


Dynamic Reserve Selection with
Land Price Feedbacks
(an example of Integer Programming)

Lecture 9 (5/3/2017)

Motivation 1: Armsworth et al. 2006

Shifting Equilibriums in Competitive Land Markets




Source: Armsworth et al. 2006

Motivation 2: Thornses 2002 – The Amenity Premium



3. Motivation 3: Irwin and Bockstael 2004 Development Hazard



$$R_{it} - \delta R_{i(t+1)} - A_{it} \geq \theta$$

An Integer Programming Approach

$$\text{Max} \left[\sum_i a_i \text{div}_i \sum_t x_{it} + \alpha \sum_i a_i \text{div}_i \left(1 - \sum_t x_{it} - \sum_t z_{it} \right) \right]$$

conservation \curvearrowright x_{it} \curvearrowleft z_{it} development


Where:

$$x_{it}, z_{it} \in \{0,1\}$$

$$\sum_t (x_{it} + z_{it}) \leq 1 \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$\sum_i p_{it} x_{it} \leq B_t \quad \forall t \in T$$

$$p_{it} \in \mathbb{R}^+$$



1. Price Feedbacks Driven by Amenity Effects



$$p_{it} = p_{i(t-1)} [1 + (r + ey_{it})]$$

$$y_{it} \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$\sum_{k \in S_i} x_{k(t-1)} \geq y_{it}$$


$$\sum_{k \in S_i} x_{k(t-1)} \leq |S_i| y_{it}$$

Example :


$$x_{28-8711(1)} + x_{28-2864(1)} \geq y_{28-11495(2)}$$

$$x_{28-8711(1)} + x_{28-2864(1)} \leq 2y_{28-11495(2)}$$

2. Price Feedbacks Driven by Shifting Competitive Equilibriums



3. Development



Development or market value $\longrightarrow \frac{p_{it}}{FV_i + \theta_t} \geq z_{it}$ ← Development indicator
 Forest value \longrightarrow

$$\left(1 - \sum_{t'=1}^t z_{it'} - \sum_{t'=1}^t x_{it'} \right) (FV_i + \theta_t - p_{it}) \geq 0$$

Full Model Formulation

$$\text{Max} \left[\sum_i a_i \text{div}_i \sum_t x_{it} + \alpha \sum_i a_i \text{div}_i \left(1 - \sum_t x_{it} - \sum_t z_{it} \right) \right]$$

Subject to :

Logical constraint — $\sum_t (x_{it} + z_{it}) \leq 1 \quad \forall i \in I$

Budget constraint — $\sum_i \underline{p_{it}} x_{it} \leq B_t \quad \forall t \in T$

Pricing — $\underline{p_{it}} = \underline{p_{i(t-1)}} \left[1 + (r + \underline{e y_{it}}) \right] + a_i \frac{\tan \varphi \cdot \tan \beta}{\tan \varphi + \tan \beta} \sum_{j \in \{I \setminus i\}} a_j x_{j(t-1)} \quad \forall i \in I, \forall t \in \{T \setminus 1\}$

Amenity triggers $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_{k \in S_i} x_{k(t-1)} \geq y_{it} \\ \sum_{k \in S_i} x_{k(t-1)} \leq |S_i| y_{it} \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{l} \forall i \in I, \forall t \in \{T \setminus 1\} \\ \forall i \in I, \forall t \in \{T \setminus 1\} \end{array}$

Development triggers $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} p_{it} \geq (FV_i + \theta_t) z_{it} \\ \left(1 - \sum_{t'=1}^t \underline{z_{it'}} - \sum_{t'=1}^t x_{it'} \right) (\underline{FV_i + \theta_t} - \underline{p_{it}}) \geq 0 \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{l} \forall i \in I, \forall t \in T \\ \forall i \in I, \forall t \in T \end{array}$


$$x_{it}, y_{it}, z_{it} \in \{0, 1\}, p_{it} \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

Non-Linearities

$$\sum_i p_{it} x_{it} \leq B_t \quad \forall t \in T$$

Let $\varepsilon_{it} = p_{it} x_{it}$

We want that $\varepsilon_{it} = 0$ if $x_{it} = 0$, otherwise: $\varepsilon_{it} = p_{it}$.

$$\varepsilon_{it} - Mx_{it} \leq 0$$


$$\varepsilon_{it} \leq p_{it}$$


$$p_{it} - \varepsilon_{it} + Mx_{it} \leq M$$

Results 1

Table 2. Objective values under different market scenarios and budget constraints.

Budget	Price elasticity of supply	Amenity premium (%)	Naïve purchases (no anticipation of price feedbacks)		Smart purchases (price feedbacks are anticipated)		Loss in objective function values due to ignoring the price feedbacks (%)
			Objective func. values (total biodiversity hectares)	Optimality gaps (%)	Objective func. values (total biodiversity hectares)	Optimality gaps (%)	
US\$1 M	1	3	271,525	0.00	271,537	0.00	0.004568
	0.36	3	271,496	0.00	271,512	0.00	0.01
	0	3	271,484	0.00	271,500	0.00	0.01
	1	27	270,168	0.00	270,927	0.00	0.28
	0.36	27	270,002	0.00	270,924	0.00	0.34
	0	27	268,958	0.00	270,911	0.00	0.72
US\$10 M	1	3	286,007	0.00	288,030	0.07	0.70–0.78
	0.36	3	286,509	0.00	287,607	0.05	0.38–0.43
	0	3	286,230	0.00	286,895	0.21	0.23–0.44
	1	27	278,586	0.00	286,966	0.04	2.92–2.96
	0.36	27	278,051	0.00	286,511	0.23	2.95–3.19
	0	27	277,908	0.00	285,778	0.68	2.75–3.41
US\$20 M	1	3	299,773	0.00	301,267	0.32	0.50–0.81
	0.36	3	299,527	0.00	300,816	0.32	0.43–0.75
	0	3	298,167	0.00	300,221	0.38	0.68–1.06
	1	27	289,092	0.00	299,655	0.44	3.52–3.95
	0.36	27	288,284	0.00	298,729	0.78	3.50–4.24
	0	27	287,452	0.00	298,487	1.02	3.70–4.67

Results 2



Results 3

