1) OWEN'S FIRST TEXTUAL ARGUMENT: Owen brings up two passages, one at 1a25-9 and one at 1b1-3. The first is used by those defending the notion that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent particulars unique to the individual subject they are in: "... the individual bit of white is in a subject, the body, but is not said of any subject." Owen brings up the second passage to show how the individual bit of white must not be unique to the subject it is in: "... Knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, grammatical knowledge." Owen's argument is that if "in the soul" is interpreted as "in a particular soul", then the second passage makes no sense: knowledge is in a particular soul? Hardly! Thus, nonsubstantial individuals must not be nonrecurrent particulars that are unique to a particular subject. -> WEDIN'S REFUTATION: Wedin's argument is that Owen's demand that "in the soul" be read in the same way for the two passages is mistaken, since the first passage applies to individual non-substances, whereas the second passage applies to universal non-substances. Since the examples "fall into different divisions of a meta-ontology", there is no reason to demand a uniform reading of the two passages. -> MY REFUTATION: I see Wedin's refutation as being too dismissive of Owen's argument. I would instead base my criticism of Owen on his conclusion that if "in the soul" is interpreted as "in a particular soul", then the second passage makes no sense. This is because "individual instance of a shade of color in a particular body" -> "shade of color in a particular body" -> "color in a particular body". In other words, in the sense that color is predicated of the individual shade that is in a particular body, color is in a particular body too! Thus, when Aristotle says that "knowledge is in a subject", isn't he just saying that an individual instance of grammatical knowledge is in a subject, and predicated of that grammatical knowledge is knowledge, and thereby knowledge is in a subject? In other words, couldn't we reconcile the passages from these differing meta-ontologies? -> POSSIBLE OBJECTION TO MY REFUTATION: Just because knowledge is predicated of an individual instance of grammatical knowledge, and that individual instance of grammatical knowledge is in a particular subject, it's not the case that knowledge is in a particular subject. 2) THE NEW IMPROVED ORTHODOXY: Here, the focus is on countering two claims: -> A2: No general property can be in B (where B is a subject) -> A2': Individual properties can only be in individual subjects The key claim in this section is that "to call a certain individual man grammatical is to call a man and an animal grammatical." The Frede camp would claim that since a property of an individual subject here (grammatical man) is also a property of a general subject (grammatical animal), it appears to deny A2'. But Wedin doesn't believe this is the case, because it assumes that "grammatical" is an individual property. Grammatical here could just as well be a general property, according to Wedin, though he doesn't exactly explain why. -> MY COMMENTS: Wedin's objections seems rather weak to me. This is because he doesn't have any reasons why grammatical can be a general property. And in talking about the potential objection with "individual" properties, Wedin ignores what seems like the more evident problem with A2': that an animal can be grammatical. Even if there is no problem with "individual" properties, there is still a potential problem with "individual" subjects, since an animal is clearly not an individual subject.... Or so it seems there is a problem. In reality, there isn't, since there is only a problem if one misinterprets Aristotle's usage of animal here. If the quality of grammatical could be in the genus animal, then A2' would be overruled. But when Aristotle says that an individual man's being grammatical entails an animal's being grammatical too, he doesn't mean that the genus animal can be grammatical. Rather, I take Aristotle as saying that the individual man, of whom "animal" is predicated, is grammatical. In this sense, "an" animal is grammatical, but only insomuch as it is is a specific animal, here a specific human being. The quality is still in the individual, not the genus. Thus, A2' can be preserved. It is this objection, to the "individual subject" part of A2', not the "individual property" part of it, that initially seems more of a problem.