Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan

Bi-yu Chang
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The construction of national imagination and territorial ownership in the ROC Yearbooks (1951–2010)

Prelude

After his first visit to Taiwan in October 1946, Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that the island was the only *ganjing tu* (meaning ‘pure land’ or ‘clean soil’) left in ROC territory that remained ‘uncontaminated’ by communism (Guoshiguan 1946). By the end of the 1940s, when his leadership was challenged and the Nationalist troops collapsed, Chiang started to prepare for the worst by deploying his own troops and resources to Taiwan and reinforcing the island as the final stronghold against communism (Tung Hsien-kuang 1952: 510). After the military defeat on the mainland, the KMT leadership set up its temporary government in Taipei in December 1949. This ‘pure land’ was given the role of anti-communist base, from which the battle to recover the mainland would be launched. Taiwan thus represented the last and only hope for the KMT to retake power on the mainland, and Taipei, the island’s provincial capital, was designated the ‘wartime provisional capital’ (*zhanshi shouda*) by the exiled regime.

After the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the territory that remained under the direct control of the ROC government was limited and the loss of the mainland greatly undermined the legal status of the ROC: What would become of a state without its territory? For many countries the ROC had ceased to exist at the end of 1949, when the PRC was established in Beijing.\(^1\) For decades the issue of how a state which has lost most of its (claimed) territories can constitute a state has haunted the ROC and coloured its national imagination; after all, ‘territory’ is the crucial factor providing the legal foundation of national sovereignty in the modern world-system (Flint and Taylor 2000: 114–56). There was a further decline in the ROC’s international standing when, on 25 October 1971, the Chinese seat at the United Nations (UN) was given to the PRC. As a result of the PRC’s recognition by the UN as the ‘only legitimate representative of China’ (UN 1971), the ROC suffered a series of diplomatic defeats in the 1970s and has continued to feel the impact of international isolation as well as the effects of the PRC’s unceasing strategies of diplomatic sabotage.\(^2\)

For over four decades, in order to survive and fight for a place in an increasingly global environment, the ROC on Taiwan continued to claim Chinese sovereignty and insisted on being recognized as the legitimate representative of a group of people and a territory that were no longer under its control. To understand the state spatiality of the postwar ROC, both this and the following chapter focus on an examination of the official version of ‘ROC national territory’. Whereas Chapter 3 concentrates mostly on the cartographic representation of ‘ROC territory’, this chapter explores the ROC’s self-image, as expressed in official documents, and also the strategies by which it has dealt with the problem of having no control over the territory that it claims as its own. This chapter examines the Chinese version of the ROC Yearbooks (*Zhonghua Minguo nianjian*) from 1951 to 2010 as a means to understand ROC territorial strategies, looking at how the ROC authorities defined the ‘national territory’, tracing changes in the course of sixty years, and addressing the coping mechanisms developed by a nation considered by many to no longer exist. It also considers how and why certain territorial strategies were adopted and changed, what kind of national imagination and narratives were constructed in the yearbooks, the ways in which different versions of ‘national territory’ were formulated and presented, and the reasons why these have changed, both in the texts and cartographic representation of the yearbooks. In so doing, this chapter aims to understand the politics of state territorialities in postwar Taiwan, rather than focusing on what the ROC *guoyu* territory entails, commenting on its postwar diplomatic policy and predicaments or resolving which piece of land belonged to the ROC.

Consistent and systematic national record

The national yearbooks issued by the government served as an important means by which the ROC was able to stake its territorial claims. On first sight, the territorial claims made by this government-in-exile seemed ludicrous, but at the same time they served as an important strategy by which political legitimacy could be justified and sustained, even if in reality the ROC occupied only one and a bit of the provinces of its claimed territory. This chapter does not dwell on the problematic legality of the ROC’s international status, nor its fanciful territorial claims; rather, my aim here is to focus on the issues of state territoriality manifested in the yearbooks and to examine the ways in which national territory and an imagined geography have been constructed and have changed over time.

Generally speaking, a yearbook is ‘a book published yearly as a report or summary of statistics or facts’ (Merriam-Webster 2003). Hence the primary function of any national yearbook is to provide, in the form of facts and figures, the most up-to-date information about the country concerned. There are many reasons for choosing the national yearbook as a case study through which to examine issues of state territoriality, but most importantly it is because they provide a formal record of national development and an official declaration of national sovereignty over territory, resources and people. In this way the ROC Yearbooks published by the Government Information Office (GIO)\(^3\) are a unique official archive that offers a clear historical account of the official line on
The importance of ‘territory’ and ‘territoriality’

Why is territory so important in the formation of a nation-state and in the struggle to assert national sovereignty? For ancient empires, neither fixed boundaries nor stable territory were necessarily essential factors for their sovereignty. Although the modern meaning of national territory can be traced back to 1494, it was not until the eighteenth century that this modern definition became firmly linked to the legal concept of sovereignty, indicating thereby that the land belonged to a ruler of state (Flint and Taylor 2000: 122). Thus the contemporary idea of ‘national territory’—now usually understood to refer to ‘the geographical area under the formal jurisdiction or control of a recognized political authority’ (Jary and Jary 1999: 683)—is not founded on a long tradition, but rather is a political concept that has come to dominate thinking about statehood only in relatively recent times. In the modern inter-state world system, to operate as a polity with legitimate sovereignty, the polity must operate within a particular piece of land. Here territory defines and delimits a portion of space, acting as the container of a polity. Hence, modern nations are territorially bounded units of population who take the particular piece of land they occupy as their homeland (Smith 1991: 13–14), while the concept of territory brings with it a particular identity and a set of characteristics inscribed within (Jones et al. 2004: 3). In this way, the ROC’s claim to the mainland seemed to run counter to international conventions of modern political thinking. In order to understand the ambiguity and legal dilemma faced by the ROC, and the mechanisms with which it dealt with these, it is important to examine how the ROC defined, and continues to define, its territory.

In the field of human geography, the notion of territory generally refers to a ‘unit of contiguous space that is used, organized and managed by a social group, individual person or institution’ (Agnew 2009: 746). However, the term is slippery and definitions such as this are sometimes contested, partly because the concept needs to be placed within a certain context. The term ‘territory’ can mean different things, depending on whether one refers to personal and private territory, such as family, one’s own bedroom or a small circle of friends, or rather to a larger-scale territory such as one’s workplace, profession, society, culture, religion, country, and indeed the term may also apply on a regional or global scale. Partly, this slipperiness is due to the fact that the word may refer not only to a particular space or a bound area, but may also imply a relationship with the practice of ‘territoriality’—that is, a spatial behaviour.

Etymologically, a fixed meaning of ‘territory’ also proves elusive since the origin of the word derives from the Latin *territorium*, which, as Gottmann (1973: 16–17) points out, is formed by adding the suffix *torium* (‘belonging to’ or ‘surrounding’) to *terra* (‘earth’ or ‘land’). The word *territorium* originally referred to a city-state’s surrounding district over which it had jurisdiction. However, Bhabha (1994: 99–100) reminds us of another etymological explanation, which makes the concept even more unsettling and multifaceted, proposing that the word ‘territory’ ‘derives from both *terra* (“earth”) and *terrere*
The Norman conquest of England is often seen as the beginning of British territorial claims. The Norman kings, in fact, were not the first to claim the land as their own. The Anglo-Saxon kings had already claimed it as their own, and the Normans simply took over the existing territories. The Norman conquest, however, was a more formal and systematic way of claiming the land. The Normans used a system of feudalism, which gave them control over the land and its inhabitants. This system allowed the Normans to claim the land as their own, and it also allowed them to control the land and its inhabitants.

The Norman conquest was also a time of great stability. The Normans were able to bring order to the land, and they were able to bring about a new era of prosperity. The Normans were able to build new cities, and they were able to create a new culture. The Normans were able to create a new system of government, and they were able to create a new system of law.

The Norman conquest was a time of great change. The Normans brought with them a new culture, a new language, and a new way of life. The Normans brought with them a new system of government, and they brought with them a new system of law. The Normans brought with them a new system of education, and they brought with them a new system of religion. The Norman conquest was a time of great change, and it was a time of great opportunity.

The Norman conquest was also a time of great power. The Normans were able to conquer the land and to control it. The Normans were able to control the land and to control its inhabitants. The Normans were able to control the land and to control its resources. The Normans were able to control the land and to control its wealth.

The Norman conquest was a time of great change, a time of great opportunity, and a time of great power. The Normans were able to bring about a new era of prosperity, and they were able to create a new culture. The Normans were able to create a new system of government, and they were able to create a new system of law. The Norman conquest was a time of great change, a time of great opportunity, and a time of great power.
original and only legitimate Chinese regime, which had been usurped temporarily by the CCP. To convey the image of the ROC as the true heir of Chinese traditional culture to its international counterparts, and also to the overseas Chinese and the domestic audience, the KMT regime took pains to assume the role of inheritor of traditional values as the direct descendant of Chinese political orthodoxy — referred to in Chinese as daotong. This is a Confucian idea, and the term is usually translated as ‘the transmission of the Way’ or ‘Confucian orthodoxy’ (Zhu 1990). The KMT’s legitimacy was said to derive from its position as successor to Sun Yat-sen, while Sun’s legitimacy was based on his political and moral succession to Confucius and Mencius (Lee 2004: 45–7). In contrast, the communist regime was portrayed as being led by a group of foreign ideologues who had no intention of safeguarding Chinese culture and tradition. In this way the ROC was positioned as the only legal Chinese regime: it portrayed itself as representing the real China and thus fundamentally different from the notorious gongfei (communist bandits), who were guided by foreign ideology. This strategy worked to some degree until the 1970s while the US continued to support the KMT regime. In addition, the anti-communist stance had also been effective at the height of the Cold War in differentiating the ROC and sustaining its legitimacy in terms of gaining the support of other nations. Nevertheless, losing control of the mainland meant the ROC’s international legal status was dubious, and the longer the political regime remained outside of China, the less credible its claim to the mainland became. After a string of diplomatic defeats in the 1970s, the ROC government was at best, for many countries, an exiled Chinese government whose legitimacy had long ceased and whose territorial claim was untenable.

**ROC territorial insistence**

In terms of ROC territory and territoriality, the following aspects of the yearbooks can be usefully examined: firstly, the territorial claims made in these government publications, including the ways in which official national territory was presented, and how and why particular changes were made over the decades; secondly, the political and psychological hierarchy (between China and Taiwan, between the central and the peripheral) explicitly stated and also implied in the yearbooks, as well as their relative ‘places’ in the national imagination; thirdly, the kinds of territorial strategies that were designed and implemented to cope with difficult Chinese claims; and lastly, the cartographic expression of ‘nationhood’. By examining each of these aspects of the ROC Yearbooks, the following analyzes the ROC national territory and investigates the ways in which postwar state territoriality has been conducted and why new spatial strategies occurred in response to changes in the political situation. While the reiteration of an ROC national territory was perhaps the focus of the early postwar yearbooks, in later volumes attention was gradually shifted to the more pragmatic strategies of localizing the ROC and territorializing Taiwan. And where insistence on the ROC’s unchangeable national territories had been both forceful and stubborn, an agility was shown in the shifts and adaptations in response to recent changes in the political environment both within and beyond the island.

National territory is of crucial importance for any nation-state and is not willingly given up or easily altered (unless it is a matter of ‘increase’). Once control over its national land is lost, then territorial practices are not able to function, and if there is no land under the direct control of the nation-state, there will be no political power or opportunity for the regime to exercise spatiality. Thus, any territorial claim not only relates to a piece of land, but also possesses a symbolic and political dimension, through which the nation-state establishes its authorities over the locality. The challenge that faced the ROC authorities on Taiwan was precisely the lack of territorial control. With no actual control over the mainland, it was difficult to sustain ROC sovereignty and international recognition. Little wonder then that the ROC reiterates and insisted on its post-1949 territorial boundaries in order to emphasize its political and historical legitimacy vis-à-vis the PRC. Equally important, the ROC ‘administrative divisions’ (xingzheng quhua) were also repeatedly asserted throughout the postwar decades. The administrative divisions manifested state territoriality and were the spatial framework imposed by the state in which to operate and exercise its power. By vigorously restating the post-1949 territorial condition in yearbooks, the KMT-defined spatial order that the ROC Yearbooks tried to create on paper consisted of two major elements, which can be thought of as two sides of the same coin: the ROC national territory and its administrative divisions. This declaration of ‘representing the whole of China’ persisted for half a century and was not removed from the yearbooks until 2006.

**National territory**

In contrast to the limited area actually under the effective control of the KMT after 1949, the ROC insisted on a territorial narrative that spoke of the whole of China. Officially, what the ROC understood to be its ‘national territory’ was based on the territorial claim enshrined in the ROC Constitution (1947 version) and defined as Chinese guyou [innate] territory. This included the ‘Taiwan Region’ (Taiwan diqu, controlled by the ROC), mainland China (controlled by the PRC) and the disputed areas such as Mongolia difang (currently the Republic of Mongolia), Tannu Uriaanhai and 64 settlements east of the Amur River (both currently under Russian control), Southern Tibet (currently under Indian control), the Jiangxinbo area (current under Burmese control) and the western part of the Pamir Mountains (now part of Tajikistan and Afghanistan). Whenever the term ‘guyou territory’ was used, it was done not only to establish historical and cultural ties, but also to create the idea of ‘completeness’. That is to say, the ROC guyou territory was conceptualized as an innate and complete piece of land that should not be encroached upon by foreign imperial powers.

The ways in which a nation presents itself in its national yearbooks offers an interesting self-portrait, reflecting as it does a nation’s own expectations, its perceived position in the world and its overall worldview. In the ROC Yearbooks,
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China was described as one of the world's most important nations, and in the 1950s, when the hope of recovering the mainland was still high, the ROC consistently presented itself as one of the largest countries in the world:

The ROC is located in East Asia, facing the Pacific Ocean to the east, bordering the Pamir Plateau on the west, neighboring the Indo-Chinese peninsula and the Indian Ocean to the south, and adjacent to Outer Mongolia and Siberia to the north... Even disregarding the area of Outer Mongolia (1,621,201 km²), the total area of the ROC is 9,736,288 km², taking up one-fourth of Asia's land surface, and 1/15 of the world's total land area. The ROC is the largest country in Asia and the third largest country in the world. (YB 1951: 1)

Emphasizing the scale and the privileged position of its territory, this representation of China’s central position in the world glossed over the poor prospects of this war-ridden and poverty-stricken country. In addition, the section entitled Jiangyu (“Territory”) was always placed in the introductory chapter of the yearbooks to demonstrate its importance. The focus on China’s huge size seemed to suggest that the greatness of its territorial reach mirrored the immensity of the nation and its influence. Typically, to further glorify the nation, this Jiangyu section usually featured a territorial inventory, as illustrated, for example, by this extract from the first yearbook:

The southeast and the east sides of Chinese territory face the sea, and the coastline extends from the Beilin River in the south to the Yalu River in the north. So far, most of the coastal islands have been returned to Chinese control, with the exception of Hong Kong, Macao, and the Ryukyu Islands [Liouyu]... Except for sections of China’s boundaries with the USSR, Afghanistan, India, Burma, and Mongolia that have not yet been settled, most national boundaries are delimited clearly after hundreds of years of diplomatic negotiation. (YB 1951: 1)

Since territories are seen as the foundation of a nation, declarations of this sort were targeted primarily at an external audience, that is to say the international community and also the CCP. It was especially important to include the disputed areas and list them in detail, such as the western part of Xinjiang bordering the USSR, Afghanistan and India, and also the areas bordering Burma and Mongolia. This list of ‘national territory’ was clearly defined in the first yearbook and remained almost unchanged for the next half century.

**ROC administrative divisions**

The yearbooks gave equal weight and exposure to the meticulous presentation of the ROC’s ‘administrative divisions’. The administrative divisions of a nation can be understood as both the materialization and the presence of the state, reflecting its spatial organization and practices. The administrative divisions manifest the operational ability and political power of the regime, set out the allocation of power at the local level and map out the spatial order of the state. Thus the ways in which the administrative divisions are structured can be thought of as an embodiment of the nation’s spatial politics. To strengthen the political legitimacy of the ROC and its ‘rightful ownership’ of China, the yearbooks called on modern Chinese history to stress the legacy and political legitimacy of the KMT. The administrative divisions quoted in all the yearbooks until 2005 were based on the ROC territorial blueprint announced on 5 June 1947 (YB 1951: 35; YB 2005: 40). This version was clearly laid out and presented as follows:

By the time that the ROC Government established the national capital in Nanjing, the administrative divisions were streamlined on two [local] levels: Provinces and Counties, based on the instructions in the Jianggu dagang [Fundamentals of National Reconstruction] by Sun Yat-sen... The country now consists of 35 provinces, 2,032 counties, 12 Yuanxiashi [Yuan-controlled Municipalities], 55 Shengxiashi [Provincial-level Municipalities], one Guanliju [Management Bureau] at Beijing, 40 Shezhiju [Preparatory Bureaus], one Tebie xingzhengqu [Special Administrative Region, SAR] in Hainan Island, and one Difang [Region] in Tibet. (YB 1951: 35)

**Territorialization**

The territorial descriptions presented in the ROC Yearbooks remained virtually unchanged for over half a century. However, slight but nevertheless significant changes have taken place in three areas – relaxing the insistence on the national boundaries, the national capital and the administrative divisions – all of which had once been emphasized as the essential components of the ROC’s territorial claim. Although the ROC’s territorial declaration may have appeared to be rigid and fixed before the 2000s, there had been modifications in yearbooks either to reflect new developments in Taiwan or to rectify 'errors'. The most prominent examples are perhaps the territorial claims to Mongolia and the South China Sea islands (Nanhai zhudao). A U-turn on the issue of Mongolian independence in 1954 reflected the change in official attitude, while the strengthening of the territorial claim to the South China Sea islands in recent years can be seen as part of Taiwan’s new strategy to lay the foundations for an independent island state.

The first three ROC Yearbooks, published between 1951 and 1953, openly stated that 'The Nationalist Government has approved the appeal for the independence of Outer Mongolia' and recognized Mongolian independence (e.g. YB 1951: 1, 35). However, this official position changed in the 1954 yearbook, echoing the ROC’s 1952 appeal to the UN to condemn the Soviet Union for violating the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (American Society of International Law 1946). After successfully pushing through UN General Assembly Resolution 505 in 1952, the ROC Legislative
Yuan declared the abolition of the Treaty on 24 February 1953 and withdrew its support of Mongolian independence. From Yearbook 1954 onwards, while most of the description of the national territory in the ROC Yearbooks remained unchanged, the text relating to Mongolian independence was removed, and without any explanation Mongolia was quietly reabsorbed into ROC territory (YB 1954: 17). To rearrange Mongolia's place in the Chinese territory, it was grouped with Tibet under the category of Difang — and, as if a natural fact, was snugly slotted into its 'rightful place' within the ROC administrative divisions and the national imagination. By withdrawing recognition of Mongolian independence the surface area of ROC territory increased by 1,621,201 km² overnight. As the consequence of this sudden 'increase' of land, the yearbooks from 1955 until 2005 made the bold claim that the ROC was 'the second largest country in the world' (YB 1955: 1; YB 2005: 36). In addition to the usual reason of sustaining the ROC's legitimacy, the attempt in recent years to territorialize the South China Sea also served other purposes. Firstly, the claim was economically motivated, designed to protect the potential rights to natural resources found in this region. Secondly, it had been persistently made to link ROC ownership with China's historic glory and maritime achievements of the past. This construction of vast ROC territorial waters echoed the opening statement in the early yearbooks, which boasted that China's geographical advantages made it 'both a continental country and a maritime one' (YB 1956: 1).

In the first few ROC Yearbooks of the early 1950s, the descriptions of the South China Seas islands were initially very short, running only to a few sentences. However, this brief account was expanded to take up a whole section of the yearbook from 1956 onwards. The new section listed the names of more than 150 islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs and sandbars that supposedly belonged to the ROC:

Thousands of small islets and islands that are scattered all over the sea belong to our country . . . There are four island groups including Tungsha Island [Dongsha qundao, aka the Pratas Islands], Nansha Islands [Nansha qundao, aka the Spratly Islands], Hiiisha Islands [Xisha qundao, aka the Paracel Islands], and Chungsha Islands [Zhongsha qundao, aka the Macelesfield Bank] . . . The great expanse of the Chinese continental shelf and the nearby waters are all ours [emphasis added]. (YB 1956: 2)

The yearbooks identified Zengmu ansa (aka James Shoal) as the southernmost part of ROC territory, which sits south of the Nansha Islands and is located approximately at 4° north latitude (YB 1956: 19). In this way it appeared as if simply naming those archipelagos and pointing them out in the maps was tantamount to 'owning' them. To further territorialize the area, the South China Sea was described as China's 'domestic sea' (nethai) where overseas Chinese sojourned 'as a result of such a godsend' (YB 1956: 2). Thus control of the South China Sea region was understood as being endowed upon China through 'divine' privilege.

National imagination vs territorial reality

The area that is currently under the direct control of the ROC — usually referred to as the 'Taiwan Region' — is not extensive and includes the island of Taiwan and some nearby islands. In contrast to its official claims of Chinese 'guoyou territory', after 1949 the ROC had in effect shrunk to a state with direct control over only one province (Taiwan) and some small islands under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. In other words, the ROC on Taiwan had become yisheng zhi guo (a state with only one province). In stark contrast to the small area of 36,179 km² that was effectively under ROC control, the official claim published in the ROC Yearbooks extended its territory by a factor of 300, to 11,420,000 km². Defying conventional political thinking, the KMT-led ROC government on Taiwan insisted on a Chinese territory that was not only out of its reach but also bigger than the actual area of the PRC. While this claim may have seemed bizarre, it is important to understand not only why and how the ROC made such an unrealistic declaration but also the ways in which ROC territorial statements were discreetly watered down over the decades.

The lack of direct control over the mainland has been the fundamental problem of the ROC territorial claim that could not be resolved simply by its unilateral insistence on a national territory that was defined by the KMT. After a series of democratic defeats in the 1970s, the insistence on ROC territory became increasingly unsustainable, both domestically and internationally. Starting in 1991, the amendment Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC (Chonghua Minguo xianfa zengxiu tiawen) has been revised seven times to offer alternative ways to respond to contemporary political developments that the ROC Constitution (1947 version) could no longer adequately justify. Against the background of democratization and increasingly vocal demands for independence, 18 DPP legislators filed a petition on 12 April 1993 requesting the Justices of the Constitutional Court to clarify and interpret the concept of 'guoyou territory' that was stipulated in the ROC Constitution (Judicial Yuan 1993a). In contrast to the certainty demonstrated in the yearbook, which provided an inventory of national territories, the Justices appeared to be less certain. A ruling — the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 328 — was reached by the Constitutional Court on 26 November 1993, which explained why the court was not able to rule on this issue:

Article 4 of the Constitution provides that the national territory of the Republic of China is determined 'according to its remaining national boundaries'. Based on political and historical reasons, a special procedure is . . . required for any change of territory. The delimitation of national territory accordingly to its history is a significant political question and thus it is beyond the reach of judicial review. (Judicial Yuan 1993b)

The Court believed that the delimitation of national territory was a purely political issue and not a legal one, and thus could only be decided by the state. In addition, any change of 'guoyou territory' required a special procedure, which would only be made possible after formal approval by the National Assembly. The Justices of the
The ‘Free China’

In most of the yearbooks before the 2000s, the ‘place’ of Taiwan was somewhat vague in the ROC national imagination, and the island was almost invisible in the 1950s. In comparison to the insistence on Chinese ‘guoyu territory’, the image of the island on which the ROC government-in-exile resided was unclear. The most obvious characteristic with which Taiwan was endowed in the national imagination was its portrayal as a historical Han island. Thus the identity of Taiwan, as presented in the yearbooks, was articulated in relation to its Chinese ownership. The positioning of China first and Taiwan second was long taken for granted and was treated as the natural order for decades: before democratization in the 1990s, the real protagonist of the ROC Yearbooks was China. The ways in which the yearbooks were structured and compiled suggested that China would always be the priority for, and the central concern of, the ROC. In addition to the suggestion that the mainland was the major and finer part of China, the China-first/Taiwan-second positioning also divided them by implication into two totally separate entities – ‘the mainland’ and the ‘Taiwan Region’. Both in terms of the structure of the yearbooks and their content, the division between the mainland (‘China proper’) and Taiwan (‘beyond the seas’) was clear-cut. Throughout the 60-year history of the ROC Yearbook, the descriptions about the two localities have never been taken as one, and have always been separated in the ROC national imagination. This consistent demarcation implied their fundamental differences: the mainland seemed to be associated with the past, while Taiwan stood for the contemporary and current.

In the first decades, the yearbook featured only two short chapters dedicated to the Taiwan region – ‘Taiwan Province’ and ‘Kinmen, Mazu and the Other Islands’ – which were placed at the end of each publication. Structurally, by putting these chapters at the very end of a 1,000-page volume, the yearbooks conveyed a sense that Taiwan was somehow trivial and low on the list of ROC priorities. The first signs of change appeared in 1960, when the yearbook formally acknowledged that the KMT government had lost the mainland and retreated to Taiwan (YB 1959: 494). In addition, the material specifically concerning the Taiwan region was moved forward to the opening chapters. When it became clear that it would not be possible to launch a counterattack on the PRC and to retake the mainland as Chiang Kai-shek had wished, Taiwan’s subaltern position to China had to be adjusted and replaced with a new role at the forefront of the anti-communist battle as the Fuxing jidi (the base for reviving the country) (e.g. YB 1963: 51; YB 1969: 48; YB 1974: 52; YB 1978: 64). Clearly reflecting the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, one yearbook stated: ‘Today, Taiwan is not only the base for reviving the country, but has also become the front-line of the world’s anti-slavery struggle’ (YB 1959: 494).

The 1970s saw fatal blows to the ROC’s international standing following the loss of its UN seat. To cope with its increasingly isolated position in the international community and strengthen internal loyalty, a new approach had to be developed in the yearbooks to gloss over the ROC’s questionable existence. The
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term ‘Free Region’ (ziyou diqu) was coined to refer to the areas that were actually under ROC control, and thus to differentiate itself from the PRC. The depiction of ROC-controlled territory as ‘Free China’ plainly implied that the mainland was the opposite, being described as the ‘Fallen Area’ (hunxian diqu). This change resulted in a different portrayal of Taiwan in the yearbooks, and for the first time the island was presented as an equal to the mainland. In the 1970s the yearbooks started to emphasize an anti-communist position (so as to play an active role in the World Anti-Communist League), rather than focus on the single goal of retaking the mainland.

Territorial hierarchy

Although Taiwan’s importance had been recognized, its place in the Chinese national imagination remained secondary. By emphasizing its strategic position in the anti-communist battle, the existence of the ‘Free Region’ was dependent on the enslavement of the ‘Fallen Area’. To further tighten the bonds between the two ‘Chinas’, the yearbooks began to stress the close ethnic, cultural and historical ties between the mainland and Taiwan in the 1970s. The shift from emphasizing China’s centrality and glory to focusing on Taiwan’s historical relations with China and its crucial role in China’s future was not a natural transition. Rather, it was a reluctant response designed to cope with the growing challenge to KMT rule from within the island. The structure and focus of the yearbooks was changed not only to redress the imbalanced treatment of the two localities, which had previously positioned Taiwan as secondary to the dominant presence of China, but also to remove the KMT’s embarrassment over its inability to address the current state of affairs on the mainland. To bury the problem of its limited control over Chinese territory, the ROC Yearbooks intentionally blurred the boundaries between the national and the local and used the term Taiwan interchangeably with the ROC. For example, the phrase guanguo (literally, ‘the whole of the nation’) was generally used in the yearbooks to refer to events and developments in Taiwan. In other words, while the phrase appeared to signal the totality of the territory to which the ROC laid claim, the content of the yearbooks relating to annual events, developments and achievements was limited to the Taiwan region. The events and developments that took place on the mainland were compressed into a separate chapter and became almost like an appendix at the end of the yearbooks after the 1950s. To obscure the fact that the PRC, rather than the ROC, was internationally recognized as the legitimate Chinese regime, the yearbooks simply referred to the mainland as dali, treating it as a part of the national territory when dealing with geographical and cultural issues, and as ‘the ROC’ when asserting its own political legitimacy. However, in order to avoid giving the false impression that the ROC referred only to Taiwan, the content relating to annual development and statistics often made no direct reference to a specific locality.

Although the focus of the yearbooks might have been shifted from China to Taiwan, the main thrust of the content relating to Taiwan still concentrated on the close ties between the two places and emphasized the idea that Taiwan was an integral part of China. The bonds between them were sometimes traced back through historical records, while other connections were constructed through archaeological, ethnic and geological ‘evidence’. Although the approaches adopted might vary from year to year, this strategy was consistent up to 2000. Three major implications were embedded in the yearbooks to support the close-ties discourse and contributed to cementing the hierarchical relation between Taiwan and the mainland: firstly, that Taiwan was part of Chinese ‘guyou territory’; secondly, that people in Taiwan and those in China belonged to one family; and thirdly, that development in Taiwan relied completely on the hard work of the Han Chinese. The discourse of close cross-Strait ties was constructed on the basis of these three premises and laid the foundations for the ROC national imagination. The first connotation was territorial in nature, while the latter two stressed cultural and historical factors and were blended together to form an encompassing narrative that formed the basis of ROC nationalist rhetoric.

Chinese ‘guyou territory’

Chinese historical records referred to the existence of an island – or sometimes islands – located off the southeast coast of China and documented occasional visits made to the island(s). There has been much discussion of which names in the historical records may have actually referred to Taiwan; some of the most well-known of these are Liuqiu, Yizhou, Dayuan, Penglai, Jilongshan, Dongfang and Beigang. However, in the absence of firm evidence, one cannot be absolutely certain which island(s) these historical accounts referred to. In the ROC Yearbooks, many historical references were mentioned in order to ‘prove’ Taiwan’s long historical connection with China (e.g. YB 1951: 738; YB 1976: 51; YB 1984: 55). Furthermore, to reinforce the idea of the innateness of Chinese territory, the yearbooks often used these historical records to establish Chinese ownership of Taiwan and its long-established cultural and ethnic connection with the mainland.

As a way of dealing with political uncertainty, the ambiguity inherent in ancient texts became increasingly useful in creating Taiwan’s identity as a Chinese island. The emphasis placed on the historical relations between China and Taiwan was central to the opening statement in the chapter ‘Taiwan’ until 2000. Bold and sometimes even creative claims were made to establish Chinese ownership of Taiwan as early as possible, so as to ‘prove’ the Han origin of the majority of Taiwanese. Similar statements emphasized the long history of communication across the Taiwan Strait (e.g. YB 1959: 493; YB 1979: 51; YB 1998: 65), the ancient migration from the mainland and the historical occupation of Taiwan by the Chinese dynasties (e.g. YB 1962: 60; YB 1976: 51). In contrast, Taiwan’s historical contact with ‘outsiders’ (i.e. non-Han Chinese) was dealt with relatively briefly. For example, Taiwan’s western name, Formosa, was mentioned only in passing in Yearbook 1959 (494). However, to ensure that the Chinese ‘discovery’ of Taiwan appeared to predate other potential claims, starting from 1960, the yearbooks began to construct a rhetoric claiming that the
Chinese ‘discovered’ Taiwan as early as the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD). They stated that the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD) was the beginning of Chinese development on the island and attributed the dynastic period of the Song (960–1279 AD) and the Yuan (1271–1368 AD) with first establishing a local Chinese infrastructure there (e.g. YB 1960: 67; YB 1963: 49). In an astonishingly assertive tone, this historical timeline was compressed into a single sentence and was presented as a ‘known fact’. In the 1970s, a much bolder claim was made, putting an even earlier date on historical connections and asserting that the earliest record of Taiwan in an ancient Chinese text was to be found in the chapter Yungong of the Book of History22 in which the island was referred to as Yangzhou zhi yu (territory of Yangzhou) (e.g. YB 1961: 59; YB 1970: 49; YB 1975: 51).

However, the intricate ties linking the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were not limited to occasional visits or historical conquests; the yearbooks also discussed links between China and Taiwan specifically in terms of culture (i.e. Taiwanese culture being a branch of Chinese culture since pre-historical times) (e.g. YB 1951: 737; YB 1970: 49; YB 1975: 51), ethnicity (i.e. Taiwanese being either Han Chinese or descended from minorities from China) (e.g. YB 1966: 50; YB 1971: 58; YB 1973: 49) and geology (i.e. the island being originally connected to the mainland) (e.g. YB 1951: 740; YB 1973: 49; YB 1998: 65). Various examples illustrating similarities between Taiwan and China were presented to establish the close relations; for example, the wooden clogs often worn by the Taiwanese were taken as evidence of the connection between Taiwan and southern China (YB 1963: 56). When mainlanders arrived in Taiwan after 1945, they were often struck by the chunky noise of the wooden clogs worn by the local Taiwanese. This type of footwear was usually associated with the Japanese. However, to argue against this prevailing view, and to weaken the perceived influence of Japanese culture on Taiwan, the yearbook cited a poem written in 1893 by Hu Tieh-hua, a Qing official working in Taiwan, in which he described the local custom of wearing wooden clogs.22 In this way, the authors of the yearbook attempted to prove that wooden clogs had in fact been introduced from Guangdong and Fujian and were commonly worn before the Japanese occupation.

We are family

The rhetoric of ‘we are family’ can be found throughout the yearbooks published before 2000. As mentioned before, the emphasis placed on China and Taiwan being one entity relied heavily on establishing Taiwan’s close connections with the mainland and portraying it as an extension of China. For example, many yearbooks stated that cross-Strait trading had been established in the Han Dynasty, with Kuaiji on the mainland serving as the centre for this activity (e.g. YB 1951: 737; YB 1976: 51), and indicated that the island was ‘formally absorbed into the Chinese territory in the Yuan Dynasty’ (YB 1962: 60). Accordingly, the influx of people from the mainland and the resulting cultural influence were described as ‘unceasing’ (wushi huozi) (YB 1985: 77). If Taiwan and China were portrayed as members of the same family, then this ‘family’ was seen not only as a cultural and historical entity, but also as an ethnic and geographical entity. Many statements in the yearbooks supporting this idea stressed the ‘oneness’ of Taiwan and the mainland, asserting that they were ‘one entity’ (yiti) (e.g. YB 1960: 69; YB 1971: 49; YB 1997: 65) which shared the same origin (tong chu yiye) and whose blood was thicker than water (xue nong yu shui) (e.g. YB 1970: 50; YB 1972: 50; YB 1975: 52).

In early yearbooks, various explanations were propounded to support the territorial claims with ‘evidence’. However, doubts about the discourse of Chinese ownership started to surface in the 1970s, and consequently the ethnic claims made in the yearbooks about the essential ‘oneness’ of the Chinese and Taiwanese appeared audacious and unwarranted. Consequently, selected archaeological finds and historical records became increasingly important in supporting KMT rule. In addition, a ‘scientific’ approach was employed to reach the conclusion that Taiwan had belonged to China since ancient times. Of all the sources of information used to back these claims, the most common were geological and archaeological. For example, a statement about the pre-history of Taiwan published in Yearbook 1961, which later reappeared in many other yearbooks, is typical of this approach: ‘based on the geologic history of the earth, Taiwan was still a part of the Chinese mainland a million years ago ... the prehistoric culture of Taiwan belonged to the same pattern and system as those on the mainland’ (e.g. YB 1961: 58–9; YB 1971: 49; YB 1975: 51).

In addition to the geological ‘evidence’, the analysis of ethnicity was perhaps the most Han-centric and prejudiced. The indigenous peoples in Taiwan are Austronesian-speaking people and the yearbooks have generally acknowledged that they were the indigenous residents before the mass migration of Chinese in the late seventeenth century. However, the yearbooks published prior to the 1990s displayed a blatantly Han-centric perspective. For example, in the discussion of the make-up of the Taiwanese population and its cultural formation, indigenous peoples were positioned at the ‘lower level’ (xiacegeng), while the Han Chinese were categorized at the ‘higher level’ (shangceng) of the population (YB 1961: 59). A particular paragraph claimed that such divisions were based on ethnological theory and justified Chinese domination over the indigenous peoples – ‘similar to the hierarchy between the Europeans and the American Indians’. Thus the ethnicity of the indigenous peoples was appropriated by a Han-centric ethnic imagination and incorporated into the Chinese cultural discourse, with the result that indigenous peoples were marginalized in their own land. To support this myth, they were conveniently grouped into the category of the minorities in the south of China, as part of the Chinese minority Buyue,24 or ‘a branch of the Yue and Pu tribes to the south of the Yangzi River in China’ (e.g. YB 1960: 69; YB 1973: 49). With the support of science, therefore, the discourse seemed to gain gravitas, leading to the conclusion that the Taiwanese people and their culture were indeed the same as those of southeast China.

Because Taiwan was seen as only ‘one part’ of China, the island was predestined to be local and provincial. This discourse of ‘we are family’ placed Taiwan at the margins of this ‘central glory’ (Zhonghua) and portrayed the island as merely one component in the vast array of Chinese local cultures. The tactics of extolling the greatness of China on the one hand and dismissing Taiwan as
unsophisticated and parochial on the other had the effect of putting the Taiwanese down and making them accept a secondary status. Seemingly, this position reiterated the message – you are one of us, and yet less than us.

Taiwanese development relied solely on the Chinese

Facing the worsening diplomatic crisis and domestic demands for more democracy in the 1970s, the KMT government found it increasingly difficult to sustain its one-party rule in Taiwan. In order to justify the Chinese ownership of the island and strengthen the KMT’s own leadership, the position taken on the European and Japanese occupation in the yearbooks needed to be handled carefully and tactfully. The issues relating to Taiwan’s long and complicated colonial past were difficult for the yearbooks to ignore altogether. Overemphasizing or being positive about the non-Chinese influences was potentially problematic, because it could undermine the importance of the Chinese and thus weaken the Chinese claim to Taiwan. As a result, the yearbooks tended to either overlook the colonial legacies and demonize the colonizers or concentrate on the contribution made by the Han Chinese. For example, the European and Japanese occupation was condemned as ‘colonization’ (e.g. YB 1974: 67; YB 1976: 51, 64), ‘invasion’ (e.g. YB 1951: 739; YB 1961: 61), ‘repression … exploitation’ (YB 1978: 51) and ‘unlawful usurpation’ (YB 1951: 739; YB 1971: 49; YB 1976: 51). The depiction in the yearbooks of these ‘foreign forces’ and their influence in Taiwan, be it successful, exploitative or catastrophic, was always negative and hostile.

In contrast, the depiction of Chinese rule was extremely positive, with the early Chinese immigrants portrayed as the unsung heroes and pioneers of Taiwan’s history, contributing greatly to its prosperity and success (e.g. YB 1976: 64; YB 1979: 60; YB 1985: 77, 87). Since the European occupations of the seventeenth century were facts of history, in order to shore up the Chinese claim to the island the yearbooks had to date the arrival of the Chinese before the Spanish and the Dutch, always emphasizing that ‘the Chinese were here first’ (YB 1976: 64). For example, Yearbook 1977 (61) used a Dutch document to stress that the Dutch themselves recognized the fact that ‘the Chinese were here earlier in the Dagregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia (Badaweiyacheng riji)’. Even though the Dutch were the first to govern and develop Taiwan in a systematic fashion, their contribution to the island was interpreted as being ‘built wholly upon the blood and sweat of the Han Chinese’ (e.g. YB 1960: 68; YB 1969: 48; YB 1980: 67). Thus the yearbooks continually asserted that Taiwan’s development for three centuries had relied on the hard work of Chinese pioneers who ‘broke through brambles and thorns (pijing zhanji)’, who contributed to the development of the island and who eventually rooted Chinese culture here (e.g. YB 1964: 50–1; YB 1978: 64; YB 1985: 87). By presenting the Han Chinese immigrants in this light, they were construed as the true ‘keepers’ of the land who had earned their territorial rights through sheer hard work and dedication.

After the mid-1970s, both the reliance on ‘scientific proof’ and the suggestion that Taiwan was an integral part of the Chinese family were gradually toned down. Instead, territorial claims were made by matter-of-fact statements in an assured and assertive manner. For example, starting from the 1970s, it was presented as an unquestionable fact in the yearbooks that Taiwan had ‘long been our national territory’ (woguo lingtu) (e.g. YB 1970: 50; YB 1984: 55; YB 1997: 65). The tactic of naturalization had the effect of reducing the feelings of uncertainty surrounding Chinese claims to Taiwan, suggesting that what was said was absolutely true. Therefore there was no need to provide evidence or explanation, because the ROC claim over the mainland was regarded as a ‘plain fact’. In addition, the ways in which these statements were presented were also indicative. For example, the image of exploitation and oppression was employed to portray European and Japanese colonial occupation, while the language used to describe Chinese rule implied top-down benevolence and, more importantly, a sense of inclusion in the ‘Chinese’ family. The yearbooks continually used the word wo – meaning either I or me, we or us, my or our – when referring to the mainland, the ROC, China or Taiwan. Such phrases were commonly deployed as a marker of territorial ownership, such as ‘the mainland of our country’ (woguo dalu) (e.g. YB 1951: 740; YB 1970: 50; YB 1987: 87), ‘our mainland’ (wo dalu) (e.g. YB 1951: 737; YB 1959: 493; YB 1963: 50) and ‘our ROC’ (wo Zhonghua Minguo) (e.g. YB 1964: 50–1; YB 1969: 48; YB 1975: 52).

It was not until 1960 that the chapters on the Taiwan region were finally moved from the end of the yearbook to the opening section. Entitled ‘Taiwan Province’ and ‘Kinmen, Matsu, and other islands’, the content and structure of these chapters remained roughly unchanged until 1996, when they were finally updated substantially. Rather than providing a general understanding of the region, the two introductory chapters had always started with a section called ‘Historical Origins’ (lishi yuanyuan), which focused on the Chinese relationship with Taiwan. This seemed to suggest that Taiwan had no (meaningful) history before the arrival of the Han Chinese, and that no development had taken place prior to Chinese rule. In other words, the chapters about the Taiwan region were presented in such a way that they only provided an account of Taiwan from the Chinese perspective. However, the fact that the beginning of Taiwanese history was dated according to its ‘discovery’ by the Chinese (YB 1959: 494; YB 1960: 67) clearly reflected the mentality of outsiders and colonizers. Under their gaze, Taiwan was objectified as a ‘blank space’ which outside powers might fight over, occupy, and make use of; as to the island and the islanders, they were of no importance.

Territorializing cultural domain and Chinese dao tong

Generally speaking, most of the ROC yearbooks before the 2000s had perpetuated the above notions – that Taiwan was an integral part of Chinese gyyou territories, that the Taiwanese were members of the Chinese family and that Taiwan’s development relied solely on the immigrants from the mainland. This line of thinking – i.e. that Taiwan is part of China and that the Taiwanese are Chinese – had not only been reiterated as government propaganda in the yearbooks, but had also been inscribed in education and daily practices (see the discussion in Chapters 4 and
5). In stark contrast with the negative portrayal of the colonial rule of the ‘foreigners’, China was presented as the rightful sovereign of the land.

However, the rhetoric of ‘we are family’ had an undesirable side effect which could possibly be exploited by the PRC. The China that Taiwan was supposedly a part of could only be the ROC’s China and should never be mistaken for territory under PRC rule. This possible confusion left the ROC government with no choice but to insist on a discourse of China’s ‘guyou territory’ that faithfully followed the guiding principles of the ROC Constitution (1947 version) so as to ‘justify’ its political legitimacy. The approach was based on the premises that the ROC was the lawful territorial owner of China and that the mainland had been usurped unlawfully and temporarily by the CCP. The insistence not only implied the ROC’s historical legacy and political pedigree, but it also reinforced a nationhood that was defined by the KMT. In so doing, a ‘Chinese dao tong’ discourse was constructed to establish the supreme status of the ROC in Chinese history as the ‘rightful’ successor and heir to China’s Confucian culture and political tradition. This discourse neatly echoed the political dao tong upheld by Sun Yat-sen. In replying to a question posed by the communist advisor Henk Sneevliet in 1922, Sun Yat-sen related the foundation of his political philosophy to the idea of Chinese dao tong:

There is a dao tong in China, which Yao passed on to Shun, Yu, Tang, King Wen, King Wu, Duke of Zhou, and Confucius without interruption. My philosophy is founded on this dao tong, and my revolution is based precisely on this dao tong. (Lo I-chun 2005)

In other words, proposing that the ROC was the heir of Chinese dao tong, this discourse gave the ROC not only political legitimacy but also a cultural mandate. This approach was a commonly used tactic in the ROC Yearbooks. For example, the Yearbook 1960 described the birth of the ROC as the succession of Chinese dao tong, and claimed that this dao tong ‘had come to maturity in the Sui and Tang Dynasties, had been maintained under Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing rule, and had finally been inherited by the newly established Republic’. The rise and fall of dynasties and political regimes was depicted as a natural course of events: ‘There has been prosperity and decline, glory and humiliation, order and warfare in Chinese history. However, history has always shown that unlawful disturbances could be curbed and the recovery of the country eventually achieved’ (YB 1960: 1, 6). This narrative therefore also justified the KMT’s defeat in the civil war as part of a ‘natural’ political cycle and the normal historical phenomena of ‘order and chaos’, ‘peace and warfare’ and ‘rise and fall’. The implication was that ‘eventual victory’ would be won by the true heir of Chinese dao tong, and therefore the mission to recover the mainland would ultimately be accomplished. In other words, the emphasis on Chinese dao tong was in effect a form of cultural territoriality.

This new strategy was adopted in the yearbooks after disastrous diplomatic defeats in the 1970s to territorialize the Chinese cultural domain and to distinguish the ROC from the communist regime which had assaulted Chinese tradition. Vowing to preserve and protect Chinese culture and tradition, the ROC on Taiwan established itself as the representative of ‘cultural China’ that could not be disputed as easily as the physical territory, particularly during the Cultural Revolution when there was a cultural vacuum on the mainland. Although the ROC had neither direct control over the mainland nor international recognition as the representative of the whole of China, this discourse ensured that it territorialized a symbolic cultural sphere and promoted the significance of upholding Chinese dao tong. Posing as the cultural protector and the true guardian of Chinese tradition, the ROC set itself up as the rightful leader of the cultural homeland for Chinese around the world, and also played the role as a surrogate China prior to the PRC’s economic reforms and opening up to the outside world in the late 1970s. In this way, geographic area was no longer the only territory that mattered in the national imagination. The fact of not being able to physically control the mainland was presented only as the consequence of an unfortunate historical event. The other side of the argument was that without a cultural and historical legacy, the territorial domination of the communist ‘usurpers’ would only be temporary. Hence, the ROC on Taiwan was portrayed as the true China – the location of its government did not matter, because the place over which the regime actually presided was only a matter of short-term contingency. What was most important was the legacy of Chinese dao tong: the intangible assets that held greater sway than ‘mere’ territorial occupation.

Accordingly, the structure, priority and content of ROC Yearbooks have also suggested a particular kind of hierarchy and worldview: one in which China was ‘the centre of the world’ (Zhongguo), possessing traditional dao tong and high culture, while Taiwan was peripheral and secondary. Thus the island was seen only as one of the spatial ‘carriers’ of the great civilization. Consequently, Taiwan itself had become a meaningless place, since its local characteristics and geographical dimension were suppressed in order to heighten the universality of an idealized ‘cultural China’25. However, the spatial homogeneity stressed by the state was always in conflict with the chaos and fluidity of daily life. This official priority of the China-first/Taiwan-second principle meant that the ROC’s actual location was considered unimportant, the geographical and social settings of its locality did not matter and a sense of Taiwan was replaced by a homogenous sense of Greater China. The difficulty thus occurred when the ROC authorities tried to create a homogeneous model of ‘cultural China’ to which Taiwan could not entirely conform. Agnew (1987) famously proposed three fundamental aspects of the concept of ‘place’: location – where a space is located on the earth’s surface; locale – the material setting for social relations; and sense of place. By smoothing the three dimensions that made Taiwan a meaningful place and allowed its people to be rooted, the island was rendered a non-place, its environment became a ‘flatscape’ (Relph 1976) and its inhabitants came to be rootless and homeless.

Ambiguity as strategy

As time went by, it had become increasingly difficult to maintain the motivation to sustain the anti-communist struggle26 and to uphold the claim of ‘representing
the whole of China’ after the 1970s. To avoid the embarrassment caused by their highly questionable territorial claims, the yearbooks adopted two strategies — arbitrary insistence on guiyou territory on the one hand and silent treatment of or deliberate vagueness regarding its lack of territorial control on the other. As a result, the China-first/Taiwan-second principle had to be adjusted and the strategies of ambiguity, silence and omission became ever more important. Because of diminishing diplomatic recognition, the once marginal Taiwan had paradoxically been moved to the centre to represent the ‘true China’. It was during the hype about Chinese tradition and culture in the Cultural Renaissance Movement that Taiwan’s place in the ROC national imagination had been enhanced. To position Taiwan at the centre of ‘cultural China’ by constructing a new role for the island was a strategy to justify the existence of the ROC. In the process of stressing Taiwan’s symbolic significance in the Chinese cultural domain, it was important not to draw attention to the gulf between the proposed Chinese guiyou territory and the areas that were actually under the jurisdiction of the ROC. However, having no control over the claimed territory, the insistence on ROC sovereignty and legitimacy became increasingly problematic. Of all the difficulties involved, the overlapping of political powers between the national (ROC) and the provincial (Taiwan) was the most embarrassing predicament. To ease tension and avoid drawing attention to this problem, the references to ‘China’, ‘the ROC’ and ‘Taiwan’ in the yearbooks were used interchangeably, thus blurring their boundaries. In order to avoid exposing its territorial weakness and also to strengthen the KMT’s legitimacy, the strategies of ambiguity and omission were employed. That is to say, the best policy was to keep territorial description vague and omit the fact that the actual territory controlled by the ROC was confined to the Taiwan region. One of the best examples of this strategy in the yearbooks was the selective information about the administrative status of Taipei City.

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, Taiwan became the 35th Province of the ROC, and Taipei City was thus made Taiwan’s shenghui (provincial capital) and also a zhixiaishi (Provincial-level municipality). When the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the status of ‘wartime (national) capital’ was bestowed on the city, similar to that of Chongqing (aka Chungking) during the Sino-Japanese War. In 1967, Taipei was upgraded from a provincial municipality to become Taiwan’s first zhixiaishi, a national-level municipality directly controlled by the central government. In other words, postwar Taipei had always retained multiple identities — shenghui, zhixiaishi and wartime capital. Although these multiple identities signified Taipei’s vital role as the political, cultural and economic centre during a period of national crisis, they also indicated its secondary status to the centre (i.e. mainland China) and the temporariness of its importance (i.e. as an interim command centre). Its second-class status could be read clearly in a paragraph of Yearbook 1977 (63), which stated that: ‘Taiwan will still be an important protective barrier in the southeast after the recovery of the mainland; while Taipei will stand side by side with Beiping and Chongqing to serve as foils to the national capital, Nanjing’.

Taipei was not alone among the cities under ROC territorial administration in having multiple identities. What was unusual in Taipei’s case, however, was the deliberate silence in the yearbooks about the city’s dual status as both Taiwan’s shenghui and ROC wartime capital. There were two reasons for this calculated vagueness: to avoid giving the ‘wrong’ impression that Taipei was now the national capital and that the ROC was limited to the Taiwan Region on the one hand, and to support the claim of representing the whole of China and having Nanjing as the ‘formal’ national capital on the other. Despite its political and geographical importance, one would be hard-pressed to find information about Taipei in the early yearbooks. Of Taipei’s three identities, the muted treatment of the city’s original status as shenghui was most meaningful. This status was granted much earlier than the other identities; nonetheless, it was never clearly indicated in the yearbooks. At most, the shenghui status was only listed among all the other provincial capitals in the ‘Table of National Administrative Regions’. Moreover, when the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG) moved out of Taipei City and relocated to central Taiwan in 1957, the issue of whether and how the TPG relocation affected Taipei’s shenghui status was never properly addressed in the yearbooks. Although Taipei had to retain its shenghui status to prevent confusion, at least on paper, the lack of clarity was such that even the current provincial authorities were unsure and its officials confused.

Taipei City was upgraded in 1967 to zhixiaishi, which represented the highest administrative status under the central state and was politically equal to a Province. This upgrade brought about a significant change in ROC territorial structure. Not only was Taipei recognized as the most important cosmopolitan city in Taiwan within the ROC political framework, this upgrade also effectively ‘created’ an extra provincial-level territorial unit of the ROC national imagination, thus alleviating the embarrassment of being a yisheng zhi guo — a country with one province. Immediately after Taipei’s upgrade, a brief statement was inserted in a footnote in Yearbook 1968 to reassert Taipei’s shenghui status: ‘without the formal order from the [central] government, the location of Taiwan’s shenghui should still be Taipei’ (YB 1968: 28). One short sentence was also added in the yearbooks between 1974 and 1976 mentioning, in passing, the fact that the TPG had relocated outside of the provincial capital (e.g. YB 1974: 67; YB 1976: 64). Generally speaking, then, there was very little information about Taipei in the early yearbook, and the situation was only slightly improved after 1974 when a short section ‘Taipei’ was added to introduce the city.

Over the years, many criticized the political ambiguity caused by the insistence on ‘representing the whole of China’ and a national territory that was defined by the 1947 Constitution, and condemned the KMT for burying its head in the sand and refusing to face up to international reality. In fact, obscurity and the avoidance of clarity were deliberate territorial strategies for survival. Taipei’s ambiguous status was actually the result of such a tactic. Its unique role as the equivalent of a ‘national capital’ was finally mentioned in the 1990s (e.g. YB 1992: 104; YB 1995/6: 91) before it was modified to ‘wartime auxiliary capital’ (zhanshi peidu)
in the yearbooks from 2001 to 2004. After all, occupying only Taiwan Province and a very small part of Fujian Province did little to warrant either ROC sovereignty or its territorial claims.

Overall, the strategy of ambiguity might have been useful and effective in masking the weakness of ROC territorial claims; however, the tactic was only a temporary measure and needed constant adjustment and modification. Sometimes, the insistent claim to guyou territory unintentionally created a habitual vacuueness and inactivity, thus paralyzing the supposedly flexible state territoriality, which in turn made the ROC territorial strategy appear to be not only slow to react, but also rigid and archaic.

The cartographic expression of the ROC

Maps were included regularly in the ROC Yearbooks as a supplement since publication began. Although they have long been associated with scientific progress and technological development, maps are never value-free and have historically served the interests of the rich and the powerful (Wood 1992; Harley 1988). Cartographic representation is particularly useful and effective for reaffirming a state’s territorial ownership and sovereignty. A comprehensive ‘national map’ provides the foundation for staking one’s territorial claim and establishing sovereignty as the absolute authority in that political community. Accordingly, the maps used in ROC Yearbooks are especially significant because they are the cartographic evidence for claiming ROC ownership and territorializing the mainland. They visualized ROC territorial claims and articulated the national imagination in cartographic representation with greater certainty and clarity than the textual descriptions.

All in all, five versions of ROC maps were used in the yearbooks up to 2001, which were published in the following sequence: (I) ‘Simple Administrative Map of China’ (Zhongguo xingzheng guoyu jiantu) (1951–7); (II) ‘Map of the ROC’ (Zhonghuaxia Minguo quantu) (1964–9); (III) ‘Map of the ROC’ (1970–95/6); (IV) ‘Map of the ROC’ (1997–8); (V) ‘Map of the ROC’ (1999–2000). Each version had its individual character, agenda and particular emphasis. The ways in which the idea of the nation – the ROC – were constructed and modified can be traced and analyzed through cartographic expression in each version. The yearbook maps not only provided an immediate visual image of a China that the KMT government wanted to construct and represent but also reflected the ROC national imagination at different periods. In other words, yearbook maps can be seen as a kind of cartographic representation that was authored and sanctioned solely by the state. Thus the shifts in state territoriality can be traced by comparing these five versions of yearbook maps.

While the next chapter will examine government control over cartographic representation and overall postwar cartographic development in Taiwan, the examination here focuses on the changes and continuity of various official versions of ‘national territory’ in the yearbook maps. I concentrate mainly on three factors that are closely connected to state territoriality: guyou territories (and disputed borders), the location of the national capital and the ROC administrative divisions. These are the three basic elements in the state’s articulation of power relationships and spatial order in the territory where it operates. Dividing the maps into two groups and taking 1970 as the dividing line, the investigation found that cartographic expressions in each version reflected the political atmosphere of the time, both domestic and international, even though the basic territorial claims remained almost unchanged. The officially authored maps not only visualized the ROC guyou territory but were also used to modify and recreate the national imagination through nuanced changes.

Yearbook maps before 1970

Used between 1951 and 1957, the earliest yearbook map, entitled ‘Simple Administrative Map of China’ (Figure 2.2), detailed the ROC administrative divisions and marked Nanjing as the ‘national capital’. It went without saying that this China was ‘naturally’ the ROC. Of all five versions, this earliest version was the largest and had to be folded several times to fit into the yearbook. Colour-coded by provincial divisions and marked with place names and city ranks, this political map also included some topographic information (such as rivers, deserts, lakes and mountains) and major transportation networks (railways, main roads and canals). While the eastern part of China’s coastal provinces were dotted with big cities and towns, the western hinterland was replete with topographic features and important cities and towns. In contrast, Taiwan was simply drawn and, with limited topographic information, appeared to be more remote from China, the centre, than the Chinese frontiers in Qinghai, Xinjiang and Mongolia.32

![Figure 2.2](image_url) The ‘Simple Administrative Map of China’ was used in ROC Yearbooks between 1951 and 1957. (Courtesy of the Executive Yuan)
This version was used for seven years. The only major modification during this period was made to reflect the change in the official position regarding the status of Mongolia. Before the ROC formally dissolved the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1954, Mongolian independence was clearly indicated both in the text and on the yearbook maps. Between 1951 and 1953, a boxed annotation was inserted in the middle of Mongolia on the yearbook maps, stating: ‘Our government informed Kulun [aka Ulan Bator] in January 1946 and approved of its independence. The actual boundaries need to be confirmed by further surveys’ (YB 1951: 1, 35) (Figure 2.3). However, after the dissolution of the treaty, recognition of Mongolian independence was withdrawn. This area on the map was first marked as ‘Mongolia Region (Outer Mongolia) (Menggu difang [wai Menggu])’ in Yearbook 1954 and was simplified to ‘Mongolia Region’ (Menggu difang) after 1955.

The first version of the map was removed in Yearbook 1958. The second version reappeared in Yearbook 1964 and was a watered-down and simplified rendition of the original map (Figure 2.4). Nevertheless, the simplicity presented an effective and vibrant national icon, which resembled a jigsaw composed of 35 provinces. This colourful image was placed against a background of black-and-white neighbouring countries, offering a clear contrast between ‘our territory’ (the Self) and the ‘outside world’ (the Other). In contrast to the colourless ‘Other’, the colourful ROC created a distinctive visual image, reinforcing the national icon of the ‘begonia leaf’ (qiuhaitang ye) as the Chinese homeland. Providing only the most basic data, this second version was the crudest of all yearbook maps. Even so, it still conveyed the three basic principles of ROC territorial insistence – the Chinese guyou territory (marked with unequivocal national boundary lines), the national capital in Nanjing and clear colour-coded ROC administrative divisions (35 Provinces shown in different colours and appropriate symbols of important cities to indicate their administrative rank). Although roughly drawn, this map provided all the territorial details necessary for the purpose not only of constructing the ROC national geography, but also of distinguishing the ROC from the PRC’s territorial management. Generally speaking, both these two early maps that were used before 1970 presented an uncomplicated China and an uncompromised ROC territory.

Even on the disputed borders and contested areas, the maps seemed to convey an orderly presence and comforting certainty. The almost uninterrupted borderlines enfolded the national territory so snugly that there seemed to be no room for doubt or contention. By marking the ROC territory with bright colours and neat borderlines, Chinese ownership appeared unquestionable and the colourless ‘Other’ was blocked out, fading into the background.

**Later maps after 1970**

The third version of the yearbook map was in use for 26 years (1970–95/6) and was an official map that was commonly seen in many official documents (Figure 2.5). It was a topographic map which included administrative details. Validated by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI, Neizhengbu), all three later
versions of the yearbook maps were made and printed by the military cartographic institute Factory 401 (silingyi chang) under the Combined Service Forces (CSF), the most authoritative cartographic institution in postwar Taiwan. Thus they were generally considered to be more professional than the earlier maps.

While the scale of the yearbook maps was too small to be considered cartographically accurate, visually, the presentation of the later versions appeared more precise and fit for purpose. They employed hypsometric tinting to reflect topographic elevations. For example, various shades of green were used to represent lowlands, and shades of brown were used to represent higher ground. However, the mass of colours became a wall of ‘noises’ that obscured differences, disputes and doubts. And although the plethora of tints and preponderance of cartographic data made them appear more accurate and scientific, the intense colouring and information overload was bewildering to the untrained eye of ordinary map readers.

As Monmonier mentioned, the conventional meaning of different colours resulted in another dimension of unwitting deception: green has long been associated with vegetation, blue with water, red with danger and high temperature, brownish yellow with earth and desert, etc. (1996: 150-4). These associations have the visual effect of creating ‘efficient decoding’, linking areas of green with lush vegetation and areas of brown with barren land (1996: 171). In these later versions of yearbook maps the areas of light green on the maps were mostly on the eastern side of the mainland, from Manchuria in the north to Guangxi, Hainan and Taiwan in the south. Although the map key indicated that the different shades of light green represented areas no higher than 100 metres above sea level, the similarity in colours created the illusion of homogeneity and had the effect of bringing different areas together as one. Consequently, the application of the same colour to such an extensive stretch of land seemed to erase differences and to suggest their continuous, similar or even identical nature. Although highly useful, such treatment is open to interpretation and induces both intentional and unintentional ‘lies’ (Monmonier 1996).

Disputed borderlines appeared to vanish behind the landforms and their strong colours. Unlike the earlier versions that had used colours to create the distinct territorial image of a Begonia leaf, the later yearbook maps blurred the national boundaries and presented a conceptual homeland. This tactic was especially effective in regard to the territorial claim to Mongolia. Against the light brown of the Mongolia Steppe and grassland on the map, the bright red boundary line held out the assurance of clear ‘ownership’. On the other hand, the dotted territorial lines indicating the disputed areas in the West and the Southwest of China had a different effect. Although the dotted lines might upset the map readers’ sense of certainty about national territory, they blended comfortably with the reddish brown tints of the Himalayas, Tibet and Pamir. In effect, the dotted lines could easily be mistaken for contour lines. To create a false sense of certainty, the supplementary lettering – weidingjie (disputed area) – was also removed. By making the once doubtful boundaries and contested frontiers less visible, the illusion was created that ‘all was well’.

During Taiwan’s democratization process, many issues concerning ROC sovereignty had been raised and fervently debated, such as its territorial claim and Taiwanese independence. The drastic political change in the 1990s pressured the state to radically adjust its territorial strategy and to address these difficult questions, which were also reflected in the yearbook maps. The ‘ROC Map’ was temporarily omitted in Yearbook 1996 to consider how to redefine ROC national territory. After a gap of one year, two slightly modified and almost identical versions of the ‘ROC map’ appeared which visualized the fast-changing national imagination. Although barely discernible, these ‘minor’ changes were highly symbolic, as they reflected the radical social change that had been taking place since the mid-1990s.

The fourth yearbook maps (YB 1997; YB 1998) contained two significant changes: the first of these was the recognition of Beijing, the PRC national capital, and the second the formal introduction of writing from left to right on the map. These alterations not only ushered in a major shift in cartographic practice that was sanctioned for the first time by the authorities, but they also manifested the beginning of a change in the political discourse and national imagination. While there was no doubt that Nanjing remained the ROC national capital, the yearbook maps after 1997 openly acknowledged the name Beijing. Three Chinese characters – Bei-jing-shi (Beijing City) – were added in square brackets next to
the place name Bei-ping-shi (Beijing City). Before this time, the ROC on Taiwan had always insisted on referring to the city as Beijing as it was called during the Republican era. The reasons why the ROC refrained from using the name ‘Beijing’ were to differentiate itself from the CCP regime and, more importantly, to avoid implying that it recognized PRC sovereignty and accepted its political legitimacy. This recognition of Beijing and PRC territorial management foretold the fundamental change of direction in Taiwan’s politics. Just a simple amendment on the map was the first sign of the ROC relinquishing its previous claims to guiyou territory.

In comparison, the political significance of adopting a left-to-right writing direction was not so obvious. For identification purposes, the use of words in maps was common in titles, place names, legends and so on. Words are a ‘foreign language’ as far as graphic communication is concerned and are treated as graphic symbols (Robinson et al. 1978: 81–2). However, Chinese characters used in modern Chinese maps present a fundamental problem. Chinese and other Asian languages are traditionally written vertically in columns going from top to bottom and ordered from right to left. Because of the stroke order and stroke direction of Chinese writing, when it was necessary to write horizontally, the general rule was to follow the Chinese convention of writing from right to left, and the same rule applied to the text used in maps. There were abundant examples of Asian maps in which words are written horizontally from right to left. However, such alignment created a problem for maps that had both Chinese and English lexicalization because of their opposite writing directions. In January 1956, the PRC had formally implemented the western horizontal alignment in Chinese publications. In response, the ROC government had condemned such practice and insisted on maintaining the right-to-left writing tradition. Consequently, all ‘ROC maps’ were required to follow the right-to-left writing convention, including yearbook maps. In the late 1980s, however, because of strong western influence and increasing cross-Strait communication, the left-to-right alignment began to take hold in Taiwan (Figure 2.6). Thus the formal adoption of the left-to-right writing direction in Yearbook 1997 not only presaged a greater political change to come, but was also a significant gesture, tantamount to abandoning the past insistence on Chinese daotong.

In the last version of the yearbook map (YB 1999; YB 2000) a simple outline of the PRC map was inserted in the top left-hand corner entitled ‘the current administrative divisions of mainland China’ (Figure 2.7). Interestingly, although Taiwan was on this map, the island was deliberately left blank with no place name. This insertion formally acknowledged the political reality, sovereignty and territory of the PRC and also reflected a fundamental change in Taiwan’s political discourse. After the DPP came to power in 2000, it became evident that the insistence on ROC ‘guiyou territory’ and the presence of the conventional ROC map had both caused great embarrassment to the new regime. Thus, from 2001, the ‘ROC Map’ disappeared completely from the ROC Yearbooks. In addition, the supplement containing the ROC Constitution was removed in 2004 and ROC territorial claims to the mainland no longer featured in the yearbooks after 2006.
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Accordingly, the China-centric national rhetoric that once dominated the ROC Yearbooks was eradicated and has been replaced by a re-imagining of an ‘island state’.

Re-imagining the ROC

Before the publication of Yearbook 2006, the same territorial claim to ‘the whole of China’ had been reiterated for over half century. The handling of disputed borders and regions had become a crucial element in shaping the ROC’s national imagination and consolidating patriotism. In the earlier yearbook maps, supplementary lettering was placed parallel to the boundaries in question (usually shown as dotted lines) to indicate their status as weidingjie (‘undecided borderlines’ or ‘disputed zones’). At the same time, the clearly defined and coloured area of the earlier ROC maps provided a high degree of assurance and seemed to dispel all doubt. In contrast, the later maps took a different approach to glossing over dispute and disguising the political uncertainties by using vast amounts of topographic data to overwhelm the map reader. Instead of providing comforting neatness and assurance with oversimplified information, they concealed the problems beneath masses of data and complicated land forms. The relaxation of the territorial claim was only possible after the mid-1990s. Step by step, changes took place first in the maps and then in the content and structure of the yearbooks, showing a clear shift of focus from China to Taiwan. The first sign of change appeared when the island formally embarked on its transformation to democracy. Although the previous territorial claim to China could not be abandoned immediately, a new section was created in Yearbook 1995/6 introducing the current administrative divisions of the PRC. For the first time, the account of the development on the mainland was treated independently from that of the ROC. Moreover, the single chapter on Taiwan – ‘The Base of Recovery [of the country]’ (facing jidi) – was expanded to form a major section – ‘Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Region’ (Tai Peng Jin Ma didu).

Even with these changes, ROC Yearbooks merely acknowledged the ‘limitation’ of ROC territorial control and at most recognized the current development on the mainland. It was not until the DPP came to power that a redefinition of national territory (and hence national identity) was finally made possible. The content of the yearbooks in the 2000s focused almost entirely on Taiwan and embraced the idea that ‘the ROC is Taiwan’. In 2001 the ‘ROC map’ was removed, which had the immediate effect of avoiding the embarrassment of making a ‘cartographic claim’ over the mainland. Furthermore, a crucial statement was made at the beginning of the introductory chapter in Yearbook 2003 (3) openly declaring the ROC’s independent status and detaching itself from the mainland: ‘In 1949, the CCP established the PRC in China, and the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan ... Ever since then, the severance across the Taiwan Straits has created a situation of buxiang lishu [having no jurisdictional connections]’. Echoing President Chen Shui-bian’s idea of ‘one country on each side’ in 2002, this phrase buxiang lishu has since set the tone for the new territorial principle and national imagination, i.e. the two sides have been separated for so long that they are now very different and thus no longer connected in any way. This statement also acknowledged the fact that the ROC only had ‘effective control’ (youxia guanxia) over an area of 36,179 km², which included Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Mazu, the Tungsha Island Group and the Nansha Island Group (YB 2003: 12). Consequently, a very different national rhetoric was formulated to prepare for the rise of a Taiwan state.

Unlike the national rhetoric that had been reiterated since the 1950s, ROC history was presented in Yearbook 2004 as a ‘natural’ process that involved four stages – developing from ‘the birth of the ROC’, ‘the ROC in China’ and ‘the ROC on Taiwan’, to eventually reach the final stage of ‘Taiwan ROC’. It explained that the ROC had entered the final phase of ‘Taiwan ROC’ (Taiwan Zhonghua Min guo) and embarked on fully fledged democratization in 1988 after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo (e.g. YB 2004: 6; YB 2006: 6). By describing the ROC’s history as a four-stage process of evolution, the newly interpreted ‘national story’ not only justified the transition from a Chinese ROC to a localized Taiwan ROC, but also consummated the separation from China. In the 2006 yearbook, to echo the new national identity of the ‘Taiwan ROC’, the content about the mainland area was removed completely. Furthermore, the title was changed to Taiwan ROC Yearbook 2006 (Taiwan Zhonghua Min guo nianjian), suggesting that the final stage of national development had been reached.40 Powerful in both injecting new meanings and removing undesirable implications, the act of naming had given a new identity to the ROC as a Taiwan state. Similarly, when the KMT regained power in 2008, the title was changed back to ROC Yearbook. For some people, this indicated the KMT’s intention to return to the previous China-centric approach. After a decade of surging Taiwanese awareness and its growing strength in the public psyche, the Taiwan-centric priority still seems to have dominated the editorial principle in the recent yearbooks and continues to do so. For example, Yearbook 2010 (17) claims that Taiwan is a ‘marine nation’ (haiyang guojia)41 of 23 million people located off the southeastern corner of Eurasia. In other words, under the new KMT regime, the trend of establishing itself as ‘a marine nation’ and the conscious positioning in close proximity to the Asian Pacific region remain prominent.

Most of the modifications to territorial claims have been triggered by Taiwan’s drastic political changes in the last two decades. The claim to the South China Sea Islands, however, has been maintained. Even though the territorial ownership of this area has always been vigorously contested and is a highly controversial issue with neighbouring countries, the ROC’s claim to the region has rarely wavered, and the area has never been marked as ‘under dispute’ in any official maps.42 Whether in the crudest second version or in the much later ones, a map of ‘the South China Sea Islands’ had always been inserted in the bottom right-hand corner of all yearbook maps. Solid boundary lines were drawn on the territorial waters to incorporate the islands into ROC territory and the national imagination. A large amount of data was squeezed into the small-scale map insertions, such as the title of the mapped area, the names of various island groups,
national borders, and the name of the nearby ocean. To ‘prove’ ROC ownership, the map insertion would usually mark out one particular island – Taiping Island – that was firmly under ROC control.

Since the 1990s, the official territorial claim to the mainland was relaxed. At the same time, the ROC strengthened its claim to the South China Sea Islands and demonstrated an even more aggressive territorial approach in later yearbooks. For example, in the most recent version of the yearbook map, four large Chinese characters Zhong-hua-min-guo (i.e. ROC) have been printed in the centre in bright red, and the type size was even bigger than the title of the map insertion, clearly marking out ROC ownership (Figure 2.8). Regardless of aesthetic considerations or map conventions, this cartographic practice of ‘labelling’ possession was more aggressive than in the past. To further assert its territorial rights over neighbouring waters and delineate the baseline and outer limits of its territorial

sea, Taipei first promulgated the ‘Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China’ in 1998 and the ‘ROC boundaries of the territorial sea and adjacent sea area’ the following year. Taken as a kind of territorial declaration, the official announcements clearly delineated the ROC territorial sea, which included the highly disputed South China Sea Islands and the Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai liuyu, aka the Senkaku Islands) (Executive Yuan 1999). This vast region included in the ROC’s territorial waters is said to be rich in oil, gas and fishing resources and has great economic potential. In the process of building a marine-oriented nation, it was only logical for the regime to tighten its hold on neighbouring waters.

Conclusion: territoriality precedes territory

Ever since the KMT-led government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the gap between the territory under its direct control and the idea of Chinese ‘guoyou territory’ to which it laid claim had been almost insuperable. Furthermore, how could this official rhetoric justify that its political centre was physically located on the periphery of the ROC territory. Several techniques were employed in the yearbooks to disguise the problems, e.g. emphasizing only favourable data, omitting contradictions, obscuring fanciful claims and burying embarrassment in long lists of place names, charts and ‘scientific’ representation. Even though these tactics created ambivalence, they were effective and reassuring. Because the official position on ROC territory had remained unchanged for over half a century, the decade-long unceasing and unchanging reiteration and ambiguity deadened public interest. The repetition became a kind of banal ‘noise’, droning in the background and dulling the senses.

The tension was temporarily eased (or muffled) by emphasizing the ROC’s role in inheriting and preserving traditional daotong. The daotong discourse that emerged in the late 1960s was constructed to compensate the problematic lack of direct control over the mainland. This approach was useful at the height of the Cold War before China opened to the outside world, effectively shifting a physical and geographical claim to one pertaining to the domain of culture, history and symbolism. The ROC government stressed the importance of Chinese culture and tradition and presented itself as the ‘true China’, the cultural homeland, and thus the core of ‘cultural China’. The focus of the ROC’s territorial claim shifted from the fight for political legitimacy to an ideological struggle for the survival of Chinese daotong, tradition and culture. In other words, the discussion about territorial claim cannot be based merely on the existing territorial condition; the historical, cultural and symbolic dimensions of territory are equally crucial.

While the gap between political reality and the official rhetoric deepened, the ROC government was often criticized for being in denial and failing to face up to international reality. For many, the insistence on guoyou territory and the wilful refusal to acknowledge changing international reality and move on was pitifully ostrich-like. This criticism is reflected in the petition filed at the Constitutional
Court in 1993, requesting an official interpretation of ‘guyou territory’ (Judicial Yuan 1993a). The petition described the ROC’s territorial claim as ‘sleep-talking’ regardless of international reality. It also accused the ROC of making a unilateral, and hence illegal, claim to China.

In the last decade, the ROC’s claim to China has been widely acknowledged to be unrealistic and outdated. However, the concept of ‘territory’ is not limited to an ontological existence, but is also closely associated with territoriality, i.e. territorial behaviour, practices and strategies. In stark contrast to the rigid insistence on the ROC’s territorial claims in the yearbooks, some important changes had been taking place in territorial strategies. After all, a national territorial claim is made (by a state) not just to reflect political and territorial reality. State territoriality can also be a policy to mark out the territory that is (or is claimed to be) ‘rightfully ours’ and to protect national interests – i.e. gaining access, protecting the people, strengthening or gaining control, possessing resources and occupying strategic positions. Although political rule is generally territorially defined, the discussion of state spatiality is not exclusive to ‘territorial states’ (Ruggie 1993), not to mention that the territorial state is not always an unchanging entity and territoriality does not necessarily involve only the practices of total mutual exclusion which dominant understandings of the modern territorial state attribute to it’ (Agnew 1994: 54). Staking a territorial claim is therefore not simply a policy of revanchism or asserting ownership, but also a tactic for political bargaining and a strategy for survival, striving for prosperity, access, security and international standing.

No matter how unlikely the chance of gaining control over the mainland, the territorial strategies pursued by the ROC government have served as a bargaining lever, be it to win international support, to provide itself with political legitimacy or to ensure that its claims would be taken into consideration, or at least not be written off completely. Furthermore, the territorial claims function as a kind of mental adhesive to consolidate internal solidarity and create consensus and national pride on the one hand, and to stir up suspicion and hostility towards the ‘outsiders’ on the other. Therefore those who took the conventional view about the ‘impracticality’ of the ROC’s claims have made the common mistake of confusing the concept of territoriality with territory and ignoring the principle of territoriality as being strategic, and not just reflecting ‘the reality’.

The ROC’s postwar territorial strategy was indeed designed to ensure its survival; nevertheless, there was no doubt that the ambiguity and escapism that dominated the yearbooks had also created the image of an incompetent, incomplete and never achievable political entity – forever imagining the unreachable homeland and occupying only an undesirable and unimportant outpost or the periphery of the ROC national imagination. This approach might have been useful when the KMT retreated to Taiwan in order to argue its legitimacy and fight for survival, and yet, as time went on, the strategy also had the side effect of prolonging the agony, ambiguity and political uncertainty, and of seriously hindering the progress of democratization.

State territoriality could be employed to both construct and dismantle a certain version of national rhetoric and identity. For example, in the nation-building process carried out by the DPP in the 2000s, the ROC’s ‘national territory’ was re-imagined simply by removing the description of guyou territory and introducing a new identity of ‘Taiwan ROC’ as a new stage in historical progression. In the present decade, the yearbooks have openly portrayed the ROC as a marine nation to draw a contrast to the image of a continental China, and they have also assertively staked the ROC’s claim to neighbouring islands and territorial waters. As a result, an independent island state – Taiwan ROC – seemed to emerge out of the Western Pacific Ocean. By the end of the 2000s, Taiwan’s close connections to the Asia Pacific region and its identity as a marine nation have been constructed.

Taiwan’s new direction has recently been challenged in the Diaoyutai dispute. On 15 August 2012, Chinese activists from Hong Kong were detained by Japanese coastguards after they had planted national flags of the ROC and the PRC on Dialyu island (Diaoyutai’s main island) to emphasize the historical continuity of Chinese ownership. The incident led to a series of nationalist protests and stirred up considerable tension in the region. The dispute not only caused diplomatic standoffs but also created outrage that rippled across many Asian countries and picked at old wounds that remained painful and unresolved after the war. Both governments across the Taiwan Strait have condemned the detention of activists and reiterated Chinese territorial ownership over the islands since the fifteenth century. On the other hand, Japan has insisted on its legal rights over the Senkaku Islands (i.e. Diaoyutai) based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to which the authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were not signatories.

As a matter of fact, some years before the international media turned their attention to the incident, the tension over Diaoyutai ownership had been building up and had come to a head in early 2012. In March, Taipei first protested to Tokyo about the Japanese plan to ‘nationalize’ some Diaoyutai islands and complained about the territorial claim to Diaoyutai in Japanese high-school textbooks (MOFA 2012a, 2012b). Four times in June and July, Taipei reiterated the ROC’s territorial claim to the Diaoyutai Islands in response to a series of territorial actions initiated by the Japanese, and complained about the illicit visits to Diaoyutai by Japanese politicians (MOFA 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2012f).

To resolve the growing tension, Taipei proposed an ‘East China Sea Peace Initiative’ (Donghai heping changyi) on 5 August, calling on all parties concerned to resolve the Diaoyutai dispute peacefully through dialogue and to reach consensus on a code of conduct (MOFA 2012g, 2012h). Obviously, Taipei recognized the difficulties of sustaining its claim to the ROC’s ‘guyou territory’ and wished to work within its current political agenda and international constraints. Unfortunately, there has been no response to Taiwan’s call for a peaceful solution and cooperation.

The strategies for dealing with complex territorial disputes, such as those relating to the Diaoyutai Islands and the South China Sea Islands, are not just based on military or economic considerations, but also involve political consequences and national sentiment. How to formulate an appropriate, and timely, territorial
strategy that serves national interests has seriously tested the wisdom of political leaders. The new conflict seemed to present a major challenge to the Taiwanese authorities to reconsider its new territorial strategy. Facing the escalating conflict, Taipei was pressured into repeating its previous line on national territory, because the disputed areas had always been considered part of the ROC’s ‘guoyou territory’ (MOFA 20121). Paradoxically, by insisting on its ownership of these areas, it implied a continuity of the ROC’s historical and political legacies, which seemed awkward for a political entity that no longer claimed to represent the whole of China. In the process of building an island state, Taipei is now facing the urgent need to redefine its national territory and identity. Although not successful, the proposal of an ‘East China Sea Peace Initiative’ was at least a first expression of the ROC’s new territoriality. Finding a way to develop an innovative state territoriality for this newly emerging ‘maritime nation’ to sit comfortably between and develop harmoniously alongside the competing powers in Asia Pacific will be the key to achieving not only a prosperous Taiwan but also peace in the region.

Notes

1. After the CCP established the PRC in October 1949, many countries immediately broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC and formally switched recognition to the PRC. The first to do so was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), quickly followed by the Eastern European countries (such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania). Other countries included the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Burma in 1950, Pakistan in 1951, Nepal and Afghanistan in 1955, Egypt and Syria in 1956, Iraq and Morocco in 1958 and Sudan in 1959. Even though the switch of diplomatic recognition was much slower in the 1960s (Cuba in 1960, Congo in 1964, Uganda in 1962, France and Central African Republic in 1964, Italy, Canada and Chile in 1970), the legal status of the ROC in the international arena has always been ambivalent. Before its expulsion from the UN, 65 countries recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government. The figure dropped sharply after 1972 and the ROC has never had formal diplomatic relations with more than 30 countries.

2. Before 1995, the GIO set up a dedicated agency – ROC Yearbook Agency (Zhonghua mingguo nianjian she) – to handle the compilation and editorial work. In recent decades, the GIO took over editorial duties before its abolition on 20 May 2012. The responsibility of compiling and publishing ROC Yearbooks has been transferred to the Executive Yuan.

3. In comparison, the publication of foreign-language versions has been inconsistent and often sporadic over the years, signalled by the frequent changes of its title. For example, until 1980 the English version was entitled China Yearbook. In 1981, the responsibility for publishing the yearbook was handed to a quasi-governmental publisher (Hilt Publishing Company Ltd, funded by the GIO), and its title was briefly changed to The Republic of China: A Reference Book, which was in the form of a guidebook. The title was changed again in 1989 to The Republic of China Yearbook.

4. The History of Song (Songshi, published in the fourteenth century) was known to have a volume entitled Nianjian, but its content has long been lost.

5. According to Sung Chien-chung (1999: 1–2), the first existing modern yearbook written in Chinese was the Custom Trading Yearbook published between 1864 and 1948. At the beginning of the twentieth century, because of the interest in the useful application of national statistics, the compilation and publication of yearbooks had increased. For example, Xinyi shiji tongji nianjian (New Translation of World Statistics Yearbook) in 1909, Shiji nianjian (World Yearbook) in 1913, Tinghang nianjian (Bank Yearbook) and Waiji nianjian (Diplomacy Yearbook) in 1922, Zhongguo nianjian (China Yearbook) in 1924, etc.

6. The publication of yearbooks on the mainland had been rare before the late 1970s. Only a few yearbooks had been produced by the PRC, such as Kaiguo nianjian (Yearbook of the New China) (1950–64).

7. The modern usage of the word has long shifted to modern ‘state’. Starting from the sixteenth century, a territorial dimension was brought into the legal basis of the modern international system and replaced the feudalist relation between the ruling class and the subject class. The signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established a consensus that each state had sovereignty within its territory and its territorial integrity should be respected. This laid the foundation for the modern state. By the end of the eighteenth century, the idea of ‘national sovereignty over well-delimited territory’ had come to the fore both in political practice and international law (Gottmann 1973: 16–17).

8. The official translation of the phrase guoyou zhi jiangyu was ‘its existing national boundaries’ (Judicial Yuan 1993b). My translation here, however, tries to keep in line with the original meaning of guoyou. According to the Kangxi Dictionary, the term guoyou means dangran (‘of course’ or ‘without doubt’), and is usually used to describe an innate, inherent and original character or quality. In other words, the phrase refers not only to China’s existing sphere of influence, but also to its ‘historical’ territories that were once under Chinese control.

9. Because the KMT government did not have control over the whole of China, the planned divisions were never completely implemented. The most well-known example was the provincial division in Manchuria. Although the policy was never executed, the proposal to divide Manchuria into nine provinces was repeated in all official documents, geography textbooks and ROC maps in postwar Taiwan.

10. ‘Yuanxiashi’ literally means ‘a municipality that is under the direct control of the Executive Yuan’, indicating its importance. In 1977, the term yuanxiashi was replaced by zhixiashi (meaning ‘a municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government’).

11. The shezhijiu was designed to prepare for the takeover and the establishment of new County Governments in China after the Second World War and was never set up in Taiwan.

12. The treaty was signed on 14 August 1945 between the ROC and the USSR. In the treaty, both sides agreed to ‘render to one another all necessary military and other assistance and support’ (Article I), give ‘every possible economic assistance’ (Article VI) and adhere to the principles of ‘mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference’ (Article V). In exchange for the Russian promise of not supporting the CCP, the ROC agreed to provide the USSR with both economic and military privileges, such as allowing the USSR to use Lushunkou (known in the west as Port Arthur) as their naval base.

13. As the world’s fourth biggest country by area, the total area of the ROC is 9,596,961 km² (CIA 2013).

14. The revised amendment stipulated that the change of national territory must be initiated by one-quarter of all the legislators and passed by at least three-quarters of the members present at the meeting (which is attended by at least three-quarters of all legislators) (Office of the President 2011).

15. This is a legal and political description referring to the territories under ROC control. In 1969, a new regulation – ‘Directions for Holding Elections for New National Representatives in the Free Region during the Period of Communist Rebellion’
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The Nationalist government set up its capital in Nanjing in 1927 and its rule before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 was generally known as the ‘Nanjing Decade’. After the end of the Second World War, the KMT relocated the central government from the war-time capital Chongqing to Nanjing. Nanjing’s status as national capital was cut short by the civil war. In 1949, the KMT government moved the provisional capital first to Guangzhou, then to Chongqing and eventually to Taipei within just one year.

On 13 February 2010, I contacted the current TPG authorities and made a formal enquiry, asking: ‘Where exactly is Taiwan’s shenghuo?’ The answer I received was so unclear that it did not help to clarify the matter (TPG 2010a). However, on 8 March the TPG (2010b) further announced a press release directly relating to my enquiry. It stated that after seeking confirmation from the central government about the official position on this question, the MOI instructed them that the Chunching New Village in Nantou County had been the seat of the provincial government since 1957 and ‘is still the seat of Taiwan’s shenghuo’ (Taiwansheng shenghuo shuozaidi). The announcement not only demonstrated the uncertainty within the TPG itself, but also showed a degree of confusion by referring to the TPG (provincial political organization), Chunching New Village (its location) and its shenghuo administrative status interchangeably, as if they were the same thing. Further discussion on the reason, the process and the impact of the TPG relocation will be discussed in Chapter 4.

The word peidu means ‘accompany’ or ‘as the secondary’. The term peidu was once used to refer to Chongqing during the Sino-Japanese War to indicate its status as the ‘provisional capital’.

Starting from 2001, the ROC map was removed completely from the yearbooks (Chinese version).

For a short period of time, early yearbooks also included a ‘Map of Taiwan’. Alongside the ‘Map of China’, the ‘New Political Map of Taiwan Province’ appeared in Yearbook 1951 and Yearbook 1952, and an updated ‘Political Map of Taiwan Province’ was included in Yearbook 1953 and Yearbook 1954. Although these two maps are not examined here, it is interesting to note their rapid removal. One might see this as a confirmation of Taiwan’s marginality in the ROC national imagination. Yet the fear of communist infiltration was also an important factor contributing to the withdrawal of the Taiwan map. The anxiety about cartographic information will be discussed in the next chapter.

The importance of this image will be further explored in Chapters 3 and 5.

Although some adjustments were made to the maps of this version to fine-tune the colours, symbols, boundary markers, explanatory writings, etc., they were generally the same.

The yearbook maps between 1979 and 1983 had indicated that they were ‘validated by the MOI’ (Neizhengbu sheding). On rare occasions (YB 1997; YB 1998), the maker’s name — Factory 401 — was found in the legend.

Hypsometric tints are a variant on contour lines, also known as layer colouring. They depict ranges of elevation as bands of colour, usually in a graduated scheme. This technique is used to enhance the landform and also show off the skills of the map-makers. According to Wu Hsin-cheng (2008), hypsometric tinging was very new in Taiwan at the time.

Both the relocation of the national capital and the renaming of the national capital are politically symbolic. During the early Ming Dynasty (1368–1403 AD), the city was known as Beijing (literally meaning ‘northern peace’). When it was made the national capital from 1421, it was named Beijing (literally meaning ‘capital of the north’, aka ‘Peking’). When the KMT set up its capital in Nanjing (literally meaning ‘capital of the south’) in 1928, the city took up its old name — Beijing — to indicate that it was no longer the national capital. Only 20 years later, the city would again resume the name Beijing when the PRC was established and it became the national capital of the ‘new China’. 

29 The name Liuqiu was mentioned in Sui shu (636 AD) and Yuan shi (1369–70 AD). Some scholars believe that the record of ‘Liuqiu’ referred to Taiwan, while some say it was a reference to what are now the Ryukyu Islands (once a China tributary state with local sovereignty), and others suggest that it was a general term referring to islands in the East China Sea and nearby waters. Because of the obscurity of the term, there has been no consensus on where exactly the record referred to.

20 The KMT regime started to become increasingly reluctant to use the name ‘Formosa’ around the late 1950s. According to Chen and Reisman (1972: 599), there were three major reasons for this reluctance: (1) the term was Portuguese in origin and thus seemed to suggest a non-Chinese legacy; (2) it suggested the undetermined legal status of Taiwan; (3) the name had been closely associated with Taiwan’s independence movement.

21 Yungong (The Tribute of Yu) is one of 58 chapters in the Book of History (Shangshi, aka Shujing). This chapter is believed to contain the historical records written in the Xia Dynasty (2,070 BC – c.600 BC) and was compiled in the Warring States Period (roughly 475 BC – 221 BC).

22 Hu Tiek-hua was also known as Hu Chuan, father of the famous Chinese philosopher Hu Shih. The poem was collected in his Taiwan Diary, Vol. 4 (Taiwan rii juan si), which described local customs when he worked in Taitung, and said: jiuta jietao mi ji shuang (kicking the streets with a pair of wooden clogs).

23 Kuaiji is the old name of present-day Shaxing in Zhejiang Province.

24 The term Baiyue literally means ‘Hundred Yue’, and is generally a loose term referring to various minority peoples who inhabited southern China and northern Vietnam between the first millennium BC and the first millennium AD. According to Brindley (2003: 11), the Han Chinese (who resided in central China during the period of the Warring States and the Han dynasty) called people in the southern regions ‘hundred Yue’ as a collective term for these dispersed groups, or possibly others who might have appeared related to the erstwhile state of Yue.

25 The idea of ‘cultural China’ has been much discussed after the publication of an article by Tu Wei-ming (1991).

26 For example, in a speech given in 1959, Chiang Kai-shek (1964g) complained that people in Taiwan seemed to enjoy economic growth and had forgotten the pain and humiliation of being driven out of their homeland. He went on to caution the people in Taiwan that if the goal of recovering the mainland could not be achieved in the next decade (i.e., the 1960s), there would be no hope of ever recovering the nation.

27 Unlike most Japanese-occupied areas in China, Taiwan became a Japanese colony long before the Sino-Japanese War. In order to deal with its special condition, the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (Taiwansheng xingzheng zhongguo gongsu) was set up to take over Japanese assets and to establish an administrative body. The TPG was only established on 15 May 1947 after the 28 February Incident.

28 Similar cities included Guangzhou, Xi’an, Shenyang, etc.
39 All the yearbook maps between 1951 and 1995 followed the right-to-left convention. The only accidental exception was the 'Political Map of Taiwan Province' in Yearbook 1953 and Yearbook 1954.

40 This title was only used for one year and was changed back to ROC Yearbook 2007 the next year.

41 This term haiyang guojia can also be translated as ‘maritime country’ or ‘oceanic nation’. Here, I borrow the phrase ‘marine nation’ from the reports published by the Australian Government’s Oceans Policy Science Advisory Group (OPSSAG 2009, 2013) because of the similarities between the goals laid down by both.

42 Starting from 2004, the ROC Yearbooks dropped the claim to the Hsiasha Islands (Paracel Islands). The most likely reason was that the PRC had actual control over this area. By removing the Hsiasha Islands from the list of ‘ROC territories’ in the South China Seas, Taiwanese authorities seemed to tacitly acknowledge the PRC’s ‘ownership’ of the islands and also declare itself to be different from the PRC.

43 Political commentators claimed that the Diaoyutai dispute was another incident about national pride and reflected a sense of victimhood in many Asian countries about the atrocities inflicted by Japan during the Second World War (McDonald 2012).

44 Using the search engine at the ‘News Release’ section of the MOFA’s website on 5 September 2012, I found that the Diaoyutai dispute was the subject of 24 press releases between 2004 and 2012.