Book/Simulation1Book/Simulation2Book/Simulation3NewsgroupANewsgroupB
Reading AssignmentsWar and TradePaper AssignmentPeer Review ForumLecture Outlines
 
Lecture 1
Lecture 2
Lecture 3

Pols 426 Lecture 1

R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics

Claim: International Relations is a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy --- realist but a bit different than Waltz

Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

States are assumed to act as if they are guided by cost benefit calculations

Definition of equilibrium -- an international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, and economic arrangements – such that not powerful state believes that a change in the system will yield additional benefits that are greater than the costs required to make the change

System equilibrium ->
diff growth in power -> redistribution of power
^
|
  
|
\/
Resolution of System crisis
(War)
 <-------- system disequilibrium

 

System disequilibirum --- economic, political, and technological developments help create differential rates of growth on these dimensions for states – at some point this differential growth changes the cost/benefit calculations for one or more major powers concerning changing the structure of the system

What is at stake in changing the system – the existing structure (prestige, division of territory, international division of labor, and rules of behavior in the system) reflect the interests of the dominant power or powers

If the relative power in the system changes, then other powers may see it in their interest to change the system so that the above features more reflect their interests

The disjuncture between the existing structure and the interests of the new more powerful nation or nations, creates a crisis and requires resolution –

Gilpin claim based on historical experience – War is the mechanism for system crisis resolution.

State Objectives

  1. Territorial gain to advance, security, economic and other interests.
  2. Increase influence over the behavior of other states (threats, coercion, alliances, spheres of influence)
  3. To control and exercise influence over the world economy

International System - an aggregation of diverse entities (essentially states) united by regular interaction (diplomatic, economic, and military relations) according to some form of control (claims anarchic but high degree of order due to the distribution of power among states)

Dominant states organize and maintain the international system --Dist of power principal form of control.

Types of international Change

Systems change – change in the nature of the actors that compose the system – change in the state system

Systemic change –change in the form of control or governance of an international system – new leader, new hierarchy or form of control

Stability and Change

Repeated Assumptions

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
Imperfect information – uncertainty
Assessments of costs and benefits are subjective
Actions can lead to unanticipated consequences
What creates change
Technology – transportation, communication, information, production
Military Innovation
Social, political, economic organization of a society
Demographic change

Economic Factors -- means of production and changes in the means of production - factors which tend states in expand and to attempt the change the international system

  1. developments that increase economics of scale that effect the production of a collective or public good – public goods like protection of an enlarged area
  2. internalization of externalities – externalities are conferred on political actors for which payment or compensation is not made -- expansion to force parties to pay for positive externalities (free trade) or be responsible for negative externalities (pollution)
  3. expansion due to diminishing rate of returns -- fi factors of production (land, labor, capital) then growth rates decline – (Lenninism)

Gilpin’s take on the role (effects) of the international structure on state behavior -- like oligopolistic market – interdependent decision-making and sufficiently few competitors so that behavior of one effects others -- expand due to relative power concerns -- same set of alliance counterbalancing alliance notions as Waltz

Gilpin – System stability and political chance is less a function of the static distribution of power and more a function of uneven and differential growth in rates of power among states

Final claim -- whether or not change will take place is ultimately indeterminant

Pols 426 Lecture 2


R. Gilpin, War and Change In World Politics - Continued

Growth and Expansion

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

Territorial, political, and economic expansion of the state increases economic surplus and ability to control - rise and decline of dominant states and empires is a function of the generation and dissipation of economic surplus

The logistic (S-curve Thesis) first increasing then decreasing returns to scale

And the attendant "relative capability curve"

The modern pattern - cycles of hegemonic nation-states

a. The triumph of the nation-state
b. Modern economies - industrial, capital accumulation - solves temporarily diminishing returns to scale of territorial state
c. World market economy - efficiency, gains from trade - rise in importance of economic competitiveness

Expansion by territorial conquest and economic expansion

S-curve and relative capability curve dynamics create new equilibria - succession of hegemonic powers
Equilibrium and Decline

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency if for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

Running an empire or leading the world economy is costly - At some point the costs overtake the benefits of leading and establishing and at that point the leader goes into decline

Running the "empire" - costs - military, financing allies, costs with maintaining the world economy

The costs of maintaining the status quo increase faster than the capacity to finance the status quo

The classic struggle between consumption, protection and investment strain the leader -- consumption rises (the good life), protection costs rise, and investment is reduced - reducing long term competitiveness

Military, technological, economic, or organizational advantages "created" and employed by the leading state eventually are copied or imitiated by other states and the advantages are lost Followers free ride

All this gives rising states the advantage on the growth curve and relative capability curve - till a point where there is a disequilibrium

Hegemonic War and International Change

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.

Hegemonic war the historic mechanism for systemic change

Others -
1. Internal rejuvenation and restructuring
2. preemptive war on rising challenger
3. Reducing costs by expanding further - defies logic of argument
4. reduction of foreign commitments - retrenchment

Pols 426 Lecture 3
Gilpin and War and Trade Simulation Discussion

Recall Gilpin’s Five Assumptions about how International Relations works

  1. An international system is stable (in equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system
  2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., an expected net gain)
  3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
  4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
  5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. – by hegemonic war

 

OK --- Lets do a translation to the Game of War and Trade Simulation

Power -- MUs and endowments – high endowments allow one to make more MUs and to reach high prosperity levels so spending capital (economic growth allows for increasing power)

Status – PUs -- the reflection of status achieved from power and economic growth – via trades, endowments and economic growth

States with high PUs are benefiting from the system and are the ascribed leaders of the game – they become the targets -- States with high levels of PUs and low MUs want things to stay as is

States with high levels of MUs and low PUs seek to change the game

The system is in equilibrium when leading states and leading challengers and/or most states have equal ascribed and achieved status – that is there is a balance between their PUs and MUs. –

The system is in disequilibrium when there is not a balance in PUs and MUs for leading and challenging states

If there is a balance in the PU/MU ratio for leading and challenging states then marginal costs to change the system (war) will exceed marginal benefits

When there is a significant enough imbalance in the PU/MU ratio, then perceived marginal costs will be less than perceived benefits -- and war is likely.

Leading states – those with large PUs are targets if their PU/MU ratio gets too large -- Gilpin claims that leading states have a difficult time running the system and that there is a drain on their resources so that challengers have an advantage catching up -- In thegame, it is hard to increase both MUs and PUs at the same time. PUs can accumulate but MUs do not increase as fast and as the leader becomes a target, challengers increase the costs by fighting attrition wars that wear down MUs increasing the ratio – till things finally tip


Group A AU IU TOT GRT PUS Net MUS War Gains War losses PU/End Cum PU Cum MU War Poss PUS Net PU Loss Trading Part War alliance War Loser? PU leader?
Round 1 90 50 120 40 160 70 0 0 0 160 70 No 180 60 18
Round 2 70 25 95 55 151 62.5 77 78 0 311 132.5 Yes 180 85 22 IM,CH,RU vs US UK
Round 3 75 10 85 55 -60 57 0 0 200 251 189.5 Yes 220 135 16 CH,IN,RU,PA vs US UK US UK Yes
Round 4 90 0 90 50 130 82 0 0 0 381 271.5 Yes 220 130 14 CH,IN,RU vs US UK
Round 5 75 15 90 60 0 68 0 0 150 381 339.5 Yes 250 160 14 CH,IN,RU,PA vs US UK
Round 6 105 10 115 60 115 35 0 0 50 496 374.5 Yes 260 135 15 US,UK,RU,PA,IN vs CH Yes
Round 7 130 25 155 60 165 -39 0 0 50 661 335.5 Yes 270 115 18 US,UK,RU,PA,IN vs CH CH
Round 8 115 5 120 50 129 24 88 88 50 790 359.5 Yes 280 160 13
Round 9 120 90 210 60 280.5 80 0 0 0 1070.5 439.5 No 280 70 16 US,UK,RU,PA,CH vs IN IN Yes
Round 10 120 145 265 60 305.1 -118 182 182 0 1375.6 321.5 Yes 280 15 14
990 375 1345 550 1375.6 321.5 347 348 500 2420 1065 160

Group B AU IU TOT GRT PUS Net MUS War Gains War losses PU/End Cum PU Cum MU War Poss PUS Net PU Loss Trading Part War alliance War Loser? PU leader?
Round 1 70 20 90 15 105 100 0 0 0 105 100 No 180 90 14
Round 2 70 20 90 60 50 100 0 0 100 155 200 No 180 90 24
Round 3 85 25 110 50 153 48 42 40 0 308 248 Yes 200 90 16 IN,US,RU,UK vs Pak Pak No
Round 4 80 30 110 50 55 85 26 26 100 363 333 Yes 200 90 18 US,RU vs Pak Pak No
Round 5 90 0 90 50 90 58 0 0 50 453 389 Yes 220 130 17 IN,US,RU,US vs CH,UK No
Round 6 95 0 95 60 95 3 0 0 100 548 392 Yes 230 135 12 UK,PA,CH,In,RU vs US Yes
Round 7 120 0 120 55 64.5 32.5 66 66 0 612.5 424.5 Yes 250 130 15 IN,CH,UK vs RU RUS Yes
Round 8 130 35 165 50 155 -17.7 88 88 50 767.5 407 Yes 250 85 14 IN,CH,UK vs US No
Round 9 105 95 200 60 165 -35 163 163 50 932.5 372 Yes 260 60 17 IN,CH,UK vs PAK,RU Pak, RUS No
Round 10 115 175 290 50 400 -237 268 268 0 1332.5 135 Yes 270 -20 8 US,IN,CH vs UK UK, RU Yes --UK also In,UK. Vs RUS
960 400 1360 500 1332.5 136.8 653 651 450 2240 880 155

Clear interaction between war and trade - war coalitions and trade coalitions overlap dramatically

A little hypothetical argument --- There are 6 nations and each needs 20AUs and 20IUs for subsistence which comes up to 120 of each per round -- Now it is possible then for each to have 30 AUs and 30 Ius to generate prosperity - for all six nations that generates 180 of each for a total of 360 PUs --- in addition all states can gain 10PUs for gains from trade for a total of a potential of 420 PUs -- the hypothetical maximum before any state reaches 200 PUs

Now the system starts with 190 AUs and 240 Ius
That leaves 70AUs and 120 IUs above subsistence to generate PUs - There is a severe shortage - a structural situation that increases the likelihood of conflict - the system could "use 110 more AUs and 60 more IUs - Even with a more severe shortage of AUs, it is IUs that can be converted to MUs

At the start of the game and until state's cash in 50PUs or more to raise their endowments, there is the potential for 250 PUs - 60 from gains from trade and 190 (70AUs and 120IUs) -
As you see from the above analysis - the net PU loss column, states and the system did not come close to this maximization.

You get the picture - This assumes everyone is nice - no MUs are converted and no wars and everyone shares fairly and evenly -- such is not life when the object is to get the most PUs


 

Book/Simulation1Book/Simulation2Book/Simulation3NewsgroupANewsgroupB
Reading AssignmentsWar and TradePaper AssignmentPeer Review ForumLecture Outlines