LEADERSHIP

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THE POWER OF LEADERSHIP

We search eagerly for leadership yet seek to cage and tame it. We recoil from power yet we are bewitched or titillated by it. We devour books on power—power in the office, power in the bedroom, power in the corridors. Connoisseurs of power purport to teach about it—what it is, how to get it, how to use it, how to "gain total control" over "everything around you." We think up new terms for power: clout, wallop, muscle. We measure the power of the aides of Great Men by the number of yards between their offices and that of Number One. If authority made the powerful "giddy, proud, and vain," as Samuel Butler wrote, today it entrances both the seekers of power and the powerless.

Why this preoccupation, this near-obsession, with power? In part because we in this century cannot escape the horror of it. Stalin controlled an apparatus that, year after year and in prison after prison, quietly put to death millions of persons, some of them old comrades and leading Bolsheviks, with hardly a ripple of protest from others. Between teatime and dinner Adolf Hitler could decide whether to release a holocaust of terror and death in an easterly or westerly direction, with stupendous impact on the fate of a continent and a world. On smaller planes of horror, American soldiers have slaughtered women and children cowering in ditches; village tyrants hold serfs and slaves in thrall; revolutionary leaders disperse whole populations into the countryside, where they dig or die; the daughter of Nehru jails her political adversaries—and is jailed in turn.

Then too, striking displays of power stick in our memories; the more subtle interplays between leaders and followers elude us. I have long been haunted by the tale of an encounter with Mtesa, king of Uganda, that John

Speke brought back from his early travels to the source of the Nile. The Englishman was first briefed on court decorum: while the king's subjects groveled before the throne, their faces plastered with dirt, Speke would be allowed to sit on a bundle of grass. Following an interlude of Wasoga minstrels playing on tambira, the visitor was summoned to the court, where women, cows, goats, porcupines, and rats were arrayed for presentation. The king showed an avid interest in the guns Speke had brought. He invited his guest to take potshots at the cows, and great applause broke out when Speke dropped five in a row. Speke reported further:

"The king now loaded one of the carbines I had given him with his own hands, and giving it full-cock to a page, told him to go out and shoot a man in the outer court, which was no sooner accomplished than the little urchin returned to announce his success with a look of glee such as one would see in the face of a boy who had robbed a bird's nest, caught a trout, or done any other boyish trick. The king said to him, 'And did you do it well?' 'Oh, yes, capitally.' " The affair created little interest in the court, Speke said, and no one inquired about the man who had been killed.

It is a story to make one pause. Mtésa was an absolute monarch, but could a man be randomly shot at the whim of the tyrant—indeed, of a boy? Did the victim have no mother or father, no protective brother, no lover, no comrade with whom he had played and hunted?

The case of the nurse of the children of Frederick William, king of Prussia, may be more instructive. Despising the mildly bohemian ways of his oldest son, the king heaped humiliation on him and flogged him in public. When the crown prince fled with a companion, the king had them arrested, falsely told his wife that their son had been executed, beat his children when they intervened in their brother's behalf, and dealt with the companion—the son and grandson of high-ranking generals—by setting aside a life imprisonment sentence imposed by a military court in favor of the death penalty. He forced his son to watch while his friend was beheaded. One of the few persons to stand up to the king was the nurse, who barred his way when he tried to drag his cowering children out from under the table, and she got away with it.

Sheer evil and brute power always seem more fascinating than complex human relationships. Sinners usually outsell saints, at least in Western cultures, and the ruthless exercise of power somehow seems more realistic, moral influence more naive. Above all, sheer massed power seems to have the most impact on history. Such, at least, is this century's bias. Perhaps I exemplify this problem of this distorted perception in my own intellectual development. Growing up in the aftermath of one world war, taking part in a second, studying the records of these and later wars, I have been struck by the sheer physical

impact of men's armaments. Living in the age of political titans, I too have assumed that their actual power equaled their reputed power. As a political scientist I have belonged to a "power school" that analyzed the interrelationships of persons on the basis only of power. Perhaps this was fitting for an era of two world wars and scores of lesser ones, the murder of entire cities, bloody revolutions, the unleashing of the inhuman force of the atom.

I fear, however, that we are paying a steep intellectual and political price for our preoccupation with power. Viewing politics *as* power has blinded us to the role of power *in* politics and hence to the pivotal role of leadership. Our failure is partly empirical and psychological. Consider again the story of Mtésa and Speke. It is easy to suspend disbelief and swallow the story whole, enticing as it is. But did the English visitor actually know what happened in the outer court? Was the king staging an act for him? If a man did die, was he an already doomed culprit? If not, would Mtésa later pay a terrible price at the hands of his subjects? Or turn back to the brutality of Frederick William? Was his "absolute" power more important than the moral courage of the nurse who resisted him? So shocking are the acts of tyrants, so rarely reported the acts of defiance, that we forget that even the most despotic are continually frustrated by foot-dragging, quiet sabotage, communications failures, stupidity, even aside from moral resistance and sheer physical circumstance.

Our main hope for disenthralling ourselves from our overemphasis on power lies more in a theoretical, or at least conceptual, effort, than in an empirical one. It lies not only in recognizing that not all human influences are necessarily coercive and exploitative, that not all transactions among persons are mechanical, impersonal, ephemeral. It lies in seeing that the most powerful influences consist of deeply human relationships in which two or more persons *engage* with one another. It lies in a more realistic, a more sophisticated understanding of power, and of the often far more consequential exercise of mutual persuasion, exchange, elevation, and transformation—in short, of leadership. This is not to exorcise power from its pervasive influence in our daily lives; recognizing this kind of power is absolutely indispensable to understanding leadership. But we must recognize the limited reach of "total" or "coercive" power. We must see power—and leadership—as not things but as *relationships*. We must analyze power in a context of human motives and physical constraints. If we can come to grips with these aspects of power, we can hope to comprehend the true nature of leadership—a venture far more intellectually daunting than the study of naked power.

The Two Essentials of Power

We all have *power* to do acts we lack the *motive* to do—to buy a gun and slaughter people, to crush the feelings of loved ones who cannot defend themselves, to drive a car down a crowded city sidewalk, to torture an animal.

We all have the *motives* to do things we do not have the resources to do—to be President or senator, to buy a luxurious yacht, to give away millions to charity, to travel for months on end, to right injustices, to tell off the boss.

The two essentials of power are motive and resource. The two are interrelated. Lacking motive, resource diminishes; lacking resource, motive lies idle. Lacking either one, power collapses. Because both resource and motive are needed, and because both may be in short supply, power is an elusive and limited thing. Human beings, both the agents and the victims of power, for two thousand years or more have tried to penetrate its mysteries, but the nature of power remains elusive. Certainly no one has mastered the secrets of personal power as physicists have penetrated the atom. It is probably just as well.

To understand the nature of leadership requires understanding of the essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power. Forty years ago Bertrand Russell called power the fundamental concept in social science, "in the same sense in which Energy is a fundamental concept in physics." This is a compelling metaphor; it suggests that the source of power may lie in immense reserves of the wants and needs of the wielders and objects of power, just as the winds and the tides, oil and coal, the atom and the sun have been harnessed to supply physical energy. But it is still only a metaphor.

What is power? The "power of A over B," we are told, "is equal to maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize in the opposite direction." One wonders about the As and the Bs, the Xs and the Ys, in the equations of power. Are they mere croquet balls, knocking other balls and being knocked, in some game of the gods? Or do these As and Xs and the others have wants and needs, ambitions and aspirations, of their own? And what if a ball does not obey a god, just as the children's nurse stood in the autocrat's way? Surely this formula is more physics than power. But the formula offers one vital clue to power: power is a *relationship* among persons.

Power, says Max Weber—he uses the term *Macht*—"is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." This formula helps the search for power, since it reminds us that there is no certain relationship between what P (power holder) does and how R

(power recipient) responds. Those who have pressed a button and found no light turned on, or who have admonished a child with no palpable effect, welcome the factor of probability. But what controls the *degree* of probability? Motive? Intention? Power resources? Skill? Is P acting on his own, or is he the agent of some other power holder? And what if P orders R to do something to someone else—who then is the *real* power recipient? To answer such questions, P and R and all the other croquet players, mallets, and balls must be put into a broader universe of power relationships—that is, viewed as a *collective* act. Power and leadership become part of a system of social causation.

Essential in a concept of power is the role of *purpose*. This absolutely central value has been inadequately recognized in most theories of power. Power has been defined as the production of intended effects, but the crux of the matter lies in the dimensions of "intent." What is the nature (intensity, persistence, scope) of purpose? How is P's purpose communicated to R—and to what degree is that intent perceived by R as it is by P? Assuming an intent of P, to what extent is there a power relation if P's intent is influenced by P's prior knowledge and anticipation of R's intent? To what extent is intent part of a wider interaction among wants, needs, and values of P and R, before any overt behavior takes place? Few persons have a single intent; if P has more than one, are these intentions deemed equal, hierarchical, or unrelated? These relationships also define the exercise of power as a collective act.

A *psychological* conception of power will help us cut through some of these complexities and provide a basis for understanding the relation of power to leadership. This approach carries on the assumptions above: that power is first of all a *relationship* and not merely an entity to be passed around like a baton or hand grenade; that it involves the *intention* or *purpose* of both power holder and power recipient; and hence that it is *collective*, not merely the behavior of one person. On these assumptions I view the power process as one in which power holders (P), *possessing certain motives and goals, have the capacity to secure changes in the behavior of a respondent (R), human or animal, and in the environment, by utilizing resources in their power base, including factors of skill, relative to the targets of their power-wielding and necessary to secure such changes.* This view of power deals with three elements in the process: the motives and resources of power holders; the motives and resources of power recipients; and the relationship among all these.

The power holder may be the person whose "private motives are displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of public interest," to quote Harold Lasswell's classic formula. So accustomed are we to observing persons with power drives or complexes, so sensitive to leaders with the "will to

power," so exposed to studies finding the source of the power urge in early deprivation, that we tend to assume the power motive to be exclusively that of seeking to dominate the behavior of others. "But must *all* experiences of power have as their ultimate goal the exercise of power over others?" David McClelland demands. He and other psychologists find that persons with high need for power ("*n* Power") may derive that need not only from deprivation but from other experiences. One study indicated that young men watching a film of John F. Kennedy's Inaugural felt strengthened and inspirited by this exposure to an admired leader. Other persons may draw on internal resources as they grow older and learn to exert power against those who constrain them, like children who self-consciously recognize their exercise of power as they resist their mothers' directives. They find "sources of strength in the self to develop the self."

These and other findings remind us that the power holder has a variety of motives besides that of wielding power over others. They help us correct the traditional picture of single-minded power wielders bent on exerting control over respondents. (Their main motive may be to institute power over *themselves*.) In fact power holders may have as varied motives—of wants, needs, expectations, etc.—as their targets. Some may pursue not power but status, recognition, prestige, and glory, or they may seek power as an intermediate value instrumental to realizing those loftier goals. Some psychologists consider the need to achieve ("*n* Achievement") a powerful motive, especially in western cultures, and one whose results may be prized more as an *attainment* than as a means of social control. Some use power to collect wives or mistresses less to dominate them than to love or to display them. Others will use power to seek novelty and excitement. Still others may enjoy the exercise of power mainly because it enables them to exhibit—if only to themselves—their skill and knowledge, their ability to stimulate their own capacities and to master their environment. Those skilled in athletics may enjoy riding horseback or skiing as solitary pastimes, with no one but themselves to admire their skills. The motivational base of this kind of competence has been labeled "effectance" by Robert White.

Still, there *are* the single-minded power wielders who fit the classical images of Machiavelli or Hobbes or Nietzsche, or at least the portraits of the modern power theorists. They consciously exploit their external resources (economic, social, psychological, and institutional) and their "effectance," their training, skill, and competence, to make persons and things do what they want done. The key factor here is indeed "what they want done." The motives of power wielders may or may not coincide with what the respondent wants done.

it is P's intention that controls. Power wielders may or may not recognize respondents' wants and needs; if they do, they may recognize them only to the degree necessary to achieve their goals; and if they must make a choice between satisfying their own purposes and satisfying respondents' needs, they will choose the former. Power wielders are not free agents. They are subject—even slaves—to pressures working on them and in them. But once their will and purpose is forged, it may be controlling. If P wants circuses and R wants bread, the power wielder may manipulate popular demand for bread only to the degree that it helps P achieve circuses. At the "naked power" extremity on the continuum of types of power holders are the practitioners of virtually unbridled power—Hitler, Stalin, and the like—subject always, of course, to empowering and constraining circumstances.

The foundation of this kind of control lies in P's "power base" *as it is relevant to those at the receiving end of power.* The composition of the power base will vary from culture to culture, from situation to situation. Some power holders will have such pervasive control over factors influencing behavior that the imbalance between P's and R's power bases, and between the possibility of realizing P's and R's purposes, will be overwhelming. Nazi death camps and communist "re-education" camps are examples of such overwhelming imbalances. A dictator can put respondents physically in such isolation and under such constraint that they cannot even appeal to the dictator's conscience, if he has one, or to sympathetic opinion outside the camp or outside the country, if such exists. More typical, in most cultures, is the less asymmetric relationship in which P's power base supplies P with extensive control over R but leaves R with various resources for resisting. Prisons, armies, authoritarian families, concentration camps such as the United States relocation centers for Japanese-Americans during World War II, exemplify this kind of imbalance. There is a multitude of power balances in villages, tribes, schools, homes, collectives, businesses, trade unions, cities, in which most persons spend most of their lives.

To define power not as a property or entity or possession but as a *relationship* in which two or more persons tap motivational bases in one another and bring varying resources to bear in the process is to perceive power as drawing a vast range of human behavior into its orbit. The arena of power is no longer the exclusive preserve of a power elite or an establishment or persons clothed with legitimacy. Power is ubiquitous; it permeates human relationships. It exists whether or not it is quested for. It is the glory and the burden of most of humanity. A common, highly asymmetric, and sometimes cruel power relation can exist, for example, when one person is in love with another but the

other does not reciprocate. The wants and needs and expectations of the person in love are aroused and engaged by a partner whose resources of attractiveness or desirability are high and whose own cluster of motives is less vulnerable. The person possessed by love can maneuver and struggle but still is a slave to the one loved, as the plight of Philip in Somerset Maugham's marvelously titled *Of Human Bondage* illustrates.

Because power can take such multifarious, ubiquitous, and subtle forms, it is reflected in an infinite number of combinations and particularities in specific contexts. Even so, observers *in* those contexts may perceive their particular "power mix," as the basic and universal type, and they will base elaborate descriptions and theories of power on one model—their own. Even Machiavelli's celebrated portrait of the uses and abuses of power, while relevant to a few other cultures and eras, is essentially culture-bound and irrelevant to a host of other power situations and systems. Thus popular tracts on power—how to win power and influence people—typically are useful only for particular situations and may disable the student of power coping with quite different power constellations.

Still there are ways of breaking power down into certain attributes that allow for some generalization and even theory-building. Robert Dahl's break-down of the reach and magnitude of power is useful and parsimonious. One dimension is *distribution*—the concentration and dispersion of power among persons of diverse influence in various political, social, and economic locations such as geographical areas, castes and classes, status positions, skill groups, communications centers, and the like. Another dimension is *scope*—the extent to which power is generalized over a wide range or is specialized. Persons who are relatively powerful in relation to one kind of activity, Dahl notes, may be relatively weak in other power relationships. Still another dimension is *do-main*—the number and nature of power respondents influenced by power wielders compared to those who are not. These dimensions are not greatly different from Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan's conception of the weight, scope, and domain of power.

A more common way to organize the data of power is in terms of the *size* of the *arena* in which power is exercised. The relation of P and R is, in many studies, typically one of micropower, as Edward Lehman calls it. Most power relations embrace a multiplicity of power holders; the relation is one among many Ps and many Rs. As power holders and respondents multiply, the number of relationships increases geometrically. Macropower, as Lehman contends, has distinct attributes of its own; the complex relations involved in the aggregate are not simply those of micropower extended to a higher plane. Causal interrelations become vastly more complex as a greater number of power actors

and power components comes into play. Paradoxically, we may, with modern techniques of fact-gathering and of empirical analysis, gain a better understanding of mass phenomena of power and leadership than of the more intricate and elusive interactions in micropower situations.

Whatever the dimensions or context, the fundamental process remains the same. *Power wielders draw from their power bases resources relevant to their own motives and the motives and resources of others upon whom they exercise power.* The power base may be narrow and weak, or it may consist of ample and multiple resources useful for vast and long-term exercises of power, but the process is the same. Dominated by personal motives, P draws on supporters, on funds, on ideology, on institutions, on old friendships, on political credits, on status, and on his own skills of calculation, judgment, communication, timing, to mobilize those elements that relate to the motives of the persons P wishes to control—even if in the end P overrides their values and goals—just as P mobilizes machines and fuel and manpower and engineering expertise relevant to the tasks of building dams or clearing forests.

Power shows many faces and takes many forms. It may be as visible as the policeman's badge or billy or as veiled as the politician's whisper in the back room. It may exist as an overwhelming presence or as a potential that can be drawn on at will. It may appear in the form of money, sex appeal, authority, administrative regulation, charisma, munitions, staff resources, instruments for torture. But all these resources must have this in common: *they must be relevant to the motivations of the power recipients.* Even the most fearsome of power devices, such as imprisonment or torture or denial of food or water, may not affect the behavior of a masochist or a martyr.

The exception to this qualification is the appalling power totally to dominate a power object physically or mentally through slavery, imprisonment, deportation, hypnotism. This kind of power has two significant implications. One is the expenditure of effort and resources by P to exercise this kind of control; unless power has been inherited, P has invested, over a period of time and through many power-related acts, in power resources that permit exertion of "total" power. The other is the constraint that may tighten when P exercises total psychological or physical control; P may gain power over a limited number of persons or goods at the expense of antagonizing other persons —Perhaps millions of them—by threatening and attacking their values. Power can be fully analyzed and measured only by viewing it in the context of multiple human interaction and broad causal relationships.

Leadership and Followership

Leadership is an aspect of power, but it is also a separate and vital process in itself.

Power over other persons, we have noted, is exercised when potential power wielders, motivated to achieve certain goals of their own, marshal in their power base resources (economic, military, institutional, or skill) that enable them to influence the behavior of respondents by activating motives of respondents relevant to those resources and to those goals. This is done in order to realize the purposes of the *power wielders, whether or not these are also the goals of the respondents.* Power wielders also exercise influence by mobilizing their own power base in such a way as to establish direct physical control over others' behavior, as in a war of conquest or through measures of harsh deprivation, but these are highly restricted exercises of power, dependent on certain times, cultures, and personalities, and they are often self-destructive and transitory.

Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals mutually held by *both* leaders and followers, as in Lenin's calls for peace, bread, and land. In brief, leaders with motive and power bases tap followers' motives in order to realize the purposes of both leaders and followers. Not only must motivation be relevant, as in power generally, but its purposes must be realized and satisfied. Leadership is exercised in a condition of *conflict or competition* in which leaders contend in appealing to the motive bases of potential followers. Naked power, on the other hand, admits of no competition or conflict—there is no engagement.

Leaders are a particular kind of power holder. Like power, leadership is relational, collective, and purposeful. Leadership shares with power the central function of achieving purpose. But the reach and domain of leadership are, in the short range at least, more limited than those of power. Leaders do not obliterate followers' motives though they may arouse certain motives and ignore others. They lead other creatures, not things (and lead animals only to the degree that they recognize animal motives—i.e., leading cattle to shelter rather than to slaughter). To control *things*—tools, mineral resources, money, energy—is an act of power, not leadership, for things have no motives. Power wielders may treat people as things. Leaders may not.

All leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders.

These definitions of power and of leadership differ from those that others have offered. Lasswell and Kaplan hold that power must be relevant to people's valued things and may be relevant to the *power wielder's* valued things and may be relevant to the *recipient's* needs or values only as necessary to exploit them. Kenneth Janda defines power as "the ability to cause other persons to adjust their behavior in conformance with communicated behavior patterns." I agree, assuming that those behavior patterns aid the purpose of the power wielder. According to Andrew McFarland, "If the leader causes changes that he intended, he has exercised power; if the leader causes changes that he did not intend or want, he has exercised influence, but not power. . . ." I dispense with the concept of influence as unnecessary and unparsimonious. For me the leader is a very special, very circumscribed, but potentially the most effective of power holders, judged by the degree of intended "real change" finally achieved. Roderick Bell et al. contend that power is a relationship rather than an entity—an entity being something that "could be smelled and touched, or stored in a keg"; while I agree that power is a relationship, I contend that the relationship is one in which some entity—part of the "power base"—plays an indispensable part, whether that keg is a keg of beer, of dynamite, or of ink.

The crucial variable, again, is *purpose*. Some define leadership as leaders making followers do *what followers* would not otherwise do, or as leaders making followers do what the *leaders* want them to do; I define leadership as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations—the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations—*of both leaders and followers*. And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values and motivations.

Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals. The essence of the leader-follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels of motivations and of power potential, including skill, in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose. That interaction, however, takes two fundamentally different forms. The first I will call *transactional* leadership (the nature of which will be developed in Part III). Such leadership occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things. The exchange could be economic or political or psychological in nature: a swap of goods or of one good for money; a trading of votes between candidate and citizen or between legislators; hospitality to another person in exchange for willingness to listen to one's troubles. Each party to the bargain is conscious of the power resources and attitudes of the other. Each person recognizes the other as a *person.* Their purposes are related, at least to the extent that the purposes stand

within the bargaining process and can be advanced by maintaining that process. But beyond this the relationship does not go. The bargainers have no enduring purpose that holds them together; hence they may go their separate ways. A leadership act took place, but it was not one that binds leader and followers together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose.

Contrast this with *transforming* leadership. Such leadership occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality. (The nature of this motivation and this morality will be developed in Part II.) Their purposes, which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused. Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose. Various names are used for such leadership, some of them derisory: elevating, mobilizing, inspiring, exalting, uplifting, preaching, exhorting, evangelizing. The relationship can be moralistic, of course. But transforming leadership ultimately becomes *moral* in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both. Perhaps the best modern example is Gandhi, who aroused and elevated the hopes and demands of millions of Indians and whose life and personality were enhanced in the process. Transcending leadership is dynamic leadership in the sense that the leaders throw themselves into a relationship with followers who will feel "elevated" by it and often become more active themselves, thereby creating new cadres of leaders. Transcending leadership is leadership *engagé*. Naked power-wielding can be neither transactional nor transforming; only leadership can be.

Leaders and followers may be inseparable in function, but they are not the same. The leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection; it is the leader who creates the links that allow communication and exchange to take place. An office seeker does this in accosting a voter on the street, but if the voter espies and accosts the politician, the voter is assuming a leadership function, at least for that brief moment. The leader is more skillful in evaluating followers' motives, anticipating their responses to an initiative, and estimating their power bases, than the reverse. Leaders continue to take the major part in maintaining and effectuating the relationship with followers and will have the major role in ultimately carrying out the combined purpose of leaders and followers. Finally, and most important by far, leaders address themselves to followers' wants, needs, and other motivations, as well as to their own, and thus they serve as an *independent force in changing the makeup of the followers' motive base through gratifying their motives.*

Certain forms of power and certain forms of leadership are near-extremes on the power continuum. One is the kind of absolute power that, Lord Acton

felt, "corrupts absolutely." It also coerces absolutely. The essence of this kind of power is the capacity of power wielders, given the necessary motivation, to override the motive and power bases of their targets. Such power objectifies its victims; it literally turns them into objects, like the inadvertent weapon tester in Mèsa's court. Such power wielders, as well, are objectified and dehumanized. Hitler, according to Richard Hughes, saw the universe as containing no persons other than himself, only "things." The ordinary citizen in Russia, says a Soviet linguist and dissident, does not identify with his government. "With us, it is there, like the wind, like a wall, like the sky. It is something permanent, unchangeable. So the individual acquiesces, does not dream of changing it—except a few, few people. . . ."

At the other extreme is leadership so sensitive to the motives of potential followers that the roles of leader and follower become virtually interdependent. Whether the leadership relationship is transactional or transforming, in it motives, values, and goals of leader and led have merged. It may appear that at the other extreme from the raw power relationship, dramatized in works like Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* and George Orwell's *1984*, is the extreme of leadership-led merger dramatized in novels about persons utterly dependent on parents, wives, or lovers. Analytically these extreme types of relationships are not very perplexing. To watch one person absolutely dominate another is horrifying; to watch one person disappear, his motives and values submerged into those of another to the point of loss of individuality, is saddening. But puzzling out the nature of these extreme relationships is not intellectually challenging because each in its own way lacks the qualities of complexity and conflict. Submersion of one personality in another is not genuine merger based on mutual respect. Such submersion is an example of brute power subtly applied, perhaps with the acquiescence of the victim.

More complex are relationships that lie between these poles of brute power and wholly reciprocal leadership-followership. Here empirical and theoretical questions still perplex both the analysts and the practitioners of power. One of these concerns the sheer measurement of power (or leadership). Traditionally we measure power resources by calculating each one and adding them up: constituency support plus access to leadership plus financial resources plus skill plus "popularity" plus access to information, etc., all in relation to the strength of opposing forces, similarly computed. But these calculations omit the vital factor of motivation and purpose and hence fall of their own weight. Another controversial measurement device is *reputation*. Researchers seek to learn from informed observers their estimates of the power or leadership role and resources of visible *community* leaders (projecting this into national arenas of power is a formidable task). Major questions arise as to the reliability of the estimates, the

degree of agreement between interviewer and interviewee over their definition of power and leadership, the transferability of power from one area of decision-making to another. Another device for studying power and leadership is *linkage theory*, which requires elaborate mapping of communication and other interrelations among power holders in different spheres, such as the economic and the military. The difficulty here is that communication, which may expedite the processes of power and leadership, is not a substitute for them.

My own measurement of power and leadership is simpler in concept but no less demanding of analysis: *power and leadership are measured by the degree of production of intended effects*. This need not be a theoretical exercise. Indeed, in ordinary political life, the power resources and the motivations of presidents and prime ministers and political parties are measured by the extent to which presidential promises and party programs are carried out. Note that the variables are the double ones of *intent* (a function of motivation) and of *capacity* (a function of power base), but the test of the extent and quality of power and leadership is the degree of *actual accomplishment* of the promised change.

Other complexities in the study of power and leadership are equally serious. One is the extent to which power and leadership are exercised not by positive action but by *inaction* or *nondecision*. Another is that power and leadership are often exercised not directly on targets but indirectly, and perhaps through multiple channels, on multiple targets. We must ask not only whether P has the power to do X to R, but whether P can induce or force R to do Y to Z. The existence of power and leadership in the form of a stream of multiple direct and indirect forces operating over time must be seen as part of the broader sequences of historical causation. Finally, we must acknowledge the knotty problem of events of history that are beyond the control of identifiable persons capable of foreseeing developments and powerful enough to influence them and hence to be held accountable for them. We can only agree with C. Wright Mills that these are matters of fate rather than power or leadership.

We do well to approach these and other complexities of power and leadership with some humility as well as a measure of boldness. We can reject the 'gee whiz' approach to power that often takes the form of the automatic presumption of 'elite control' of communities, groups, institutions, entire nations. Certain concepts and techniques of the 'elitist' school of power are indispensable in social and political analysis, but 'elitism' is often used as a concept that *presupposes* the existence of the very degree and kind of power that is to be estimated and analyzed. Such 'elite theorists' commit the gross error of equating power and leadership with the assumed power bases of preconceived leaders and power holders, without considering the crucial role of

motivations of leaders and followers. Every good detective knows that one must look for the motive as well as the weapon.

What Leadership Is Not: Closing the Intellectual Gap

It may seem puzzling that after centuries of experience with rulers as power wielders, with royal and ecclesiastical and military authority, humankind should have made such limited progress in developing propositions about *leadership*—propositions that focus on the role of the ruled, the power recipients, and the followers. The first, and primary, explanation lies in a blind alley in the history of political thought; a second, in an inadequacy of empirical data. Plato's parable of the ship epitomizes the first.

'Imagine then,' said Plato, 'a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better.' A furious quarrel breaks out among the crew; everyone thinks he has a right to steer, no matter how untrained in navigation. The sailors throng around the captain, begging him to commit the helm to them; when he refuses, they take over the ship and make free with the stores. 'Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot . . . they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman . . . but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and wind . . . and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like it or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts. . . .' And the true pilot, Plato added, would be dismissed as a prater, a stargazer, a good-for-nothing.

Plato was apotheosizing a certain kind of authority—that of the true philosopher, artist, expert. Yet in derogating the sailors who would dismiss the navigator he was defending the status of philosopher-kings and of those in their courts. He was also ignoring the rightful concerns of the crew—their suspicion of experts, their difficulties with *this* expert, their doubts about *his* destination for the ship, their own needs and aspirations and destinations. For centuries after Plato his kind of expert embodied authority, but scientific revolutions later brought much learned authority under attack. It was discovered that captains and navigators pretended to an intellectual authority that often turned out to be false. Doctors and scientists and theologians are still treated as 'authority' though their expertise may be challenged, their doctrines overturned, and the purposes to which they lend their expertise may be found to diverge from the public's own purposes.

For philosophers and kings, however, authority came to stand for much

more than expertise. It was the intellectual and often the legal buttress of the power of the father in the family, the priest in the community, the feudal lord in the barony, the king in the nation-state, the Pope in Western Christendom. Authority was seen as deriving from God or, later, from the innate nature of man. Authority was even more fundamental than the state for it was the source and the legitimation of state power. In the tumultuous Western world the power of authority was the means of preserving order; it was necessary in an "unquiet world," Hooker said. It would compel men to regulate their conduct, Hobbes wrote. Church and state combined to furbish authority. It carried formal legitimacy, religious sanction, and physical force.

Typically authority was perceived and used as a *property*. Rulers were symbolically invested with authority through things—crowns, scepters, maces, scrolls, robes, badges. Such rulers were objects of awe for their subjects, until rivals seized the armaments of office or substituted their own. To the extent that authority was a *relationship* between monarch and subjects it was a relationship of gross inequality, of the ruler and the ruled. But authority was sharply distinguished from naked power, force, coercion. Rulers must be *legitimate*. They must inherit or assume office through carefully established procedures; they must assume certain responsibilities under God, and for the people.

Authority, in short, was legitimated power. But it was legitimated by tradition, religious sanction, rights of succession, and procedures, not by mandate of the people. Authority was quite one-sided. Rulers had the right to command, subjects the obligation to obey. Only a few complained. The fundamental need of the people was for order and security; obedience seemed a fair exchange for survival. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the concept of authority was undermined. Thinkers and preachers, riding new intellectual currents of innovation and iconoclasm, rebelled against the old canons of authority that were founded so often in the past, the dead, or the patriarchs. Spreading through Europe and America, powerful new doctrines proclaimed the rights of individuals against rulers, set forth goals and values beyond those of simple order or security, and called for liberty, equality, fraternity, even the pursuit of happiness.

Authority did not crumble under the impact of these forces; revolutionary disturbances and excesses like the French terror confirmed its importance. But it could not be re-established on the old foundations, for now it was supposed to be derived from the people and hence ultimately lie in their hands—at least in the hands of those people who were not poor, slaves, or women. A new secular basis of authority was needed. In response, the old "substantive" authority gave way to procedural. Since the citizenry now embodied authority, since the people had to be protected against themselves, and since authority had to be

protected against shifting majorities and volatile popular movements, constitutions were adopted to safeguard the people against themselves. Under the constitutions, authority was concentrated in judges, legislative upper chambers, local governments, in doctrines of due process, protection of property, and in judicial review.

The upshot was this: the doctrine of authority came into the modern age devitalized, fragmentized, and trivialized; it became a captive of the right, even of fascism. Mussolini substituted authority, order, and justice for liberty, equality, fraternity. Hannah Arendt in this century could mourn that the entire concept of leadership had lost its validity; almost everyone could agree that the concept had been emptied of meaning and definition. The loss was not simply of a stricken concept—doctrines, like empires, grow, flourish, and decline—but of authority that was not transformed into a doctrine suitable for the new age. No new, democratized, and radicalized doctrine arose to salvage the authentic and the relevant in authority and link these strengths to a doctrine of leadership that recognized the vital need for qualities of integrity, authenticity, initiative, and moral resolve. Max Weber, Carl Friedrich, and others tried to pump new vitality and relevance into the concept, without marked success; authority was never turned on its head.

Vilfredo Pareto's famous concept of the "circulation of the elites" focused chiefly on the problem of bringing fresh talent or expertise to the top. They, like the shapers of the grand tradition in earlier centuries, typically looked at the ruler-ruled relationship from the top down, not upward from the peasant's sward or the worker's bench. In the end, in a more democratic age, authority was never turned on its head.

The resulting intellectual gap—that is, the absence of a doctrine of leadership with the power and sweep of the old doctrine of authority but now emphasizing the influence of followers on leaders—was especially evident in America. The pilgrims' voyage to Plymouth in 1620 has been contrasted with Plato's parable of the ship most arrestingly by Norman Jacobson. The goal of the settlers was Virginia but they lost their way. Facing rebellion, and with their authority undermined, the leaders had to grant the demands of the rest of the party for a compact among all the members. Under this declaration no person or group was empowered to assume authority, nor was any one person seen as commanding special expertise. The compact idea was restated in the Declaration of Independence. By the time of the constitutional convention of 1787, however, in the wake of Shays' rebellion in Massachusetts, the Federalist leadership had become fearful of popular unrest and of electoral majorities that represented the turbulent masses. Under the new constitution, authority was derived from the people, but direct popular action was frustrated by an elaborate system of federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances.

What would happen in a nation that made the people sovereign, that elevated Jeffersonian and Jacksonian and Lincolnian leaders who orated about government by the people, but a nation that hedged in popular majorities *and their leaders* with checks and balances that constituted probably the most elaborate and well-calculated barriers in constitutional history? As usual, the Americans tried to have the best of both ways. They maintained their system of restraints on leaders almost intact, but they encouraged the emergence of a powerful executive, especially in the twentieth century. American Marxists contended that not leaders but technicians—simple administrative functionaries, in Engels' words, "watching over the true interests of society"—would run the state. American Progressives looked on leadership as "bossism" and sponsored successfully such anti-leadership devices as the initiative, referendum and recall, and the destruction of parties. The failure was also intellectual. Historians and political scientists admired individual leaders, especially Presidents, who could break through legislative and judicial barriers. Some of them—notably Woodrow Wilson—moralized about the need for leaders in education and politics. No one advanced a grand theory of *leadership*.

Perhaps such a theory was impossible in any event, in the absence of hard and detailed data about the people, the public, the masses, the voters, the followers. Earlier thinkers had by no means ignored the psychology of the ruler's subjects. Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau and Bentham, and others, had offered some remarkable insights into human nature. These insights were based on observation and speculation, not on scientific data. In recent decades advances in theories of opinion formation, the revolution in the technique and technology of analyzing public attitudes, aspirations and goals in depth, and above all the impressive work of psychologists in analyzing the formation, structure, qualities, and change in persons' opinions, attitudes, values, wants, needs, and aspirations, have made possible an understanding of followers' response to leadership impossible only half a century ago. Cross-cultural research and analysis in popular motives and values at last permits us to avoid parochial notions of authority and power and to identify broad patterns of leadership-followership interaction as part of a broader concept of social causation. At last we can hope to close the intellectual gap between the fecund canons of authority and a new and general theory of leadership.

Such a general theory demands the best of several disciplines. Historians and biographers typically focus on the "unique" person with more or less idiosyncratic qualities and traits confronting particular sets of problems and situations over time. Psychologists scrutinize genetic factors, early intrafamily relationships, widening arcs of personal interaction, changing constellations of attitudes and motivations. Sociologists view the developing personality as it

moves through a series of social contexts—family, school, neighborhood, workplace—and undergoes powerful socializing forces in the process. Political scientists emphasize the social and political institutions impinging on developing leaders, changes in political leaders as they learn from their experience, the eventual impact of leadership on policy and on history. And most of these various investigators wander into one another's fields, pouncing on insights, borrowing data, filching concepts.

We, too, will poach as required, but the initial emphasis will be heavily dependent on theories of personality development. As a political scientist I am sensitive to the impact of social and political entities—of homes, schools, regimens, constitutions, and political systems. I see that leaders operate in many contexts for many purposes. Why then is my central emphasis on "psychology"? The principal limitation of institutional or systemic analysis is that the kind of transferability of power or leadership that we can assess in gross terms (the influence of Indian Brahmins, the electoral power of a steel union, the discipline of the British Labour party) is not directly transferable to the calculating of influences on, or the influence of, particular leaders at particular times in particular circumstances. The power of the institution must be translated into discernible forces that immediately influence the behavior of leaders. In the past the exercise has often been fruitless because we lacked deep understanding of motivational forces. Modern developmental theory and data can help us to grasp the psychological forces immediately working on or in leaders and the dynamic psychological factors moving persons to new levels of motivation and morality.

The study of leadership in general will be advanced by looking at leaders in particular. The development of certain leaders or rulers is described not in order to "solve" leadership problems or necessarily to predict what kind of leader a person might become, but to raise questions inherent in the complexity of leadership processes. In singling out, among others, four twentieth-century "makers of history," Woodrow Wilson, Mahatma Gandhi, Nikolai Lenin, and Adolf Hitler—the first two of these leaders in my sense, the third a leader whose theory of leadership had a fatal flaw, the fourth an absolute wielder of brutal power—we can compare the origins and development of four men who took different routes to power and exercised power in different ways. We will note in these cases and others that authoritarian rulers can emerge from relatively benign circumstances, and democratic leaders from less benign ones. This will only enhance our sense of humility, complexity, and mystery (useful intellectual inhibitions in the explorations of leadership).

We might also note, in shunning simplistic theories, that the German crown prince who was endlessly mortified and savagely punished by his wrath-

ful father grew up to be Frederick the Great, one of the most masterful—by contemporary standards—constructive and successful rulers in recent times. He who had been abused by power bore it with equanimity. "The passions of princes," Frederick wrote toward the end, "are restrained only by exhaustion."

2

THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL LEADERSHIP

"We have many wants," Plato said, and society and government arose out of these needs as people began to exchange things that they made. Necessity is the mother of invention, Plato went on. "Now the first and greatest necessity is food, which is the condition of life and existence. . . . The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like. . . ." Once a family had these things, then "noble cakes and loaves" would be served up on a mat of reeds or clean leaves, the parents "reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. . . ."

With these words Plato posed a question that has challenged philosophers and scientists to this day: whether people the world over share common wants and needs. As some wants are satisfied are other—"higher"—wants created? Are wants and needs arranged in roughly the same hierarchies in most or all cultures? Common sense tells us that any person, whether Eskimo or Hottentot, Zuni or Kpelle, Brooklynite or East End Londoner, puts first things first—breathing before eating, human life above property, basic nourishment before the "sauces and sweets" that Plato proposed as the climax of the meal. The same would seem to be true of "higher needs"—for survival needs before social acceptance, and social needs—love and esteem—before aesthetic. Yet anthropologists have identified countless cultures with the most remarkable varieties of wants and needs. Consider the assumed top priority of sheer survival. Some societies kill their infants to protect their food reserves. In others, men kill themselves (Wall Street, 1929) when they lose their property. In India women burned themselves on funeral pyres when they lost their husbands.

For students of leadership an even more urgent question arises. Supposing we could find species-wide commonalities among hierarchies of wants and needs, could we also find common stages and levels of moral development and reasoning emerging out of those wants and needs? If so, we could assume common foundations for leadership. If we define leadership as not merely a property or activity of leaders but as *relationship* between leaders and a multitude of followers of many types, if we see leaders as interacting with followers in a great merging of motivations and purposes of both, and if in turn we find that many of those motivations and purposes are common to vast numbers of humankind in many cultures, then could we expect to identify patterns of leadership behavior permitting plausible generalizations about the ways in which leaders generally behave?

During the last decade or so, researches in the field of moral development have uncovered remarkable uniformities in hierarchies of moral reasoning across a number of cultures. The research is far from complete; certain cultural relativists hold that the findings and implications are overgeneralized; and it is alleged that the values considered to be universal have in fact a Western bias. But, as Harry Girvetz has said: "In rejecting moral dogmatism are we to be driven to moral skepticism?" Identification of leadership patterns does not depend on finding absolutely universal motives and values. Universal patterns simply assume strong probabilities that most leaders in interacting with followers will behave in similar ways most of the time. In dealing with the structure of moral leadership in this chapter, we will be summarizing more extensive findings to be presented more fully in the next chapter. Here we must note how levels of wants and needs and other motivations, combined with hierarchies of values, and sharpened by conflict, undergird the dynamics of leadership.

Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral.
First comes the belly, then morality.

Bertolt Brecht, Three-Penny Opera

The Power and Sources of Values

Like Plato, we can see the role of power and values in every-day life.

A thousand years ago, according to Soviet Armenian legend, Moslem invaders tried to find a way to lower the water level of Lake Sevan. Their aim was to make a land attack on an island fortress and monastery in the lake, located halfway between the Black Sea and the lower Caspian. In the 1930s Soviet engineers accomplished this feat not for military but for economic purposes; by tapping the lake's waters they were able to create new farmland and to generate electric power for local industrial development. They succeeded.

but the lowered water level caused extensive ecological and aesthetic damage. Forty years later Soviet construction crews were digging a huge, thirty-mile tunnel from a nearby river to replenish the lake.

"When we were poor," a local water power official observed, "Lake Sevan helped us to stand on our feet. But when we became richer, we began to think how we had to help Sevan, this beauty of nature."

In New York City not long ago a construction crew, chain saws in hand, suddenly appeared on East 63rd Street and fell upon a dozen or so spreading sycamores. The tearing, growling noise of the saws brought residents to their windows. One woman hurled a plastic bag filled with water at a foreman; another woman burst into tears as she watched. She was not propitiated by the setting up of some potted trees where the sycamores had stood.

"They were beautiful old trees, so old, so fresh," she said later, "you looked up at them and regardless of your depression, you simply thought, oh isn't that lovely."

"I'll tell you, to be very honest, I was mad," the foreman said. "We're poor people, but we're human beings." Pointing to the replacement trees, he added: "You see what the poor people do for the rich people."

"I must study politics and war, that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy," John Adams said. "My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history and naval architecture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry and porcelain." A Thai boy scout, recruited to combat "communism," bespoke the value he was scheduled to embrace. "Once we get trained, we are united. So it is very difficult for other types of ideas to come in. We stress love of our king, of our country, of religion." Oh, there was no ideology, he added; they did not mention Communism, "but it works automatically."

We must not put groups or societies into conceptual straitjackets. Sometimes the people seem to "skip" a level and advance to a higher one apparently inappropriate to present need. In the 1976 electoral revolt against Indira Gandhi and the Congress party, India voted against suppressors of liberty despite the emphasis of the Congress party on basic needs for food, shelter, and land. Ordinarily, however, economic want and social disarray are stultifying, causing people's aspirations to turn downward and inward; only after physical survival and economic security are assured do people turn to higher needs and hopes.

The long relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph P. Kennedy illustrates the complex interplay of power and values, and suggests that

ultimately the role of values may be crucial, even in the "practical" relationships of leaders. Both were Harvard men, but otherwise their backgrounds contrasted sharply: Roosevelt the product of a benign, secure and small patrician world on the banks of the Hudson, Kennedy of the striving, competitive, vulnerable world of the Irish immigrant on the urban East Coast. The two men were thrown into a personal confrontation in World War I when Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, asked Kennedy, assistant manager of the Fore River shipyard in Massachusetts, to deliver several battleships Fore River had built for the Argentine government. Kennedy refused to release the ships because the Argentinians had not yet paid the bill. After appealing in vain to Kennedy's sense of patriotism in wartime, Roosevelt threatened to have the navy tow the ships away. Kennedy left fuming and defeated; he was so upset on leaving Roosevelt's office, he admitted later, that "I broke down and cried."

More than two decades later, during another great European war, Kennedy and Roosevelt confronted each other once again, under a very different set of circumstances. Having joined the Roosevelt bandwagon well before the Chicago convention of 1932, Kennedy had headed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Maritime Commission and then eagerly accepted an appointment by Roosevelt as ambassador to Britain. But as Europe plunged into war, disquieting reports trickled into Washington about the ambassador's "defeatist" view of Britain's ability to withstand Nazi attack and about his veiled but pungent criticism of Roosevelt and his administration. As the 1940 presidential campaign got under way, Kennedy seemed to hold a pivotal political position. To fight off a hard drive by Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt was picking out a tortuous path between the interventionists and the America Firsters. A resignation by such a prominent Roosevelt ambassador as Kennedy and a return home to join Willkie's "crusade"—or even a Kennedy warning against the administration's "interventionism"—might have tipped the scales in favor of the Republicans. Kennedy's conspicuous Catholicism gave him considerable leverage with the Irish and other ethnic voters who might be pivotal in some of the Northeastern states. He could help the President a lot—or hurt him a lot.

The problem for the President was to persuade Kennedy either to remain in London or to declare for Roosevelt with the right kind of endorsement. First Roosevelt directed that Kennedy be ordered to remain at his post, but when Kennedy threatened to release a statement critical of the administration if not allowed home, the President granted his envoy home leave, with repeated instructions not to say a word about politics or diplomacy on the way back to America. Presidential agents intercepted Kennedy at LaGuardia Field and in effect cordoned him off from Willkie emissaries who had hoped to bring the ambassador into the Republican campaign. A red carpet awaited Kennedy at the

White House, where Roosevelt greeted him effusively and invited him to talk. The ambassador proceeded to pour out his grievances against the State Department and against the White House for asking him to perform favors and then not reciprocating. Roosevelt made no defense of his subordinates or of himself. On the contrary, he nodded understandingly, adding that he knew exactly how Kennedy felt and promising that State Department bureaucrats would not be permitted to treat old and valued envoys so outrageously in the future. The President even—or so the ambassador was led to believe—made some "offer" to Kennedy of the Democratic party nomination in 1944. The carrot was dangled, but so perhaps was the stick—according to a British secret service agent, Roosevelt brought out transcripts of Kennedy's London denunciations of the President. Now his chief asked him to support him publicly for re-election, and Kennedy gave in. A few nights later Kennedy endorsed Roosevelt in a nationwide radio address. The President defeated Willkie, and after the election, Kennedy resigned in expectation of another presidential appointment. No word came from the White House. A year later, after Pearl Harbor, Kennedy volunteered his services for an important war job, but he never received one. Roosevelt exerted the power of inaction.

Leadership in the shaping of private and public opinion, leadership of reform and revolutionary movements—that is, transformational leadership—seems to take on significant and collective proportions historically, but at the time and point of action leadership is intensely individual and personal. Leadership becomes a matter of all-too-human motivation and goals, of conflict and competition that seem to be dominated by the petty quest for esteem and prestige. In the battle of the battleships Kennedy and Roosevelt seemed to be engaged in a naked power fight, and the bigger battalions—in this case, battleships—won. Roosevelt finally got his way not by appealing to Kennedy's motives of patriotism or personal advancement; he got it through direct exercise of power. In the crux Kennedy had no recourse. Conceivably he might have appealed to the head of Bethlehem Steel, who owned the Fore River yard, but Bethlehem would hardly have challenged the administration in time of war. Or he might have appealed to shipyard workers to cordon off the battleships against the navy, but the workers hardly shared Kennedy's obsession with cash on the barrelhead. Kennedy built warships but Roosevelt disposed of them. No wonder Kennedy cried.

Roosevelt's bringing Kennedy back into camp in 1940 is a contrasting kind of power-wielding. Once again Roosevelt seemed to exert his will, but this time Kennedy had considerable freedom of choice. The President could try to exploit the ambassador's motives of self-esteem and patriotism, but Kennedy could achieve self-esteem through the esteem of others beside Roosevelt—of

the Willkieites, for example—and he had his own notion of patriotism. If Roosevelt blocked his hopes of becoming a wartime czar, Kennedy had other means of achieving recognition.

What ultimately dominated World War II politics and strategy, however, was the moral issue of aid to the allies who were fighting Nazism. It was because Roosevelt's fundamental values were deeply humane and democratic that he was able, despite his earlier compromises and evasions, to act when action was imperative. Within a few weeks of his re-election in 1940 he was hard at work on a program—Lend Lease—that was to have an extraordinary impact on war and post-war outcomes. Testifying on the Lend Lease bill before the House Foreign Affairs committee, Kennedy was so inconclusive and self-contradictory that he gave no clear lead to friend or foe. Kennedy never seemed to see a transcending moral issue in the war. Because Roosevelt did, he was able to act with moral impact—to act with power.

Clearly the leader who commands compelling causes has an extraordinary potential influence over followers. Followers armed by moral inspiration, mobilized and purposeful, become zealots and leaders in their own right. How do values come to hold such power over certain leaders? What theories of human development cast light on the sources of such values in both leaders and followers? Do some leaders respond to followers' values without sharing them?

The need for social esteem, we have noted, is a powerful one. Mature leaders may have such a voracious need for affection that they seek it and accept it from every source, without discrimination; Lyndon B. Johnson seemed to want every member of the Senate to love him when he was majority leader and every American to love him when he was President. No matter how strong this longing for unanimity, however, almost all leaders, at least at the national level, must settle for far less than universal affection. They must be willing to *make enemies*—to deny themselves the affection of their adversaries. They must accept conflict. They must be willing and able to be unloved. It is hard to pick one's friends, harder to pick one's enemies.

On what basis is the decision *not* to win friends made? The calculus may seem purely pragmatic; leaders may need to win only enough support to gain a party nomination, build an electoral majority, put a bill through the legislature, bring off a revolution. But even in the most practical terms leaders must decide what side they will take, which group they will lead, what party they will utilize, what kind of revolution they will command. They will, in short, be influenced by considerations of *purpose* or *value* that may lie beyond calculations of personal advancement. Can we trace the origins of the shaping and sharing of values back to various needs of childhood, or is purpose and influence built into the potential leader by social and political processes only during later

years? Is it in some measure independent of psychological need and environmental cause—objectively based in process of mind? How deep are the roots of values held strongly by leaders and the led?

The roots lie very deep, entwined with guilt feelings that arise out of the child's early confrontation with parental authority, too deep to disentangle them completely. In Freudian theory the superego develops as part of the resolution of Oedipal conflicts, as the child internalizes prohibitions expressed in the form of parental chidings and warnings. In need of urgent instant gratification, anxious also to identify with the parents and gain their affection, the child learns to evade parental displeasure and punishment by repressing the behavior that would invoke these penalties. Typically the superego manifested itself in feelings of conscience early in childhood. Jean Piaget noted that children internalized rules and standards so automatically that they grew literal and absolutist about them; rules they saw as ends—almost as objects—in themselves, to be responded to indiscriminately. In some persons these moralistic rigidities carried on into later years without adequate transformation of rule into values. In most cases they were altered by socializing forces.

Out of these elemental but powerful influences of the superego values emerge. The question is how the child makes the transition from rules dictated by Oedipal and other conflict, articulated and enforced by parents, and internalized by the child to the shaping of values. This question has divided the analysts. Freud doubted that the early configurations of conscience and standards could be substantially changed in adult life, except perhaps through psychoanalysis, for they were determined by an iron law of biological and child-parent relations. Carl Jung criticized the "Viennese idea of sexuality with all its vague omnipotence," the notion that the brain was merely an appendage of the genital glands, and the entire mechanistic approach to causation. Persons, Jung insisted, acted not only in response to causal (i.e., mechanistic) forces but to ends or aims (*fines*) as well. Julian Huxley wrote that the evolution of "the primitive super-ego" into a "more rational and less cruel mechanism" is "the central ethical problem confronting every human individual." Erik Erikson said: "The great governor of initiative is conscience. . . . But . . . the conscience of the child can be primitive, cruel, and uncompromising. . . ." Talcott Parsons contended that Freud's view while correct was too narrow, that not only moral standards but all the components of the common culture become rooted in personality structure.

Of these views on the origins of values, Freud's theory of Oedipal conflict, as applied to broader social processes, and Jung's concern with ends, or purposes, are together most useful to students of leadership, for they make possible a concept of values forged and hardened by *conflict*.

Conflict and Consciousness

Leadership is a process of morality to the degree that leaders engage with followers on the basis of shared motives and values and goals—on the basis, that is, of the followers' "true" needs as well as those of leaders: psychological, economic, safety, spiritual, sexual, aesthetic, or physical. Friends, relatives, teachers, officials, politicians, ministers, and others will supply a variety of initiatives, but only the followers themselves can ultimately define their own true needs. And they can do so only when they have been exposed to the competing diagnoses, claims, and values of would-be leaders, only when the followers can make an informed choice among competing "prescriptions," only when—in the political arena at least—followers have had full opportunity to perceive, comprehend, evaluate, and finally experience alternatives offered by those professing to be their "true" representatives. Ultimately the moral legitimacy of transformational leadership, and to a lesser degree transactional leadership, is grounded in *conscious choice among real alternatives*. Hence leadership assumes competition and conflict, and brute power denies it.

Conflict has become the stepchild of political thought. Philosophical concern with conflict reaches back to Hobbes and even Heraclitus, and men who spurred revolutions in Western thought—Machiavelli and Hegel, Marx and Freud—recognized the vital role of conflict in the relations among persons or in the ambivalences within them. The seventeenth-century foes of absolute monarchy, the eighteenth-century Scottish moralists, the nineteenth-century Social Darwinists—these and other schools of thought dealt directly with questions of power and conflict, and indirectly at least with the nature of leadership. The theories of Pareto, Durkheim, Weber, and others, while not centrally concerned with problems of social conflict, "contain many concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses which greatly influenced later writers who did attempt to deal with conflict in general." Georg Simmel and others carried theories of conflict into the twentieth century.

It was, curiously, in this same century—an epoch of the bloodiest world wars, mightiest revolutions, and most savage civil wars—that social science, at least in the West, became most entranced with doctrines of harmony, adjustment, and stability. Perhaps this was the result of relative affluence, or of the need to unify people to conduct total war or consolidate revolutions, or of the co-option of scholars to advise on mitigating hostility among interest groups such as labor and management or racial groups such as blacks and whites. Whatever the cause, the "static bias" afflicted scholarly research with a tendency to look on conflict as an aberration, if not a perversion, of the agreeable and harmonious interactions that were seen as actually making up organized so-

ciety. More recently Western scholarship has shown a quickened interest in the role of conflict in establishing boundaries, channeling hostility, counteracting social ossification, invigorating class and group interests, encouraging innovation, and defining and empowering leadership.

The static bias among scholars doubtless encouraged and reflected the pronouncements of political authority. Communist leaders apotheosized conflict as the engine of the process of overthrowing bourgeois regimes and then banned both the profession and the utilization of conflict in the new "classless" societies. Western leaders, especially in the United States, make a virtual fetish of "national unity," "party harmony," and foreign policy bipartisanship even while they indulge in—and virtually live off—contested elections and divisive policy issues. Jefferson proclaimed at his first Inaugural, "We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans." Few American presidents have aroused and inflamed popular attitudes as divisively as Franklin D. Roosevelt with his assaults on conservatives in both parties, his New Deal innovations, and his efforts to pack the Supreme Court and purge the Democratic party, yet few American presidents have devoted so many addresses to sermonlike calls for transcending differences and behaving as one nation and one people.

The potential for conflict permeates the relations of humankind, and that potential is a force for health and growth as well as for destruction and barbarism. No group can be wholly harmonious, as Simmel said, for such a group would be empty of process and structure. The smooth interaction of people is continually threatened by disparate rates of change, technological innovation, mass deprivation, competition for scarce resources, and other ineluctable social forces and by ambivalences, tensions, and conflicts within individuals' personalities. One can imagine a society—in ancient Egypt, perhaps, or in an isolated rural area today—in which the division of labor, the barriers against external influence, the structure of the family, the organization of the value system, the acceptance of authority, and the decision-making by leaders all interact smoothly and amiably with one another. But the vision of such a society would be useful only as an imaginary construct at one end of a continuum from cohesion to conflict. Indeed, the closer, the more intimate the relations within a group, the more hostility as well as harmony may be generated. The smaller the cooperative group—even if united by language and thrown closely together by living arrangements—"the easier it is for them to be mutually irritated and to flare up in anger," Bronislaw Malinowski said. Some conflict over valued goals and objects is almost inevitable. Even small, isolated societies cannot indefinitely dike off the impact of internal changes such as alteration of the birth rate or the disruption caused by various forms of innovation.

The question, then, is not the inevitability of conflict but the function of

leadership in expressing, shaping, and curbing it. Leadership as conceptualized here is grounded in the seedbed of conflict. Conflict is intrinsically compelling; it galvanizes, prods, motivates people. Every person, group, and society has latent tension and hostility, forming a variety of psychological and political patterns across social situations. Leadership acts as an inciting and triggering force in the conversion of conflicting demands, values, and goals into significant behavior. Since leaders have an interest of their own, whether opportunistic or ideological or both, in expressing and exploiting followers' wants, needs, and aspirations, they act as catalytic agents in arousing followers' consciousness. They discern signs of dissatisfaction, deprivation, and strain; they take the initiative in making connections with their followers; they plumb the character and intensity of their potential for mobilization; they articulate grievances and wants; and they act for followers in their dealings with other clusters of followers.

Conflicts vary in origin—in and between nations, races, regions, religions, economic enterprises, labor unions, communities, kinship groups, families, and individuals themselves. Conflicts show various degrees and qualities of persistence, direction, intensity, volatility, latency, scope. The last alone may be pivotal; the outcome of every conflict, E. E. Schattschneider wrote, "is determined by the scope of its contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number of participants . . . affects the results . . . The moral of this is: If a fight starts, watch the crowd, because the crowd plays the decisive role." But it is leadership that draws the crowd into the incident, that changes the number of participants, that closely affects the manner of the spread of the conflict, that constitutes the main "processes" of relating the wider public to the conflict.

The root causes of conflict are as varied as their origins. No one has described these causes as cogently as James Madison.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have

been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property.

Not only "attachment to different leaders" but all these forces for conflict are expressed and channeled through many different types of leaders "ambitiously contending for pre-eminece and power."

Leaders, whatever their professions of harmony, do not shun conflict; they confront it, exploit it, ultimately embody it. Standing at the points of contact among latent conflict groups, they can take various roles, sometimes acting directly for their followers, sometimes bargaining with others, sometimes overriding certain motives of followers and summoning others into play. The smaller and more homogeneous the group for which they act, the more probable that they will have to deal with the leaders of other groups with opposing needs and values. The larger, more heterogeneous their collection of followers, the more probable that they will have to embrace competing interests and goals within their constituency. At the same time, their marginality supplies them with a double leverage, since in their status as leaders they are expected by their followers and by other leaders to deviate, to innovate, and to mediate between the claims of their groups and those of others.

But leaders shape as well as express and mediate conflict. They do this largely by influencing the intensity and scope of conflict. Within limits they can soften or sharpen the claims and demands of their followers, as they calculate their own political resources in dealing with competing leaders within their own constituencies and outside. They can amplify the voice and pressure of their followers, to the benefit of their bargaining power perhaps, but at the possible price of freedom to maneuver—less freedom to protect themselves against their followers—as they play in games of broader stakes. Similarly, they can narrow or broaden the scope of conflict as they seek to limit or multiply the number of entrants into a specific political arena.

Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated the fine art of controlling entry in the presidential nomination race in 1940. There was widespread uncertainty as to whether he would run for a third term. He himself was following the development of public opinion at the same time that he was influencing it. Leaders in his own party were divided; onetime stalwarts like James A. Farley and Cordell Hull opposed a third term. It was supposed that FDR would discourage Democrats from entering the nomination race. On the contrary, he welcomed them. Secondary figures like Joseph Kennedy, coming to the Oval Office to sound out Roosevelt on his intentions and on their own chances, found themselves flat-

tered and rated as serious and deserving possibilities. The effect was to broaden the field of possible adversaries and hence divide and weaken the opposition. FDR had little trouble winning the nomination.

The essential strategy of leadership in mobilizing power is to recognize the arrays of motives and goals in potential followers, to appeal to those motives by words and action, and to strengthen those motives and goals in order to increase the power of leadership, thereby changing the environment within which both followers and leaders act. Conflict—disagreement over goals within an array of followers, fear of outsiders, competition for scarce resources—immensely invigorates the mobilization of consensus and dissensus. But the fundamental process is a more elusive one; it is, in large part, *to make conscious what lies unconscious among followers.*

The purposeful awakening of persons into a state of political consciousness is a familiar problem for philosophers and psychologists and one that has stimulated thought in other disciplines. For the student of leadership the concept of political consciousness is as primitive as it is fertile. That "conflict produces consciousness" was fundamental in the doctrine of Hegel, Marx, and other nineteenth-century theorists, but they differed over the cardinal question: consciousness of *what?* They recognized the essential human needs but differed as to the nature of those needs. Feuerbach, an intellectual leader of the young Marx, conceived humanity as imbued with real, tangible, solid needs arising from Nature. Marx compared human consciousness with that of animals, which had no consciousness of the world as something objective and real apart from the animal's own existence and needs. But *human* labor, rather than leading to direct satisfaction of need, generates human consciousness and self-consciousness. Thus the early Marx had some understanding of the variety and inexhaustibility of human needs.

It was a marvelous insight, but Marx came to be identified with the doctrine that *true* consciousness, to be achieved through unremitting conflict, was always of *class.* Felt, palpable human needs, however, did not seem to be translated into a rising class consciousness in the capitalist environment of the mid-nineteenth century. Marx and Engels railed at the "false consciousness" of religion and nationalism and the other diversions and superficialities that seemed to engage men who were caught in the iron grip of material deprivation. The progress toward class consciousness was slow, irregular, uneven. The almost automatic movement toward revolution, emerging out of the "spontaneous class-organization of the proletariat," simply did not come about in the great bourgeois societies; ultimately revolution would need to be spurred by militant leadership and iron party discipline.

In the fiery intellectual and political conflict of the nineteenth century both Marxists and their adversaries assumed too much about the central springs of human behavior without knowing enough about motivation or the complex relations between motives and behavior. Few perceived that if people did not behave the way they were supposed to, the fault might lie in the suppositions rather than in the people. One of the suppositions was that ultimately humans would respond rationally and "realistically" to "objective" social conditions. But what was real and rational? If Marx had turned Hegel's dialectic of ideas on its head, Freud turned Marx's Consciousness upside down. Freud was drawn to the function of the unconscious rather than the conscious or the preconscious; for him the unconscious was the "true psychic reality," betrayed by dreams, fantasies, accidents, and curious slips of the tongue. Consciousness and related concepts of alienation and identity have continued to be variously defined and heatedly debated. During the ferment of the 1960s that reached across the Western world, young people were urged to "expand consciousness" and "consciousness-raising" became something of a fad and a profession.

If the first task of leadership is to bring to consciousness the followers' sense of their own needs, values, and purposes, the question remains: consciousness of *what?* Which of these motives and goals are to be tapped? Leaders, for example, can make followers more conscious of aspects of their *identity* (sexual, communal, ethnic, class, national, ideological). Georges Sorel argued that only through leadership and conflict, including "terrifying violence," could the working class become conscious of its true identity—and hence of its power. But to what extent was Sorel imposing his own values and goals on workers who might have very different, even idiosyncratic, ones? We return to the dilemma: to what degree do leaders, through their command of personal influence, substitute their own motives and goals for those of the followers? Should they whip up chauvinism, feelings of ethnic superiority, regional prejudice, economic rivalry? What must they accept among followers as being durable and valid rather than false and transient? And we return to the surmise here: leaders with relevant motives and goals of their own respond to followers' needs and wants and goals in such a way as to meet those motivations and to bring changes consonant with those of both leaders and followers, and with the values of both.

The Elevating Power of Leadership

Mobilized and shaped by gifted leadership, sharpened and strengthened by conflict, values can be the source of vital change. The question is: at what level

of need or stage of morality do leaders operate to elevate their followers? At levels of safety and security, followers tend to conform to group expectations and to support and justify the social order. At a certain stage Kohlberg finds a "law and order" orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and maintenance of the social order for its own sake. At a higher stage Simpson found a significant relation between tendencies toward self-esteem and positive law values (belief that the authority for judgments rests in the laws and norms humans have developed collectively). This is the level of "social contract morality."

At the highest stage of moral development persons are guided by near-universal ethical principles of justice such as equality of human rights and re-spect for individual dignity. This stage sets the opportunity for rare and creative leadership. Politicians who operate at the lower and middle levels of need and moral development are easily understood, but what kind of leadership reaches into the need and value structures, mobilizing and directing support for such values as justice and empathy?

First, it is the kind of leadership that *operates at need and value levels higher than those of the potential follower* (but not so much higher as to lose contact). This kind of leadership need be neither doctrinaire nor indoctrinative (in the ordinary sense of preaching). In its most effective form it appeals to the higher, more general and comprehensive values that express followers' more fundamental and enduring needs. The appeal may be more potent when a polity faces danger from outside, as from an invasion, or from inside, as in social breakdown, civil war, or natural catastrophe. "If inefficiencies and corruption of governmental and social leadership go beyond 'normal,' if demands are con-stantly frustrated by incapacities, which can be readily laid at some human door, if all of this is compounded by a rising consciousness of discrimination and sense of justice," according to a four-nation study, "then people can ex-perience great and often very sudden transformation of values, or those values that were subdued can become the basis for vigorous action." No single force, such as economic conditions, predetermines change, this study concluded; other factors—notably the quality of leadership—intervene, so the role of val-ues in social change varies from culture to culture. Among the nations studied (India, Poland, the United States, Yugoslavia) similarities were found in lead-ers' espousal of innovative change, economic development, and the norms of selflessness (commitment to the general welfare) and honesty.

Second, it is the kind of leadership that *can exploit conflict and tension within persons' value structures.* Contradictions can be expected among com-peting substantive values, such as liberty and equality, or between those values and moral values like honesty, or between terminal values and instrumental val-ues. "All contemporary theories in social psychology would probably agree

that a necessary prerequisite to cognitive change is the presence of some state of imbalance within the system," Rokeach says.

Leaders may simply help a follower see these types of contradictions, or they might actively arouse a sense of dissatisfaction by making the followers aware of contradictions in or inconsistencies between values and behavior. The more contradictions challenge self-conceptions, according to Rokeach, the more dissatisfaction will be aroused. And such dissatisfactions are the source of changes that the leader can influence. There is an implication in Rokeach that the contradictions in themselves cause change, simply on the basis of self-cog-nition. Typically, however, an outside influence is required in the form of a leader, preferably "one step above." Rokeach bases much of his analysis on experimental situations in which the subjects are exposed to close direction and restraint—certainly a context of manipulation if not of leadership. Autonomous cognition usually is not enough to enable persons to break out of their impris-oning value structures. Experimenters may assume a leadership role.

Given the right conditions of value conflict, leaders hold enhanced influ-ence at the higher levels of the need and value hierarchies. They can appeal to the more widely and deeply held values, such as justice, liberty, and brotherhood. They can expose followers to the broader values that contradict narrower ones or inconsistent behavior. They can redefine aspirations and grati-fications to help followers see their stake in new, program-oriented social movements. Most important, they can gratify lower needs so that higher mo-tivations will arise to elevate the conscience of men and women. To be sure, leadership may be frustrated and weakened at the higher levels as well as the lower. Potential support may thin out when immediate parochial needs and val-ues threaten to weaken higher, more general ones. Substantive values, such as liberty or equality, may compete with one another, and, however logically compelling the leader's value priorities may look, they may not co-exist so har-moniously in the political arena. Perhaps the most disruptive force in competi-tive politics is conflict between *modal values* such as fair play and due process and *end-values* such as equality. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, with its use of dubious means to attain high ends, is a case in point. Some of those believing in equal opportunity today may also believe in certain modes of conduct—endless debate, for example, or elaborate procedures for judicial review—that make the attainment of equal opportunity far less certain.

The potential for influence through leadership is usually immense. The es-sence of leadership in any polity is the recognition of real need, the uncovering and exploiting of contradictions among values and between values and practice, the realigning of values, the reorganization of institutions where necessary, and the governance of change. Essentially the leader's task is consciousness-raising

on a wide plane. "Values exist only when there is consciousness," Susanne Langer has said. "Where nothing is felt, nothing matters." The leader's fundamental act is to induce people to be aware or conscious of what they feel—to feel their true needs so strongly, to define their values so meaningfully, that they can be moved to purposeful action.

A congruence between the need and value hierarchies would produce a powerful potential for the exercise of purposeful leadership. When these hierarchies are combined with stage theories—for example, Erikson's eight psychosocial stages of man, with its emphasis on trust versus mistrust, autonomy versus shame, role experimentation versus negative identity—leadership, with its capacity to exploit tension and conflict, finds an even more durable foundation. While both Maslow's and Kohlberg's hierarchies imply *uni-directionality* and *irreversibility*—persons move through the levels at varying rates of speed but in only one direction—we know that people can and do regress. Still, for four values in particular—the end-values of equality, freedom, and a world of beauty (Rokeach's "terminal" values) and the instrumental value of self-control—the long-term changes have been documented in several studies as leading toward heavier impact of values. These findings suggest one of the most vital aspects of leadership: it cannot influence people "downward" on the need or value hierarchy without a reinforcing environment. The functioning of some persons at the levels of principle or self-actualization would not easily regress to the conventional level (e.g., need for social esteem). *Stasis* operates to prevent slippage to an earlier stage. If leaders reflecting more widely and deeply held values compete for support among followers who are moving toward more socially responsible levels in the hierarchies, leadership itself tends to move on to still broader and "higher" values.

This phenomenon provides the theoretical foundation for Gunnar Myrdal's brilliant analysis of the likely course of the conflict between egalitarian values and practice in the United States. Just as most persons strive for some coherence and consistency within their value hierarchies, so value systems in whole societies, reflecting the cognitive-affective-behavioral factors described above, tend toward some structuring. As societies, like persons, confront challenges, crises, and conflict, there is a tendency toward consistency. A rough hierarchy of values develops as lower and higher priorities develop (or are assigned) in circumstances where people cannot equally embrace all the end-values and modal values that they might wish. In the process of the moral criticism that men make upon each other, Myrdal notes, "the valuations of the higher and more general planes—referring to *all* human beings and *not* to specific small groups—are regularly invoked by one party or the other, simply because they are held in common among all groups in society, and also because of the

supreme prestige they are traditionally awarded. . . . Specific attitudes and forms of behavior are then reconciled to the more general moral principles. . . ." There are, of course, limits to the tendency toward congruency in societies—and probably in persons as well. The four-nation study found an unexpectedly high degree of conflict *within* the countries studied, not merely conflict among the countries. At societal levels, however, such conflict is not random but assumes some kind of form and persistence. And conflict, as we understand it here, is necessary for leadership and, indeed, for higher levels of coherence, in a kind of dialectical and synthesis response.

In a famous distinction Max Weber contrasted the "ethic of responsibility" with the "ethic of ultimate ends." The latter measured persons' behavior by the extent of their adherence to good ends or high purposes; the former measured action by persons' capacity to take a calculating, prudential, rationalistic approach, making choices in terms of not one supreme value or value hierarchy alone but many values, attitudes, and interests, seeing the implication of choice for the means of attaining it—the price paid to achieve it, the relation of one goal to another, the direct and indirect effects of different goals for different persons and interests, all in a context of specificity and immediacy, and with an eye to actual *consequences* rather than lofty intent.

This dualism is of course oversimplified; most leaders and followers shift back and forth from specific, self-involved values to broader, public-involved ones. But the perception of dualism poses sharply the dilemmas facing leaders who embrace and respond to popular needs and values. The ethic of responsibility, whatever its appeal to moral rationalists like Weber, opened the floodgates to such a variety of discrete, multiple, relativistic, individualistic values as to allow a person observing this ethic to legitimate an enormous variety of actions. This ethic, by extension, permitted expedient, opportunistic, and highly self-serving action because the concept of responsibility could easily be stretched to authorize the kind of opportunism that we associate, for example, with nineteenth-century "rugged individualism." If leaders are encouraged to follow immediate, specific, calculable interests, they can end up serving their narrow, short-run interests alone, rationalizing the consequences in terms of responsibility to themselves, to their families, or to a relatively narrow group. Leaders holding this ethic, or representing persons holding this ethic, would act amid such a plethora of responsibilities as to legitimate both high-minded and self-serving behavior, action both for broad, general interests and for parochial ones, action that might be self-limiting contrasted with action that in the long run might be self-fulfilling (by the standards of the highest level of moral development). Worse, leaders might lack useful standards for distinguishing between the two sets of alternatives.

By the same token, Weber's ethic of ultimate ends emphasizes the demands of an overriding, millenarian kind of value system at the expense of the far more typical situation (at least in pluralistic societies) in which choices must be made among a number of compelling end-values, modal values, and instrumental values. And the ethic of responsibility could rather be seen as the day-to-day measured application of the "ethic of ultimate ends" to complex circumstance.

For the study of leadership, the dichotomy is not between Weber's two ethics but between the leader's commitment to a number of overriding, general welfare-oriented values on the one hand and his encouragement of, and entanglement in, a host of lesser values and "responsibilities" on the other. The four-nation study notes the "most important motivational distinction among leaders desiring change—the distinction between those who see progress primarily in terms of political opportunity and those who nurse a feeling of social injustice arising out of the gap between the economically deprived and the privileged," even though no consistent relationship seemed to explain it. The great bulk of leadership activity consists of the day-to-day interaction of leaders and followers characterized by the processes described above. But the ultimate test of moral leadership is its capacity to transcend the claims of the multiplicity of everyday wants and needs and expectations, to respond to the higher levels of moral development, and to relate leadership behavior—its roles, choices, style, commitments—to a set of reasoned, relatively explicit, conscious values.

PART II

ORIGINS

OF

LEADERSHIP

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