POLS 321
 
 Reading Assignments  Lecture Outlines  Related Links
 
Course Introduction
1945-1950
Lecture Notes for Course Introduction
 
American Foreign Policy - Course Themes
 
1. Policy Making -- Problems and Solutions
2. Cold War - Post Cold War (same policy or different)
3. Post World War II Foreign Policy
a. Creating an Empire
b. Running an Empire
c. Now What?
 
U.S. Foreign Policymaking
U.S. policymakers confront or create Problems.
The construction of Solutions to Problems is Policymaking
Sometimes out of the search for specific solutions to specific problems and sometimes big doctrines emerge
Big Doctrines are those policies that are applied by different policymakers to many cases or problems.

Why an American Empire and what kind of empire?

The role of Client States
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I. Lecture Notes for The Historical Context of American Foreign Policy
 
A. Lecture Notes for Constructing America's World 1945-1950
 
Period when the U.S. figures out if and how to run an Empire and
what it takes to be a global leader
 
Three Main Areas of Policy

1. Economic -- Economic growth - free trade access to global markets and materials (Capitalism)

2. Political -- Order, Stability, Freedom to determine political regimes, collective security,
anti-communism, promoting Democracy
 
3. Security -- Order, Stability "Containment"
Problems Solutions
Poland – Governmental Selection None
Greece-Turkey –aggression/subversion Truman Doctrine – containment - military aid
West European Economic and Political Instability

Marshall Plan

Economic Aid
Berlin –1948 War scare - Containment NATO – Formal Military Alliance


1. Greece/Turkey and the Truman Doctrine
Administration chooses to make a big deal out of the Civil War in Greece
Containment and the role of World Policeman is born
Truman "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" 3/12/47
 
2. Marshall Plan
A pragmatic approach to addressing the problems of Western Europe
supply capital, tools, food to restore Europe
eonomic non-militaristic, non-ideological - humanitarian, common sense
 
August 1947 - European Recovery Plan -- $28 billion -- December 1947 to Congress 17 billion --
something for everyone --
Humanitarian
Economic - Foreign markets, avoid depression, very good for U.S. businesses
Pol/mil - stems pol and economic chaos and instability in W. Europe
Marshall Plan and incredible success -- poured 13 billion into Europe - about 90 billion in current dollars -- template for future - creating economic/pol stability and growth - applied with less success other places
 
3. NATO
 
last phase - the security part
Why did policymakers see military commitments to Europe as necessary
answers in part found in the famous scholarly article by "X" (George Kennan) -- led to belief in the necessity of military commitments
"the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet Policy"
essential misinterpretation -- from pol/economic - military
key to NATO - formalization of western alliance - entangling alliance - commitment to Europe - a formal presence and role in Europe - institutional commitment

High level U.S. foreign policy maker - (Lovett) -- departure from the past - "The U.S. had sought peace through weakness now it seeks peace through strength."
 
High Times for the Truman Adminstration.
 
A string of major foreign policy successes
A major come from behind victory 1948 Presidential Election
Success in May of 1949 in overcoming the Soviet effort to isolate and break Berlin - blockade given up
Communist revolution in Greece had failed - M. Plan working, Berlin was relieved, West allied against the Soviet threat -- "America, Winston Churchill proclaimed "has saved the world"
 
BUT
Three big problems on the horizon
 
1 Republicans bitter at election loss -- pursue a destructive but effective strategy against Truman and the democrats
2 "Loss" of China
3 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb
 
The Plan to Run the World and Win the Cold War -- NSC-68
 
NSC - 68
Why? Policy of Global Leadership in place but little Capability to do the Job
Realization of Problems
Europe - Conventional Soviet Threat
S. Korea - Lacking capability to protect clients states
Loss of Nuclear Monopoly
Growing political and military problems in the developing world --- Vietnam
 
Structure of NSC- 68
 
The enemy - The Soviet Threat and Rhetoric
Basic Strategy
U.S. Intentions - Containment
Containment via Aggregate superior military strength
The Present Risks
Possible Courses of Action
1. continue current policies
2. isolation
3. war
4. a more rapid buildup of the pol, eco, and mil strength of the free world than provided under 1 above

Why no general War -- no first use of nuclear weapons

Key Policy Features of NSC- 68
 
How to Win the Cold War
1. Negotiate with Soviets from position of strength
2. No Direct War
3. Build Economically and outlast the Soviet Union
4. Contain by combination of aggregate superior military strength and the construction of a strong periphery (foreign military and economic aid - advisers - military presence oversees)
5. develop intelligence and covert operations capabilities (develop the CIA)
6. Develop strong unified democratic West
7. Build up military strength
8. develop domestic internal security and civil defense programs
9. reduce the Federal deficit and defer domestic programs
10. Increase taxes
Raising overall security spending by three fold from approx 14 Billion to 35 billion
How to sell this politically? -- Cut desirable domestic programs, raise taxes to increase security --
Policy makers have no answer
 
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B. Lecture Notes for The Korean War and The "Masters of the Universe" - 1950-1960

Truman - The Korean War 1950-1953
 
1. How to Sell NSC-68
2. N. Korea Invades June 26, 1950
Problem -- Solution and the Co-evolution of
Policy
A. Defining the Problem --- "Soviet inspired and
supported"
B. World War III?
C. Implementing Containment - Helping a Client State facing external aggression
D. Quickly up the military escalatory ladder till U.S. combat troops deployed with combat mission for an indefinite period of time

3. Policy Chaos - Summer till Fall - Containment or
rollback (liberation) --- Rollback it is and across the 38th parallel
4. Winter 1950-1951 - Limited War or all out War - the Struggle between Truman and MacArthur
5. Why no "peace" untill 1953
 
The Korean War Legacy
 
Permanent Cold War - Hostility toward the Soviet Union and Communist China
permanent tension and risk
Clashes on the periphery
Political Destruction of the Truman Presidency and the "lesson of Korea"
U.S. rearmament 1949 11.1 Billion
1952 57.7 Billion
1953 35.0 Billion
U.S. Troops deployed to Europe
Containment practiced in Asia
Expanded military establishment and permanent arms industry - the mil/ind complex
Problems - unpopular limited wars, and the psychology of containment
The Eisenhower Years
 
Rhetoric Hot --- rollback - liberation - strong anticommunism
Policy - relatively cool, subdued, more of a domestic politics focus
Implementing Containment
Confronting the Soviet Union
Nuclear weapons buildup
massive retaliation
Nuclear superiority - brinksmanship
Pactomania
The Developing World - client state problems
Covert operations - Iran, Guatemala, Cuba
Overt operations - Yes (Lebanon - 1958) - No Indochina (1954),
Rollback - (No - Hungary 1956)
A brief thaw in the Cold War - 1959-1960 -- Cuba, Laos and the U2 incident


C. The Hegemon Stumbles and Things Fall Apart (1960-1980)
 
 
J.F. Kennedy -- 1961-1963
 
1. Election Politics -- "The Missile Gap," Too Complacent - particularly in the struggle with Communism in the developing world (the do nothing Eisenhower administration
 
2. Strategy to confront the Soviet Union
Even though there was a missile gap (The U.S. was substantially ahead)
Out with massive retaliation and in with "flexible response" - more nuclear weapons - more conventional capability - rising military expenditures - a new counterforce doctrine and the beginning of a move toward Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) - development of the strategic triad -- - the arms race of the 60's is on
 
3. Dealing with developing world problems - the wars of national liberation -- The real driving force of Kennedy Foreign Policy
 
What was on the plate --
 
Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, Congo
 
The Kennedy approach - aggressive, technological, counterinsurgency
 
Laos - Problem - Marxist forces winning a war against the U.S. supported Royal Laotian Forces - Solution - A reasonable but weak response - A coalition neutralist regime
 
Cuba - Problem - Communism 90 miles from the U.S. - a major domestic political headache
"Solution" - A big "covert" military operation to oust Castro -- April 1961-The first big foreign policy splash for JKF and "the best and the brightest"- The Bay of Pigs - a major foreign policy disaster
Pressure for success -
 
Vietnam becomes the unlikely place to invest in success --
Kennedy and his advisers begin a move up the escalatory path to help and save a increasingly important client state (1961-1963) military aid, economic aid, military advisers (15,000), bombing in S. Vietnam, strategic hamlets ---
By the Fall of 1963 - really no success - The decision to support the coup of S. Vietnamese leader Diem.
 
Relations with the Soviets
 
Vienna (Late Spring 1961)
Berlin (Late Summer 1961)
The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)
Assassinations Diem Early November 1963,
Kennedy Late November 1963
L.B. Johnson takes Over
 
A Vietnam Chronology --- Getting into Vietnam
 
1. Fall 1961 - Kennedy commits U.S. as limited partner to S. Vietnam - Sends Approx. 15,000 U.S. military advisers to assist, train, and fight
 
2. 1962-3 - Pacification and Strategic Hamlets - Trying to help the client state win its political and military struggle against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese
 
3. Fall 1963 - Faced with growing political and military failure of U.S./S. Vietnamese policy in Vietnam - U.S. gives up on Diem - coup then assassination - J.F.K assassination and beginning of LBJ Presidency
 
4. 1964 - Secret covert operations begin against North Vietnam --OPLAN 34- Election Politics - Congressional Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin ---
 
5. September 1964-Fully developed plans to begin a plan of graduated sustained pressure on North Vietnam - via overt sustained bombing
 
6. December 1964 - LBJ agrees in principle to begin plan of overt sustained bombing - to raise the costs of the war on N. Vietnam and to raise morale in the South -- but need political stability in the South first
 
7. Jan to Early Feb. 1965 - Continued Government instability (more coups) in the South coupled with serious military setbacks in the South -
 
8. The attack on Pleiku - changing arguments among High level policy makers - decision to start a plan graduated sustained pressure - Rolling Thunder starts March 2, 1965 - a major step into Vietnam - internationalizing the war
 
9. Base Protection - Enclaves - The beginning of the flow of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam
 
10. One small chance for negotiations and peace - Ball and Acheson have their chance for setting negotiations going with the North Vietnamese - April 1965
 
11. By June 1965 - There are about 80,000 U.S. combat troops in Vietnam - The U.S. is bombing many targets in both North and South Vietnam. U.S. combat troops are sustaining casualties
 
12. But the military situation in the South is constantly getting worse - The North, in response to U.S. actions has drastically stepped up infiltration and is fighting in large units with tanks and artillery. They are destroying at a rapid rate large units of U.S. trained and supported South Vietnamese military units
 
13. U.S. military Commander Gen. W. Westmoreland - fears that S. Vietnam will be cut in half and that the South will collapse both militarily and politically - In early June he makes a request for 44 U.S. combat battalions (approx. 100,000 more U.S. combat troops-
 
14. LBJ and his advisers must decide on whether to escalate the War or not -- Strangely, they see it was a decision of whether to go to war or not
1965 Vietnam Decisions - Who's Who
 
President -- L. B. Johnson
Sec. of State - Dean Rusk
Sec. Of Defense Robert McNamara
Under Sec. Of State - George Ball
Ambassador to Saigon - Maxwell Taylor
Special Asst. for National Security McGeorge Bundy
Mil. Commander/Vietnam - William Westmoreland
Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Wheeler
Asst. Sec. Of of State - William Bundy
 
July 1965 Policy Recommendations - Vietnam
 
1. R. McNamara - a revised version of the Westmoreland Troop request - 100-120,000 more U.S. Combat Troops - more to follow as needed, call of U.S. reserves, ask Congress for a supplemental military appropriation
 
2. George Ball -- No More Troop Increases - Look for ways to withdraw via negotiations with N. Vietnam - S. Vietnam a loser - the situation will only get worse - the U.S. must cut its losses
 
3. William and McGeorge Bundy - Hold troops a current levels (80,000) for two months to see how well U.S. forces do and how the South and North Vietnamese respond to significant U.S. combat involvement
 
George Ball - Arguments for Getting Out of Vietnam
U.S. cannot win
War will be too costly
Vietnam not essential
In the long term, better to cut our losses and pull out - will show better judgment and leadership
Why? --
Because the U.S. will end up just like the French
Fighting a guerrilla war it cannot win - U.S. will win all the battles, but a combination of terrain, popular support for the guerrillas, a weak S. Vietnamese government, and a determined enemy ensure a war that will drag on for years with rising U.S. causalities and increasing international and domestic pressures to withdraw
 
Dean Rusk counter argument
"The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world."
So Given these states Rusk argued that is was not necessary to defeat the Viet Cong.
"It is said we are "losing": this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind in the effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But this does not mean that the Viet Cong are "winning"; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Vietn Cong can be denied victory, even if pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect."
 
The U.S. must be the "good doctor," in Vietnam - It must get bloodied and do everything it can to help the patient (even if essentially terminal) so that U.S. global credibility can be maintained. The U.S. enemies (Soviet Union and the PRC) must not believe that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" who can be pushed around in other parts of the world with no resistance. So fighting in Vietnam is a way to signal U.S. resolve to our enemies and to a avoid a major crisis the road and possibly World War III
 
Ball the Odd man out -
LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, the Bundy Brothers, and high level military officials all agreed on escalation knowing full well the consequences
No one argued that the war would be easy.
Everyone understood that there would be considerable U.S. casualties
Everyone know the war would last a long time and that victory while possible was not very likely
Why? -- U.S. credibility and leadership
and Domestic politics - protecting the President
 
The Tragedy of Vietnam
 
Soldiers and citizens of the U.S., and South and North Vietnam
10 more years of war
Responsibility -- LBJ and his advisers - A war of their own making ---
Entraped by their own conceptions of the Cold War
 
Vietnam Policy from July 1965 to elections 1968
 
escalation -- 200,000 by the end of 1965 - 500,000 + by mid 1967
Search and Destroy -- A TV war - brutal, bloody and seemingly pointless
Rise of the Peace Movement - Slow turning of U.S. public opinion and congressional support
Late 1967 - one more major troop increase request from Westmoreland
March 68 - LBJ throws in the towel in his famous March 1868 speech -- bombing pause - seek meaning negotiations with N. Vietnamese and will not run for reelection
R. M. Nixon 1969-74
 
1. Ending the War
2. Opening to China and Détente with the Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger's grand strategy)
3. Inflation and Oil
4. Watergate and the "demise of the Imperial Presidency -- The universe falls apart
Ending the War
1968 - "peace with honor" - and a secret plan to end the war -- campaign rhetoric
A. A secret plan emerges (secret)
B. Vietnamization (public)
Nixon administration reject 1) overt escalation 2) continuing Kennedy/Johnson policies, 3) bringing troops home
Secret plan - The Madman strategy - threaten N. Vietnam with massive escalation to get bargain - secretly bomb Cambodia and begin the concerns for leaks which leads to the plumbers and Watergate
Fails
The public plan of Vietnamization works - gradual U.S. withdrawal - returning war to the S. Vietnamese, reduces U.S. casualties, silences peace movement and keeps Democrats in Congress at bay
Works Domestically - but not a solution to the war
Why? -- Need leverage to get the North Vietnamese to end the war on terms acceptable to the U.S. and the South Vietnam - But how when the U.S. is constantly reducing its role in S. Vietnam
2. The Grand Plan -
A Stubborn Enemy
No bargaining leverage
Growing Strategic Problems (an out of control nuclear arms race)
Growing economic problems (inflation, low productivity)
Solution -- Opening to China - The politics of the triad - pressure on the Soviet Union for a better relationship with the U.S. - Détente and a new set of friends to influence the North Vietnamese - and the process of arms control (SALT I)
The Nixon Doctrine (containment retrenchment)
1971 - End to floating international exchange rates pegged to Gold - Decline of the dollar and international monetary control
How the War ends - After reelection - Public negotiations, Secret Negotiations continue - Christmas bombing -- "Secret negotiations succeed" -- U.S. withdraws - with continued U.S. pledges to help South Vietnam
3. Inflation and Oil - War driven inflation and then the shock of the Oil embargo in the fall of 1973 - an economy in trouble -
4. Watergate does not go away - The cover-up the smoking gun - the forced resignation (8/74)
 
The end of the imperial presidency??
The Universe falls apart - 25 years after NSC-68 Things are very bleak
Internal (domestic) Politics - President forced out - major political divisions (high partisanship), Congressional/Presidential struggle over foreign policy - War Powers, budget authority - Democrats vs. Republicans
External
SALT I only a start
Shadow of Vietnam
Retrenchment -
Economic weakness

INF treaty - a classic twist

Containing and rolling back Communism
U.S. policy in Latin America

Supporting an anti-communist regime in El Salvador --- Military and political solutions - but no more Vietnams

Trying to Rollback Communism in Nicaragua
Covert operations - supporting the Contras - and economic embargo

The shadow of Vietnam - Wars with Congress - Major political struggles - very symbolic - but no strong solutions - no winning policies

II. Understanding How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made -

Case 1 "Good" Policymaking - The Cuban Missile Crisis
 

 
Cast of Characters
J. F. Kennedy - President
R. McNamara - Sec. of Defense
D. Rusk - Sec. of State
J. McCone - Director of the CIA
McG. Bundy - Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
P. Nitze - Asst. Sec. of Defense
M. Taylor - Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
T. Sorensen - Special Council to the President
A. Stevenson - Ambassador to the United Nations
G. Ball - Under Sec. of State
R. Kennedy - Attorney General
D. Dillon - Sec. of the Treasury
D. Acheson - "Wise Man"
 
Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
Rational Choice Approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis
We the analyst or observer assume
1. the individual or group making a decision pursues one set of specified goals and objectives - Policy makers agree up preferences concerning goals and outcomes (unified goals and objective)
2. The policy making group evaluates all available alternative courses of action (full information)
3. The policy making group assesses the consequences for each possible course of action - how likely various outcomes are given an alternative course of action in conjunction with how much the group values the outcome --- (expected utility maximizing decision rule)
4. The choice among the alternative courses of actions is that which the group evaluates as maximizing their goals and preferences over outcomes -- They choose the best alternative course of action given their preferences and the constraints imposed by the situation
Cuba -- The problem - Soviets deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba which will soon become operational
The group sees the deployment of these missiles as unacceptable - the Soviets must remove them
How is the question and at what risk
 
Objectives ---
1. Removing the missiles
2. Avoiding a military conflict with the Soviets that could well escalate to a nuclear war
3. The political necessity for Kennedy and the U.S to win this showdown
 
Alternative courses of action
1. Do Nothing
2. Negotiate - Trade missiles (Cuba and Turkey)
3. Surgical Air Strike
4. Military Invasion
5. Blockade - Quarantine
 

     Goals    
     Remove Missiles  Avoid Nuclear War  Political Victory, look aggressive
   Do Nothing  LP  HP  LP
 Actions  Negotiate  MP or HP  MP or HP LP 
   Surgical air Strike  HP  MP or LP  HP
   Mil Invasion  HP  MP or LP  HP
   Blockade  MP  MP  MP or HP

 

Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
 
A Game Theoretic -- Joint Decision-making problem
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis as a game of Chicken
 
Choices for both nations
1) Back Down (BD)
2) Do Not Back Down (NBD)
Preferences for each
 NBD, BD>  BD, BD>  BD,NBD>  NBD,NBD
 4,2  3,3  2,4  1,1
 
 
     Soviet Union  
     BD  NBD
 U.S.  BD  (3,3)  (2,4)
   NBD  (4,2)  (1,1)

The problem in this "game" is one of
 
COMMITMENT
That is somehow signaling in a credible way to your opponent that you will not back down (NBD) and it is up to the opponent to save both parties
 
That is by commiting credibly to NBD you in effect change the game to
 
   BD  NBD
 NBD  (4,2)  (1,1)
 
 
Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
 
The Governmental Politics Approach
 
Focus - A group of high level decision-makers, typically leaders of organizations, are engaged in a competitive game --
The Group decision is seen as the outcome of a game among these players - It is the product of (and explained by) the pulling and hauling of politics
The choice is the product of

1) the reasons for actions - linked to the players goals
2) and the routines of organizations to enact alternatives --packages of tools and missions or standard operating procedures (SOPs)
3) the power and skills of the players - their control of information, argumentative skill, structural power position
 
So - we need to

1) isolate who plays
2) what determines their position -
a. role organization
b. political coalition
c. ideology and beliefs
3) what determines a players impact on the decision
a. power position
b. skill - expertise
c. experience
4) How the game among the players is structured
 
The decision is explained in this approach by displaying the above components
Note - this approach requires far more detailed evidence that the rational actor model
 
 
   Initial Positions  
 Diplomatic  Air Strike  Uncommitted
 Stevenson  Acheson  McNamara
 Ball  Ntize  Bundy
   McCone  Sorenson
   Dillon  R. Kennedy
   J.C.S.  (Rusk)
   (J.F.K.)  
 
JFK - opposed to doing nothing and saw the missile trade as too weak a response - note as well that no one else was in favor of doing nothing
Strong and powerful air strike coalition
The uncommitted need to jump on board the air strike or find a more viable alternative -- Construct the blockade option
McNamara, Bundy, Sorenson, R. Kennedy, Rusk join Stevenson and Ball in new coalition for a blockade
Revealing the "game" then can be seen in one of two ways that are of course connected
1) A competition among the two groups to persuade their Boss (JFK) that their option is best
2) Building an argument that their solution will solve the problem and that the other position has serious flawed problems
 
 
The Blockade Group case ---
 
Positive
 
A Blockade is aggressive and tough
It puts the initiative and responsibility for the next move on the Soviets
It is safer than an air strike
It does not rule out an air strike later
It gives time for the Soviets to understand their mistake and back down
It signals U.S. resolve and determination
 
Negative aspects of the alternative
 
An air strike is very risky and could be escalatory
An air strike may well not solve the problem since it is possible that some missiles will not be destroyed and thus it may require an invasion - an option with additional problems
An air strike makes the U.S. the aggressor and JFK like Tojo - Pearl Harbor
 
 
 
The Air strike Group Case
 
Positive
 
Removes missiles (almost all)
Some risk but fairly safe since the U.S. holds but a tactical and overall strategic advantage over the Soviet Union
Is aggressive and tough and demonstrates resolve and determination
Can help to destabilize Castro and help lead to his downfall and could lead to a Castro reaction that could warrant U.S. military intervention
 
Negative
 
Blockade does not remove missiles soon to be operational - only prevents additional materials from entering
Blockade gives away the element of surprise making future military action more difficult
Blockade creates its own set of problems with our allies that may make future military action more difficult
Blockade is a soft response, which gives the Soviets time to obtain a more palatable (for them) negotiated settlement - such as a missile trade
 
Keys to why the Blockade group "won"
 
1) Small but significant probability that the air strike would not remove all the missiles and would probably require an invasion
2) Belief among key actors (JFK, RFK, McNamara, and Rusk that the blockade opened up possibilities to solve the crisis without ruling out others later and
3) it was less risky than the air strike but politically palatable
4) The coalition that formed around the blockade was closer to the President ideologically and personally
 
 
 Hawks  Doves/Owls
 Nitze  McNamara
 Taylor  R. Kennedy
 Dillon  T. Sorenson
 McCone  A. Stevenson
 Acheson  D. Rusk
   McG. Bundy
 
 
 
 
Cuban Missile Crisis -- Cognitive/Pyschological Approach
 
The Psychological Approach to Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Introduction.
Psychologist Bligh's argument in a nutshell.
Body.
A. Who are the players in the Cuban missile crisis?
B. What facts do the players agree on?
C. How are the facts perceived differently by different players?
I. Balance of power.
II. Risks of Soviet slip-up and US aggression.
D. Why do different players perceive facts differently?
I. Different goals.
II. Different assumptions.
III. Different formative periods.
Conclusion.
What are the strengths and limitations of the psychological approach?


INCOMMENSURABLE VIEWS,
OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
 
Hawks:
1. relatively understandable
2. predictable
3. controllable
4. safe
 
Doves:
1. inexplicable
2. unpredictable
3. uncontrollable
4. dangerous
 
Hawks and Doves disagreed about:
1. POWER Their understandings of the relative U.S. and Soviet positions in the crisis
2. PERCEPTIONS on their perceptions of the risks

3. POLICY on their policy prescriptions
 
Key Issues
 Hawks  Doves
 Power  Cuban Missiles significantly change military calculus-must be removed  Cuban Missiles not militarily significant - just a political threat
   But Soviets vastly outnumbered on nuclear level (17 to 1 advantage for the U.S.) and useful in making Russians back off  No advantage to the U.S. because strategiv imbalance gives us no leverage over the Soviets
 Perceptions  Risk of nuclear war exists but probability of success high and risk of disaster low  Risk exists and is possible - must be avoided at all costs
   Risk of inadvertent action or deliberate escalation after U.S. attack low  Risk of inadvertent actiona dnd deliberate escalation high
 Policy  High degress of confifence of Soviet rationality  Less certain of Soviet intentions and more concern about inadvertent actions -- look at recent history
   No qualms about an air strike - necessary to take forceful and decisive action  High degree of responsibility "weight of the world on our shoulders"
     
 
Why these differences?
 
Changing world from U.S. nuclear dominance to mutual vulnerability
 
Hawks do not see this change
· Schooled in Cold War
· Deeply anti-communist
· Saw Soviets as responding to force alone
· Powerful faith in nuclear coercion
· U.S. has both conventional and nuclear superiority in this area of the
world
End result: U.S. settled for less than it should have in this crisis
 
Doves are very aware of new world
· Experience of hawks irrelevant this case
· Nuclear exchange is possible--first time in history that both sides
vulnerable
· Misstep could be fatal
· Anxiety and tension affects clear thinking
· Information about Soviet objectives lacking
· Personally responsible for fate of world
 
End result: Advocate less threatening course of action--ultimately successful
 

III. Understanding How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made

Case 2 "Bad" Policymaking - The Iran/Contra Affair

Problems

Iran

- We had no diplomatic relations
-Iran was supporting terrorism (put on State Dept. terrorist list in 1983)
-Iran was doing better in the war with Iraq than expected (and we were supporting Iraq)
-there was a “power struggle” underway in Iran and it was feared that the Soviets could capitalize on the unrest to
increase their influence

Nicaragua

-the Sandinista government had close ties to Cuba and the USSR
-it was supporting leftists in El Salvador and possibly Honduras and Costa Rica, too- raised the specter of communist
revolutions in 3 or 4 Central American countries
- it was a communist government on the Central American mainland, always a bad thing

Lebanon

- hostages

Nicaragua Policy

December 1, 1981 Presidential finding: “to support and conduct paramilitary operations against Nicaragua”

1. to get the Sandinistas and Cubans to stop funding the FMLN in El Salvador
2. to force the Sandinistas to either democratize or be overthrown

Sept. 19, 1983; US policy is stepped up with a new presidential finding

July 1985, Oliver North’s policy memo: (p. 50 reader)
1. we can’t invade Nicaragua
2. Nicaraguans like our policy and Congress will fund it
3. the Contras are finally coming together
4. the Sandinistas are unpopular
5. the Soviets won’t intervene to stop a US invasion nor to stop the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government

--Owen’s response (p. 53 in reader)

Iran Policy

Policy statement June 17, 1985 (p220 reader)
The Facts, according to the statement:
1. domestic power struggle could cause Iran to “disintegrate”
2. Soviets could step in to take advantage of the turmoil
3. we need access to Gulf oil

Assumptions:
1. Iran might fall
2. we can shape events with the right policy

So... we should:
1. encourage our allies to help Iran, including with the provision of arms to aid their war effort
2. we should increase contacts and provide support for Iranian moderates

Caspar Weinberger’s response:
“This is almost too absurd to comment on... the assumption here is that Iran is about to fall and we can deal with that on
a rational basis; like asking Qadhafi to Washington for a cozy chat.”

The Assumptions Underlying Iran-Contra

Iran
1. Iran could fall, and the Soviets could step in to increase their influence.
2. we could shape events by supporting moderates
-assumes our contacts were negotiating in good
faith

Nicaragua
1. Soviets/Cubans were behind Sandinista actions
2. Contras are “good people” and have support inside Nicaragua

Hostages:
1. Iran can control Hezbollah
2. our channels to Iran were trustworthy

Iran-Contra

Goals:

Central America:
to contain the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and weaken Cuban/Soviet influence in Central America

To help the government in El Salvador with its battle against a left-leaning insurgency

Iran:
to make contacts with “moderates” in Iran and restore Iranian-American diplomatic relations
To prevent the Soviets from increasing their influence in Iran

Lebanon:
to obtain the release of American hostages in Beirut and avoid a Carteresque hostage affair

The Plan:
1. supply and support the counterrevolutionary guerrilla movement in Nicaragua (the Contras)
2. Use Iranian influence with Hezbollah (party of God) in Lebanon to win the release of American hostages
3. Restore relations with Iran and give McFarlane & Reagan “their own China”
4. Sell arms to Iran for a profit; use the profits to support the Contras and to 1)get around Congressional restrictions on
aid to the Contras and 2) get around the Reagan administration’s own policy statement against dealing with “terrorist
nations”

“Using the Ayatollah’s money to support the Nicaraguan resistance… I think it was a neat idea.”
-Oliver North, 1987

The Iran/Contra Affair Chronology

1981

The long war 1981-88 between Iran and Iraq begins with an Iraqi invasion

The Reagan administration begins an aggressive policy to support the regime in El Salvador and later couples this with an aggressive campaign to isolate the Sandinistas. So begins a bitter political and policy struggle with Democrats in Congress

December - Presidential finding authorizing covert CIA actions against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua

1982

First Boland Amendment - Prohibits federal funds to be used to overthrow the government of Nicaragua

1983

U.S. Congress restricts aid to the Contras to 24 million dollars

1984

February - McFarlane (national security adviser) tells Reagan that money is running out for the Contras

March - CIA chief W. Buckley kidnapped in Beirut

April- CIA implicated in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
May - Clarriadge (CIA) tells Contras that O. North (NSC) will take his place if Congress cuts of aid

Money solicited from Saudi Arabia to support the Contras

Additional kidnapping in Beirut

August - McFarlane asks for reassessment of U.S. policy toward Iran

October - Boland II - Bans any agency or entity involved in intelligence activities from spending money to aid the Contras

More Kidnappings

1985

January - June - Several kidnappings

June - NSC staff forms a new policy toward Iran - Sec of Defense Weinberger writes that it is "almost too absurd to comment on."

July - After meeting with hostage families and frustrated Reagan approves "in principle" the sale of TOW missiles to Iran

August - McFarlane and Reagan meet about Israeli proposal to sell missiles to Iran - Dispute later about whether President approved the sale

North flies to Costa Rica to discuss construction of an airstrip to be used to resupply the Contras

August 20th - Israel sends the first shipment of missiles to Iran

September - U.S complains that no hostages were released

September 14 - More missiles sent to Iran

November - Beginning of the private organization called the Enterprise

CIA ships 18 Hawk missiles to Iran -- officers later claim they thought cargo was "oil drilling parts"

December 5 - President sign retroactively a finding authorizing the arms sales operation

December McFarlane resigns and J. Poinexter appointed new National Security Adviser

December 6th - North tells Israeli officials he plans to use profits from the arms sale to support the Contras

December 7th - Famous meeting among high level national security officials on the arms shipments to Iran - very different versions recalled about this meeting

1986

January 17th - Reagan authorized arms shipment to Iran to improve relations with moderates and to release the hostages - the order authorizes the CIA to assist third parties and friendly countries in shipping the weapons

February 17th - 500 TWO missiles sent - no hostages freed
U.S. officials meet with Iranians and demand that hostages be freed

February 27 - more missiles sent - no hostages freed

March - Resupply effort to the Contras from airbases inside Costa Rica goes smoothly

April 4 - Famous O. North memo about diverting 12 million in arms profits to Contras - Poindexter claims he never showed it to Reagan

June 26 - Congress reverses itself and approves 100 million in military and non-lethal aid to the Contras

June - August - More missiles send = some hostages released but more kidnapped

August 6 - North testifies before the House Intelligence committee that he did not raise money for the Contras or offer them military adviser - Later at the Iran Contra hearing he admitting lying

October 5th - Cargo plane of the North/Secord -Enterprise operation operating from Costa Rica is shot down over Nicaragua - a operative E. Hassenfus is captured by the Sandinistas

October - more kidnappings - more hostages released more missiles sent

November 3rd - Story of arms sales to Iran breaks in a Lebanese newspaper

November 5-6 - White House issues denial and then the U.S. press confirms account

November 12-19 - North and White House officials prepare inaccurate chronologies of the Iran arms sales process

November 19 - Reagan press conference - he make serious errors that are corrected by staff immediately afterward

November 21 - W. Casey (CIA Director) appears before Congress and testifies about the CIA role in the arms shipments in 1985

Attorney General Edwin Meese is concerned about the confusion and varying accounts of the arms sales within the administration and wants an internal investigation

North told by justice officials that they will inspect his files the next day - He and his assistant F. hall begin shredding documents

November 22-25 - Investigation discovers a memo to the President about the diversion of funds (the North memo) - On the 24th - the White House notified on the 25th - the famous news conference where Meese reveals the diversion memo - Poindexter resigns and North is dismissed

The political and legal part of the affair begins ---and does not end until President Bush pardons Weinberger just as he leaves office in January 1993.

Crimes with which the Reagan administration was charged:

1. Raising private and foreign funds for the Contras:
? violated the Boland amendment prohibiting “direct or indirect” military support for the Contras

2. Shipping of missiles to Iran in 1985:
? violated Arms Export Control Act by not authorizing via Presidential finding
? violated Intelligence Oversight Act by not notifying Congress

3. Diverting funds to the Contras:
? misappropriation of federal funds
? violated the Boland Amendment

4. The Cover-up:
? conspiracy to defraud the government;
? obstruction of justice


Lectures for 2/22, 2/25, 2/27 will discuss in detail a number of the documents from the Iran-Contra Document book. I recommend that you bring the document book with you to class to make it easier to follow along. Unfortunately, it will be difficult to view the documents in class.

IV. The End of the Cold War, The Gulf War, and Post Cold War Foreign Policy

The Bush Administration and the End of the Cold War

The Cold War comes to an End

Gorbachev - starts a revolution in the Soviet Union - Perestroika and Glasnost

Tells then V.P Bush in late 1988 -

"Your staff may have told you that what I'm doing is all a trick. It's not. I'm playing real politics. I have a revolution going that I announced in 1986. Now, in 1988, the Soviet people don't like it. Don't misread me, Mr. Vice President, I have to play real politics."

George Bush comes into office in 1989 and faces a first year of sweeping change

Started out with foreign policy as usual - cold war style

Détente with Soviets
improving relations with China
strong NATO and SDI
support Contras
peace process in Middle East
BUT - the world did not cooperate

1. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and major changes in the Soviet Union

2. The squashing of democracy in China - Tiananman Square

3. Revolution, elections, drugs, military intervention in Central America - Nicaragua and Panama

In the face of dramatic changes in the World, the U.S. sat on the sidelines, ran along behind change, was strapped financially, and was not willing to get out in front and lead since the future was so unclear

W. and E. Europeans charting their own course Europeans leading the way in providing economic aid to E. Europe and the Soviet Union

U.S. chastised by allies for not getting its economy in order --- debtor nation, bad trade imbalances, big budget deficits, slow growth

Was the Cold War really over? Had the three "isms"
Colonialism, Fascism, and Communism been defeated?

Who was the enemy now? - terrorists, drug dealers, new ethnic nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists

How should U.S. foreign policy change? And how should U.S. foreign policy institutions change?

Should the U.S. continue to lead or focus inward?

Should there be more real collective security? Should our allies pick up more of the burden?

Is defense and security less important and economics more so?

What should be the role of the CIA and defense? - Is there a peace dividend for winning the cold war? SDI,
B-2 stealth bombers

Central America

Nicaragua - embargo, contras, the deal - disbanding the contras and elections - the election surprise
Drugs, dictator, the end of the cold war, old style colonialism, and the new world order -- U.S. military intervention in Panama - oust Noriega and the PDF

The Bush Administration and The Gulf War

The Cold War - Post Cold War Divide

I. Gulf War Foreign Policymaking
II. Justifications and Explanation
III. What is Old and What is New

I. Gulf War Foreign Policymaking

Three Phases

a. Initial Understandings and Responses

b. From defend and deter (contain) to the Offensive

c. Selling the War to Congress and the American Public

a. Confused signals to Iraq prior to the Iraqi invasion
A preoccupation with Soviet problems
First reactions - Don't exactly know what to do or how important the problem is
Then the problem and the stakes take form

1. Oil
2. Aggression
3. New world order and collective security

Response - UN sanctions - diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions --- after some work U.S forces to Saudi Arabia - deter and defend --- protect Saudi Arabia - the big oil prize but also rollback aggression and free Kuwait -
Hot confrontational trapping rhetoric

b. From defense to the offensive option

Late October decisions by the group of 5 -- build an offensive option - from 250,00 to 500,000 and all the sophisticated technology and weapons available

Why? --
Sanctions might not work and they might take too long to work -
fragile coalition,
Israel problem,
troops in the desert problem
military windows of opportunity

Decision in secret - before midterm elections and after the famous budget summit and the breach of the no new taxes pledge

c. Selling the Offensive Option

Positives --

Eventually get UN resolution use al means necessary - force to remove Iraq from Kuwait -- International U.S. led coalition

Bad public relations by Hussein - hostages -- an easy enemy to demonize

Kuwait as the innocent democratic victim

Building the force option to call Hussein's bluff - coercive diplomacy

U.S. and Presidental leadership

Negatives

What is the hurry on sanctions
What is the rush to military options
Adverse public opinion on military options

Presidential approval down from 82% in August to 59% in Mid November

Task for the administration

Finding successful formulas to speak to the public or publics

Hearings and the Congressional debates leading to support

Administration position

Have U.N. resolution and International coalition

UN resolution + international coalition + increased troops = best chance for peace and success -- Congressional support the last key piece in the equation

II. Justifications and Explanations

Iraq must get out of Kuwait or be forced out

Why? - Speaking to different publics

Aggression - and the principles of sovereignty and collective security - New global order - controlling dictators and protecting democracies

Punish and remove Hussein- can't let Hussein save face

Brutality in Kuwait - human rights and war crimes
Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the wrong hands

Oil energy costs - Hussein too much control

Dangerous change in the balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East - regional interests Israel and oil rich friends

A personalized struggle between Bush and Hussein that the leader of the global community must win - Presidential Credibility

Three narratives to justify war and the use of military force

1. War as Politics and Politics as Business - cost benefits analysis --- using the most effective approach to achieve political and economic ends - including force weighting political and economic gains vs. cost of war

Oil
Geopolitics
Nuclear weapons
Balance of power concerns

2. Fairy tale and the Just War

Victim - Kuwait

Villain - Iraq

Hero - U.S.

Human rights, war crimes
Protecting democracy
Thwarting dictators
Personalized politics

3. War as a competitive game

Winners and losers - connection to chess and sports examples
personalization and credibility
Perceived and actual effects of winning or losing outweigh the actual cost/benefit calculations

Some rules of thumb - as the level and degree of military commitment increases then

a. costs and benefits more scrutinized and greater disagreement between the administration and the public but more consensus within the administration

b. rhetoric in the fairy tale metaphor -- more harsh, more emotional, more definitive and black and white

b. competitive game narrative enters and grows and increasingly dominates the cost/benefit approach

All follow in the Gulf case - Think about the extent these hold or not in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia

III. The Gulf War - Post-Cold War characteristics

Overt Western Involvement in the Middle East

A new coalition for collective security - UN (NATO), Russia, and US -- also a significant portion of the developing world including Arab states

Who pays the bill for collective security - not who lead

The Four Futures

F1 Standing Up for Democracy (crusaders)

Based on the democracy-peace "finding" coupled with dictatorship-aggression presumption

"enlargement of democratic states"

All will be well in the end - harmony of interests among democratic/capitalist states after a short messy and potentially costly transition period to rid the international system of dictatorships

Idealist- principled policy

Policy
1. support democracies
2. punish and pressure dictatorships via alliances, arms transfers, economic sanctions and use of force if necessary

World characterization

Post cold war - simply replace the Cold war script by inserting dictatorships (or terrorist) for communist states

F2 - Charting a Stable Course (Hegemonic Leader)

Based on Realism

Power politics (power, wealth, security)
Multipolarity and international anarchy

"power politics works the same for dictatorships and democracies"

alliances - regional balances of power "Every nations for itself"

Policy

1. Maintain "western" alliances
2. Protect U.S. Middle East Interests
3. Use arms transfers to balance regional power
4. Use military force, covert means based upon the principle of balancing power

World Characterization

Return to the balance of power, realist IR and foreign policy world of the Concert of Europe system 1815-1914

F3 Cooperating Globally (McWorld)

Based on Global interdependence -- and dependence
Complex interdependence - economic, technical, environmental, and security

"internationalist"

international institutionalist - for effectiveness and efficiency
cooperation in all parties interest

create institutions to facilitate cooperation -- building trust

Policy

1. Build UN and collective security
2. UN peacekeeping force
3. more arms control regimes
4. U.S. arms and economic embargos as sanctions
5. UN mediate disputes
6. World development via IGOs and NGOs - helps all

World Characterization

International institutions - creates a transnational web
Construction of structures to generate efficiency, order, cooperation

F4 - Building U.S. Economic Strength (Economic Nationalism - isolation)

Based upon world of increased economic competition (still anarchic) and not cooperative

System is anarchic - still a struggle for power but the currency of power is more economic and military or security in nature

National economic power is paramount

National interests clash and democracy, human rights, equality take a back seat

Policy

1. U.S. reduce alliances
2. Reduce military spending
3. Reduce military presence in the world
4. Nonintervention
5. More organized national economic policies
6. Protect sovereignty
7. Compete successfully

World Characterization

World based upon a new mercantilism
Regional/national economic competition
Politics not relevant - democracies/dictatorships not relevant
Stability relevant only in markets - in some instances a lack of stability can hurt competitors