CHANGING KOREAN VILLAGES 1980-2000

MODERN KOREAN SOCIETY
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Sŏkp’ŏ-ri in 1965

- Village remote and reachable only by foot or boat
- Village a self-contained, face-to-face “community of fate”
  - Men born, raised, and live in village all their life with life-long friendships
  - Women often born and raised outside the village, and come in at time of marriage but form strong relations with other village women in the same situation through p’umasi
- Social status based on age, gender, kinship, and land tenure
  - Within the family: male house head, female house mistress, eldest son, daughter-in-law, younger sons and daughters, maybe retired grandparents (teknonymy)
  - Between families: Big houses and little houses linked by ancestor worship that form minimal lineages (tangnae), and larger lineages (munjung)—e.g. Chŏnju Yi, Kimhae Kim, etc.
    - Ties with in-laws, however, important
  - Class—big landowning farmers top, owner-cultivators middle, landless tenants, laborers, and fishermen the bottom
SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

- Household is unit of production and of consumption with gendered division of labor (inside labor for women, outside labor for men)

- Families were large (stem family cycle)
  - Daughters marry into other houses, eldest son brings in bride, younger sons find something to do
  - About 40% of houses in stem family stage of family cycle at any one time (rest nuclear)
  - Eldest son favored for secondary education

- “good hearted people” (인심이 좋다) who offer hospitality

- Social, economic, and ritual labor exchange (p’umasi) maintains affective ties (chŏng) among the villagers (separate systems for men and women)
  - Reciprocity between the generations based on filial piety (including the ancestors), and between gods and humans
WHEN URBAN INDUSTRIALIZATION BEGINS (C. 1965) URBAN TO RURAL MIGRATION BEGINS

- Younger sons and others who have no land no longer hire themselves out as agricultural servants (mősüm), but delay marriage (25-35) and take factory jobs in the cities.

- Daughters begin to delay marriage (25-30) and take temporary factory jobs to send money home to help families or send brothers to school.

- Villages begin to hollow out as people in their twenties and thirties leave for town, leaving those under 15 and older than 40 in the village.

- As industrialization intensifies prosperous families send children to college who move into the urban middle class, while the landless and the poor leave the village for factory work (proletarianization?)
RATES OF URBANIZATION

![Bar chart showing rates of urbanization for South Korea and North Korea over different decades. The chart indicates higher urbanization rates for South Korea compared to North Korea.]
DEGREE OF URBANIZATION

South Korea
North Korea

- Chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and “green revolution” varieties of rice introduced 1970s
- Hand-held plows introduced (kyŏngun’gi) 1970s
- Rice transplanter introduced (ianggi) 1980s
- Field consolidation for combine harvesters and the like (1990s)

Effect on the Village
- Encouraged more urban migration as opportunities for rural wage labor for the poor dried up
- Allowed consolidated farming, part-time farming, and/or the “feminization of agriculture”
- Mechanical transport allowed villagers to seek work outside the village
  - (near cities could commute to town, near highways could work at rest stops, fishermen could market fish in Inch’ŏn)
SOCIAL EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY
(> KIM JOOHEE DYNAMICS OF A RICE CULTIVATING VILLAGE, 1977-2015)

• Prosperity leads to all children of both genders being given the education they need (and are capable of)

• Land ownership does not directly correlate with social class anymore, since labor power can also yield income from other occupations besides farming

• The living standard of the elderly depends upon the success of their children in the city (urban family members come down to help on the farm during the busy season)

• Adoption is no longer practiced as daughters can inherit

• Reduction in size and complexity of households as birth rates fall (less than 25% of families are stem—less than 10% in the city)—immigrant wives as women leave villages
Sŏkp’ŏ-ri 1992 (Brandt 2014 Chapter 14)

• 7 busses a day from T’aean to Sŏkp’ŏ
• Cement block houses covered with stucco and tiled roofs
• Informal masil kagi not so common, for people are busy making money, few have time to exchange reciprocity and create affective ties (cheong), and people don’t talk much about good heartedness anymore (many work outside the village and commute by car)
  • “No one summons me peremptorily to eat or drink on his veranda. No one asks me to share makkŏlli in the fields. If I am hungry during the day I buy a bowl of noodles at Mun Yongbae’s shop.” p227
• Introduction of beach culture, bathing suits and all
• Fishermen prosperous because urban fish markets have good prices
• Farmers use combines on straightened and consolidated fields (compare figure 13-1 p209 with figures 14-3, 14-4 p232)
RELIGION IN THE VILLAGE

• Ancestor worship still going on, but 1/3 of the village is Christian

• Shrine to the village god was torn down by Christians (from another village) who objected to the drunken celebrations
  • Some villagers are joining the church for fellowship—church services, picnics, sightseeing trips, joint singing and prayer with people in other villages

• New people have come into the village, and those who still live there have social contacts outside the village (in town and elsewhere)

• The village is no longer a “community of fate” with intense, life-long face-to-face relations smoothed over with reciprocity that creates chŏng (jeong)
  • The money economy means that single-stranded rather than multi-stranded relations are the norm