all act clearly in their self-interest? Did emotion matter?
2) balance of power - Yes - alliances mattered
3) some "mistakes" - fail to align soon enough, fail to break alliances soon enough, fail to align with states that have injured the state in the past, fail to make appropriate or smart moves -
4) evidence of balancing and/or bandwagoning

 

 

Gilpin and War and Trade Simulation Discussion
Recall Gilpin's Five Assumptions about how International Relations works
1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. - by hegemonic war

OK --- Lets do a translation to the Game of War and Trade Simulation
Power -- MUs and endowments - high endowments allow one to make more MUs and to reach high prosperity levels so spending capital (economic growth allows for increasing power)
Status - PUs -- the reflection of status achieved from power and economic growth - via trades, endowments and economic growth
States with high PUs are benefiting from the system and are the ascribed leaders of the game - they become the targets -- States with high levels of PUs and low MUs want things to stay as is
States with high levels of MUs and low PUs seek to change the game
The system is in equilibrium when leading states and leading challengers and/or most states have equal ascribed and achieved status - that is there is a balance between their PUs and MUs. -
The system is in disequilibrium when there is not a balance in PUs and MUs for leading and challenging states
If there is a balance in the PU/MU ratio for leading and challenging states then marginal costs to change the system (war) will exceed marginal benefits
When there is a significant enough imbalance in the PU/MU ratio, then perceived marginal costs will be less than perceived benefits -- and war is likely.
Leading states - those with large PUs are targets if their PU/MU ratio gets too large -- Gilpin claims that leading states have a difficult time running the system and that there is a drain on their resources so that challengers have an advantage catching up -- In the game, it is hard to increase both MUs and PUs at the same time. PUs can accumulate but MUs do not increase as fast and as the leader becomes a target, challengers increase the costs by fighting attrition wars that wear down MUs increasing the ratio - till things finally tip

Clear interaction between war and trade - war coalitions and trade coalitions overlap dramatically

A little hypothetical argument --- There are 6 nations and each needs 20AUs and 20IUs for subsistence which comes up to 120 of each per round -- Now it is possible then for each to have 30 AUs and 30 Ius to generate prosperity - for all six nations that generates 180 of each for a total of 360 PUs --- in addition all states can gain 10PUs for gains from trade for a total of a potential of 420 PUs -- the hypothetical maximum before any state reaches 200 PUs
Now the system starts with 190 AUs and 240 Ius
That leaves 70AUs and 120 IUs above subsistence to generate PUs - There is a severe shortage - a structural situation that increases the likelihood of conflict - the system could "use 110 more AUs and 60 more IUs - Even with a more severe shortage of AUs, it is IUs that can be converted to MUs
At the start of the game and until state's cash in 50PUs or more to raise their endowments, there is the potential for 250 PUs - 60 from gains from trade and 190 (70AUs and 120IUs) -
states and the system did not come close to this maximization.
You get the picture - This assumes everyone is nice - no MUs are converted and no wars and everyone shares fairly and evenly -- such is not life when the object is to get the most Pus

 

Group A - Analysis

Winner UK

War - Yes in 6of 10 rounds -- 4,5,6,8,9,10
With two decisive wars
India lost round 5 and Russia lost in round 6 -- these were what I would call predatory wars - States that did not adequately protect themselves -- not wars among leaders and challengers

But both India and Russia were targets in that they had high PU/MU ratios -- each more than 2/1

In Round four it was US,UK,CH, vs Ind, Rus - the war was not decisive

In round five it was the same coalition vs Ind - Russia bails out. India is not that big a prize as both Ind and Rus used Pus to raise endowments

Leaders US and UK are looking for easy pickings notice that it is the US that is really the unbalances nation with a more than 3/1 PU/MU ratio

Round 6 the same coalition goes after Russia - The UK makes itself less of a target by raising endowments - interestingly in this round the real target is Pak with more than a 2/1 ratio

Round 7 no war but the UK becomes a target 136/59 PU/MU ratio -- What is interesting is that noone goes after them. The US in coordination with Ch, and Ind or Rus could have done in UK. Why not? US had just gone to war with UK and still had an alliance -- too nice or alliances are more "sticky" than Waltz gives them credit for

Round 8 THE BIG CHANGE

The two leaders (US and UK) part company - And the world goes totally bipolar - Two hard alliances
US, CH, Pak and UK, RUS, Ind - note that trading also becomes totally bipolar- - there are only 12 bilateral trading partners - all 6 nations only trade with two partners and they are strictly within their military alliance -
The UK goes for protection with former losers -- RUS and Ind - these two states both have more Mus than PUS . They are have nots with power but not status - why did they align with the UK - the biggest target - UK still unbalanced with >2/1 ratio - US more balanced while Pak remains a target with >2/1 ratio

Rounds 8,9, and 10

Big war losses but alliances stay together and are balanced in terms of military strength and prosperity

Round 8 US-led coalition MU 294 PU 517
UK-led coalition MU 259 PU 317

Round 9 US-led coalition MU 285 PU 402
UK-led coalition MU 268 PU 363

 

Round 10 US-led coalition MU 298 PU 512
UK-led coalition MU 301 PU 503

China, India, Russia, and Pakistan realize that they cannot win but they do not all bandwagon and ride with either the US or the UK and wipe out one of the two big challengers. Instead they balance. This allows the UK to stay a bit ahead of the US and win.

China and India just become military machines for their prospective alliances and Russia and Pakistan add military capability to the alliances as well as some prosperity.

Why balancing and not bandwagoning

My take - fear of being picked off later - lesson learned from predatory wars in rounds 4,5, and 6 -- If they participate in taking out the US or the UK, then they are next

Note there are real imbalances in the PU/MU rations within coalitions but not across coalitions - Things are more sticky and history matters more than either Waltz and especially Gilpin take into account

MUS and Pus essentially split 50/50
Here is the mix as of the end of round 10


% MU %PU %MU %PU
UK .11 .34 US .18 .33
IN .25 .01 CH .30 .00
RUS .13 .17 PAK .02 .14
.50 .52 .50 .47


Group B - Analysis

Winner US

War - Yes in 8 of 12 rounds -- 2,3,6,8,9,10,11,12
With three decisive wars
China lost round 8 and round 9 and India and Russia lost in round 11 -- The wars on China these were what I would call predatory wars - States that did not adequately protect themselves -- not wars among leaders and challengers

But both India and Russia were targets in that they had high PU/MU ratios -- each much much more than 2/1

In Round two it was Ch, Rus, IND vs Pak, US, UK- the war was not decisive but the UK and Pak were easy targets with almost no MUs - only alignment with the US saved them

In round five it was the same coalition vs Ind - Russia bails out. India is not that big a prize as both Ind and Rus used Pus to raise endowments

Leaders US and UK are looking for easy pickings notice that it is the US that is really the unbalances nation with a more than 3/1 PU/MU ratio

In Round 3 there was a reprise of the round 2 war again with inconclusive results - again the US saved both UK and Pak

Round 6 the same coalitions go after each other after a two round pause. No clear why - the two coalitions are of relatively equal strength 252 MU vs 219 MU -- Most states are not too unbalanced except India 135/58

Round 7 no war but the UK becomes a target 136/59 PU/MU ratio -- What is interesting is that noone goes after them. The US in coordination with Ch, and Ind or Rus could have done in UK. Why not? US had just gone to war with UK and still had an alliance -- too nice or alliances are more "sticky" than Waltz gives them credit for

Round 8 THE BIG CHANGE as in Group A as well

Unlike in Group A where the two leaders (US and UK) parted company and the world went totally bipolar, here the CH, INd, RUS alliance fell apart and Ch and RUS joined the other coalition and wiped out China. This is an interested case as after round 7 all three members of the CH, IN, and Rus coalition were all quite unbalanced and thus ripe for attack PU/MU ratios all greater than 2/1 but interestingly China the least desirable prey of the three - most was India - China loses and the victors obtain war gains

Round 9 is a continuation of the war to destroy China by all others - China is wiped out again but war gains total only 65 and war losses total 105 for the five victors.

In the process of the grand coalition wiping out China in Rounds 8 and 9, several things happen - First of course China is now out as a contender to win, Second, Pakistan wisely limits its PU total so as to not look like a target, and Three and most importantly all four remaining contenders US, UK, IN, and Rus suffer significant war losses and obtain substantial war gains and Pus gains so all are quite unbalanced - US and UK approx 2/1 but Ind and Rus periously at more than 5/1

Rounds 10 - In surprise a coalition of US, UK, and Pak go after Ind and Rus -- China stays out - Losses cut deeply into the weak IND and RUS

Round 11 - China joins in and India and Russia are defeated - with the winners enjoying substantial wars gains - 87Pus each

The war coalition containing the two leaders (US and UK) that wipes out India and Russia does several things
1) it wipes out India and Russia
2) creates two uncontested leaders US and UK but with the US in a commanding position so that it cannot be caught for a while
3) creates a world that is quite out of balance - the leaders US, UK have PU/MU ratios of more than 4/1, China even worse - but there is so little military capability in the system Total MUS after round 12 are 349 -- So even if all other states ganged up on either the US or the UK, either state could survive for a one round and probably two but not more

The lesson is that unlike group A, this system is quite unstable -- Group A - states balance

Here in group B - states in effect bandwagon and wipe out first China, and then India and Russia

Here the lesson of getting picked off are not learned - but perhaps more importantly in this group US and UK stick together whereas they break in Group A and create balanced coalitions around them

Group A AU IU TOT GRT PUS Net MUS War Gains War losses PU/End Cum PU Cum MU War PU/MU ratio bal Trading Part War alliance
Round 1 70 35 105 55 160 85 0 0 0 160 85 No NA 20 all defensive
Round 2 70 32 102 55 67 98 0 0 50 227 183 no no 14 all defensive
Round 3 75 25 100 60 100 100 0 0 150 327 283 no yes 14 all defensive
Round 4 87 61 148 60 -42 -7 0 89 200 285 276 Yes yes 18 US,UK,CH vs IN, RU
Round 5 120 9 129 60 41 66 30 85 150 326 342 Yes No 18 US,UK,CH vs IN
Round 6 125 10 135 60 205 45 33 110 0 531 387 Yes yes 16 Us,UK,CH vs RU
Round 7 130 14 144 60 114 166 0 0 100 645 553 no no 17 all defensive
Round 8 140 0 140 60 282 0 0 192 0 835 553 Yes no 12 US,CH,Pk vs IN,RU,UK
Round 9 115 0 115 60 -20 -39 0 244 250 815 519 yes no 12 US,CH,Pk vs IN,RU,UK
Round 10 150 80 230 60 140 70 0 250 150 955 589 Yes no 12 US,CH,Pk vs IN,RU,UK
1082 266 1348 590 1047 584 63 970 1050 153

Group A Tot MU ToT Pus Ch MU CH Pu Uk MU UK PU US MU US PU Pk MU PK PU IN MU IN PU RU MU RU PU
Round 1 85 160 18 20 7 50 30 25 5 15 15 30 10 20
Round 2 183 227 43 40 22 20 53 60 10 27 30 55 25 55
Round 3 283 327 68 10 47 50 68 100 15 7 45 30 40 80
Round 4 276 285 70 0 32 100 70 85 28 35 43 10 33 55
Round 5 342 326 83 50 48 90 88 115 35 21 35 5 53 35
Round 6 387 531 99 111 59 136 91 166 38 71 60 40 40 17
Round 7 553 645 126 101 89 171 123 196 45 115 100 5 70 57
Round 8 553 835 134 136 87 201 115 236 36 145 113 20 68 97
Round 9 519 815 150 71 93 236 131 226 17 155 134 0 74 127
Round 10 589 955 175 6 68 326 106 316 12 130 149 10 79 167

Group B AU IU TOT GRT PUS Net MUS War Gains War losses PU/End Cum PU Cum MU War PU/MU ratio bal Trading Part War alliance War Loser?
Round 1 80 32 112 50 162 78 0 0 0 162 78 No NA 23 all defensive
Round 2 70 40 110 60 20 50 0 30 150 182 128 yes yes 24 Ch,RU,IN vs US,UK,PK no
Round 3 90 15 105 60 165 77 0 42 0 347 205 yes yes 16 Ch,RU,IN vs US,UK,PK no
Round 4 80 10 90 60 160 125 0 0 50 507 330 no No 14 all defensive
Round 5 90 0 90 60 40 140 0 0 50 547 470 no No 16 all defensive
Round 6 90 0 90 60 150 160 0 126 0 697 490 Yes yes 14 Ch,RU,IN vs US,UK,PK no
Round 7 95 40 135 60 195 105 0 0 50 892 595 no yes 12 all defensive
Round 8 105 70 175 60 205 -152 100 248 50 1257 411 yes no 15 Us,UK,RU,PA, IN vsCH Ch
Round 9 100 50 150 60 160 -32 65 209 50 1070.5 439.5 yes no 16 Us,UK,RU,PA, IN vsCH CH
Round 10 102 55 157 60 137 -39 0 139 50 1394 372 Yes no 16 Us,UK,PA vs In Ru no
Round 11 110 45 155 60 56 -23 348 136 150 1470 349 yes no 12 US,UK,PA,CH vs In, RU IN, RU
Round 12 125 20 145 60 105 151 0 104 100 1575 500 yes no 16 US,PA vs IN,CH,RU,UK no
Total 1137 377 1514 710 513 1034 700 194

Group B Tot MU ToT Pus Ch MU CH Pu Uk MU UK PU US MU US PU Pk MU PK PU IN MU IN PU RU MU RU PU
Round 1 78 162 25 20 3 34 20 30 0 28 20 20 10 30
Round 2 128 182 40 45 10 16 23 20 5 1 30 45 20 55
Round 3 205 347 43 80 32 38 30 60 30 24 38 70 33 75
Round 4 330 507 58 110 62 62 60 80 60 35 43 110 48 100
Round 5 470 547 83 130 92 86 90 70 70 16 58 135 78 110
Round 6 490 697 87 150 101 110 99 110 79 32 52 160 72 135
Round 7 595 892 102 180 121 144 109 170 109 53 67 185 87 160
Round 8 443 1097 25 90 96 230 99 247 99 61 57 242 67 217
Round 9 411 1257 25 45 85 287 98 320 103 60 49 280 51 265
Round 10 372 1394 40 15 72 329 90 375 110 100 29 305 31 290
Round 11 349 1470 26 152 86 423 91 520 116 227 15 3 15 145
Round 12 500 1575 43 177 73 473 95 570 110 272 62 13 17 70

 

 

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