The Rhetoric of Western Thought

Third Edition

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KENDALL/HUNT
PUBLISHING COMPANY
Dubuque, Iowa

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Nature and Relevance

One of the most commonly used words in contemporary society is the term "rhetoric." It is employed almost daily by politicians, educators, and lawyers, as well as by members of countless other groups. Regrettably, however, when one alludes to the notion of rhetoric the intended meaning often has no resemblance to the art first developed by Corax in the fifth century, B.C., and later amplified by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

As we begin our survey of Western thought, it will be our purpose in this first chapter to provide an overview of what we believe to be the general nature and relevance of rhetoric as taught by major theoreticians during the past twenty-five hundred years. Before doing so, however, we would like to pause briefly to discuss four myths which have contributed significantly to the contemporary practice of relegating the idea of rhetoric to the level of a pejorative concept.

Myth One. Rhetoric, it is argued, deals with ornamental language rather than with substantive ideas. Such a perspective prompted the German scholar Ernst Robert Curtius, after tracing the historical thrust of rhetoric in the Middle Ages, to express the view that the subject has little more than a "waste of paper" appeal for the contemporary student of literature.[1] Those who, like Curtius, continue to perpetuate the myth that rhetoric is associated with flowery figures of speech and empty verbalism and bombast are not inclined to give this traditional art a central place in modern education.

Myth Two. Concurrent with the association of rhetoric with ornamentation is a present attempt, like that employed by Plato in his dialogue *Gorgias,* to ally it with appearance rather than reality. But whereas Plato then proceeded to construct a true rhetoric in the *Phaedrus,* numerous modern critics, treating all rhetoric as a monolithic form, have portrayed its permanent nature as a hollow discipline without substance or utility. Several years ago a group of two hundred professors at Ohio State University signed their names to a petition as a gesture of opposition to the War in Vietnam. Above their signature was the caption: "Rhetoric or Reality?" This damaging dichotomy, so widely accepted by activists throughout the United States, has contributed further to the deterioration of the meaning of rhetoric. What is perhaps most alarming is the image of rhetoric held by student leaders on university campuses. In the transcript of former Vice President Agnew's confrontation with five representative college students in October, 1970, the term rhetoric appears eleven times, and in each instance as a devil word. Observe, for example, how one of the students named Silverman spoke with a cutting edge when he said to the other panelists: "It strikes me as macabre that we are sitting here pondering the wisdom of one's rhetoric . . . when we really have some very real questions before us."[2]

A careful review of extant literature will show clearly that these are not isolated examples selected for the purpose of making a convenient generalization. Among other representative illustrations that might be cited are the following:

1. A. Lalande's refusal to include the word rhetoric in his lexicon.
2. Eric Hoffer's description of rhetoric or persuasion as propaganda whose influence is over-rated.
3. Eugene McCarthy's use of the following title for Chapter 5 in his book *The Limits of Power:* "Rhetoric or Reality in Latin America."
4. The *Wall Street Journal's* expressed hope that Anwar Sadat's proposed visit to Israel in November, 1977 would soon be transformed "from rhetoric to reality."
5. The occasional troubling reminders by our last six presidents that what is needed is action, not rhetoric.
6. NBC Tom Brokaw's suggestion on the eve of the televised presidential debate between Carter and Reagan that at long last we would hear the "real views" of the candidates, ". . . something other than rhetoric."

Myth Three. Rhetoric, it is suggested by others, is a truncated art primarily concerned with style and/or delivery; or with limited aspects of invention. In the sixteenth century Richard Sherry and Henry Peacham felt justified in limiting rhetoric to the single canon of style. In the same century Peter Ramus generously awarded the canons of invention and disposition to logic, thereby reducing rhetoric to style and delivery. A century later other separatists, including Thomas Sheridan and John Walker, further truncated rhetoric by identifying it with voice control and bodily activity.[3] Nor has this debilitating truncation process been limited to a separation of the canons. Equally deleterious is the practice of corrupting a canon by removing from its sphere some essential parts. When the Romans following the death of the Republic in 43 B.C. instituted a monarchial system of government under Caesar Augustus, meaningful controversial ideas no longer fell under the province of rhetoric. The central canon of invention or message forthwith was reduced to the ceremonial genre. As a result there was "a decay of eloquence."[4]

But if the Romans in the period of the emperors amputated vital segments of rhetoric, so too have many modernists. Some businessmen and advertisers, for example, have removed hard core logos from their inventional theory. Not a few historians and literary figures, moreover, have excluded the spoken word in their discussion of the flow of ideas. In doing so, these groups and others holding similar views have become what the late Bower Aly called "the natural enemies of rhetoric."[5] For together they have adhered to a policy of truncation by cutting off important elements, then picking and choosing only those aspects of rhetoric that may serve their immediate purposes or promote their long range biases.

Myth Four. The separatists are not alone in their adherence to a myth regarding the meaning of rhetoric. They are joined by their counterparts, the expansionists, who have enlarged the scope of rhetoric to such a point that all types of communication fall within its range. The following list of appendages is typical:

1. Literary or dramatic productions without an identifiable purpose
2. Painting, art, and architecture
3. Color and form
4. Confrontation with its metaphor, the closed fist
5. Subliminal nonverbal patterns
6. Reflective thought

That all of these activities are communication forms that may in varying degrees lead to a persuasive effect there can be little doubt. But when appended to rhetoric they give to this field of study a scope so broad and general that it lacks the utility to be relevant.

If the myths surrounding rhetoric are due largely to persistent attempts to define it too narrowly or too broadly, let us seek to examine its true nature and scope, and then apply to it the test of relevance for the 1980s. At the outset several basic principles seem in order. *Rhetoric is, first of all, a humane discipline grounded in choice and designed primarily to persuade.*[6] The communicator's function is to influence choice by developing meaningful probabilities in support of a proposition that is being contested. By associating rhetoric with probability, the major classical scholars devised comprehensive, yet flexible definitions to describe their art. Consider, for example, the infinite possibilities inherent in Aristotle's celebrated definition that rhetoric "is the faculty of discovering all of the available means of persuasion in any given case." Such a definition embraces the concept of choice and the use of symbols—both verbal and non-verbal—that have as their principal intent to change a listener's attitudes, modify his behavior, or stimulate him to follow a particular course of action.

Consistent with the emphasis of Aristotle, the Roman authors Cicero and Quintilian caught the essence of rhetoric when they described it as one great art comprised of five lesser arts. This five-fold division included *inventio* (the investigative function); *dispositio* (the disposing and adapting of materials); *elocutio* (the use of language control); *memoria* (recalling the discovered materials); and *pronunciatio* (delivering the message). Only he who could excel in each of the five arts could be called the ideal orator portrayed in Cicero's *de Oratore.*

But it is not enough to say that the purpose of rhetoric is to influence choice on subjects where contention exists, or that rhetoric is the combination of five canons interacting with each other in a particular situation. Not to be overlooked in our quest for a satisfactory definition of rhetoric is the equally compelling fact that a rhetoric grounded in choice carries with it a strong ethical dimension. Observe the emphasis on ethics and values in the classical discussion of rhetoric. The purpose of rhetoric, said Plato, was to make the will of God known. Aristotle not only listed ethics as one of the major subject areas for rhetoric but suggested that one of the functions of rhetoric was to make truth and justice prevail. In 95 A.D. Quintilian, who is regarded as the definitive summarizer of classical theory, developed the thesis that an orator is a good man skilled in speaking. It is not surprising, therefore, that these writers condemned the practices of the sophistical speakers because of their lack of moral purpose, their claim to be able to speak on any subject, and their tendency to use an artificial, showy style as a substitute for substance.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century period the major rhetoricians such as Hugh Blair, George Campbell, and Richard Whately criticized sophistical evasion and the deliberate use of obscurity to conceal thoughts. Moreover, they condemned all trickery in speechmaking, and gave primacy to a speaker's character.

Today we have similar standards of ethics of rhetoric. We severely indict a speaker if we think he is a demagogue, or if he has what we believe to be a credibility gap. Richard Weaver, in his insightful book, *The Ethics of Rhetoric,* goes so far as to examine the intrinsic worth of a speaker's premises. He criticized Edmund Burke's speech "On Conciliation with America" on the grounds that it derived its strength from an argument based on circumstance. He praised Lincoln's presentation in the Douglas debates, on the other hand, because the principal argument used was based on definition or the essential nature of things.[7] Consistent with Weaver's high standards is the policy of the Speaker of the Year Board of the national forensic society Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha. This organization holds that a speaker must not only be articulate and effective; he must also be responsible.

In addition to emphasizing persuasion that permits choice and derives its strength from ethics, *rhetoric is, secondly, a dynamic, developing process which is culture bound and multidisciplinary in nature.* As Douglas Ehninger has correctly observed, there are three great periods in the rhetoric of Western thought—each of which has distinguishing characteristics reflecting the peculiar dynamics of the age. The classical period—extending from the 5th century B.C. to the first century A.D.—gave a unique stamp to the rhetorical theory by focusing on its oral characteristics and grammatical structure. The British period, covering the era from the sixteenth century to 1830, borrowed many ideas from the ancients, but nevertheless altered the scope of rhetoric. For these thinkers the listener, rather than the occasion, became the starting point; and psychology was the key to construct not only an oral but a written rhetoric that would conform to the basic nature of man. The contemporary period which began in the 1920s, Ehninger further argues, is sociological in its thrust because of its concern with meaning, communication breakdown, and interpersonal relations.[8]

Although rhetoric, as we have seen, is an ongoing, dynamic process geared to a particular culture, there has remained through the years a consistent body of knowledge, unity, and emphasis to warrant a renewed attempt to conceive its true nature and limits. Each of the three rhetorics outlined above contains the constituent elements of communicator, message, and audience. Similarly, they view as outside the scope of rhetoric all verbal and nonverbal written and oral messages that only incidentally produce a persuasive effect; and situations of force which eliminate genuine choice. Finally, they hold, as Lloyd Bitzer has pointed out, that rhetoric does not exist when the intended receiver lacks the power to act in accordance with the message intent.[9] Out of this framework we would like to present the following perspective: *Genuine rhetoric occurs when a communicator presents an informative or suasory ethical verbal (written or oral) or non-verbal message specifically designed to create a persuasive effect in an audience comprised of readers or listeners who have a choice or perceived choice and the power to modify the exigencies upon which the discourse is constructed.*

It is against the background of this definition that rhetoric may claim an enormous contemporary relevance for the 1980s. First, we might observe as a self-evident premise that all disciplines and fields of study must rely upon rhetoric to communicate their content. Consider, for instance, the subject of philosophy. Plato set for himself the task of constructing a rhetorical system in the *Phaedrus* that would enable man to express his thoughts and sentiments to the gods. In subsequent years philosophy was disassociated with rhetoric. As a response to this trend in 1953, Chaim Perelman and his colleague L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, concerned with the neglect of rhetoric on the part of the epistemologists and logicians for three hundred years, developed a "new rhetoric" based on the analysis of the methods utilized to gain adherence.[10] In this volume they assail the typical philosopher's devotion to the Cartesian principle that self-evidence is the prime characteristic of reason. They further argue, as the Italian author Giambattista Vico noted early in the eighteenth century, that the use of rhetorical topics and commonplaces drawn from the realm of probability and verisimilitude, leads to the generation of hypotheses which, in turn, may be put to empirical tests. It is for this reason Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conclude that "logicians owe it to themselves to complete the theory of demonstration" by adding to self-evident truths a theory of argumentation. *The New Rhetoric,* in short, is a masterful treatise designed to show philosophers how they may use rhetoric to convey the content and methodology of their subject and to gain adherents for an epistemological view.

Anthropology constitutes a second area where rhetoric performs a vital function. Since it deals with man's physical and mental characteristics, customs, and social relationships, it seeks to describe the cohesive nature of race and culture and to lift primitive man to a higher plane. Since man is a "transcending animal" capable of responding to intellectual and emotional appeals, Kenneth Burke observes: "We can place in terms of rhetoric all those statements by anthropologists, ethnologists, individual and social psychologists, and the like, that bear upon the *persuasive* aspects of language, the function of language as *addressed*. . . ."[11]

In still another field, political science, the role of rhetoric seems clear. As early as the fourth century, B.C., Greek thinkers associated politics with rhetoric. That this close relationship has persisted to the present day is

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observable in the writings and speeches of theorists and practitioners. Adlai Stevenson, who sought mightily to "talk sense to the American people" and "to tell them the truth," saw in rhetoric a "great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership. . . ."[12] It is illuminating to note that Stevenson, who put his own high ideals into practice, later had the privilege of praising Churchill and Kennedy for their successful attempts to marshall the elements of rhetoric in order to achieve their goal of educating and elevating their countrymen in moments of crisis.

Perhaps the strongest case for the social scientist's need to rely upon rhetoric may be found in the works of Richard Weaver. He argues that insofar as the social sciences seek to modify attitude, appeal to authority, and order facts in accordance with values, they are engaged in a "rhetorical expression," not an "analytical one. . . ."[13]

The demand for rhetoric as a means of communicating the findings of social and behavioral science research is even more compelling when we turn to the physical and biological sciences and to engineering. In 1963, John Osmundsen of the *New York Times* attended the 130th convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In the summary analysis of the proceedings which followed, he reported a growing hostility toward scientists because of their inability to communicate adequately with the Federal Government, general public, and themselves. Three years later a brief article appeared on the editorial page of the *New York Times*, entitled "Incomprehensible Science." Again the author focused on the communication gap that exists between science and its publics. Pointing out that the communications problem tends to get worse as the volume of scientific data increases rapidly, he said:

> . . . the need has probably never been greater than now for adequate public understanding of what scientists are up to. One reason is the tremendous impact of science and technology upon modern civilization. A second reason is the heavy dependence scientific research now must place upon financial support from Government agencies, which in turn must look to the layman and to Congress for their budgets. The poorer the communication between scientists the greater the danger that wrong decisions may be made in a period when the competition among scientists and scientific fields for limited research funds is becoming unprecedentedly intense.[14]

Thus far we have seen the relevance of rhetoric for a wide variety of disciplines and fields of study. This in no way implies that these same subject areas do not have a similar impact on rhetoric.[15] What we have, in effect, is a reciprocal influence in which communication theory contributes to and benefits from all disciplines.[16]

Not only may rhetoric function as a means of communicating an understanding of and an appreciation for the content of a discipline, it also, as noted earlier, has an ethical dimension and is instrumental in producing an action goal. The best rhetorical thought of the modern era, as well as the classical tradition, tends to support Chaim Perelman's claim that the purpose of rhetoric "is to intensify an adherence to values, to create a disposition to act, and finally to bring people to act."[17] Since it is the essential nature of man to have a scheme of values, any communicator, regardless of his orientation or specific aim in a particular rhetorical situation, must function as a minister who urges his listeners to make a choice concerning values. For this reason Richard Weaver is correct in describing language as sermonic, and in observing that "society cannot live without rhetoric. . . ."[18] So, too, is Karl Wallace on target when he argues that "the substance of rhetoric" is "good reasons," and "the basic materials of discourse are ethical and moral values and information relevant to these."[19] Seen in this light, rhetoric cannot avoid relevance whether one is engaged in interpersonal communication or formal public address.

The challenge facing the communicator is to know how he may convey a message of values that will ultimately lead to a desired action. To put the question more clearly, let us turn to actual examples in the field of science. In 1966, a group of 124 delegates from various universities attended the seventy-fifth anniversary of the California Institute of Technology. The major recommendation emanating from the conference was the need for science and technology to place greater stress on human values.[20] Five years later in 1971, twenty-one scholars meeting in Washington, D.C. ended a similar session with a plea for scientists to initiate a campaign to stress ethics as a factor in scientific gains.[21] What occurred in both of these incidents was a call for a response to a genuine rhetorical situation. Unfortunately, however, these participants listed no guidelines for carrying out the campaign.

It is to this type of problem that contemporary rhetoricians are able to provide relevant suggestions for communicating values. As the speaker begins his message, Kenneth Burke reminds us, he can assume that a division exists between himself and the audience. That division takes the form of "social estrangement"—a human condition which may be eliminated through identification based on courtship. The speaker, in effect, woos his listeners by using a common language and by expressing shared values early in his remarks. In this process understanding becomes important; for it becomes the key to the reinforcement of old values and the institution of new ones. Observe how Burke pinpoints the relationship between understanding and persuasion in the following excerpt drawn from his *Rhetoric of Motives:* "Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. . . . And wherever there is 'meaning,' there is 'persuasion'. . . . And so, out of persuasion, we can . . . derive *pure information.* . . ."[22] Burke is here proclaiming that meaning is always accompanied by persuasion or rhetoric. Moreover, he is implying that understanding and meaning are synonymous terms. Richard Weaver, who doubtless was strongly influenced by Burke, similarly strove to highlight the importance of a rhetoric that is grounded in understanding. The model of communication which he created features a partnership between rhetoric and dialectic in the tradition of Plato. What he wants, in sum, is a universe of discourse that begins with understanding.[23]

If Burke and Weaver constructed a theory of rhetoric that starts with understanding, the semanticist I. A. Richards produced a philosophy of communication that begins and ends with a rhetoric of meaning. In one of his most celebrated phrases, he said: "Rhetoric, I shall urge, should be a study of misunderstanding and its remedies."[24] Burke, Weaver, and Richards, it would appear, developed an action-centered rhetoric that uses identification and an understanding and ordering of values for generating an improvement of man and his environment.

When we accept the view that a rhetorical transaction, if properly conceived and executed, culminates in an intended action, we have little difficulty seeing the strong bond between rhetoric and reality. That this is a cardinal tenet of communication dating back to the classical period seems clear in the example of Cicero. Throughout his writings Cicero, who perhaps more than anyone else, personified the Roman Republic, preached action. His rhetorical treatises are reinforced with practical personal illustrations showing rhetors on the Rostrum or in the Curia. His great essay "On Moral Duties," written in the year of his death, placed action above philosophical speculation.[25] How difficult it was for the medieval scholars to recognize this need for action. They idolized Cicero for his thoughtful essays and treatises, and for his eminent position as a Stoic sage. Moreover they perhaps would have agreed with the modern classical historian Chester Starr who said that Cicero was the most important man of letters in a thousand years.[26] Yet they denigrated his orations because they were part of action. Why, they asked, did he challenge the monarchy that Caesar was to initiate? Petrarch, writing in 1345, bemoaned the fact that his fallen idol Cicero refused to accept the clemency offered by Caesar.

> Why did you choose to involve yourself in so many vain contentions and unprofitable quarrels? Why did you abandon the retirement proper to your age, profession and fortune? What false dazzle of glory led you, an old man, to implicate yourself in the wars of the young? What tempted you to dealings that brought you to a death unworthy of a philosopher? . . . How much better it would have been for you, the philosopher, to have grown old in country peace, meditating, as you yourself write somewhere, on eternal life, not on this transitory existence! How much better if you had never held the fasces of power, never longed for triumphs, never corrupted your spirit with any Catilines![27]

Several years ago we stood in the Roman Forum and relived the public life of Cicero. We stood near the Rostrum and the Curia where he had made so many of his famous speeches on behalf of the Roman Republic. Then we remembered how he left public life and enjoyed a few years in contemplation as an essayist and historian of Roman culture—a scholar who placed the original stamp of his genius on the Latin language. With Petrarch we found ourselves asking why Cicero left the life of an author to come back into the Forum following the assassination of Caesar. But had Petrarch and we paused to reflect on the unmistakable connecting links that bind rhetoric and action, we would perhaps not have raised the question. It simply was unthinkable that Cicero would place contemplation on a higher plane than action. For the action-centered quality inherent in its nature gave to rhetoric, according to Cicero, the power of relevance.

In the preceding discussion it has been our purpose to demonstrate that the field of study called rhetoric has an honorable tradition spanning twenty-five centuries. It has frequently fallen into disrepute because of faulty definition and use. But at his highest, rhetoric represents an attempt to speak to the whole man—his cognitive and affective nature—by stimulating his understanding as a means of intensifying his values, thereby causing action. Such a perspective rejects the popular notion of the phrase "rhetoric or reality" and substitutes in its place the phrase "rhetoric and reality." And therein lies its relevance as a theoretical discipline.

The relevance of rhetoric as depicted here has come into sharp focus with the publication of the 1981 Carnegie Foundation essay entitled, "A Quest for Common Learning: The Aims of General Education."[28] The authors of this challenging report emphasize the cultural role that rhetorical communication can play in removing potential and real barriers that tend to exist among members in similar and in different cultures, in creating meaning and understanding so that our knowledge is enlarged, in promoting an appreciation of and commitment to important personal and societal values, and in causing action designed to enhance our quality of life. After noting that all students must be taught "to read with understanding, write with clarity, and listen and speak effectively"—both verbally and nonverbally—they make these representative claims, each of which strongly buttresses the goals of a timely and vital rhetoric:

> (1) Language gives individuals their identities, makes transactions among people possible, and provides the connecting tissue that binds society together. . . . Learning about the significance of our shared use of symbols is . . . a central goal of common learning. (p. 36)
> (2) More than at any time in our memory, researchers feel the need to communicate with colleagues in other fields. (p. 51)
> (3) The aim of general education should be to help students think clearly about how values are shaped, and how each one of us must build and periodically review an authentic, satisfying value structure of our own. (p. 45)

As implied in the Carnegie Foundation essay, rhetoric is more than a process or a body of theory that may be described from the armchair or the ivory tower. It has a set of principles which, if followed, can enable a communicator either to achieve his purpose or to do all that is possible within a given situation. The application of rhetorical precepts constitutes what we call public address. In the remaining part of this presentation we would like to examine briefly several case studies involving major issues of the past two decades: Vietnam, Civil Rights, and Watergate. These three themes, we maintain, are almost as salient now as they proved to be at the time of their dramatic occurrence in the 1960s and 1970s. The issue of human rights, for example, conforms to Lloyd Bitzer's notion of a recurring rhetorical situation that repeatedly demands an informed response. Of equal significance for our purposes is the fact that when current "undergraduates are asked what events most influenced their thinking, they answer most frequently 'Watergate' and 'Vietnam.'"[29] The question which now concerns us is this: To what extent did a particular speaker on each of these problems achieve relevance? Let us consider first the Vietnam War rhetoric of President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1964 through 1968.

The most pressing issue facing Johnson during his last four years in office was the war in Vietnam. Repeatedly this troublesome theme provided him with opportunities to gain an adherence by establishing identification and understanding as it related to the past, present, and future implications of the war. Yet he consistently failed to take advantage of such opportunities. There is no evidence to suggest, for example, that he was willing to follow Adlai Stevenson's advice "to talk sense to the American people" and "to tell them the truth." In refusing to fulfill these noble aims that are so essential for a relevant rhetoric, he promoted a credibility gap which doubtless played a major part in his surprise decision to withdraw from the 1968 campaign.

On February 21, 1964, reiterating the sentiments of his predecessor John F. Kennedy, Johnson declared: "The contest in which South Vietnam is now engaged is first and foremost a contest to be won by the Government and the people of that country for themselves."[30] Later, during the presidential campaign, he attempted to blunt the aggressive arguments of his rival Senator Barry Goldwater with these words: "We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved with a nation of 700 million people and get tied down to a land war in Asia. . . ."[31] Despite these claims the President in July of the following year, then convinced that circumstances had changed, observed: "If we are to be driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection."[32] Even if we grant the principle that changing circumstances require alterations in policy, it is difficult to support a rhetorical practice which changed so drastically in such a short period of time—especially when commitment remained stable.[33] Thus these statements, along with comparable ones by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, prompted Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* to say: "Never look ahead. Something may be gaining on you."[34] That critics were correct in implying that Johnson "fuzzed" his policies in his addresses on Vietnam may be seen from the following excerpt taken from the Pentagon Papers, September, 1964: "White House Strategy meeting. Analyst finds 'general consensus' on necessity for early 1965 air strikes but says 'tactical considerations' require delay. Cites President's 'presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint,' need for 'maximum public and congressional support,' fear of 'premature negotiations,' Saigon weakness."[35] In retrospect, Johnson, notwithstanding his tendency to employ a rhetoric of justification, faulted himself for his failure to communicate the truth as he knew it. On February 6, 1970, he told Walter Cronkite on a C.B.S. interview that he "did a poor job in pointing up to the American people our attempts to have peace."[36] And in his memoirs, he conceded he failed to "brace the American people for the Tet offensive by informing them that he was anticipating it." He further noted that he had made a mistake in "not saying more about Vietnam in his State of the Union address on January 17, 1968." Most of all, he confessed: "If I had forecast the possibilities the American people would have been better prepared for what was soon to come."[37]

Not content to withhold vital data from the American electorate in his own addresses, Johnson also used the power of the executive office in an attempt to stifle free discussion on the Vietnam issue in Congress. Partly because of pressures which began to build in the summer and fall of 1967, and partly because of President Johnson's declining popularity and influence, some legislators, after years of relative silence, suddenly decided to initiate meaningful discussions on Vietnam. On October 2, 1967, John Sherman Cooper, Republican Senator from Kentucky, urged "the unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam." These remarks prompted extended rejoinders from twelve other senators from both parties. In all, the arguments covered thirty-one pages in the *Congressional Record*.[38] What was the response to this animated confrontation? President Johnson who, according to his own Vice President, preferred action to advocacy,[39] viewed the debate not as helpful dialogue but as a vehicle to convey comfort to Ho Chi Minh. Within hours he gained the support of one of his closest confidants—Republican Senator Everett Dirksen. On the following day the sympathetic Illinois senator, armed with documents defending the Administration position, scolded his colleagues for demeaning the Office of the Presidency. Dirksen's principal thesis was that excessive freedom in debate—however conscientious—would endanger the lives of American fighting men in Vietnam.[40] Shortly afterwards, what had promised to be a productive debate ended.

By January, 1968, these rhetorical tactics had tarnished the image of the president, prompting Max Frankel of the *New York Times* to write a column, entitled: "Why the Gap between Lyndon B. Johnson and the Nation?" In his analysis, Frankel argued that "the measure of Mr. Johnson's trouble is not only Vietnam. . . . It is his failure to persuade much of the country that his war policy is right. . . ."[41]

The foregoing analysis suggests that an evaluation of Johnson's rhetorical transactions on Vietnam, along with the testimony of critics and of the former president himself, reveals a remarkable failure to create a relevant rhetoric. By contrast, however, one of Johnson's contemporaries, Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke feelingly and effectively on the other great issue of the 1960's—civil and human rights. In 1954 the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education ruling brought consternation to many Southern whites, but heralded good tidings for blacks throughout the country. Now convinced that a united campaign could change personal attitudes on racial prejudice and influence the federal government to take positive action, black leaders organized other civil rights groups with similar goals but different strategies. One of these was the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the only organization on race relations begun in the South. The inspiration for the movement came from King, as he led a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955. Catapulted into national fame following his role in the incident, King began a distinguished career as an advocate of human rights. It was clear from the outset that King, a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, felt non-violence was the key to social change. What he saw in the remarkable successes of the N.A.A.C.P. legal cases and the Montgomery bus boycott simply reinforced his faith in the philosophy. With renewed spirit, therefore, he expressed the hopes and aspirations of his race, using language that symbolized the black American's quest for freedom and justice.

We saw Martin Luther King and 200,000 of his followers as they came to the nation's capital on August 28, 1963. One of the authors watched them pass on Constitution Avenue waving their banners in the warm summer breeze. They stopped on the Washington Monument Grounds and chanted the word "freedom," then marched in unison toward the Lincoln Memorial. It was, in short, a revolution of non-violent resistance that dramatized the Negro's serious intent to assimilate as an equal into the American society. What King said on this occasion in his "I Have a Dream Speech" already has gained a permanent place in literature. This address and his "Letter from Birmingham Jail" demonstrate King's ability to speak to man's nobler nature. Through such messages and the thrust of his forceful personality and graphic style, he identified with the masses of his race and won the respect of the enlightened members of the white community. Later, as he was attacked by more militant leaders in the civil rights movement, he modified his attitudes on "black power" but refused to alter his basic strategy of non-violence. Shortly after his tragic death the *New York Times*, in capsuling his career, spoke the sentiments of the majority of Americans:

> Martin Luther King was a preacher, a man from Georgia and a Negro who became a golden-tongued orator, a spokesman for the Deep South and the Ghetto North, a symbol above color of undying yearnings and imperishable rights. He was an American in the truest sense: for he had a dream. . . . He was a Negro who made Americans aware that the better angels of our nature could dominate the struggle of the United States and its people. The dream of true equality of rights and opportunities without regard to race is nearer because in our lifetime there lived an American named Martin Luther King.[42]

One of the writers went to Washington, D.C. during the days following King's death for the purpose of presenting a Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha Award to Eric Sevareid as Speaker of the Year. During the course of our dinner conversation Mr. Sevareid was asked to name the greatest speaker he had known. Without hesitation he ranked Martin Luther King first. His choice was a good one, for until the end, King's faith in the power of rhetoric to alter attitudes and exalt mankind never diminished.

The challenging issue of the 1970s, that of Watergate, also is instructive in revealing the major differences between a relevant and an irrelevant rhetoric. As in the case of Johnson on Vietnam, President Nixon and his men opted for a false rhetoric based on appearances. Recall the following overt acts which, according to the Senate Select Committee Hearings and several Grand Juries, were undertaken by members of the Nixon Administration: (1) the gathering of secret intelligence data on political opponents; (2) the breaking-in of a psychiatrist's office in California where the confidential records of Daniel Ellsberg were stored; (3) the deliberate destruction of tape-recorded evidence; (4) the promise of "hush money" to defendants who took part in a plan to steal documents from the Democratic National Headquarters; and (5) the construction and implementation of a cover-up plan.

Before these acts occurred, the President and his co-agents apparently chose national security as the rationale for their argument of justification. Once they had concluded that national security provided adequate justification to engage in extra-legal or unethical acts, the Administration—especially John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, and the President himself—saw no need to submit their arguments to others for analysis and possible refutation. Instead they sought refuge behind silence and, in some cases, either encouraged or condoned acts of perjury.

In evaluating the rhetorical implications of the type of communication strategy noted here, we cannot help but see the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the premise and its application. For when Nixon and his principal aides did discuss the question of national security, they presented an unconvincing rationale and often refused to begin dialogue on the level of a shared frame of reference.[43] They did not demonstrate that precedents on national security supported their ethical and legal claims.[44] What they did offer as their perceived rationale was in direct conflict with the notion of justice as fairness. In fact, the overt acts constituted "an obstruction of justice." The end result was a total disregard of consequences pertaining to the common good.

In retrospect, it seems clear why the American people in general and rhetorical critics in particular could fault the reasoning that made up the rhetorical stance of President Nixon. Longing for an articulation of good reasons to support the acts of the Administration, we repeatedly heard inconsistent statements on "ends" and "means," misleading claims suggesting the full story of Watergate had already been told, false allusions to national security, and begrudging references to post-Watergate morality.

Fortunately, not all of the rhetoric triggered by the Watergate affair was irrelevant. As the congressional impeachment proceedings engrossed millions of television viewers around the world, a relatively unknown rhetor from Houston, Texas, Barbara Jordan, presented a memorable plea. Armed with the tenets of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, she eloquently upheld the principles of democracy and expressed an abiding faith in the stability of our government, even in time of dire emergency. By constructing arguments grounded in traditional American beliefs, clothing them in language that stimulated the imagination, and delivering them in a stately and compelling manner, she taught us anew the nature of a genuine and relevant rhetoric based on understanding, values, and action.

Let us restate a quotation from Chaim Perelman used earlier in this chapter. The goal of rhetoric, he said, "is to intensify an adherence to values, to create a disposition to act, and finally to bring people to act." "Seen in such a perspective," Perelman adds, "rhetoric becomes a subject of great philosophic interest. . . ."[45] Instead of being separated from reality, rhetoric is joined with it. Instead of being divorced from action, it embraces it. Out of these dynamic relationships the relevance of rhetoric is derived.

Notes

1. Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Willard R. Trask, tr. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1953), p. 78.
2. "Agnew's Talk with Five Students," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 12, 1970, p. 94.
3. Those who had a special concern with language constituted leaders in "The Rhetoric of Style," while those who focused primarily on delivery became disciples of "The Elocutionary Movement." For an analysis of these two trends in British theory, see Douglas Ehninger, "Dominant Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750–1800," *The Southern Speech Journal*, XVII (September 1952), 3–12.
4. Harry Caplan, "The Decay of Eloquence at Rome in the First Century," *Studies in Speech and Drama in Honor of Alexander M. Drummond* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1944), pp. 295–325.
5. Bower Aly, "Rhetoric: Its Natural Enemies," *The Speech Teacher*, XVII (January 1968), 1–10.
6. Everett L. Hunt, "Rhetoric as a Humane Study," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLI (April 1965), 30–33.
7. Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 85–114.
8. Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, I (Summer 1968), 131–144.
9. Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, I (January 1968), 1–15.
10. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 1–10.
11. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric of Motives* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 567–68.
12. Adlai E. Stevenson, "Acceptance of Nomination, July 26, 1952," in John Graham, *Great American Speeches* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 99.
13. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks, eds., *Language is Sermonic: Richard Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 144.
14. *New York Times*, November 6, 1966.
15. For an illustration of this point, see the following source: James L. Golden, "The Influence of Rhetoric on the Social Science Theories of Giambattista Vico and David Hume," *Western Speech*, XXXIV (Summer 1970), 170–180.
16. This is demonstrated in Henry W. Johnstone's essay, "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy and of Philosophy to Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 52 (February 1966), 41–46.
17. Perelman, "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning," p. 279.
18. *Language is Sermonic*, p. 174.
19. Karl Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 49 (October 1963), 239–49.
20. Peter Bart, "Scientists Define Technology's Aim," *New York Times*, October 30, 1966, p. 52.
21. "Ethics as a Factor in Scientific Gains Urged by Scholars," *New York Times*, October 24, 1971, p. 51.
22. Burke, p. 696.
23. *Language is Sermonic*, pp. 181–84; *Ethics of Rhetoric*, p. 17.
24. I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 3.
25. Moses Hadas, ed., *The Basic Works of Cicero* (New York: The Modern Library, 1951), p. 57.
26. Chester G. Starr, *A History of the Ancient World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 526.

27. To Marcus Tullius Cicero; from Verona, 16 June 1345. Cited in Morris Bishop, ed., *Letters from Petrarch* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 206–207.
28. Ernest L. Boyer and Arthur Levine, *A Quest for Common Learning: The Aims of General Education* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Foundation, 1981), pp. 1–77.
29. *Ibid.* p. 20.
30. Tom Wicker, "Into the Quicksand," *New York Times*, November 27, 1966, p. E 13.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. For some of the most authoritative published statements on the history of the Vietnamese War, see the late Bernard Fall's works: *Vietnam Witness* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) and *Last Reflections on a War* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967).
34. Wicker, "Into the Quicksand."
35. *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: The New York Times Company, 1971), p. 308.
36. Interview on Columbia Broadcasting System Television, February 6, 1970.
37. See frequent references to Johnson's admitted inability to remove division regarding the controversy over the war in Vietnam in Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).
38. *U.S. Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, S 13991–14021.
39. Emmet Hughes, "The Stammering Advocate," *Newsweek*, October 30, 1967, p. 19.
40. *U.S. Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, S 14055–14063.
41. Max Frankel, "Why the Gap between L. B. J. and the Nation?" *New York Times Magazine*, January 7, 1968.
42. *New York Times*, April 7, 1968, p. E 12.
43. We are indebted to Wayne Brockriede for the use of these criteria to evaluate argument. See his essay on "Where Is Argument?" *Journal of American Forensic Association* (Spring 1975), 179–182.
44. Interview with Stephen Toulmin, Columbus, Ohio, November 22, 1974.
45. *The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning*, p. 279.

In this opening chapter on the nature and relevance of rhetoric, the ensuing essay by Everett Lee Hunt is of central importance. Despite its brevity, the study catches the significance of the role the humane tradition has performed in shaping the rhetoric of Western thought. With conciseness and clarity, Hunt focuses on learning, understanding, and values as forming the core of enlightened decision-making emanating from the freedom of choice. A humane rhetoric, he argues, is a responsible and persuasive rhetoric consistent with the teachings of Plato and the communication practices of Lincoln. This strong commitment to a belief in the salutary influence of the humanities on discourse also leads Hunt to warn us of the "dehumanizing effects of technology." Many of the leading theorists of each of the three major chronological periods featured in this volume, as we shall later observe, share the insights and concerns articulated in this essay.

Rhetoric as a Humane Study

The case for rhetoric as a humane study may be stated with deceptive simplicity. Rhetoric is the study of men persuading men to make free choices. It may well be regarded as the oldest and most central of humane studies. Man's first great free choice was to sin by eating the apple. The first persuader was the devil, and there are many who feel that there always has been and always will be something devilish about persuasion. That first decision has often been referred to as the victory of passion over reason, or as the result of an over-ambitious refusal to be content with the estate wherein man found himself. The long history

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of the arguments about the nature and effects of this first decision shows how many human qualities are involved in the discussion of any choice.

In fact, the definition of a humanistic study that I present as basic to this discussion is that the "humanities" embrace whatever contributes to freedom in making enlightened choices. An enlightened choice is a choice based upon a wide knowledge of all the alternatives, but knowledge about the alternatives is not enough. There must be imagination to envisage all the possibilities, and sympathy to make some of the options appeal to the emotions and powers of the will. Such dignity as man may have is achieved by the exercise of free choice through the qualities of learning, imagination, and sympathy; and we should add to these qualities as a fitting accompaniment, what may be called civility.

These qualities are sometimes recognized more readily by considering their opposites. The man who lacks learning is often narrow-minded, ignorant, and dogmatic; the man who lacks imagination is literal-minded and pedantic; the man who lacks sympathy is self-centered, opportunistic, and insensitive; if he lacks dignity and civility he may be base, boorish, brutal, or merely trivial and snobbish. The exercise of free choices through an imaginative and sympathetic learning and a dignified civility, then, is the mark of the liberally educated, humane man.

Applying this to a study of rhetoric, we go back to the old debate between Plato and Isocrates. Plato believed that a man should search for a reality above and beyond the vain shows of his world; and he thought that he could be found through mathematics and philosophy. Conformity to the ways of the world was mere sophistry. Isocrates, on the other hand, defined the liberally educated man as one who, in an uncertain situation, could make the best guess as to what he ought to do next. Making these guesses upon the basis of whatever learning, imagination, and sympathy he could command, and strengthening all these qualifications by attempting to make himself and his conclusions acceptable to others, he might well acquire dignity and civility and become a persuasive man, a rhetorician, in the best ancient sense of that now debased word. He would become acquainted in a general way with those persistent questions about which generations of men continually debate, he would know the characteristics of different types of audiences, what kind of ends, aims, and values would appeal to them, and without necessarily attempting to be all things to all men, would both consciously and unconsciously attempt to commend himself as a personally trustworthy agent of the policy he was supporting.

Now there is a large measure of identity between this ideal of Isocrates, and the modern ideal of the humane man, which I have taken largely from a contemporary philosopher, Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard.[1]

But what happens when this integrated and understandable ideal is presented for recognition amidst the curricular and administrative machinery of departments and divisions—of deans and presidents?

In an age of specialization this conception of rhetoric seems almost primitively simple-minded. It is as if one went up to a psychiatrist and said, "Sir, do you believe that he that controlleth his spirit is mightier than he that taketh a city?" The reply would probably be, "Man, do you realize all the implications of what you are saying?"

Or if you went to a philosopher in agony of spirit and said, "Tell me what I ought to do," you would hear him reply, "First let us decide what it means to ask, What ought I to do? Who are you, and how did you get your concept of self? What do you mean by it and where did you get your sense of duty?"

This academic necessity of dealing analytically and semantically with all questions makes it difficult to talk to the lay mind, to the man in the street, without seeming hopelessly naive and superficial. One answer, of course, has been to think with the learned and talk with the vulgar, but the success of academic specialists in writing and talking to the general public suggests that talking with the vulgar may be a more difficult achievement than thinking with the learned.

If academic men could talk with the vulgar, under the terms of the definition of the humanities that I have offered, it ought to be possible for all subjects in the curriculum to contribute to the making of free and enlightened choices.

Natural science can reveal the world around us as the source and environment of human life, and enable us to make our choices of the ends of action with a recognition of our qualities as children of nature, and with admiration for the human qualities displayed in the disinterested pursuit of truth. But science is perpetually being dehumanized by its quite necessary concern with technology.

The social sciences were once concerned with the good life, with the appraisal of purposes for which social institutions exist, but now they identify themselves more and more with the development of scientific technique. A colleague of mine, Professor J. M. Moore, recently spent a semester traveling among colleges and discussing concern with values; and he found that many social scientists in talking of this, repudiated any responsibility for value, although in arguments he did occasionally convict them of having a social conscience.

History and philosophy, which now appear at times as social sciences and not as humanities, often seem definitely to repudiate the humanistic ideal. Where history might humanize a man by leading him to participate imaginatively in the life of the past, it often becomes absorbed in the techniques of factfinding, with statistics and cycles, Philosophy, which can fertilize thought and strengthen the will by criticizing the ultimate principles of thought and action, seems more and more to abandon the classical problems as insoluble and to devote itself to semantics.

Literature is most commonly allowed to deserve the title of "the humanities," because, as Professor Perry has remarked, literature and the arts seem to be the studies which inhumane teachers are least able to dehumanize. In courses on Sophocles, Dante, and Shakespeare, it is difficult to counteract wholly the influence of Sophocles, Dante, and Shakespeare. Literature presents experience concretely and simply, not as abstracted by scientists and philosophers. But the critics of literature, writing for each other, seem to relegate literature to the simple-minded. Only the other day I heard a scholar state that the criticism of Hamlet had progressed beyond the point where it could be treated in any essay for the general reader.

Rhetoric has certainly not been immune from the dehumanizing influences of technology, and some of the most eloquent passages of Longinus were written in protest against the absorption of rhetoric with technique. Now we are faced with a scientific development of rhetoric under the heading of communication. It seems a little paradoxical, but typical of our age, that the most vigorous claims for the fundamental importance of communication should come from those concerned with development of communicating machines. Norbert Wiener, in *The Human Use of Human Beings,* makes clear the central place of communication in the history of science, and writes that communication and control belong to the essence of man's inner life even as they are of the essence of his life in society. Wiener is fully aware of the human possibilities and human dangers of the new technology. But in many of the books on communication the development of techniques seems all out of proportion to the results—as, for instance, an elaborate series of experiments to show that obsessional neuroses make persuasion more difficult, or that persons who have established a high degree of credibility are more persuasive than those with a low degree of credibility.

I am sure all these technical studies in the psychology of persuasion are going to expand enormously, and they will eventually prove useful in statistical estimates of the effectiveness of mass media of communication; but they seem to me to contribute little to individual understanding. It is difficult for me to believe that a person receiving a specialized training in these procedures would ever be much more than a statistical calculator of tests and measurements. I am reminded of George Kennan's recent Princeton address on training for statesmanship, when he said that graduate departments of political science had replaced human significance with technicalities, but that it was really more important to read the Bible and Plutarch than to learn all the tricks. The study of Lincoln's First Inaugural as published in *American Speeches* by Parrish and Hochmuth seems to me to typify the very best tradition of rhetoric as humane letters. It presents concretely, with literary skill, the historical background of tension and excitement in which a noble character appeals to people to make a choice which will elevate them as a nation. It is difficult to read such a chapter without being moved and inspired, and without having one's own style improved by unconscious emulation. This kind of study seems to me what we most need in the field of rhetoric to make clear our significance as one of the humanities.

This paper may sound a little like the petulant complaint of one who fears that he is defending a lost cause, but I have no desire to scold all intellectual workers into conformity with the conception of humanism here set forth. We can no more all be "humanists" than we could all agree to contemplate timeless beauty together without eternal boredom. The quantitative, the technical, the utilitarian, are the raw stuff of life, from which the human must be extracted by processes of interpretation. Their ever-expanding development leads to a continuous demand, even from the technologists, for human reinterpretation, and more insights may come from the studies of new examples of men persuading men to make free choices, than from too rigid a concentration on the examples whose human values have been long established.

We are met here to honor Max Parrish, whose work rightfully belongs to the central humanistic traditions of liberal education, and we honor ourselves, I think, in expressing our gratitude and admiration for his devotion and achievement, and for his understanding of rhetoric as a humane study.

Everett Hunt

Everett Lee Hunt is a former dean and professor emeritus at Swarthmore College and past editor (1927–1929) of the QJS. This paper was presented during the Convention of the Speech Association of America at a luncheon on December 28, 1954, in honor of Professor Wayland M. Parrish.

Notes

1. Ralph Barton Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," in *The Meaning of the Humanities*, ed. Theodore M. Greene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938).

In establishing the parameters for a relevant rhetoric, Lloyd Bitzer, in the following essay on "The Rhetorical Situation," expresses ideas that are a natural extension of the views set forth by Hunt. Rhetoric, Bitzer convincingly argues, cannot take place in a vacuum or, indeed, in an unstructured or haphazard environment. Rather it is the product of a simple or complex situation or setting consisting of three elements: (1) an exigence or urgent needs that must be addressed; (2) an audience containing the potential power to act; and (3) a series of societal constraints that function as a deterrent to action. According to this notion, the starting point of rhetoric is the situation. Once the dimensions of the situation become clear, the rhetor, of necessity, is challenged to construct a timely and appropriate response which speaks to the problem of the exigencies and the constraints. What makes Bitzer's essay so valuable to the contemporary student of rhetoric are its far-reaching implications not only for communication theory but for public address and criticism as well.

The Rhetorical Situation

If someone says, That is a dangerous situation, his words suggest the presence of events, persons, or objects which threaten him, someone else, or something of value. If someone remarks, I find myself in an embarrassing situation, again the statement implies certain situational characteristics. If someone remarks that he found himself in an ethical situation, we understand that he probably either contemplated or made some choice of action from a sense of duty or obligation or with a view to the Good. In other words, there are circumstances of this or that kind of structure which are recognized as ethical, dangerous, or embarrassing. What characteristics, then, are implied when one refers to "the rhetorical situation"—the context in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse? Perhaps this question is puzzling because "situation" is not a standard term in the vocabulary of rhetorical theory. "Audience" is standard; so also are "speaker," "subject," "occasion," and "speech." If I were to ask, "What is a rhetorical audience?" or "What is a rhetorical subject?"—the reader would catch the meaning of my question.

When I ask, What is a rhetorical situation?, I want to know the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse: How should they be described? What are their characteristics? Why and how do they result in the creation of rhetoric? By analogy, a theorist of science might well ask, What are the characteristics of situations which inspire scientific thought? A philosopher might ask, What is the nature of the situation in which a philosopher "does philosophy"? And a theorist of poetry might ask, How shall we describe the context in which poetry comes into existence?

The presence of rhetorical discourse obviously indicates the presence of a rhetorical situation. The Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Churchill's Address on Dunkirk, John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address—each is a clear instance of rhetoric and each indicates the presence of a situation. While the existence of a rhetorical address is a reliable sign of the existence of situation, it does not follow that a situation exists only when the discourse exists. Each reader probably can recall a specific time and place when there was opportunity to speak on some urgent matter, and after the opportunity was gone he created in private thought the speech he should have uttered earlier in the situation. It is clear that situations are not always accompanied by discourse. Nor should we assume that a rhetorical address gives existence to the situation; on the contrary, it is the situation which calls the discourse into existence. Clement Attlee once said that Winston Churchill went around looking for "finest hours." The point to observe is that Churchill found them—the crisis situations—and spoke in response to them.

No major theorist has treated rhetorical situation thoroughly as a distinct subject in rhetorical theory; many ignore it. Those rhetoricians who discuss situation do so indirectly—as does Aristotle, for example, who is led to consider situation when he treates types of discourse. None, to my knowledge, has asked the nature of rhetorical situation. Instead rhetoricians have asked: What is the process by which the orator creates and presents discourse? What is the nature of rhetorical discourse? What sorts of interaction occur between speaker, audience, subject, and occasion? Typically the questions which trigger theories of rhetoric focus upon the orator's method or upon the discourse itself, rather than upon the situation which invites the orator's application of his method and the creation of discourse. Thus rhetoricians distinguish among and characterize the types of speeches (forensic, deliberative, epideictic); they treat issues, types of proof, lines of argument, strategies of

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ethical and emotional persuasion, the parts of a discourse and the functions of these parts, qualities of styles, figures of speech. They cover approximately the same materials, the formal aspects of rhetorical method and discourse, whether focusing upon method, product or process; while conceptions of situation are implicit in some theories of rhetoric, none explicitly treat the formal aspects of situation.

I hope that enough has been said to show that the question—What is a rhetorical situation?—is not an idle one. I propose in what follows to set forth part of a theory of situation. This essay, therefore, should be understood as an attempt to revive the notion of rhetorical situation, to provide at least the outline of an adequate conception of it, and to establish it as a controlling and fundamental concern of rhetorical theory.

I

It seems clear that rhetoric is situational. In saying this, I do not mean merely that understanding a speech hinges upon understanding the context of meaning in which the speech is located. Virtually no utterance is fully intelligible unless meaning-context and utterance are understood; this is true of rhetorical and non-rhetorical discourse. Meaning-context is a general condition of human communication and is not synonymous with rhetorical situation. Nor do I mean merely that rhetoric occurs in a setting which involves interaction of speaker, audience, subject, and communicative purpose. This is too general, since many types of utterances—philosophical, scientific, poetic, and rhetorical—occur in such settings. Nor would I equate rhetorical situation with persuasive situation, which exists whenever an audience can be changed in belief or action by means of speech. Every audience at any moment is capable of being changed in some way by speech; persuasive situation is altogether general.

Finally, I do not mean that a rhetorical discourse must be embedded in historic context in the sense that a living tree must be rooted in soil. A tree does not obtain its character-as-tree from the soil, but rhetorical discourse, I shall argue, does obtain its character-as-rhetorical from the situation which generates it. Rhetorical works belong to the class of things which obtain their character from the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur. A rhetorical work is analogous to a moral action rather than to a tree. An act is moral because it is an act performed in a situation of a certain kind; similarly, a work is rhetorical because it is a response to a situation of a certain kind.

In order to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-to-situation, we should acknowledge a viewpoint that is commonplace but fundamental; a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive.

To say that rhetorical discourse comes into being in order to effect change is altogether general. We need to understand that a particular discourse comes into existence because of some specific condition or situation which invites utterance. Bronislaw Malinowski refers to just this sort of situation in his discussion of primitive language, which he finds to be essentially pragmatic and "embedded in situation." He describes a party of fishermen in the Trobriand Islands whose functional speech occurs in a "context of situation."

> The canoes glide slowly and noiselessly, punted by men especially good at this task and always used for it. Other experts who know the bottom of the lagoon . . . are on the look-out for fish. . . . Customary signs, or sounds or words are uttered. Sometimes

> a sentence full of technical references to the channels or patches on the lagoon has to be spoken; sometimes . . . a conventional cry is uttered. . . . Again, a word of command is passed here and there, a technical expression or explanation which serves to harmonize their behavior towards other men. . . . An animated scene, full of movement, follows, and now that the fish are in their power the fishermen speak loudly, and give vent to their feelings. Short, telling exclamations fly about, which might be rendered by such words as: "Pull in," "Let go," "Shift further," "Lift the net."

In this whole scene, "each utterance is essentially bound up with the context of situation and with the aim of the pursuit. . . . The structure of all this linguistic material is inextricably mixed up with, and dependent upon, the course of the activity in which the utterances are embedded." Later the observer remarks: "In its primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection."[1]

These statements about primitive language and the "context of situation" provide for us a preliminary model of rhetorical situation. Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character. In Malinowski's example, the situation is the fishing expedition—consisting of objects, persons, events, and relations—and the ruling exigence, the success of the hunt. The situation dictates the sorts of observations to be made; it dictates the significant physical and verbal responses; and, we must admit, it constrains the words which are uttered in the same sense that it constrains the physical acts of paddling the canoes and throwing the nets. The verbal responses to the demands imposed by this situation are clearly as functional and necessary as the physical responses.

Traditional theories of rhetoric have dealt, of course, not with the sorts of primitive utterances described by Malinowski—"stop here," "throw the nets," "move closer"—but with larger units of speech which come more readily under the guidance of artistic principle and method. The difference between oratory and primitive utterance, however, is not a difference in function; the clear instances of rhetorical discourse and the fishermen's utterances are similarly functional and similarly situational. Observing both the traditions of the expedition and the facts before him, the leader of the fishermen finds himself *obliged* to speak at a given moment—to command, to supply information, to praise or blame—to respond appropriately to the situation. Clear instances of artistic rhetoric exhibit the same character: Cicero's speeches against Cataline were called forth by a specific union of persons, events, objects, and relations, and by an exigence which amounted to an imperative stimulus; the speeches in the Senate rotunda three days after the assassination of the President of the United States were actually required by the situation. So controlling is situation that we should consider it the very ground of rhetorical activity, whether that activity is primitive and productive of a simple utterance or artistic and productive of the Gettysburg Address.

Hence, to say that rhetoric is situational means: (1) rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence in response to a question, or a solution in response to a problem; (2) a speech is given *rhetorical* significance by the situation, just as a unit of discourse is given significance *as* answer or *as* solution by the question or problem; (3) a rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a necessary condition of an answer; (4) many questions go unanswered and many problems remain unsolved; similarly, many rhetorical situations mature and decay without giving birth to rhetorical utterance; (5) a situation is rhetorical insofar as it needs and invites discourse capable of participating with situation and thereby altering its reality; (6) discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions (or seeks to function) as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it. (7) Finally, the situation controls the rhetorical response in the same sense that the question controls the answer and the problem controls the solution. Not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity—and, I should add, of rhetorical criticism.

II

Let us now amplify the nature of situation by providing a formal definition and examining constituents. Rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence. Prior to the creation and presentation of discourse, there are three constituents of any rhetorical situation: the first is the *exigence;* the second and third are elements of the complex, namely the *audience* to be constrained in decision and action, and the *constraints* which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience.

Any *exigence* is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be. In almost any sort of context, there will be numerous exigences, but not all are elements of a rhetorical situation—not all are rhetorical exigences. An exigence which cannot be modified is not rhetorical; thus, whatever comes about of necessity and cannot be changed—death, winter, and some natural disasters, for instance—are exigences to be sure, but they are not rhetorical. Further, an exigence which can be modified only by means other than discourse is not rhetorical; thus, an exigence is not rhetorical when its modification requires merely one's own action or the application of a tool, but neither requires nor invites the assistance of discourse. An exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse. For example, suppose that a man's acts are injurious to others and that the quality of his acts can be changed only if discourse is addressed to him; the exigence—his injurious acts—is then unmistakably rhetorical. The pollution of our air is also a rhetorical exigence because its positive modification—reduction of pollution—strongly invites the assistance of discourse producing public awareness, indignation, and action of the right kind. Frequently rhetors encounter exigences which defy easy classification because of the absence of information enabling precise analysis and certain judgment—they may or may not be rhetorical. An attorney whose client has been convicted may strongly believe that a higher court would reject his appeal to have the verdict overturned, but because the matter is uncertain—because the exigence *might* be rhetorical—he elects to appeal. In this and similar instances of indeterminate exigences the rhetor's decision to speak is based mainly upon the urgency of the exigence and the probability that the exigence is rhetorical.

In any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence which functions as the organizing principle: it specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to be effected. The exigence may or may not be perceived clearly by the rhetor or other persons in the situation; it may be strong or weak depending upon the clarity of their perception and the degree of their interest in it; it may be real or unreal depending on the facts of the case; it may be important or trivial; it may be such that discourse can completely remove it, or it may persist in spite of repeated modifications; it may be completely familiar—one of a type of exigences occurring frequently in our experience—or it may be totally new, unique. When it is perceived and when it is strong and important, then it constrains the thought and action of the perceiver who may respond rhetorically if he is in a position to do so.

The second constituent is the *audience.* Since rhetorical discourse produces change by influencing the decision and action of persons who function as mediators of change, it follows that rhetoric always requires an audience—even in those cases when a person engages himself or ideal mind as audience. It is clear also that a rhetorical audience must be distinguished from a body of mere hearers or readers: properly speaking, a rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.

Neither scientific nor poetic discourse requires an audience in the same sense. Indeed, neither requires an audience in order to produce its end; the scientist can produce a discourse expressive or generative of knowledge without engaging another mind, and the poet's creative purpose is accomplished when the work is composed. It is true, of course, that scientists and poets present their works to audiences, but their audiences are not necessarily rhetorical. The scientific audience consists of persons capable of receiving knowledge, and the poetic audience, of persons capable of participating in aesthetic experiences induced by the poetry. But the rhetorical audience must be capable of serving as mediator of the change which the discourse functions to produce.

Besides exigence and audience, every rhetorical situation contains a set of *constraints* made up of persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence. Standard sources of constraint include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives and the like; and when the orator enters the situation, his discourse not only harnesses constraints given by situation but provides additional important constraints—for example his personal character, his logical proofs, and his style. There are two main classes of constraints: (1) those originated or managed by the rhetor and his method (Aristotle called these "artistic proofs"), and (2) those other constraints, in the situation, which may be operative (Aristotle's "inartistic proofs"). Both classes must be divided so as to separate those constraints that are proper from those that are improper.

These three constituents—exigence, audience, constraints—comprise everything relevant in a rhetorical situation. When the orator, invited by situation, enters it and creates and presents discourse, then both he and his speech are additional constituents.

III

I have broadly sketched a conception of rhetorical situation and discussed constituents. The following are general characteristics or features.

1. Rhetorical discourse is called into existence by situation; the situation which the rhetor perceives amounts to an invitation to create and present discourse. The clearest instances of rhetorical speaking and writing are strongly invited—often required. The situation generated by the assassination of President Kennedy was so highly structured and compelling that one could predict with near certainty the types and themes of forthcoming discourse. With the first reports of the assassination, there immediately developed a most urgent need for information; in response, reporters created hundreds of messages. Later as the situation altered, other exigences arose: the fantastic events in Dallas had to be explained; it was necessary to eulogize the dead President; the public needed to be assured that the transfer of government to new hands would be orderly. These messages were not idle performances. The historic situation was so compelling and clear that the responses were created almost out of necessity. The responses—news reports, explanations, eulogies—participated with the situation and positively modified the several exigences. Surely the power of situation is evident when one can predict that such discourse will be uttered. How else explain the phenomenon? One cannot say that the situation is the function of the speaker's intention, for in this case the speakers' intentions were determined by the situation. One cannot say that the rhetorical transaction is simply a response of the speaker to the demands or expectations of an audience, for the expectations of the audience were themselves keyed to a tragic historic fact.

Also, we must recognize that there came into existence countless eulogies to John F. Kennedy that never reached a public; they were filed, entered in diaries, or created in thought.

In contrast, imagine a person spending his time writing eulogies of men and women who never existed: his speeches meet no rhetorical situations; they are summoned in existence not by real events, but by his own imagination. They may exhibit formal features which we consider rhetorical—such as ethical and emotional appeals, and stylistic patterns; conceivably one of these fictive eulogies is even persuasive to someone; yet all remain unrhetorical unless, through the oddest of circumstances, one of them by chance should fit a situation. Neither the presence of formal features in the discourse nor persuasive effect in a reader or hearer can be regarded as reliable marks of rhetorical discourse: A speech will be rhetorical when it is a response to the kind of situation which is rhetorical.

2. Although rhetorical situation invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response. Thus the second characteristic of rhetorical situation is that it invites a *fitting* response, a response that fits the situation. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address was a most fitting response to the relevant features of the historic context which invited its existence and gave it rhetorical significance. Imagine for a moment the Gettysburg Address entirely separated from its situation and existing for us independent of any rhetorical context: as a discourse which does not "fit" any rhetorical situation, it becomes either poetry or declamation, without rhetorical significance. In reality, however, the address continues to have profound rhetorical value precisely because some features of the Gettysburg situation persist; and the Gettysburg Address continues to participate with situation and to alter it.

Consider another instance. During one week of the 1964 presidential campaign, three events of national and international significance all but obscured the campaign: Khrushchev was suddenly deposed, China exploded an atomic bomb, and in England the Conservative Party was defeated by Labour. Any student of rhetoric could have given odds that President Johnson, in a major address, would speak to the significance of these events, and he did; his response to the situation generated by the events was fitting. Suppose that the President had treated not these events and their significance but the national budget, or imagine that he had reminisced about his childhood on a Texas farm. The critic of rhetoric would have said rightly, "He missed the mark; his speech did not fit; he did not speak to the pressing issues—the rhetorical situation shaped by the three crucial events of the week demanded a response, and he failed to provide the proper one."

3. If it makes sense to say that situation invites a "fitting" response, then situation must somehow prescribe the response which fits. To say that a rhetorical response fits a situation is to say that it meets the requirements established by the situation. A situation which is strong and clear dictates the purpose, theme, matter, and style of the response. Normally, the inauguration of a President of the United States demands an address which speaks to the nation's purposes, the central national and international problems, the unity of contesting parties; it demands speech style marked by dignity. What is evidenced on this occasion is the power of situation to constrain a fitting response. One might say metaphorically that every situation prescribes its fitting response; the rhetor may or may not read the prescription accurately.

4. The exigence and the complex of persons, objects, events and relations which generate rhetorical discourse are located in reality, are objective and publicly observable historic facts in the world we experience, are therefore available for scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them. To say the situation is objective, publicly observable, and historic means that it is real or genuine—that our critical examination will certify its existence. Real situations are to be distinguished from sophistic ones in which, for example, a contrived exigence is asserted to be real; from spurious situations in which the existence or alleged existence of constituents is the result of error or

ignorance; and from fantasy in which exigence, audience, and constraints may all be the imaginary objects of a mind at play.

The rhetorical situation as real is to be distinguished also from a fictive rhetorical situation. The speech of a character in a novel or play may be clearly required by a fictive rhetorical situation—a situation established by the story itself; but the speech is not genuinely rhetorical, even though, considered in itself, it looks exactly like a courtroom address or a senate speech. It is realistic, made so by fictive context. But the situation is not real, not grounded in history; neither the fictive situation nor the discourse generated by it is rhetorical. We should note, however, that the fictive rhetorical discourse within a play or novel may become genuinely rhetorical outside fictive context—if there is a real situation for which the discourse is a rhetorical response. Also, of course, the play or novel itself may be understood as a rhetorical response having poetic form.

5. Rhetorical situations exhibit structures which are simple or complex, and more or less organized. A situation's structure is simple when there are relatively few elements which must be made to interact; the fishing expedition is a case in point—there is a clear and easy relationship among utterances, the audiences, constraints, and exigence. Franklin D. Roosevelt's brief Declaration of War speech is another example: the message exists as a response to one clear exigence easily perceived by one major audience, and the one overpowering constraint is the necessity of war. On the other hand, the structure of a situation is complex when many elements must be made to interact: practically any presidential political campaign provides numerous complex rhetorical situations.

A situation, whether simple or complex, will be highly structured or loosely structured. It is highly structured when all of its elements are located and readied for the task to be performed. Malinowski's example, the fishing expedition, is a situation which is relatively simple and highly structured; everything is ordered to the task to be performed. The usual courtroom case is a good example of situation which is complex and highly structured. The jury is not a random and scattered audience but a selected and concentrated one; it knows its relation to judge, law, defendant, counsels; it is instructed in what to observe and what to disregard. The judge is located and prepared; he knows exactly his relation to jury, law, counsels, defendant. The counsels know the ultimate object of their case; they know what they must prove; they know the audience and can easily reach it. This situation will be even more highly structured if the issue of the case is sharp, the evidence decisive, and the law clear. On the other hand, consider a complex but loosely structured situation, William Lloyd Garrison preaching abolition from town to town. He is actually looking for an audience and for constraints; even when he finds an audience, he does not know that it is a genuinely rhetorical audience—one able to be mediator of change. Or consider the plight of many contemporary civil rights advocates who, failing to locate compelling constraints and rhetorical audiences, abandon rhetorical discourse in favor of physical action.

Situations may become weakened in structure due to complexity or disconnectedness. A list of causes includes these: (a) a single situation may involve numerous exigencies; (b) exigences in the same situation may be incompatible; (c) two or more simultaneous rhetorical situations may compete for our attention, as in some parliamentary debates; (d) at a given moment, persons comprising the audience of situation A may also be the audience of situations B, C, and D; (e) the rhetorical audience may be scattered, uneducated regarding its duties and powers, or it may dissipate; (f) constraints may be limited in number and force, and they may be incompatible. This is enough to suggest the sorts of things which weaken the structure of situations.

6. Finally, rhetorical situations come into existence, then either mature or decay or mature and persist—conceivably some persist indefinitely. In any case, situations grow and come to maturity; they evolve to just the time when a rhetorical discourse would be most fit-

ting. In Malinowski's example, there comes a time in the situation when the leader of the fishermen should say, "Throw the nets." In the situation generated by the assassination of the President, there was a time for giving descriptive accounts of the scene in Dallas, later a time for giving eulogies. In a political campaign, there is a time for generating an issue and a time for answering a charge. Every rhetorical situation in principle evolves to a propitious moment for the fitting rhetorical response. After this moment, most situations decay; we all have the experience of creating a rhetorical response when it is too late to make it public.

Some situations, on the other hand, persist; this is why it is possible to have a body of truly *rhetorical* literature. The Gettysburg Address, Burke's Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Socrates' Apology—these are more than historical documents, more than specimens for stylistic or logical analysis. They exist as rhetorical responses *for us* precisely because they speak to situations which persist—which are in some measure universal.

Due to either the nature of things or convention, or both, some situations recur. The courtroom is the locus for several kinds of situations generating the speech of accusation, the speech of defense, the charge to the jury. From day to day, year to year, comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses; hence rhetorical forms are born and a special vocabulary, grammar, and style are established. This is true also of the situation which invites the inaugural address of a President. The situation recurs and, because we experience situations and the rhetorical responses to them, a form of discourse is not only established but comes to have a power of its own—the tradition itself tends to function as a constraint upon any new response in the form.

IV

In the best of all possible worlds, there would be communication perhaps, but no rhetoric—since exigencies would not arise. In our real world, however, rhetorical exigences abound; the world really invites change—change conceived and effected by human agents who quite properly address a mediating audience. The practical justification of rhetoric is analogous to that of scientific inquiry: the world presents objects to be known, puzzles to be resolved, complexities to be understood—hence the practical need for scientific inquiry and discourse; similarly, the world presents imperfections to be modified by means of discourse—hence the practical need for rhetorical investigation and discourse. As a discipline, scientific method is justified philosophically insofar as it provides principles, concepts, and procedures by which we come to know reality; similarly, rhetoric as a discipline is justified philosophically insofar as it provides principles, concepts, and procedures by which we effect valuable changes in reality. Thus rhetoric is distinguished from the mere craft of persuasion which, although it is a legitimate object of scientific investigation, lacks philosophical warrant as a practical discipline.

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Notes

1. "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," sections III and IV. This essay appears as a supplement to Ogden and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning.*

The preceding discussions which have described rhetoric as a relevant field of study grounded in the humane tradition and deriving its impetus from a situation are vital introductory materials for understanding the nature of this volume. As essential as these analyses are, however, they do not go far enough in explaining the full rationale of our method in organizing the parts and chapters that follow. The added key to open up our panoramic view of Western thought, we feel, may be found in Douglas Ehninger's essay "On Systems of Rhetoric." Rejecting the notion that a single, clear-cut definition of the term rhetoric can be developed, Ehninger borrows from systems theory to show that what we have are three great rhetorics which he labels Classical, British or Continental, and Contemporary. This study, as you will see, delineates the special communication characteristics of each of the systems. The practical relevance of this model for us is that it provides a framework in which we can concentrate almost exclusively on the major western theorists without sacrificing what is significant and unique in the body of rhetorical literature. A final point to be observed here is this: if we perceive rhetoric from the vantage point of a systems approach, we not only come to a further appreciation of rhetoric as a humanity but will also see its roots in the social and behavioral sciences.

On Systems of Rhetoric

I

In this paper I shall be concerned with rhetorical systems as systems.

A rhetoric I define as an organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about practical discourse in any of its forms or modes. By practical discourse I mean discourse, written or oral, that seeks to inform, evaluate, or persuade, and therefore is to be distinguished from discourse that seeks to please, elevate, or depict. An organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about something, in line with my present purpose, I call a system. In this sense, not only the rhetoric embodied in a single treatise, but also the rhetoric embodied collectively in the treatises of a given place or period constitutes a system, and may be spoken of as such.

In the remarks that follow I shall be concerned with the second of these possibilities. Specifically, I shall attempt to describe the rhetorics of three historical periods in terms broad enough to exhibit their essential characteristics as systems, and then to suggest certain practical uses of an analysis conducted at this level.

It would be naive to suppose that in the characterizations I offer it will be easy to walk a line between the obvious on the one side and the disputable or false on the other. Nor do I expect that the formulations I advance or the inferences I draw will escape criticism. Because not all of the rhetorical treatises of a period fall into a mold, an attempt to treat that period as a system means that one must select from diverse possibilities the trends and emphases that are dominant. Because any one treatise, insofar as it pretends to completeness, is a complex construct, involving a delicate balance among ethical, aesthetic, semantic, and pragmatic elements, attempts to fit it into a pattern inevitably invite refutation by the citation of isolated passages.

But while the hazards are sizable the rewards beckon. Unlike microscopic sightings, which atomize and divide, a macroscopic view extending over an entire genus of treatises submerges differences and details so as to call forth the common characteristics of rhetorical

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systems as organized wholes—the parts of which they are composed, the joints at which they are articulated, and the weaknesses to which they are prone.

Of these advantages, however, I shall speak further in the final section of this paper. Initially, I turn to the task of characterizing the rhetorics of three historical periods in terms broad enough to display their common nature as systems. I chose as case studies for my investigation what I regard as the three crucial eras in the development of Western rhetorical thought—the classical period, the late eighteenth century, and the period extending from the early 1930s to the present time.

II

The rhetoric of the classical period arose out of a two-fold problem or need.

First, with the development of democratic institutions in the city states of Sicily and Greece, speechmaking as an activity found new avenues of expression and gained in importance until it came to be regarded as an art form as well as a social instrument. What was this phenomenon upon which men depended for the making of laws, the administration of justice, and the honoring of heroes? What was the essential nature of the speech act? Of what parts did this act consist? Upon what faculties or arts did it depend? How could it systematically be described and talked about? And, second, how could proficiency in the important business of performing this speech act be taught in a society where every man must act as his own lawyer and his own legislator? How might instruction in speechmaking be methodized and imparted to the masses?

These two needs, as limited and shaped by the social and intellectual milieu in which the new activity of speechmaking found itself, were the decisive factors in determining the nature of the classical rhetoric. Because this rhetoric operated in an aural world it became the art or science of oral rather than of written discourse. Because its principal functions were to argue the relative merits of laws and policies and to attack or defend from attack in the courtroom, it became primarily the art of persuasion. Because skill in speaking had to be imparted to the masses rhetoric was written with an eye to easy prescription and stressed the development of mechanical or "artificial" procedures and routines. Because speaking was regarded as a fine art as well as a practical tool, rhetoric was given both aesthetic and pragmatic dimensions.

But while all of these properties and others must be recognized in a full description of the classical rhetoric, the one characteristic which perhaps most adequately distinguishes it as system is its basically grammatical nature. For, without denying other achievements, it still must be said that the central concern and principal contribution of the classical rhetoric were the development of the syntax of the speech act—the delineating and naming of the parts of that act and the tracing of the permutations and combinations of which these parts permit. And this emphasis is entirely understandable. Before the classical writers could consider the pragmatic or aesthetic aspects of speechmaking, they first had to determine what the act of speaking entailed and to devise a grammar for talking about its parts and their relationships.

The work of the classical rhetoricians in devising such a grammar was admirable. So well, indeed, did they perform this task that even today any system of rhetoric which fails to encompass the basic terms and relationships which they isolated is properly regarded as incomplete. They defined or located the speech act itself in two important ways: first, methodologically, by distinguishing rhetoric from grammar, logic, and poetic; and second, substantively, by exploring the relations rhetoric bears to politics and ethics. They divided the speech act into its functional parts of speaker, speech, and audience-occasion, and speculated upon the relative importance of each of these parts in determining the success of the whole. They distinguished among the kinds or types of speeches which they found in the world about them—the legislative, judicial, and epideictic—and described the characteristic uses of each. They recognized the various arts or "offices" upon which oral communication depends—invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery—and they assigned a specific function to each. As sub-classifications within the various *officia,* they devised vocabularies for discussing types of proofs, characters of style, and the parts of a speech. And, finally, they arranged this grammar into a pattern which permitted its easy acquisition by the aspiring student.

But while as a grammatically centered and pedagogically oriented system the classical rhetoric had strengths, its focus on grammar and pedagogy also made for weaknesses.

First, in their desire to draw lines between phenomena which by nature blend into another—to divide, compartmentalize, and name—the ancients gave if not a false, at least a painfully over-simplified picture of the relationships between invention and disposition and invention and style. Indeed, save perhaps in the case of delivery—and even here modern studies in paralanguage give grounds for doubt—the divisions among all the *officia* tend to be artificial rather than real.

Second, in their desire to render the art of speaking teachable, and teachable to the average man, the classical writers were led to depend too much on preprocessed materials and modes of expression; to reduce to formula or routine, matters inherently incapable of such reduction; to provide, as in the *status* and the topics, purely "artificial" substitutes for knowledge and cogitation—substitutes which by converting *noesis* to rote might equalize individual differences in industry and ability.

Third, and most important, in their emphasis upon the speech act as such and hampered by the primitive psychology and epistemology with which they worked, as a group the classical writers tended either to scant or to present a patently naive account of the relation between the speech act and the mind of the listener.

III

Whereas the rhetoric of the classical period was basically "grammatical" in nature, the rhetoric of the period we now are to examine is best described as "psychological." For it was the major contribution of the "new British rhetoric" of the later eighteenth century, as embodied principally in such works as Lord Kames' *Elements of Criticism* (1761), John Ogilvie's *Philosophical and Critical Observations* (1774), George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776), and Joseph Priestley's *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism* (1777), that it corrected the major deficiency of the classical system by working out a series of detailed statements concerning the relation between the communicative act and the mind of the listener-reader.

And here, too, the new emphasis or interest arose in response to a felt need and was shaped by the environment in which that need emerged. For as Locke and his successors among the British empiricists began to develop more sophisticated systems of psychology and epistemology, not only did the ancients' lack of attention to the message-mind relationship seem a more glaring deficiency, but many of the traditional assumptions concerning how men know or are persuaded no longer were acceptable.

So far as the student of rhetorical systems is concerned, it is immaterial that most of the doctrines which the new rhetoricians chose as groundings for their work—the faculty and associational psychologies, the common sense philosophy, and the like—no longer are fashionable. What is important is that, taking these doctrines as premises, the British rhetoricians of the period worked out a more sophisticated statement of the message-mind relationship than had hitherto been possible, and that here again the statement was shaped by the environment in which the need arose.

In their effort to carry rhetoric beyond the grammar of the speech act, with its attendant pedagogical rules and cautions—to bring it, as Campbell said, to a "new country" where rules might be validated by checking them against those principles of the human understanding from whence they sprang[1]—the architects of the new system gave rhetoric an epistemological rather than a grammatical or a logical starting point. Instead of approaching rhetoric through an analysis of what might be said on behalf of a cause, as had the ancients, they approached it through an analysis of the mind of the listener-reader, premising their doctrine upon assumptions concerning the ways in which men come to know what they know, believe what they believe, and feel what they feel. From such an analysis, they assumed, the radical principles of rhetoric could be inferred and, as Campbell said, validated. In short, whereas the ancients had built a subject- or substance-centered rhetoric, the eighteenth-century theorists built an audience-centered one. They classified speeches in terms of the effect the speaker sought to produce upon his listener—"to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will."[2] They categorized proofs according to the ways in which listeners come to believe—by experience, analogy, testimony, and the calculation of chances.[3] They fused the traditional areas of invention and arrangement into the broader concept of this conduct or "management" of a discourse and included in this rubric all of the grosser resources, both substantive and methodological, by which the listener could be persuaded.[4] They rejected the view that rhetoric is a "counterpart" of dialectic or logic, and declared it to be an "offshoot" of logical studies. Then, with rhetoric dependent upon logic for its routines of analysis and proof, they took the bold step of ruling the tasks of search and discovery entirely out of the art, and of substituting in their stead a new doctrine of invention conceived of as the framing and use of proofs that had previously been derived.[5]

How shall we evaluate this "new" rhetoric? Although now largely dated, there can be little question, I think, but that on the whole it was a remarkable achievement and represented a level of sophistication not envisioned by the ancients. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that this new system, as had the classical rhetoric, suffered from too intense a preoccupation with one aspect of the communication spectrum. While the ancients had focused on the grammar of the speech act at the expense of exploring how that act is related to the listener, so the eighteenth-century writers focused on the speaker-listener relationship at cost of developing an improved grammar of the act itself. Consequently, as in the case of Priestley,[6] they gave the traditional concepts new tortured meanings, or like Campbell they accepted the ancient grammar and buried it in their works—deemphasized it until the parts of the speech act and the arts or offices upon which the act depends tended to lose identity as discrete units.

Even more important, however, in their preoccupation with the message-mind relationship the architects of the "new" rhetoric gave insufficient attention to another vital dimension of a complete and rounded theory of communication. And this is the role that practical discourse plays in society—the function it performs and should perform in promoting social cohesion and exercising social control.

In two different senses the "new" rhetoric of the eighteenth century was almost entirely an armchair construct—a product of the study rather than of the forum. First, it was largely unrelated to and uninterested in speaking and writing as they existed in the world about it. It was a hypothetical or "if, then" rhetoric—a self-contained theoretical study which might equally well exist if actual discourses never were or never had been composed. Campbell, who in the *Philosophy* defends the study of "eloquence" on the ground that it furnishes the quickest, surest, and pleasantest way to knowledge of the human mind, reserves most of his practical advice on speaking for the strangely unphilosophical *Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence* (1807). Joseph Priestley regards his *Lectures on Oratory* as a practical illustration of the associational psychology of David Hartley.[7] And Hugh Blair, by allying rhetoric with *belles lettres,* places that discipline at the service of the critic as well as of the speaker or writer.[8]

Finally, and more briefly, as one might imagine of a system that largely predates the development of experimental techniques of investigation and verification, the "new" rhetoric was armchair in the sense that for the most part it consisted of inferences drawn from premises based upon intuition or common sense.

IV

The third and last of the period systems we are to examine extends from the early 1930s to the present time, and encompasses developments which, for the most part, have occurred here in the United States.

If the classical rhetoric may be characterized as "grammatical" and the "new" rhetoric of the eighteenth century as "psychological," the rhetoric of our third period may best be described as "social" or "sociological." For while as a system contemporary rhetoric is unusually complex and embraces many specialized strands of interest, all of these strands find unity in the fact that at bottom they view rhetoric as an instrument for understanding and improving human relations.

Like systems of the past, the contemporary system arises out of a felt need and is shaped by the intellectual and social milieu in which rhetoric today finds itself. And here the need is simple but compelling. From the personal to the national and international levels tensions and breakdowns in human relations now, as never before, may result not only in maladjusted personalities or in misunderstanding among individuals, but in depressions, wars, and the suicide of the race itself.

Under such circumstances it is natural that rhetoric as a form of verbal interaction among persons and groups should be concerned with the part it can play in promoting human understanding and in improving the process by which man communicates with man.

This motive is reflected in the thinking of Kenneth Burke who argues that because language is symbolic action rhetorical analysis can throw light upon human relations and motives generally, while rhetoric as a social force arising out of an atmosphere of divisiveness can promote consubstantiality and peace through the process of identification.[9] Similarly, it underlies I. A. Richards' definition of rhetoric as a study of the causes and remedies of misunderstanding and accounts for his interest in metaphor and in "comprehending."[10]

Proponents of group discussion, under the influence of Dewey's instrumentalism and the explorations of the group dynamists, seek to implement the ideal of improved human relations by developing a specialized rhetoric of reflective problem solving. Students of communication theory, influenced by the terminology and insights of the electronics engineers, believe that an understanding of transmission systems will help to eliminate many of the blockages that occur when man speaks to man. The General Semanticists profess to find a neuter or feckless mode of communication a cure for many of the world's social ills. Writers on argument, aware that traditional proof patterns are inapplicable to disputes on moral issues, seek a logic of "ought propositions," drawn with a particular eye to the problems of "conflict resolution."

But these workers and others throughout the broad field of contemporary rhetoric do not find unity only in their concern with the social aspects of improved communication. They are bound still more closely together by their common belief that at the root of many of the misunderstandings which impair or block communications are man's language and his habits of using and abusing it—a conviction bolstered by the growing realization that language is not a pliable medium which through struggle may be molded to one's will, but rather is itself a shaping force which goes far toward determining how man will conceive of himself and of his world.

Therefore, while the ancients centered principally upon methods for analyzing the substance or subject matter of a "cause" and while the eighteenth-century framers of the "new" rhetoric emphasized the message-mind relationship, contemporary writers find a locus of interest in language as the vehicle by which the message is transmitted. Beyond this, however, they recognize that while language is the central instrument of human communication, other symbol systems, some of which lie beneath the sender's or receiver's threshold of awareness, also may carry messages which influence thought or behavior.

The new focus, no less than the ones which preceded it, has had both desirable and undesirable results. The encompassment within rhetoric of appeals which are at least partially "unconscious"[11] has extended the traditional range of that science, and in so doing has provided a more comprehensive picture of the role which rhetorical forces play in promoting social cohesion and effecting social control. On the other hand, since this extension carried to its fullest would render any stimulus-response situation rhetorical, rhetoric is in danger of losing its identity as a discrete discipline. Indeed, even today it is moot to dispute whether one may with profit talk of a rhetoric of clothes, or of social status, or, for that matter, of a rhetoric of the stoplight.[12]

And, second, the current interest in vehicles of message transmission, coupled with the premium which quantitative studies in communication research place upon ever more effective transmission, threatens the concern which a sound rhetoric should have for message content and for the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of communication. If a rhetoric is to pretend to completeness, it must be concerned not only with means, but with ends. Besides asking what does communicate and persuade, it must ask what should persuade and what that which persuades should persuade to. Moreover, because at bottom ethical and pragmatic considerations are inseparable from the problem of form, a complete rhetoric also must have an aesthetic dimension.

If, then, as there is reason to suspect, the present emphasis on the vehicle of transmission may threaten the integrity of rhetoric as a bounded discipline or impair those relations which guarantee its character as a humane subject, it may be well in the future to watch this development with more than ordinary care.

V

As I remarked at the outset, this paper has two purposes: (1) to attempt to describe the rhetorics of three periods in terms broad enough to exhibit their essential characteristics as systems, and (2) to suggest some of the uses of an analysis conducted at this level. Having described the three rhetorics, I now inquire into the uses which such analysis may have.

First, I would argue that attempts to characterize the rhetorics of various places or periods at the systems level are useful because they introduce a healthy and much needed relativism into studies still too much dominated by the notion of the classical rhetoric as a preferred archetype from which all departures are greater or lesser aberrations.

As our survey has suggested, the collective rhetorics of a period, as well as the rhetoric embodied in a single treatise, are time- and culture-bound. Systems of rhetoric arise out of a felt need and are shaped in part by the intellectual and social environment in which the need exists. No matter how sound internally or how imposing architecturally a given system may be—no matter how much its ethical or aesthetic groundings may arouse our admiration—to regard it as a universally applicable paradigm is to overlook a fundamental fact concerning the very nature of rhetoric.

From this it follows that the continuing dialogue on the question, What is rhetoric? except as an academic exercise, is largely profitless. If there is no one generic rhetoric which, like a Platonic Idea, is lurking in the shadows awaiting him who shall have the acuteness to discern it, the search for a defining quality can only end in error or frustration. It would serve the cause of rhetorical studies in general, I think, if instead of continuing this dialogue we openly adopted the plural of the noun and spoke of the history or theory of "rhetorics."

But more important than any reform in notation which might be effected by the laying of the one-rhetoric myth is the fact that a view which allows for many rhetorics rather than a single preferred one pointedly reminds us that in the final analysis the worth of a rhetorical system cannot be divorced from pragmatic considerations. It cannot be merely good or bad; it must be good or bad for something. Abstractly considered, a system geared to the Platonic ideal of communicating truth in order to make men better is to be ranked above one devoted to the ornamenting of language or the tricks of persuasion, and without doubt every "good" rhetoric has as its ultimate purpose the communication of "truth." But, at the same time, a rhetoric which conceives of truth as transcendent entity and requires a perfect knowledge of the soul as a condition for its successful transmittal automatically rules itself out as an instrument for doing the practical work of the world, and for this reason is less preferable than a system geared to the communication of contingent truths as established by probable rather than apodeictic proofs. In short, the problem of evaluating a rhetoric is a complex one, calling for a delicate balancing of the ideal with the utilitarian and for a precarious adjustment of ends to means. A study of rhetorical systems as systems, I believe, may contribute to our understanding of this fact.

Second, I would contend that analysis of the sort here attempted is useful because it helps to clarify the roles which form and substance play in the creation of a rhetoric. Our discussion appears to show that while the form a rhetoric assumes is a joint product of need and environment, its content or subject matter in each case is supplied by all or some of the constituents of the communication process. Indeed, if a system of rhetoric did not have these constituents as its subject matter, it would not be a system of rhetoric but a system of another sort.

Because systems of rhetoric share in part or in whole the same content or substance, no matter how much they vary in form or purpose they have inescapable elements of commonality. Therefore, looked at from one point of view they are different rather than alike, while from another they are alike rather than different. It is, I suggest a failure on the part of the disputants to make clear how they are viewing a rhetoric which lies at the basis of the wearisome controversy concerning the classical or non-classical orientation of the rhetorics of George Campbell or Kenneth Burke.[13] In any event, by making their respective points of view clear, the parties to this argument almost certainly would narrow the area of dispute.

Third, analysis of rhetorics at the systems level, I believe, is useful because it directs attention to the dangers and difficulties involved in constructing a rhetoric. And surely this information is helpful both in evaluating systems of the past and in building systems to meet the changing needs of the future.

Because even by the loose definition adopted here a system is an organized and coherent way of looking at something, unless an account of the communication process has a distinctive emphasis or focus—is ordered in terms of a hierarchy of ends and is marked by a distinguishing method—it is not a system but a random collection of observations and precepts. And yet it would appear from our discussion that emphasis in one direction may lead to unwarranted de-emphasis in another. For if the classical rhetoric focused on the grammar of the speech act at the expense of exploring the message-mind relationship, and if the "new" rhetoric of the eighteenth century emphasized the gramamar of the act, so the concern of contemporary theorists with the vehicle of transmission and its more efficient use threatens to detract interest from the crucial problem of message content.

In a different vein, our analysis underscores the fact that he who would construct a rhetoric of any sort must draw lines and erect boundaries where in fact none exist, and hence to this extent always must give an unreliable account of the territory and processes he attempts to map. On at least two counts practical discourse resists systematizing. First, human communication itself is a process—a fluid, on-going, circular movement without a definite beginning, middle, or end. In order to talk about communication at all not only must one arbitrarily slice off a segment of the whole, but he must momentarily stop or freeze motion within this segment, thus imposing a false stasis upon a kinetic phenomenon. And, second, discourse resists systematizing for the quite different reason that the several arts or skills upon which writing or speaking depends cannot be compartmentalized. Style glides imperceptibly into invention on the one hand and disposition on the other, while memory, as Ramus suggested,[14] is dependent on both, and invention and disposition, as the formulary rhetoric recognized, may perform interchangeable functions.[15] It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that a system of rhetoric never has and that very probably none ever will satisfactorily solve the foregoing problems.

And finally under this head, an analysis on the systems level confirms that while a distinctive grammar must lie at the basis of every rhetorical system a narrow focus upon a grammar is the least healthy and productive way of regarding rhetoric. Because rhetorical concepts may profitably be divided into only a limited number of parts and usefully combined or arranged in only a limited number of ways, after these possibilities have been exhausted innovation must consist of pointless elaborations and refinements. Hence, with the passage of time the distinctions drawn by a grammatically oriented rhetoric tend to become needlessly minute, its rules are multiplied beyond warrant, and ever growing areas of doctrine are reduced to formula and routine.[16] If rhetoric is to have status as a humane discipline, clearly it must develop its psychological and social dimensions. In proportion as it does so, however, our analysis also indicates that rhetoric may become a challenging and illuminating field for study—one worthy of attention by the best minds of an age. The great rhetorical systems of the past and present stand as testimony to this fact.

Fourth and last, I would argue the usefulness of examining rhetorics as systems for what such study may suggest concerning a possible metasystem of rhetorics and the promise which this metasystem holds for the future. For as our analysis suggests—and as I believe an examination of additional systems would confirm—while in one sense the major rhetorics of the Western world may properly be described as revolutionary, in another sense they may perhaps be regarded as evolutionary. Although each of the systems we have examined overthrew the premise or starting point of its predecessor for a premise that was radically different and distinctively its own, it also appears that in each case the new starting point not only corrected a deficiency in the preceding system but encompassed that system to pass beyond it. Just as the "new" rhetoric of the eighteenth century, though it accepted much of the classical grammar, raised its sights above the grammatical to develop an account of the message-mind relationship, so contemporary theorists, accept the crucial position which this relationship must occupy in a fruitful rhetoric, and entertain the still broader purpose of exploring the social significance of the communication act in all its forms and uses.

Whether in the long view all major systems of rhetoric tend to correct deficiencies in their predecessors and tend to pass beyond them is a complex question, and one which cannot be divorced from a careful consideration of the social and intellectual environment in which each system arises. It would seem, however, that through the ages, and despite occasional setbacks, rhetorics have constantly become both richer in content and more embracing in scope. Perhaps the central lesson to be learned from an analysis of the rhetorics of various periods considered as systems is that while the final word on rhetorics never has and probably never will be said, there is reason for optimism concerning the future of rhetoric as a discipline—reason to believe that as man's knowledge grows and his attempts to talk about practical discourse in a coherent and consistent fashion improve, rhetorics ever will become more penetrating and more fruitful.

Douglas Ehninger

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Notes

1. George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* ed. Lloyd Bitzer (Carbondale, Ill., 1963), p. li.
2. *Ibid.,* p. 1.
3. *Ibid.,* pp. 50–58. Cf. Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric,* ed. Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale, Ill., 1963), pp. 46–108.
4. Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres,* ed. Harold Harding, 2 vols. (Carbondale, Ill., 1965), II, 127–155, etc.
5. Whately, pp. 4, 35–167 *passim.*
6. Joseph Priestly, *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism,* ed. Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Carbondale, Ill., 1965), *Lectures,* II–IV, VI—VII, etc.
7. *Ibid.,* Preface, p.i.
8. See Blair, *Lectures* XX–XXIV, XXXV–XLVII *passim.*

9. Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York, 1950), pp. xiv–xv.
10. I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York, 1936), pp. 3, 89–138; *Speculative Instruments* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 17–38.
11. See Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric—Old and New," *Journal of General Education, V* (April 1951), 203. "If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the 'old' rhetoric and a 'new' (a rhetoric reinvigorated by fresh insights which the 'new' sciences contributed to the subject), I would reduce it to this: The key term for the old rhetoric was 'persuasion' and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the new rhetoric would be 'identification,' which can include a partially 'unconscious' factor in appeal."
12. See Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Scope," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXXIX (December 1953), 405.
13. See, for example, Douglas McDermott, "George Campbell and the Classical Tradition," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLIX (December 1963), 403–409.
14. See *P. Rami Scholarum Dialecticarum, seu Animadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, libri* XX, Recens emendati perJoan. Piscatorem Argentinensem (Frankfurt, 1581), p. 593.
15. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), pp. 138–145.
16. Besides the excessive refinements worked by the classical rhetoricians in the areas of invention and disposition, the sixteenth-century rhetoric of style may be taken as an example of this tendency; for this rhetoric, in its concern to distinguish and name all possible deviations from the normal and usual patterns of expression, was no less grammatical in nature than was the routinized rhetoric of the ancients.

……

Hopefully we have succeeded in the opening section of this volume in creating the framework upon which the rhetoric of Western thought has been built. The beginning chapter and accompanying essays have described the general nature of rhetoric as a humane, action-centered field of study involving enlightened choices that an audience assembled in a specific situation is morally obligated to make. This introductory material further has pictured rhetoric as an art or science concerned with generating understanding, emphasizing values, and producing persuasion; and used by members of all disciplines in communicating the content of their field. Finally, at least one of these essays has discussed the systemic nature of rhetoric, making it possible for us to view rhetoric from the perspective of three great systems: the classical, the British, and the contemporary.

?

From the vantage point of the above perspectives, the ensuing chapters will be treated. As they are developed, it is our belief that the following popular contemporary ideas pertaining to the true nature of rhetoric will be seriously challenged:

1. Rhetoric is an appearance, not a reality.
2. Rhetoric is a truncated art excessively concerned with ornate style and delivery.
3. Rhetoric deals exclusively with public communication.
4. Rhetoric is limited to the oral genre.
5. Rhetoric is a prescriptive study involving communication practicum, and containing little or no body of theory and literature.

2

The World of Greece and Rome

Douglas Ehninger tells us that the collective rhetorics of a period are culture-bound. Consequently if we mean to understand the major rhetorical theories of classical civilization—a civilization quite different from our own—we must first examine Greek and Roman culture.

Let us begin with a consideration of geography and climate, two important cultural determinants. The land of the Greeks is a rugged, mountainous peninsula in eastern Europe, jutting southward into the Mediterranean Sea. Although countless islands in the Aegean and the Adriatic have from time to time been under Greek control, what interests us most is the Greek mainland, a land mass of some 40,000 square miles, about the size of the state of Ohio.

In Greece, you are never far from the mountains or the sea. The crisp, clear air and the bright, blue skies of the eastern Mediterranean are a delight to tourists and cameramen alike. Even amateurs return home with marvelous colored slides for both the scenery and atmosphere are spectacular.

What is not spectacular is the limited productivity of Greek soil. Tillable soil is at a premium here. Olive trees are carefully tended on hillside slopes because there is no other place for them to grow. Farmers struggle to eke out a living today as in ancient times. The modern visitor to Greece still sees coarse-garbed peasant women weeding their crops by hand, bent over as their forbears were centuries before. Donkeys haul precious twigs and prunings for fuel, along with hay to feed the cattle. The importation of food from abroad is a fact of life familiar to every Greek.

It was trade from abroad in fact which provided Athens with its opportunity to lead the ancient world. While Sparta, her primary rival, is ringed by snow-capped peaks even in May, Athens is an easy dozen miles from a large natural harbor, the Piraeus. It was the Athenian navy which destroyed the Persians at sea in 480 B.C., after their city had been sacked. And it was the Athenians who replaced the Phoenicians as the leading traders of the Mediterranean world.

Scattered islands and isolated mountain communities had one thing in common in ancient times; both preferred strong local government. The Greeks formed between two and three hundred city states, with Athens and its population of 200,000 being by far the largest. These mini-states shared much in common: all spoke the same language; all shared a common history and literature; all worshiped the same gods; each participated whenever it could in athletic games and in music, drama, and oratory contests.

Yet, strangely enough, these miniature city states rarely joined together in common defense. Local rivalries often seemed more threatening to them than distant barbarians in the north and east. The pleas of countless orators for pan-Hellenism, for a single Greek state, were of no avail. Only military dictators like Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great, would eventually force unification. What the city states seemed to want most was simply to be left alone.[1]

Culture is more than the sum of its parts. Oftentimes there is a spirit, an esprit de corps, a unique way of life which transcends geography, climate, agriculture, and government. In *The Greek Way,* Edith Hamilton tried to capture this thread, by contrasting the civilizations of East and West, of Egypt and Greece.[2] The Kingdom of the Nile was a vast, rich land area controlled by the pharoah, his priests, and his soldiers. An army of slaves made specialized vocations possible. There was ample sustenance for all and extended periods of peace. Yet Hamilton tells us that Egyptian society was preoccupied with death. The pharoahs erected giant monuments to themselves to impress future generations. As a result, Egypt became the land of tombs and pyramids. Priests counselled the downtrodden that they could look forward to an afterlife; regardless of their present state, a brighter future lay ahead. Given such advice, acceptance of servitude was widespread.

Athens was a world apart from such thinking. Individual perfection of mind and body dominated Greek thought; hence, the Greeks excelled at philosophy and sports. Life in all its exuberant potential was the keynote to Greek civilization. The free citizen of Athens was trained to be a generalist, able to do many things well. He might be asked at any time to judge a murder trial or oversee the strengthening of city fortifications, embark on an embassy abroad or participate as a member of the Executive Council in city government. Citizens were expected to join in Assembly debates on topics ranging from war and peace, to finance, legislation, national defense, and commerce.[3] Probably the historian Thucydides summed up Athenian civic responsibility best when he wrote: "We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all."[4]

The early Greeks worshiped perfection. It was, they thought, the domain of the gods. If man were to approach godliness, he must strive always to do his best, to be as perfect as he was able. The Greeks thought every object had a character of its own, an essence which they called *ethos*. Modern sociologists often speak of a society's ethos when they mean its distinctive flavor. Everything the Greek saw about him appeared to have just such a character. A perfect speaker, for example, was conceived of as a man of honesty, intelligence and good will.[5] The speaker did not himself necessarily possess such qualities; rather, others perceived such qualities in him. It was the appearance of perfection which mattered.

In Greek society, form often seemed to be more important than reality. The perfect statue revealed a superb, muscular body and a faultless face, devoid of human emotion. It is only later in the days of the Romans that a smile appears upon faces cut in stone. The perfect story conformed to a literary ideal rather than to factual accuracy. The way a soldier died in battle seemed to be more important in the eyes of his relatives than whether the battle was won or lost. Ritual and procession typified Greek religion rather than sermons and the worship of a personal God.

Greek society, like our own, was oriented to the spoken word. Take Homer's great epic poems, the *Illiad* and the *Odyssey,* for example. These works constitute the poetic cornerstone of Greek culture—part history, part mythology, part oratory, part patriotism.[6] It was as if a single great genius wrote the *Bible,* Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales,* and Shakespeare's plays all in one. Homer's epics involved events which took place about 1300 B.C. An Asian prince violated the Greek code of hospitality and had to be punished; ten years of bitter warfare followed. About six centuries later, a blind wanderer began to collect and narrate the many tales of the conflict. Homer's tales passed from generation to generation by word of mouth until at last they became so much a part of Greek heritage that Homerology was taught to every schoolboy. Years later, at Olympia, Delphi, and Epidaurus, when a Greek citizen heard Homer's tales repeated, he would at any moment pick up the narrative himself if the story-teller paused unduly. Known throughout history as the first great work of European literature, Homer's epic poems were not finally written down until the third century, B.C. Oral tradition was as much a part of Greek culture as it is today in modern Africa or India.

The Greeks depended upon trade for survival. Because of their geographic isolation, they were committed to strong local government. These independent city states shared much in common however—language, religion, history, literature, the persistent drive to seek perfection in mind and body. Theirs was an oral society dedicated to self-actualization. Thus the theory and practice of speechmaking came to flourish among them.

The first written rhetoric in the Western world was composed about 465 B.C. at the Greek colony of Syracuse in Sicily. A change of government resulted when a tyranny was displaced by a democracy. In the aftermath, property holders presented conflicting claims to various parcels of land. Who were the true owners? An enterprising bystander by the name of Corax realized that if a claimant could establish a more plausible case than his opponent, he would win title to the disputed property. With this insight, the rhetoric of probability was born. Corax devised a system of rules for arranging and arguing a legal case and promptly made this knowledge available to others, for a fee.[7] His system was later introduced to Athens and other city states on the mainland.

Legal suits were an everyday occurrence in ancient Greece. In cases involving major crimes, the jury usually included five hundred members. Thus, oratory often was more critical to legal success than factual evidence. Greek law did not provide for an advocate system like the one we know in America.[8] Every free citizen spoke for himself. But it was possible to secure the services of a good speechwriter if one had the necessary means. Many of the leading orators of ancient Greece, such as the great Demosthenes, amassed considerable fortunes by serving as forensic logographers, legal ghost-writers for the well-to-do.

Since the city state of Athens was a democracy governed by some 40,000 free citizens, the power of every citizen to speak effectively was highly valued. Rule by precinct, or *deme* as the Greeks called it, meant that on almost any day one might be called upon to speak on a matter of public policy.[9] Except for generals, all city officials were chosen annually by lot. The ruling Executive Council of Fifty was chosen anew each month. Jury panels of 6,000 were regularly on call. In any given day, one out of every five Athenian citizens was engaged in some form of public service. The ability to speak, to listen critically to the arguments of others, and to utter appropriate response were deemed valuable skills by all.

At the foot of the Acropolis, the three hundred foot limestone hill which dominates the central city of Athens, stands the *agora* or marketplace. Here traders came to buy and sell. Here were located the minor courts, side by side with merchant stalls, and here was the *stoa* or porch where the philosophers liked to stroll. The agora was an international marketplace for goods and ideas—colorful, noisy, varied, unique in the world of the ancient Greeks. While most other city states had their acropolis and agora, none attracted the clientele, foreign and domestic, like Athens did.

Greek mythology tells us that a maiden named Cassandra possessed the power to prophesy the future, but the god Apollo decreed that her prophesies should never be believed. A prophet the Greeks (and later the Romans) *did* believe was the oracle at Delphi. For a thousand years men came to an isolated mountainside in central Greece to seek her advice. Petitioners presented their questions to the priests of the Temple of Apollo. The priests would then disappear into the bowels of the Temple to consult with the oracle herself, a peasant woman from a nearby village. In a semi-trance, the oracle mumbled a reply which was later relayed to the questioner. In gratitude, he would leave valuable gifts of goods and money. One such petitioner, a wealthy prince from Thrace, asked if his contemplated invasion of Persia would prove successful. The response was that as a result of the action he was about to undertake, a great empire would fall. The prince confidently led his army into battle and was badly defeated. Ruined and disillusioned he returned to Delphi and demanded to know what went wrong. As a result of your action, a mighty empire fell, the priest replied; we did not say that it would be the *Persian* Empire.

From 776 B.C. until the Christians took over the Roman Empire some thousand years later, competitive athletic contests were held every four years at the village of Olympia in southern Greece. Besides sports, Greeks from all over the Mediterranean world vied with one another for trophies in drama, music, and oratory. Distinguished visitors from foreign lands, such as the Sicilian, Gorgias of Leontini, were invited to address the assembled multitude.[10] Each city state had its own treasure house for the series of events often took weeks at a time. So much a part of the Greek world were these Olympic games that warring cities would declare a truce so they could compete peacefully with one another and resume battle once competitive activities ceased.

Of the many uses of the spoken word in ancient Athens, none was more important than education. Athenian boys were trained orally by private tutors. They learned music, reading, writing, and gymnastics in this way.[11] The dialogue method of question and answer was reserved for advanced work. At the start of the fifth century, B.C., an information explosion took place in Ionia and on the islands near Asia Minor. In Athens, there was keen interest in higher education and in the new discoveries. The need to disseminate this knowledge and to offer advanced work was met by a band of wandering teachers who travelled by foot from one city state to another offering short courses for a fee.[12] These itinerant professors were called *sophists,* after the Greek word *sophos* meaning knowledge. Their function was to supplement the elementary instruction of the day. Fluent lecturers with excellent memories, the Greek sophists offered courses in rhetoric, grammar, art, drama, architecture, mathematics, poetry, literature, and various other branches of knowledge. The later fall of the sophists was partly due, Plato tells us in one of his dialogues, to the use of rhetoric as mere flattery and as a vehicle for misleading others.[13] If happiness meant a life founded on truth, sophists who disregarded the truth and made the worse appear the better cause were evil-doers, clever but specious reasoners. Sophistic education was also an expensive luxury few common citizens could afford. Some sophists were suspect as agnostics who preferred man rather than god as the measure of all things. Others offered instruction on any subject at all for a fee and many promised more than they could deliver. For all these reasons sophistic education declined in importance early in the fourth century, B.C.

Protagoras

Athenian society was oriented to the spoken word; hence the study of rational discourse, of oral persuasion, and of drama was a natural outgrowth of Greek curiosity and inventiveness. Dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics were the terms the Greeks used for such studies. As we would expect in such a society, Greek rhetoric encompassed a variety of speech settings. Legal speaking in the law courts was referred to as forensic discourse; political speaking such as that which occurred in the Athenian Assembly was called deliberative; occasional ceremonial speeches were labelled epideictic. Greek interest in the language with which to clothe ideas produced a plain, middle, and grand style of address.[14] The perfect speaker was conceived of as bright, honest, and socially responsible, a man of truth and reason who could, when occasion demanded, move the mind and passions of his listeners.

The orator-general, Pericles, was just such a leader. Remarkably adept at political persuasion, Pericles succeeded in having the war treasury of the Delian defense league transferred from its island home to Athens for safekeeping. He then convinced his fellow Athenians to use these war funds for peaceful purposes by re-building the Acropolis, earlier destroyed by a Persian army. Pericles' dream was of structures made to last centuries, marble temples to dazzle and fascinate mankind for thousands of years. He secured the services of the best artisans known to man. And he presided over the entire grand operation for the better part of thirty years. If we would know what the Golden Age of Pericles was like, we need only look at the Parthenon in downtown Athens. A temple dedicated to the patron goddess Athena (whose forty-foot ivory and gold statue it housed), the Parthenon is one of the man-made wonders of the world—a living testimonial to the power of the spoken word.

Of the many Greek orators of note, two particularly merit our attention. The first was a man of great natural talent, a soldier-athlete, who began life as a teacher's aide in his father's school. Aeschines by name, this eloquent Greek was a professional actor of considerable ability. He was chosen as court clerk, a position of responsibility, and represented Athens in an important diplomatic mission to Philip of Macedon. Aeschines was graceful of movement, an easy, fluent speaker to whom success seemed to come without effort. He was, in short, naturally talented. As one who chose the course of political expediency, Aeschines was often in the public eye, a popular, if not always credible, leader.

In contrast stood Demosthenes, acclaimed by many as the world's greatest orator.[15] Demosthenes began life so inauspiciously we would today think of him as a "born loser." He was a sickly child who could not participate in athletic games like other youths. His patrimony was squandered by unscrupulous guardians and though he ultimately defeated them after five separate trials, he was penniless at the time of the final verdict. Demosthenes yearned to play a major role in the affairs of his city state but he labored under an awesome series of handicaps: a weak voice, awkward movement, sloppy diction, a lateral lisp, shortness of breath, and a tendency to compose long sentences, ill-suited for oral presentation. It is said that when he first spoke in the Athenian Assembly, men laughed at his fumbling ways and he retired in shame. Failure might deter a lesser man but not Demosthenes. He dreamed of fame and fortune and he meant to have both.

Legend tells us that an actor instructed him in voice and physical action.[16] To overcome his lisp, Demosthenes spoke with pebbles in his mouth. To project his voice, he delivered speeches by the seashore, shouting above the crashing waves. To strengthen his breath, he declaimed orations while running uphill. To strengthen his will to succeed, he shaved half his head so that he could no longer appear in public and could thus undertake his studies unmolested in a hidden cave. Demosthenes, to a large degree, represented the triumph of nurture over nature.

Demosthenes and Aeschines were political and oratorical rivals whose final confrontation came in 330 B.C. in a famous trial known as the case "On the Crown." A well-meaning friend proposed that the Athenian Assembly award Demosthenes a golden crown for public service to the state.[17] The friend recommended that the crown be bestowed at the Theater of Dionysius where a large assembly of citizens and foreigners could observe the ceremony. Aeschines, who barely won a bribery suit brought against him by Demosthenes several years before, now saw his chance for revenge. He contested the crown on three bases: first, that Demosthenes could not receive such an award because the books he kept as a financial official had not yet been audited; second, that Athenian law required citizen honors to be given before the Assembly rather than at the Theater specified; and third, that Demosthenes did not deserve such an award for he had not always had Athens' best interests in mind.

Technically, Aeschines was in the right on the first two charges. Athenian law stipulated that unaudited officials were not eligible to receive public honors and that when public awards were given, they were to be awarded before the Assembly itself. But the critical issue was the third and it was here that Demosthenes was to score his greatest victory. His problem was one of self-vindication: how does a public man defend himself when his advice proves costly in men and property? For many years Demosthenes urged his fellow citizens to oppose Philip of Macedon—the father of Alexander the Great. Finally, they did so and were soundly defeated. How then could this advocate of defeat win an audience to his cause when many of his listeners counted relatives among the fallen?

The case Demosthenes devised has won the admiration of such diverse contemporary leaders as Ted Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Knowing that his listeners would be annoyed by self-praise, Demosthenes coupled his political career with the course taken by their ancestors. What he advised, their parents endorsed. To reject Demosthenes meant to reject what most recognized as the best of the Athenian past. The vindictive oratory of Aeschines was simply no match for Demosthenes' brilliant strategy. Heavily fined because he failed to get even one fifth of the jury's vote, Aeschines retired in defeat to Rhodes. Exile from the mother city, Athenians believed, was a fate worse than death.

The military defeat of the Greek city states by Philip of Macedon in 338 B.C. brought with it a dramatic change in Greek thinking. Forced at last into a pan-Hellenic mold, the Greeks now found themselves part of a much larger world. In the new Macedonian society, the individual citizen was no longer king. Greek philosophers sought to ease this dissonant situation in two ways.[18] The first involved reducing the importance of the world around the Greeks. This approach was championed by a thinker named Epicurus. By non-involvement in public affairs, the individual Greek could achieve a state of tranquility, of apathy or non-concern. He could avoid pain simply by entering a non-feeling state. Epicureans defined pleasure not as physical indulgence and sexual license but as the absence of pain in the body or trouble in the mind. Satisfying momentary needs was essential; community involvement was not.

A second popular philosophy of the day was called stoicism, after the porch where Zeno and his followers roamed. Wisdom and self-control lay at the heart of this school of thought. The stoics declared there was a basic order to the universe, knowable to man. An individual achieved happiness by discovering this order or pattern and conforming to it. At various times, the pattern was referred to as nature, providence, the cosmos, god, reason, and law. The stoic was unaffected by such externals as wealth, beauty, and power. Conformity to the plan of the universe, even if this involved suffering, guided his behavior.

Greek stoics interpreted the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world as the divine plan of life. Later when Christianity became the state religion in Rome, its ready acceptance throughout the Roman Empire was assured. Thus, a pagan Greek philosophy paved the way for the expansion of the Christian religion.

If the culture of Greece contributed to the development of a viable and enduring rhetoric, so, too, did the setting which surrounded the Romans. Central Italy is blessed with a warm climate and fertile plains. Life is easy there as it had been earlier in ancient Egypt. Captive slaves did a thousand manual tasks, freeing the wealthy for entertainment and capricious whim. One of the Caesars, for example, liked horse races so much he set legions of workers to the task of creating a hippodrome in his back yard—a five story excavation and race course viewable to the tourist today on Palatine Hill. The Romans founded a vast empire that lasted a thousand years. Their mother city became the dominant center of Western civilization, a far more powerful metropolis than Athens had ever been.

Practicality dominated Roman thought. In order to control a vast empire from the steppes of Russia to the shores of the Atlantic the Romans created a powerful army, an efficient bureaucracy, and a set of universal laws. They also constructed a connecting network of all-weather roads and a system of aqueducts to carry water to inland towns far from river or sea. The Caesars sought to provide the citizens of Rome itself with spectacular diversions, so they built eight coliseums in addition to the one which still stands at one end of the Forum.[19] Here the people witnessed such spectacles as chariot races, naval battles, fights to the death among powerful animals and, of course, the confrontation of lions and early Christians. Inside plumbing and outside sewers were Roman inventions, too.[20] Remnant Greek temples were refurbished to become modern Roman temples and later, Christian churches. No structure went to waste when the Romans controlled the Mediterranean world.

The Romans found much to admire in Greek culture and they borrowed generously. Rhetoric struck them as a more practical art than philosophy, for their Republic was modeled after the Athenian city state. The twelve Greek gods became twelve Roman gods. Roman youth were taught by Greek tutors, thus insuring the preservation of much of earlier Greek civilization. Homer's epic poems inspired Virgil's *Aeneid.* Roman dramatists copied Greek dramatists. Roman history, architecture, philosophy—all contained much that was Greek in origin.

But the Romans were more than just borrowers. They were classifiers and refiners. They preserved and transmitted the heart of Hellenic civilization to the wide world they conquered, and later this same Roman network served the cause of Christianity, for it was the Romans who brought the new religion to Britain and Africa, Babylon and Scandinavia.

In the realm of education, Isocrates' Greek system of liberal arts wedded to the spoken word became the pattern everywhere. In Rome as in Athens earlier, the philosopher-orator became the ideal citizen. Cicero was the Latin embodiment of the ideal. A brilliant speaker, a lifelong student of philosophy and liberal studies, a clever politician, ambitious, expedient, marvelously literate and articulate, Cicero epitomized the Roman Republic a half century before Christ. When he desired to study rhetoric and philosophy, he sailed east to Athens and Rhodes. Demosthenes, he perceived as the greatest of the Greek orators; men would later debate whether Cicero himself surpassed Athens' favorite son. Greek teachers, Greek ideals, Greek philosophy, Greek gods adopted with little or no change—that was the Roman way.[21]

The treatment presented here of Roman culture is admittedly brief. A helpful overview of that culture can be found in Edith Hamilton's *The Roman Way to Western Civilization* (1932; available in recent paperback reprint), a companion volume to her *Greek Way* mentioned earlier. M. L. Clarke's *Rhetoric at Rome* (1953) provides the interested reader with a coherent specialized treatment.

In 292 B.C. Egyptian and Greek scholars at the great library at Alexandria began the mammoth job of preservation, classification, and refinement of Greek culture. Here for the first time ever an authoritative text of Homer's *Iliad* was written down. Here were deposited and catalogued Aristotle's encyclopedic studies, including the *Rhetoric* salvaged by a Roman general from a cellar in Asia Minor. The concept of stock issues applicable in trial settings was identified here for the first time. Such central turning points in a criminal case included the following: that an alleged crime was committed, that the alleged act caused harm, that the harm was less than the prosecution charged, and that the alleged act was justified.

The *Rhetorica ad Herenium,* written in the first century, B.C., is the earliest Latin rhetoric of which we have knowledge. Characteristically, it is Greek to the core and tersely practical.[22] Here in this schoolboy manual we encounter for the first time the five great canons of classical rhetoric: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria,* and *pronuntiatio.* In order to compose an effective speech, the speaker must first choose an appropriate topic. Then he must identify the whole range of relevant ideas and supporting evidence available. This initial process of discovery the Romans labelled *inventio;* modern rhetoricians call it invention. Next the speaker must select from the whole spectrum of ideas available to him those which best meet the needs of purpose, audience, and occasion. Further, he must arrange them in a sequence both clear and memorable. Then the speaker must determine the amount of detail needed for the proofs he intends to employ. Selection, sequence, and apportionment were what the Romans call *dispositio;* modern speech communication scholars prefer the term speech organization. *Elocutio* refers to style, to the words and rhetorical devices the speaker uses to clothe his ideas. *Memoria* or memory embraces the mental process of recall. In a day when manuscript speeches were drafted *after* a speech was delivered, when the question demanded discourse hours in length, memorization was a necessary skill for the orator. The Greeks and Romans like today's college students recognized the value of code words, mnemonic devices designed to aid instant recall. Finally, the Romans stressed *pronuntiatio* or delivery. Here they meant the speaker's voice and physical action. To Roman theorists rhetoric was one great art, composed of five lesser arts.

The Romans made other contributions to rhetorical theory as well. In contrast to Aristotle and the Greeks, they stressed the impact of the speaker's prior reputation upon his listeners.[23] The speaker, they noted should adjust his material to the audience *while speaking* rather than serving as a slave to a set speech memorized earlier. In a court of law, the speaker should focus his attention upon the key issue in the case rather than provide equal stress to each argument he advanced. Like the Greeks, the Romans recognized the importance of emotion in persuasion, but what was new was their emphasis upon a moving peroration, an end to the speech deliberately calculated to influence the feelings of listeners throughout the audience.

The Roman lawyer-rhetorician, Quintilian, compiled a four-volume work on rhetoric which embodied a system of education from the cradle to the grave. So systematic was Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory* that it served as the model for much of medieval education throughout Europe.[24] Clarity of language was stressed to the point where misunderstanding was virtually impossible. The apprenticeship of student speakers to master orators was encouraged in much the same way as masons and carpenters learned their trade. As a rule, Roman rhetoricians were better at amplification than innovation. Greek ideas became Roman ideas, often with little or no credit being given to the original source.

Broadly speaking, speech theorists in Greece and Rome viewed the subject of rhetoric in one of three ways: as a moral instrument for conveying truth to the masses, as a culturally important subject which merited scientific classification and analysis, and as practical training essential for the active citizen. Plato typified the first view; Aristotle, the second; and Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, the third.[25] Let us turn now to a sampling of the views of each.

Notes

1. The above description is based on the following sources: Professor Berquist's travels in Greece in the spring of 1971; Walter Agard, *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960 reprint of 1942 edition); C. M. Bowra et al, *Classical Greece* (New York: Time, Inc. Great Ages of Man series, 1965); *Greece and Rome: Builders of Our World* (National Geographic Book Service, 1968).
2. Cf. especially chaps. I and XVI in E. Hamilton, *The Greek Way to Western Civilization* (New York: Mentor reprint of 1930 edition; 1960).
3. R. C. Jebb, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle: A Translation* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), pp. 16–18. Unless otherwise noted, further quotations from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* come from this source.
4. C. C. Arnold, D. Ehninger and J. C. Gerber, *The Speaker's Resource Book* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1961), p. 218.
5. Cf. William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," *Speech Monographs,* 14 (1947), 55–65.
6. Some observers assumed Homer's poems were fiction. For a quite different view, see M. B. Grosvenor, "Homeward with Ulysses," *Nat. Geog. M.,* 144, 1 (July, 1973), 1–39.
7. For a fuller account of Corax's activities, see Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* 7, 1 (Feb., 1921), 13–42.
8. Cf. James G. Greenwood, "The Legal Setting of Attic Oratory," *Central States Speech Journal,* 23, 3 (Fall, 1972), 182, *et passim.*
9. Agard, *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks,* p. 70, *et passium.*
10. Cf. Bromley Smith, "Gorgias: A Study of Oratorical Style," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* 7, 4 (Nov., 1921), 335–59.
11. D. L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 21.
12. Bromley Smith's studies of the sophists, published in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* included the following: Protagoras (Mar., 1918), Prodicus (Apr., 1920), Corax (Feb., 1921), Gorgias (Nov., 1921), Hippias (June, 1926), Thrasymachus (June, 1927), and Theodorus (Feb., 1928).
13. Plato, *Gorgias,* trans. by W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), *passim.*
14. George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 12, *et passim.* Cf. also the comprehensive work of R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1893, 2 vols.).
15. For an enlightening account of the rivalry between Aeschines and Demosthenes, see *Demosthenes' On the Crown: A Critical Case Study of a Masterpiece of Ancient Oratory,* ed. by James J. Murphy (New York: Random House, 1967).
16. *Plutarch's Lives,* trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 17ff
17. Demosthenes' friend, Ctesiphon, proposed the crown in 336 B.C. but the trial was repeatedly postponed.
18. The authors are indebted at this point to the research of Mr. James Dennison.
19. The other eight were destroyed because Christians were sacrificed to lions in their arenas.
20. The best view of a restored Roman city we have is ancient Pompeii, south of Naples. This thriving Roman

community was buried under volcanic ash in 79 A.D., and later discovered at the time of the American Revolution. Even today there remains considerable work for the archaeologist at Pompeii.

21. Cf. Edith Hamilton, *The Roman Way to Western Civilization* (New York, N.Y.: Mentor, 1961 reprint of 1932 ed.).
22. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
23. Jebb, *Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 6.
24. Cf. Harold F. Harding, "Quintilian's Witnesses," *Speech Monographs*, 1 (1934), 1–20.
25. The authors are indebted to Donald Lemen Clark for this three fold designation of classical rhetorical theory. See his *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*, pp. 24–25.

4

The Scientific Approach of Aristotle

Of all the students educated at Plato's Academy, none was so distinguished as Aristotle. The son of the court physician at the kingdom of Macedonia to the north of Greece, Aristotle was trained as a field biologist. He was an expert at observing all living and non-living things and in classifying such data for the use of others.[1] Unlike today's scientists, Aristotle's investigations were not limited to specialties like botany and zoology. Instead he took the whole Greek world as his laboratory. Thus we find works by Aristotle on law and political science, ethics and drama as well as what we currently think of as "the sciences." Every subject to which an Athenian turned his attention received the diligent attention of Aristotle as well, and among these was rhetoric, the art of effective speaking. So comprehensive and fundamental were Aristotle's views on rhetoric that it is no exaggeration to say that his treatise on the subject is the most important single work on persuasion ever written.

General Nature of Rhetoric. Rhetoric, like dialectic, is common to all men. Yet the art of persuasion like the art of reasoned discourse belongs to no one field of study. "All men in a manner use both; for all men to some extent make the effort of examining and of submitting to inquiry, of defending or accusing."[2] Earlier works on rhetoric, Aristotle maintained, dealt with only part of the field. They concerned themselves, he declared, with irrelevant appeals to the emotions of a jury, while they neglected reason in public discourse. They prescribed how a speech should be organized but ignored the speaker's role in creating proof. Further, they stressed legal speaking while neglecting the deliberative rhetoric of the political assembly, a branch of the art "nobler and worthier of a citizen," Aristotle noted, "than that which deals with private contracts."[3]

Aristotle perceived this subject to be both significant and challenging and when he established his own school, he made it part of the regular curriculum. Rhetoric is useful, Aristotle wrote,

> first, because truth and justice are naturally stronger than their opposites; so that, when awards are not given duly, truth and justice must have been worsted by their own fault. This is worth correcting. Again, supposing we had the most exact knowledge, there are some people whom it would not be easy to persuade with its help; for scientific exposition is in the nature of teaching, and teaching is out of the question; we must give our proofs and tell our story in popular terms,—as we said in the *Topics* with reference to controversy with the many. Further,—one should be able to persuade, just as to reason strictly, on both sides of a question; not with a view to using the twofold power—one must not be the advocate of evil—but in order, first, that we may know the whole state of the case; secondly, that, if anyone else argues dishonestly, we on our part may be able to refute him. Dialectic and Rhetoric, alone among all arts, draw indifferently an affirmative or a negative conclusion: both these arts alike are impartial. The conditions of the subject-matter, however, are not

> the same; that which is true and better being naturally, as a rule, more easy to demonstrate and more convincing. Besides it would be absurd that, while incapacity for physical self-defense is a reproach, incapacity for mental defense should be none; mental effort being more distinctive of man than bodily effort. If it is objected that an abuser of the rhetorical faculty can do great mischief, this, at any rate, applies to all good things except virtue, and especially to the most useful things, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. By the right use of these things a man may do the greatest good, and by the unjust use, the greatest mischief.[4]

The foregoing passage clearly shows that rhetoric, in Aristotle's opinion, has an important four-fold function: (1) to uphold truth and justice and play down their opposites; (2) to teach in a way suitable to a popular audience; (3) to analyze both sides of a question; and (4) to enable one to defend himself. Viewed from this perspective, rhetoric is a moral, but practical art grounded in probability or the contingent nature of things.

Aristotle's analytical approach to rhetoric is most apparent in his definition of the term: "the faculty of discovering in every case the available means of persuasion."[5] It was not enough that a speaker conceive of a single approach to persuasion. He must examine *all* the means available. Only then would he be likely to choose the best course of action rather than that which first came to mind. A *comprehensive* view of one's subject and audience is much to be preferred over a narrow one, Aristotle told his students.

Forms of Proof. Proof is either invented for the occasion or already existent, "artistic" or "nonartistic," Aristotle tells us.[6] A speaker may create support for his ideas or he may use documents or depositions already at hand. Of the first type, proofs artistically created by the speaker, there are three kinds: those which demonstrate that a thing is so *(logos)*, those which depend for their effectiveness on the believability of the speaker *(ethos)*, and those designed to sway a listener's feelings *(pathos)*. Logical proof, Aristotle declared, "is wrought through the speech itself when we have demonstrated a truth or an apparent truth by the means of persuasion available in a given case." Ethical proof, he wrote, "is wrought when the speech is so spoken as to make the speaker credible; for we trust good men more and sooner, as a rule, about everything; while, about things which do not admit of precision, but only guess-work, we trust them absolutely." Lastly, "the hearers themselves become the instruments of proof when emotion is stirred in them by the speech; for we give our judgments in different ways under the influence of pain and joy, of liking and of hatred."[7] Aristotle's threefold analysis of proof is every bit as appropriate to persuasion today as it was when written twenty-three centuries ago.

The enthymeme. The heart of Aristotle's theory of logical proof was the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme. Because Aristotle believed that "enthymemes are the very body and substance of persuasion,"[8] we will treat this concept in detail, first by summarizing its nature, and then by applying it to a portion of one of Shakespeare's plays. Although many approaches to the study of the enthymeme have appeared in our literature in recent years, the one we will use is in keeping with the traditional interpretation presented by James McBurney of Northwestern University.[9]

Aristotle regarded the enthymeme as a method of persuasion which has the same relationship to rhetoric that the syllogism has to logic. Both of these forms of reasoning begin with a general premise and proceed to a particular case. The ideas may be presented in three steps: a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. The initial or major premise was usually a categorical statement such as *All Athenians love to argue.* A second or minor connecting premise might be *Socrates is an Athenian.* The conclusion which then follows is *Socrates loves to argue.* It is significant to note that while the enthymeme and syllogism are structurally the same, they differ in one major respect: that is, the degree of certainty of the sources from which they draw their premises. The enthymeme deals with probable knowledge, whereas the syllogism is concerned with scientific truths. Consider, for instance, the following argument:

All men are mortal.	(Major Premise)
Socrates is a man.	(Minor Premise)
Socrates is mortal.	(Conclusion)

The degree of certainty in this major premise is stronger than that in the previously cited statement: "All Athenians love to argue." The degree of probability, therefore, constitutes an essential difference between enthymematic and syllogistic reasoning. Some writers have overlooked this fact, and, consequently, have defined the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism. There is, of course, some justification for this point of view. For nowadays rarely does one give formal speeches using all three steps of an enthymeme. Nor did the Greek orators. Usually the persuasive speaker would omit one or even two of the parts of the rhetorical syllogism, for they already existed in the minds of the listeners. As Aristotle put it, "if one of these elements is something notorious, it need not even be stated, as the hearer himself supplies it."[10] But while a characteristic of the enthymeme is its capacity to suppress one of its parts, the point which we are here stressing is that the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism "drawn, not from universal principles belonging to a particular science, but from probabilities in the sphere of human affairs."[11]

The three sorts of premises from which enthymemes are drawn are probabilities, signs [fallible and infallible], and examples. By probability Aristotle meant arguments that are generally true and contain an element of cause. For example, since "sons tend to love their mothers, Orestes will love his mother." In this connection McBurney has observed that "when one concludes that Orestes loves his mother, because 'love [usually] attends the objects of affection,' the argument does not attempt to prove [to give a sign] that Orestes actually does love his mother; but rather [assuming it probable that he loves his mother] attempts to account for or explain this phenomenon."[12]

The sign, which is the second premise of the enthymeme, is a proposition setting forth a reason for the existence of a particular fact. No attempt is made to explain what has caused the fact.[13] According to Aristotle there are two types of signs: the fallible and the infallible. When a speaker, in seeking to demonstrate the truth of the statement that "wise men are just," asserts that "Socrates was wise and also just," he is employing a fallible sign because the conclusion does not establish with certainty. Further, to observe that one has "a fever for he is breathing rapidly" does not necessarily indicate illness. If, on the other hand, a speaker states that a woman "has had a child because she is in milk," he is relying on an infallible sign; for, in every instance, an assumption of this kind can be scientifically verified.

Aristotle is not so specific in his discussion of the example, the third premise of the enthymeme. He made it evident, however, that the enthymeme can be formed either from historical or invented examples. In Book II he tells us that enthymemes taken from examples are those which proceed by induction from one or more parallel cases until the speaker abstracts a general rule, from which he argues to the case in point.[14] Let us assume, for instance, that a speaker wishes to establish the relationship between military ingenuity and political acumen. He first examines the life of General Grant and immediately discovers that the Civil War hero is regarded as one of America's worst presidents. Next he finds that General DeGaulle failed to organize a strong political party in France. He then sees that Colonel Peron, as a political leader, alienated Argentina from the free world. Finally he notes that Dwight Eisenhower is ranked by contemporary historians in the lower one-fifth of American presidents. From these parallel examples he may conclude that military leaders make poor politicians. The speaker is now ready to argue the case in point. Thus he claims that Alexander Haig should not be elected President in 1984.

Not only was Aristotle interested in analyzing the premises of the enthymeme but also in a consideration of its proper subject matter. Here he was concerned with the problem of the sources or places which furnish arguments. The rhetorician may draw his material from either universal or particular *topoi*. Universal topics are broad, general sources which are equally applicable to physics or politics. The four common topics are the possible and impossible, past fact, future fact, and size. Special topics, on the other hand, are associated with a "particular species or class of things." They provide the speaker with a thorough insight into a specific problem. Aristotle advises his readers that most enthymemes are formed from special subjects such as ethics and politics.

After the speaker has chosen his premises from the available special and universal *topoi,* he must next turn to what Aristotle calls "lines of argument." These topics are to be interpreted as "methods of reasoning rather than material propositions."[15] Twenty-eight types of valid arguments and nine which are referred to as "sham" are discussed in Book II. They are as follows:

Valid Lines of Argument

1. Opposites
2. Inflections
3. Correlative terms
4. More and less
5. Time
6. Definition
7. Induction
8. Existing decisions
9. Turning the tables
10. Part to whole
11. Simple consequences
12. Criss-cross consequences
13. Inward thoughts, outward show
14. Proportional results
15. Identical results and antecedents
16. Altered choices
17. Attributed motives
18. Incentives and deterrents
19. Incredible occurrences
20. Conflicting facts
21. Meeting slander
22. Cause to effect
23. Meaning of names
24. Actions compared
25. Course of action
26. Previous mistakes
27. Division
28. Ambiguous terms

Sham Enthymemes

1. Diction (Structure of and homonyms)
2. Fallacious combination and separation
3. Indignation
4. A "sign"
5. The accidental
6. Consequence
7. Post hoc propter hoc
8. Time and manner
9. Substituting the absolute for the particular

Whenever one of these lines of argument is combined with a premise derived from a general or special topic an enthymeme is formed.[16]

The *Rhetoric* also distinguishes between the two primary species of the enthymeme, the demonstrative and the refutative. The demonstrative begins with consistent propositions and reaches affirmative conclusions. The converse is true of the refutative enthymeme. Since its purpose is to controvert the demonstrative the conclusions are obtained from "inconsistent propositions," and its purpose is not to affirm but to destroy a premise. One should remember, however, that both the enthymeme and the counter syllogism are constructed from the same *topoi.*

In discussing the question of refutation Aristotle carefully emphasizes the fact that the enthymeme is not properly refuted by simply pointing out the existence of probability in one of the premises. For by its very nature the enthymeme embraces the probable and, as a result, cannot be expected to set forth conclusions of scientific certainty. The same is true with respect to refutation of any argument from sign. It is not a question, therefore, of the presence of probability in either the premise or the conclusion, but rather one of how closely the probability or the sign resembles truth.

It would appear from the discussion thus far that Aristotle was thinking of the enthymeme only as a mode of logical proof. If this were true, however, the organizational pattern of the *Rhetoric* cannot be adequately understood.[17] If Aristotle were sincere in assuming that the enthymeme is "the body and substance of persuasion," he would not have given such spatial emphasis to ethical and pathetic appeals, unless he felt these proofs were directly related to the rhetorical syllogism.

In his explanation of the maxim, which is a shortened enthymeme, Aristotle suggests two advantages produced by this type of general truth. First, the audience will be delighted in hearing an expression of an oft repeated generalization which corresponds to their own beliefs. Thus, an audience comprised exclusively of men, would react favorably to the assertion that women drivers are poor drivers. While the form of the argument is enthymematic the degree of pathos is strong.

Secondly, by employing maxims the speaker often enhances his own character in the eyes of his auditors. Aristotle, commenting on this point, observed that "maxims always produce the moral effect, because the speaker in uttering them makes a general declaration of ethical principles (preferences); so that, if the maxims are sound, they give us the impression of a sound moral character in him who speaks."[18] Only by recognizing the relationship of the enthymeme to ethos and pathos can we fully comprehend the integral part which that mode of persuasion played in Aristotle's rhetorical system.

In summary, the enthymeme may be defined as a rhetorical syllogism which draws its premises from probabilities, signs, and examples. It has two species, the demonstrative and refutative, both of which derive their materials from particular or universal *topoi*, and then combine that material with the various lines of argument. Further, while the enthymeme is technically a form of logical proof, it frequently produces an emotional and ethical effect.

Most of the principles which we have discussed are clearly illustrated in Shakespeare's historical play, "Julius Caesar." An analysis of Mark Antony's speech on the death of Caesar should suffice to show that Shakespeare was evidently acquainted with the theory of the enthymeme. Moreover, it will tend to demonstrate how the enthymeme is a vital component of practical argument.

Antony's address was delivered primarily for the purpose of counteracting the influence of a previous oration by Brutus. Antony knew that he must refute the charge that Caesar was ambitious. To do this he used enthymematic reasoning based on Aristotelian principles both to disarm his hearers and motivate them to action.

The introduction contains two maxims which adequately express the sentiment of the audience. "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones." This statement is, in effect, a truncated enthymeme constructed from probable knowledge. Antony next states that "the noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was ambitious; if it were so, it was a grievous fault, and grievously hath Caesar answered it." Such an assertion may be restated in enthymematic form as follows:

Ambition is a grievous fault.	(Major Premise
Caesar had ambition.	(Minor Premise)
Caesar had a grievous fault.	(Conclusion)

Of course Antony did not accept the minor premise or the conclusion of this argument, but since the audience concurred with Brutus it was necessary to give them sufficient proof to show the fallibility inherent in the reasoning. He chose to do this by developing a counter syllogism utilizing signs. Caesar could not have been ambitious, he argued, because

1. "He hath wrought many captives home to Rome, whose ransoms did the general coffers fill."
2. "When the poor have cried Caesar hath wept."
3. "You all did see that on the Lupercal I thrice presented him with a kingly crown which he did thrice refuse."

The orator naturally concluded that these signs are the substance of non-ambition.

Antony next turned to the line of argument based on "time." "You all did love him once not without cause; what cause withholds you then to mourn for him?" The following enthymeme is implied in this plea:

We should mourn for those we once had cause to love.	(Major Premise)
We once had cause to love Caesar.	(Minor Premise)
We should, therefore, mourn for Caesar.	(Conclusion)

Antony's persuasion was complete as he demonstrated the enormity of Brutus' crime. "For Brutus as you know was Caesar's angel. Judge O you Gods how dearly Caesar loved him! This was the most unkindest cut of all." Actually he was telling his listeners that

Those who kill their friends are the unkindest of men.
Brutus killed his friend.
Brutus is the unkindest of men.

This is an enthymeme expressing the argument of "more or less."

The rhetorical syllogisms which Antony used are consonant with the teachings of Aristotle. All of the premises of the enthymemes are drawn from the particular *topoi* of ethics and politics, those branches of knowledge dealing with the conduct of man in human affairs. In addition, many of the twenty-eight lines of argument suggested by Aristotle can be seen. They may be summarized as follows:

1. Antony succeeds in "turning the utterances" of Brutus against him.
2. The question of "time" is noted in the reference that "you all did love him once."
3. Throughout the oration there seems to be an ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the term "ambition." To Brutus it had one connotation; to Antony it had another.
4. The enthymeme constructed from signs is an argument "from part to whole."
5. The "consequence" of envy and hate as seen in Casca is murder.
6. Although Brutus professed to love Caesar his testimony is not sincere. It is nothing more than "inward thoughts and outward show."
7. The problem of "incentives and deterrents" permeates the discussion.
8. It seems "incredible" that Brutus would commit such a crime.
9. The doctrine of "more or less" is implicit in the charge that there is no greater crime than that of killing your friend.

By combining the special *topoi* of ethics and politics with these lines of arguments, Antony strengthened his own character and obviously aroused the emotions of his hearers. In short, his persuasion, which is expressed through the media of ethos, logos, and pathos, originates with the enthymeme.

Ethical and Pathetic Appeals. In Book II of his three book treatise, Aristotle focuses his attention on the listener. It is here that he describes ethos as the hearer's perception of a speaker based on the speech itself. The Greeks conceived of the perfect speaker as one who possessed intelligence, a virtuous character, and good will. They judged the soundness of the speaker's ideas in terms of their own experience and the evidence he presented to support his proposal. The speaker's integrity was judged on the basis of the apparent truthfulness of the statements made. Good will was judged in terms of the best interests of the listening audience. Despite the fact Aristotle's inclination to assume the basic rationality of man led him to stress logical proof, he came to believe that in a typical rhetorical situation involving a general audience ethical appeals are perhaps the most influential single element in persuasion.[19]

Since Aristotle equated rhetoric with the whole man, he also analyzed human emotions. The method he used was that of contrast as he discussed the following pairs: anger and mildness, friendship and enmity, fear and boldness, shame and shamelessness, gratitude and ingratitude, pity and indignation, envy and emulation.[20] As he probed into the nature of these emotions and related them to the challenge facing a rhetor, Aristotle revealed his orderly mind and scientific technique. He asked such questions as these: What type of person feels a given emotion? What is the state of mind of one experiencing a particular emotion? Under what circumstances is the emotion aroused or allayed? Out of the response to these inquiries, Aristotle was able to define the emotion. Typical explanations used in describing the emotions are the following statements:

1. "Anger (is) an appetite, attended with pain, for revenge, on account of an apparent slighting of things which concern one, or of oneself, or of one's friends, when such slighting is improper."
2. "Friendship (is) wishing for a person those things which one thinks good—wishing them for his sake, not for one's own—and tending, in so far as one can, to effect these things."
3. "Fear (is) a pain or trouble arising from an image of coming evil, destructive or painful; for men do not fear all evils—as, for instance, the prospect of being unjust or slow; but only such evils as mean great pain or losses, and these, when they seem not distant, but close and imminent."
4. "Shame (is) a pain or trouble about those ills, present, past or future, which seem to tend to ignominy; shamelessness is a kind of negligence or indifference about these things."
5. "Pity (is) a pain for apparent evil, destructive or painful, befalling a person who does not deserve it, when we might expect such evil to befall ourselves or some of our friends, and when, moreover, it seems near."[21]

Taken as a whole this early analysis of human nature merits the attention of those interested in psychology.

Forms of Discourse or Speaking Occasions. Aristotle classified speaking in ancient Athens in three ways: forensic discourse—that which deals with happenings in the past as in the case of alleged criminality; epideictic—that which deals with praise and blame as in the case of a ceremonial address; and deliberative—that which deals with future policy as in the case of legislative debate. Crucial to an understanding of Aristotle's theory of forensic speaking is his treatment of wrongdoing. Criminal acts, he said, are either voluntary or involuntary and are caused by such forces as chance, nature, reason, and passion.[22] Since the major concern of both the prosecution and the defense focuses on whether or not an act was committed and the causes that were operative, forensic discourse emphasizes fact past. The forensic addresses Lysias wrote for wealthy patrons parallel the later rhetoric of Clarence Darrow and Edward Bennett Williams. Notwithstanding its usefulness as a practical art in the Western world, however, forensic discourse did not have a strong appeal for Aristotle because of its susceptibility "to unscrupulous practices."[23]

Epideictic speaking occasions are those in which an orator praises or blames an individual, an idea, or organization, a locale, or a nation. In view of the fact that the substance of epideictic discourse is drawn largely from the field of ethics, "we have in the *Rhetoric* . . . a summary view of the needed ethical material—happiness, goods, virtue and vice, wrongdoing and injustice, pleasure, equity, laws, and friendship."[24] Of particular importance to this type of rhetorical occasion is the subject of cardinal virtues. Plato doubtless influenced Aristotle with his summary of the four virtues which he believed to be essential for the formation of an ideal republic—courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. The trait Plato held to be the great integrating virtue which could only exist if the other three were present is justice.[25] When Aristotle turned to an analysis of epideictic discourse, he discussed these four cardinal virtues of Greek culture and added five others including magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and magnificence.[26] The epideictic speaker's task is to relate the virtues to the theme being discussed. Evidence would be cited, for example, to show that a praiseworthy individual exemplified specific virtues, while a blameworthy person practiced vices. Pericles' Funeral Oration is the ancestor of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and Douglas MacArthur's Farewell Speech to Congress. Demosthenes' attacks on Philip of Macedon established the pattern for Cicero's philippics against Mark Antony and Winston Churchill's addresses on Adolph Hitler. Epideictic discourse eulogizing the founding fathers typified much of the speaking during the bicentennial celebration.

Of the three types of discourse, Aristotle was most interested in the deliberative. Partly because other writers had ignored this speaking form, and partly because it embraces all of those subjects dealing with fact future, Aristotle felt justified in giving to deliberative speaking his major attention. If ethics permeated all aspects of the epideictic genre, politics performed the same function for the deliberative. Thus a rhetor using this speaking form must be a student of each type of government—an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy. Only in this way can he adapt to the political views of his hearers. From our contemporary American perspective it is instructive to note that the chief subjects about which all men debate in a democracy, Aristotle observed, are these: ways and means (i.e. public revenue), war and peace, national defense, commerce (i.e., imports and exports), and legislation.[27] No modern political scientist would disagree.

Aristotle's discussion of the forms of address is significant for several reasons. First, he implies that the speaker's starting point is the occasion. Secondly, he notes that epideictic discourse is primarily concerned with fact present, forensic discourse with fact past, and deliberative discourse with fact future. Thirdly, he reinforces the notion that the principal subject matter fields utilized by rhetoric are ethics and politics.

To summarize Aristotle's notions on types of speeches and occasions, we reprint below the chart developed by Forbes Hill in his essay on "The Rhetoric of Aristotle."[28]

Organization of Ideas and Audience Analysis and Adaptation. In his discussion of forms of proof and the types of speaking occasions, Aristotle developed his views on the message—a canon of rhetoric described by the Romans as *inventio*. The arrangement and adaptation of the speaker's ideas became a second canon, which later was labeled *dispositio*. Any speech, Aristotle observed, has four parts which unfold in a chronological order: proem or introduction, statement, argument, and epilogue or conclusion.[29] Most essential to Aristotle were the statement and argument; for it is in these parts of the discourse that logical appeals are used. Proems and epilogues are included in an address in order to arouse the attention of or create good will with a popular audience in the beginning of a speech and to stir their emotions in the conclusion.

Another facet of *dispositio* was audience analysis and adaptation. On this point Plato and Aristotle held widely divergent views. "Aristotle did not share Plato's notion that a true art of rhetoric would enable a speaker to adapt himself to each of the persons of an audience as the dialectician adjusts himself to one deuteragonist."[30] What should concern the rhetor, argued Aristotle, was not "a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type."[31]

Kind of Speech	**Kind of Auditor**	**Time**	**Ends**	**Means**
Forensic	Decision-maker	Past	The unjust and just	Accusation and defense
Deliberative	Decision-maker	Future	The advantageous and disadvantageous	Persuasion and dissuasion
Epideictic	Spectator	Present	The noble and the shameful	Praise and blame

Because of his preoccupation with the characteristics of groups as a whole rather than with the special traits of a particular person, Aristotle approached audience analysis in a comprehensive way. To begin with, he pointed out, all men seek happiness. Speakers must, if they mean to be persuasive, propose those things which either create or enhance the happiness of their listeners. Aristotle listed the following traits as those most treasured by his fellow Greeks: good birth (as measured by the eminence of one's family), numerous children, wealth, good repute, honor, health, physical beauty, strength, size, long life, many friends, good fortune, and virtue.[32] The wise speaker related his proposals to those goods which bring happiness to his listeners. Thereby, he adapted to his audience.

A second dimension of audience analysis involved the traits one associates with audiences of different ages. Compare, for example, Aristotle's description of the young with America's male college students:

> Young men are lustful in character, and apt to do what they lust after. Of the bodily desires, they are most apt to indulge, and to exceed in, the sexual. They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are violent but soon appeased; for their impulses are rather keen than great, like the hunger and thirst of the sick. They are passionate, quick to anger and apt to obey their impulse; and they are under the dominion of their passion, for, by reason of ambition, they cannot bear to be slighted, and they are indignant, if they think they are wronged. They are ambitious, or rather contentious; for youth covets preeminence, and victory is a form of pre-eminence. They are both ambitious and contentious rather than avaricious; this they are not at all, because they have not yet experienced want—as goes the saying of Pittakos about Amphiaraos. They think no evil, but believe in goodness, because as yet they have not seen many cases of vice. They are credulous, because, as yet, they have not been deceived. They are sanguine, because they are heated, as with wine, and also because they have not had many disappointments. They live for most part by hope; for hope is of the future, as memory of the past, and for young men the future is long and the past short; since, on the first day of a life, there is nothing to remember and everything to hope. They are easily deceived, for the same reason,—since they hope easily. They are comparatively courageous; for they are passionate and hopeful, and passion keeps men from being fearful, while hope makes them bold: no one fears while he is angry, and to hope for a good thing is emboldening. They are shy; for, as yet, they have no independent standard of propriety, but have been educated by convention alone. They are high-minded; for they have not yet been abased by life, but are untried in its necessities; and to think oneself worthy of great things is high-mindedness; and this is characteristic of the hopeful man. They choose honourable before expedient actions; for they live by habit rather than by calculation; and calculation has the expedient for its object, as virtue has the honourable. They are fond of their friends, their relations, their companions, more than persons of the other ages, because they delight in society, and because, as yet, they judge nothing by the standard of expediency, and so do not apply it to their friends. All their mistakes are on the side of excess or vehemence—against the maxim of Chilon; they do everything *too much;* they love too much, hate too much, and so in all else. They think they know everything and are positive; this, indeed, is the cause of their overdoing all things. Their wrong deeds are done insolently, not viciously. They are ready to pity, because they think all men good, or *rather* good; for they measure their neighbours by their own innocence, and so conceive that these are suffering wrongfully. And they are lovers of laughter,—hence also lovers of wit; for wit is educated insolence.[33]

How does the following analysis of senior citizens accord with your view of, say, your grandparents?

> As they have lived many years, and have been deceived or have erred more often, and as most things are disappointing, they are

positive about nothing, and do all things much too feebly. They *think,* but are never *sure;* in their uncertainty, they always add 'maybe,'—'perhaps'; they speak thus on all subjects, and positively about nothing. They think evil; for evil-thinking is to put the worst construction upon everything. Further, they are suspicious through their incredulity, being incredulous through their experience. For these reasons they neither like nor hate strongly, but, according to the advice of Bias, like, as if they would afterwards hate, and hate, as if they would afterwards like. They are meansouled, through having been abased by life; for they desire nothing great or extraordinary, but only the appliances of life. They are illiberal; for property is one of the necessaries; and, at the same time, they know from their experience, that it is hard to acquire, but easy to lose. They are cowardly, and afraid of everything; for they are of the opposite temperament to youth; they are chilled, while youth is hot; and so old age has prepared the way to cowardice, since fear is a chill. They cling to life, and the more on their latest day, since the object of desire is the absent, and since, too, men most desire that in which they are deficient. They are unduly selfish; for this, too, is a meanness of soul. And, because they are selfish, they live too much for the expedient, too little for the honourable; the expedient being a relative good, the honourable an absolute good. They are not shy, but rather shameless; for, as they do not care, in the same degree, for what is honourable, as for what is expedient, they disregard appearances. They are slow to hope, owing to their experience,—since most things which happen are unsatisfactory and turn out for the worse,—and also from their cowardice. They live in memory more than in hope; for the remainder of their life is small, and the past part large—and hope is of the future, as memory of the past. This is the reason of their talkativeness;—they are for ever speaking of the past, since the retrospect gives them pleasure. Their fits of passion are sharp, but feeble; hence they are not lustful, nor apt to act after lust, but rather for gain. Hence men of this age appear temperate, their desires have become slack, and they are slaves to lucre. And their life is regulated by calculation rather than by moral instinct; calculation having expediency for its object, while moral instinct has virtue. Their wrong deeds are done viciously, not insolently. Old men, like young, are compassionate, but not for the same reason as young men; the latter are so from benevolence, the former from weakness; for they think that every possibility of suffering is near themselves, and this, we saw, was a condition of pitying. Hence they are given to lamentation, and are not witty or lovers of mirth; for the love of lamentation is opposite to the love of mirth.[34]

Unlike our own culture in which youth is worshipped, the Athenians admired a period they termed the "prime of life." Aristotle described that ideal state this way:

Men in their prime will evidently be of a character intermediate between these, abating the excess of each;—neither excessively bold, for this is rashness, nor over-timid, but rightly disposed in both respects, neither trusting nor distrusting all things, but rather judging by the true standard, and living neither for the honourable alone, nor for the expedient alone, but for both; inclining neither to frugality nor to extravagance, but to the just mean. And so, too, in regard to passion and desire, they will be courageously temperate and temperately courageous. Young men and old men share these qualities between them; young men are courageous and intemperate, old men are temperate and cowardly. To speak generally—those useful qualities, which youth and age divide between them, are joined in the prime of life; between their excesses and defects, it has the fitting mean. The body is in its full vigour from thirty to five and thirty; the mind at about forty-nine.[35]

Aristotle's partiality for the "golden mean" prompted him to suggest that whenever a speaker addresses an audience comprised of all three groups, he should gear his remarks to the prime of life. In this way he would not deviate too far from the interests of the young and the old.

Style and Delivery. In the preceding analysis we have seen how Aristotle was a message-centered rhetorician whose principal concern was to help his student discover, organize, and adapt the available means of persuasion to a particular rhetorical situation or occasion. But he also recognized that a speaker must reinforce his invention and disposition with a compelling style and delivery. Even though these canons held a subordinate position, they, like the spectacle in a dramatic production, are essential tools in persuasion. Thus style (the use of language to express ideas) and delivery (the management of the voice) form part of the focus of Book III.

In his treatment of style, Aristotle deals with the traditional elements of language such as accuracy of word choice, clarity, appropriateness, and vividness. He was especially interested in delineating the characteristics of the metaphor or implied comparison. "Metaphor," said Aristotle, "is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy."[36] Aristotle then clarifies this definition by giving an example of each type of metaphor. A transferral of a term from genus to species can be seen in the statement, "Here *stands* my ship." When we say that a ship stands we actually mean that it is "riding at anchor," for the latter is a species of standing. The sentence, "Indeed *ten thousand* noble things Odysseus did," is an example of transference from one species to another. The term "ten thousand" is akin to "many." since they are both members of the same species, one can be substituted for the other.

The fourth and most commonly used method of deriving metaphors is that of analogy. Here we have four terms which have a proportional relationship to each other, such as B is to A as D is to C. By analogy the D may be substituted for the B and the B for the D. Replacing these letters with names, we let A be Plato, B a goblet, C Ares, and D a shield. By definition the goblet is to Plato as the shield is to Ares. A metaphor is obtained by referring to the goblet as a shield of Plato or the shield as a goblet of Ares. Since the shield and the goblet are both characteristic of deity, they come under the same genus and can therefore be interchanged.[37]

In developing his theory of style, Aristotle further observed that one of the most important functions of a metaphor in public address is to teach. If words are strange, foreign, or archaic, they are not known to all and, consequently, do not give any new information. Proper and ordinary words, on the other hand, are already known by the audience. It is the metaphor, more than any other figure of speech, therefore, that increases our knowledge. When Homer calls old age a stubble, he conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the genus, because they are both withered.[38]

The metaphor, Aristotle states, teaches by bringing into view resemblances between things which appear on the surface as dissimilar. It is most effective when it is drawn from objects that are related, but not too obvious to everyone at first sight. Whenever the significance of the metaphor is comprehended at first glance, the mind is not stirred into action. If people are to engage in reflective thinking, the figure must arouse curiosity.

Similarly Aristotle suggests that metaphors should also "be derived from something beautiful. . . ."[39] When a speaker plans a speech of praise he must take his metaphors from the superior things that fall under the same genus. Thus it makes a difference whether we say "rosy-fingered morn" or "red-fingered morn" because the rose reminds us of something that is agreeable to sight and smell. It is essential, therefore, that the forms of the word express an agreeable sound.

Aristotle, finally emphasizes the point that metaphors cannot be derived from anyone else.[40] This does not imply that one writer or speaker cannot borrow a metaphor from another; but that the invention of metaphor is an innate talent, and therefore cannot be taught. Although metaphors are not confined to men of genius, they do show originality and are definite marks of natural ability. It is obvious, then, that a proportional relationship exists between one's intellect and his success in using metaphors.

Aristotle was far less enthusiastic about analyzing delivery. It was to him a necessary but low priority canon that does not lend itself to philosophical speculation or scientific inquiry. As a result he subordinates it to style—a fact which disturbed the Roman rhetoricians.

The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle is not a well organized textbook by modern standards. Rather it appears to be Aristotle's own lecture notes collected over a twelve year period. Topics are treated briefly, dropped, and reconsidered elsewhere. Illustrative material is limited, perhaps because Aristotle resorted to impromptu examples at the time of utterance, examples which undoubtedly changed over the years. Clearly Aristotle himself made no effort to edit this material for later publication. What we have instead are rough lecture notes used intermittently when needed. But despite these reservations the *Rhetoric* remains the most significant rhetorical work in Western thought. Indeed, as Lane Cooper correctly points out, "Aristotle's treatise on Rhetoric is one of the world's best and wisest books."[41]

In order to make Aristotle's comprehensive treatise more manageable to the reader, we have provided a detailed outline of the parts comprising the whole, along with brief explanatory material in the right-hand margins. We are indebted to Professor Herbert James of Dartmouth College for portions of this material.

I. *General Nature of Rhetoric*
  A. Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic.
  B. Rhetoric is the faculty of discovering in the particular case all the available means of persuasion.
  C. The functions of rhetoric are to make truth prevail, to instruct, to debate, to defend.

Rhetoric, which seeks to discover all types of verbal and non-verbal means of persuasion appropriate to a given situation, deals with probable knowledge designed to promote truth and justice. It recognizes the contingent nature of propositions, and the need to speak in self-defense.

II. *Kinds of Hearers, corresponding to Kinds of Oratory*
  A. Deliberative speaking
    1. Audience seeking advice
    2. Divisions = persuasion and dissuasion concerning advantage and injury with respect to the future
    3. Subject matter
      a. Happiness
        1. Good birth
        2. Good children
        3. Many children
        4. Good friends
        5. Many friends
        6. Health
        7. Beauty
        8. Strength
        9. Stature
        10. Good old age
        11. Athletic ability

Speakers in legislative bodies and/or related groups recommend actions which an assembly should take in order to guarantee success in the future. Elements of happiness and good are emphasized.

12. Wealth
13. Honor
14. Fame
15. Good fortune
16. Virtue
17. Power
18. Avoid opposites

b. Goods
1. Happiness
2. Virtues of Soul
3. Excellence of body
4. Wealth
5. Friends
6. Honor-Reputation
7. Power in speaking
8. Power of action
9. Memory
10. Aptness in learning
11. Quickness of thought
12. Arts and Sciences
13. Life
14. Justice

c. Deliberations
1-4
1. Ways and Means
2. War and Peace
3. National Defense
4. Imports and Exports
5. Legislation

These five political and economic issues constitute the major subjects that are to be discussed in making legislative decisions.

1-8
d. Forms of Government
1. Democracy
2. Oligarchy
3. Aristocracy
4. Monarchy

The deliberations will be affected by the form of government.

B. Forensic speaking
1. Audience seeking justice
2. Divisions = accusation and defense involving justice and injustice as it relates to the past
3. Subject matter
a. Human Actions

The forensic speaker, whether a member of the prosecution or the defense, stresses justice or injustice with respect to an accused person's alleged action.

1. Causes of Human actions
a. Chance
b. Nature
c. Compulsion
d. Habit
e. Reasoning
f. Anger
g. Desire

Acts are committed from one or more of these seven causes.

- 2. Aims
  - a. Good (See list under Deliberative speaking)
  - b. Pleasant
- b. Nature of Wrong-doing
  - 1. Disposition of wrong-doers
    - a. Believe action possible
    - b. Escape detection
    - c. Penalty less than pain

It is important for a speaker and judge to know the characteristic traits inherent in or associated with potential wrong-doers and victims of wrong-doing.

  - 2. Victims
    - a. Possess needed things
    - b. Distant and near
    - c. Unsuspecting
    - d. Easy going, retiring
    - e. Frequently wronged
    - f. Unpopular
    - g. Friends, Enemies
    - h. Lacking friends
    - i. Lack speaking ability
    - j. Foreigners
    - k. Criminals
  - 3. Special Law (Written)
  - 4. Universal Law (Unwritten Equity)

- C. Epideictic speaking
  - 1. Audience seeking praise
  - 2. Divisions = praise and blame as they pertain to honor and dishonor in the present
  - 3. Subject matter
    - a. Virtue
      - 1. Justice
      - 2. Temperance
      - 3. Courage
      - 4. Magnificence
      - 5. Magnanimity
      - 6. Liberality
      - 7. Gentleness
      - 8. Prudence
      - 9. Wisdom

An individual who exemplifies these cardinal virtues is an honorable person meriting praise. One who violates these virtues deserves blame.

- b. Acts of nobleness
  - 1. Act of courage
  - 2. Just deeds

Noble acts are those which are grounded in virtue.

- 3. Honor
- 4. Unselfish deeds
- 5. Absolute goods
- 6. Gifts of nature
- 7. Goods for after-life
- 8. Goods done for others
- 9. Goods not beneficial to doer
- 10. Deeds opposite of shame
- 11. Concern without fear
- 12. Virtues of a class
- 13. Gratification for others
- 14. Avenge against enemy
- 15. Memorable things
- 16. Unique possessions
- 17. Non-yielding possessions
- 18. Special traits of people
- 19. Distinctive marks of habit
- 20. Independence
- 21. Opposites for blame
- 22. Victory

- III. *The Elements of Persuasion*
  - A. Basic Ideas
    - 1. Sources
      - a. Lines of Argument
        - 1. Materials of Enthymemes
          - a. Probabilities
          - b. Examples
          - c. Infallible Signs
          - d. Fallible Signs
        - 2. Universal
          - a. Genuine
          - b. Spurious
        - 3. Substantive Items
          - a. Commonplaces
            - 1. Possible and Impossible
            - 2. Past Fact
            - 3. Future Fact
            - 4. Size
          - b. Special Topics
            - 1. Ethics
            - 2. Physics
            - 3. Politics
            - 4. Philosophy
            - 5. Other Special Sciences

An enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism based on probability, may make use of both fallible and infallible signs.

A line of argument may be derived from a broad general topic or from a special topic area or field of study.

2. Proof
   a. Ethical Proof
      1. Intelligence
      2. Character
      3. Good Will
   b. Logical Proof
      1. Rhetorical Syllogisms or Enthymemes
         a. Demonstrative = draw conclusions from admitted propositions
         b. Refutative = draw conclusions inconsistent with adversary's
            1. Sham enthymemes
            2. Maxims
      2. Refutation of Enthymemes
         a. Counter-syllogisms
         b. Objection based on attacking premise, adducing similar premise, adducing contrary premise, and adducing previous decisions
      3. Rhetorical Induction—Examples
         a. Historical parallel
         b. Invented parallel (Comparison, Fable)
   c. Pathetic Proof
      1. Emotions
         a. Anger–Mildness
         b. Love–Hatred
         c. Fear–Boldness
         d. Shame–Shamelessness
         e. Benevolence–Unkindness
         f. Pity
         g. Indignation
         h. Envy
         i. Emulation–Contempt

Proof may be of two types: artistic (reasoning) and inartistic (evidence)

These three traits are the constituent elements of ethical or personal proof.

The most important aspect of logical proof is enthymematic reasoning. Enthymemes may be constructed for the purpose of demonstrating or refuting a claim

Although an enthymeme may be constructed from examples, reasoning by example may also be a form of inductive reasoning.

For a speaker to arouse or allay a particular emotion in the audience, he must understand the nature of the emotion and its opposite, as well as the type of person who is inclined to experience the emotion.

    2. Adapting to emotional traits of the audience
        a. Time of Life = Youth, Prime of Life, Old
        b. Varieties of Fortune = good birth, wealth, power

B. Arrangement
  1. Proem
    a. Function is to state end and object
    b. Epideictic discourse
      1. Entrance alien or akin to theme
      2. Knit proem to theme
      3. Topics include praise, blame, advice
      4. Appeal for indulgence
    c. Forensic discourse
      1. State subject
      2. Appeal for indulgence
    d. Deliberative discourse
      1. Proem rare
      2. Excite or remove prejudice
      3. Amplify facts; adornment
  2. Statement
    a. Reveal necessary facts
    b. Depict character and emotional traits observing proper mean
    c. Epideictic = use of intermittent approach
    d. Forensic = ethical appeal, brief in defense, continuous
    e. Deliberative = refresh memory; least important part
  3. Argument
    a. Function is to prove, refute, interrogate
    b. Epideictic discourse
      1. Amplification is best
      2. Proof of facts rarely given
    c. Forensic discourse
      1. Enthymeme is best

Since a person's emotional attitude is affected by his age level, it is necessary to know and appreciate the motivating forces of each age group.

Our heritage, wealth, and power also influence our emotional well-being.

Although not a very important part of arrangement, the proem sometimes is needed. The type of proem depends upon the form of discourse being employed.

The statement, which is a crucial part of the discourse, contains the narrative needed to construct the argument.

On the whole, the statement is not a vital part here.

The principal claims are incorporated into the argument. They may be designed to prove, refute, or question. Generally speaking, argument is less important for epideictic discourse than for the other two forms.

2. Determine stasis or status
   a. Act not committed
   b. Act not harmful
   c. Harm less than reward
   d. Act justified

The stasis is the turning point of an issue or the central point being disputed. Thus it may consist of one or more of these four points.

d. Deliberative discourse
   1. Example is best
   2. Thing cannot be done
   3. Thing is unjust
   4. Thing is harmful
   5. Thing is of minor importance

By suggesting that a thing cannot be done, or is minor or harmful, the speaker may either persuade or dissuade an audience regarding a course of action to be taken.

4. Epilogue
   a. Ethical appeal
   b. Magnify and depreciate
   c. Pathetic appeal
   d. Recapitulation

As in the case of the proem, the epilogue is not always required. When it is needed, it may contain both ethical and pathetic appeals and/or a summary of the argument.

C. Style and Delivery
   1. Delivery
      a. Pitch
      b. Volume
      c. Rhythm

Delivery, which may be viewed as a subordinate part of style, makes use of pitch, volume, and rhythm.

2. Diction
   a. Choice of Words
      1. Lucidity
         a. Current terms
         b. Distinctive names
         c. Metaphors
      2. Propriety (Deviations from ordinary usage)
      3. Impressiveness
         a. Metaphors
         b. Epithets
         c. Simile

Clarity, correctness, appropriateness, and vividness should be evident in a speaker's choice of words and sentence structure. Special care should be taken in the handling of metaphors.

b. Sentence movement
   1. Purity
      a. Connecting words
      b. Specific words
      c. Avoid ambiguity
      d. Proper gender
      e. Correct number
   2. Appropriateness
      a. Emotional
      b. Ethical
      c. Suited to theme

In sentence movement, as in the case of word choice, the doctrine of usage in style constitutes an important guideline.

3. Dignity
   a. Description
   b. Metaphors and Epithets
   c. Plurals
   d. Repeat definite article
   e. Connective particles
   f. Negatives
   g. Antithesis
   h. Actuality
   i. Deceptive surprise

Notes

1. For a more extended analysis of Aristotle's methodology, see Donal J. Stanton and Goodwin Berquist, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric:* Empiricism or Conjecture?", *Southern Speech Communication Journal,* 41, 1 (Fall, 1975), 69–81.
2. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle: A Translation* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), p. 1.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 3.
4. *Ibid.,* pp. 4–5.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 5.
6. The use of the terms "artistic" and "non-artistic" comes from the Lane Cooper translation of *"The Rhetoric* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932), p. 8. These terms seemed to the authors more meaningful than Jebb's "artificial" and "non-artificial."
7. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Jebb, p. 6.
8. Rhetorical scholars now generally seem to agree that what distinguishes the enthymeme from the syllogism is its *probable* nature and that some enthymemes may include a statement of all three terms, rather than one or two.
9. James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs,* 3 (1936), 49–74.
10. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Jebb, p. 9.
11. Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans* (New York: The Century Co., 1925), p. 50.
12. McBurney, "The Enthymeme," p. 57.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 56.
14. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, p. 147
15. McBurney, "The Enthymeme," p. 61.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 62.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 63.
18. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, p. 154.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 9.
20. *Ibid.,* pp. 90–131.
21. Jebb, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle,* pp. 71–89.
22. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, pp. 56–67.
23. Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle," p. 52.
24. *Ibid.*
25. See *The Republic.*
26. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, p. 47.
27. *Ibid.,* pp. 21–23.
28. James J. Murphy, ed. *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 24.
29. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, pp. 221–241.
30. Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle," p. 58.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, pp. 24–29.
33. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Jebb, pp. 99–100.
34. *Ibid.,* pp. 100–102.
35. *Ibid.,* p. 102.
36. Aristotle, *Poetics,* trans. by W. Hamilton Fyfe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 81.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, pp. 206–207.
39. *Ibid.,* p. 189.
40. *Poetics,* p. 91.
41. *The Rhetoric,* trans. by Cooper, p. vii.