The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal Victimization in Darfur

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Sociologists empirically and theoretically neglect genocide. In this article, our critical collective framing perspective begins by focusing on state origins of race-based ideology in the mobilization and dehumanization leading to genocide. We elaborate this transformative dynamic by identifying racially driven macro-micro-macro-level processes that are theoretically underdeveloped and contested in many settings. We investigate generic processes by exploiting an unprecedented survey of refugees from the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Our focus is on the Sudanese government's crisis framing of a dehumanizing collective process. Sudanese forces joined with Janjaweed militia to attack black African settlements. They aggregated and concentrated racial epithets in a collective process of dehumanization and organized terror, which amplified the severity of genocidal victimization, the lethal and lasting scar of the genocidal state. Our findings question primordial and counter-insurgency explanations, while supporting aspects of the instrumental, population–resource, constructionist, and cognitive perspectives that form the foundation of our critical collective framing perspective. It has been more than 50 years since Sutherland famously added white-collar crime to public sociology, radically reordering discourse about crime. It is time to do the same with Raphael Lemkin's concept of genocide.

"We are Sudanese living in our homeland. We have no problem with the Sudanese government. They became our first enemy, they do not protect us. They want to kill all the black people. Why? I can ask myself, and also ask you."

— Darfurian Refugee in Chad Camp

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

Genocide is now widely discussed by journalists and lawyers, but it still is neglected, marginalized, and undertheorized by sociologists. Horowitz (1980:3) speculates that sociologists feel "a studied embarrassment about these issues, a feeling that intellectual issues posed in such a manner are melodramatic and unfit for scientific discourse." Fein (1990:7 and 2007:1) similarly insists that "the primary deterrent is our own inhibitions and lack of boldness." Further methodological difficulties are posed by the unpredictability of genocides, the devastation of whole groups and places, and governments' participation and cover-ups.

Nonetheless, accounts of genocide assume fundamental sociological processes. These descriptions often emphasize dehumanization framed in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, or nationhood. This process is usually depicted as

collectively driven—led by groups and leading to group destruction. Yet few quantitative analyses evaluating these social aspects of genocide exist. This article investigates genocide in the context of Sudan, not because this time or place is unique, but because during the ongoing Darfur genocide, for the first time in history, the U.S. government collected detailed data on racial dehumanization and intergroup violence. This allows us to address the fundamental question: How is racial genocide accomplished?[1]

Brubaker and Laitin (1998:427) argue that "the most fundamental questions—for example, *how* the adjective 'ethnic' modifies the noun 'violence'—remain unclear and largely unexamined" and that the answers require analysis of "the forms and dynamics of ethnicization."[2] We make a similar argument about racialization and dehumanization. The Sudanese state instigated a collective framing process that dehumanized its victims (black Africans in Darfur) and resulted in genocide. Although the details are case specific, we cite parallel processes and illustrations from other genocides.

In Darfur, the dehumanization involved racial epithets (e.g., "you are slaves, kill the slaves" and "this is the last day for blacks") resulting in violent victimization, which we analyze using survey interviews about attacks on black African villages. We show that the role of race is prominently denied in this genocide, as it often is historically.

The role of the state in activating racial dehumanization leading to genocide is essential to our critical collective framing theory.[3] Through racial framing, the Sudanese government mobilized local Arab Janjaweed militia toward much death and destruction. Our critical collective framing theory argues that this racial targeting was the socially constructed and critically contingent mechanism that mediated the influence of population–resource competition on genocidal victimization. We build on Katz's (1988) account of the role of cursing in the "righteous slaughters" of intimates and acquaintances. We hypothesize that racial epithets played a parallel role in transforming individual motivation and intent into collectively organized dehumanization and violence. More specifically, we hypothesize that the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets during attacks created a collective effect that intensified the severity of genocidal violence. Collective dehumanization processes place groups outside the normative universe of moral protection, leaving them vulnerable to targeted genocidal victimization. These racialized and collectivized dehumanization processes establish the contingent conditions for genocide (Fein 1990).

First, we use historical material to establish the ideological link in Darfur between the Sudanese state and the targeting of three black African groups: the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit. We then analyze the historically unprecedent-

[1] The question of *why* Sudan indiscriminately attacks black Africans is in one sense simple: because Sudan can, and cheaply. Black African rebels are a threat. De Waal (2007) calls indiscriminate attacks "counter-insurgency on the cheap." China and Russia sell Sudan the limited weaponry required to devastate the relatively defenseless black Africans, while fending off the UN for trade advantages. So the larger question is: *How does Sudan do genocide so efficiently?* That is, *how* does Sudan accomplish genocide? In this sense, the answer to the question of *how* becomes the explanation of *why.*

[2] Most scholarly discussions of genocide focus on this concept as a noun. For example, Gurr and Harff (1994) advocate expanding genocide to include political conflicts. Others advocate including nonlethal acts that threaten group members (Lemkin 1946), emphasizing the role of the state (Horowitz 1980), highlighting one-sided killing by the state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990), excluding ethnocide (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990), and specifying genocide as political mass murder (Chirot and Edwards 2003). These definitions are insightful for probing the boundaries of genocide, but our interest here is in understanding how dehumanizing processes of collective racial and ethnic framing drive genocidal victimization.

[3] The expanding research literature on genocide focuses on problems of definition (e.g., Chirot and Edwards 2003; Fein 1990), the identification of antecedents (e.g., Gurr and Harff 1994; Horowitz 2001), disputes about scale (e.g., Hagan and Palloni 2006; Heuveline 2001), the creation of typologies (e.g., Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Lemkin 1946), and the development of explanatory approaches considered below. Our distinctive focus is on the dehumanizing racial motivations and intentions that explain how a government mobilizes and collaborates in the ideological dehumanization and criminal victimization of a racial group.

ed U.S. State Department's Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) data on racial dehumanization and violence collected during the Darfur genocide. We use these data to document the combined role of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces in the incitement of racial epithets to collectively dehumanize and victimize black African groups. Finally, we use narratives from the ADS interviews to document the organized leadership and integration of Janjaweed with Sudanese forces in perpetrating genocide. We present this crucial interstitial link last to underscore the importance of social efficacy and agency in genocide.

RACIAL DEHUMANIZATION AND DENIAL

Dehumanization is a mechanism that imposes degrading attributes on both individuals and entire groups for purposes of massive group destruction, the defining feature of genocide.[4] This process strips black Darfurians of their individuality and membership in Sudanese society, justifying attacks and denying moral or normative protection (Alvarez 1997:146; see also Browning 1992; Fein 1979; Hilberg 1985; Kelman and Hamilton 1989). Racial and ethnic epithets conveying contempt and denying humanity to targeted group members are effective instruments of dehumanization that make it easier for ordinary people to permit and participate in genocide (Dower 1986).

Given what we know sociologically about the pervasiveness of racial/ethnic antagonism in genocide historically, it is surprising to encounter frequent denials of the role of race in Darfur. The United Nations International Commission of Inquiry (2005) concluded that victims of violence in Darfur were not *objectively distinct* from their attackers and thus were not recognizable as *protected ethnic or racial groups* under the Genocide Conventions:

> The various tribes that have been the objects of attacks and killings (chiefly the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes) do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, also due to the measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished in their outward physical appearance from the members of tribes that allegedly attacked them. (UN 2005:129)

Although this UN Commission conceded that victims of violence in Darfur might *subjectively* identify *themselves* as racially distinct, it did not find evidence that the attackers intended to destroy victim groups protected on this basis in international law. The Commission urged the UN to refer the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation as a crime against humanity, rather than genocide. The Commission did not further investigate the role of race as a socially constructed and contingent element in the Darfur genocide.[5]

This denial of race responded to two nonscientific concerns: (1) applying "African" and "Arab" racial categories might have deleterious repercussions, "setting in motion the complete dismemberment of Darfurian society" (de Waal 2007:3), and (2) acknowledging race might lead to an unsuccessful genocide prosecution (Power 2004). A simpler crime-against-humanity prosecution requires proof of widespread and systematic violence against civilians, rather than evidence of intent to destroy racial or other protected groups.

In 2007, the ICC followed the UN Commission's recommendation, charging a Sudanese deputy minister, Ahmad Harun, and a Janjaweed militia leader, Ali Kushayb, with crimes against humanity. The legal brief, which exceeded 100 pages (Office of the Prosecutor 2007), contained several references to race but sidestepped claims of racially targeted Darfur atrocities (these claims were made, for example, by the U.S. State Department, the Save Darfur

[4] Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," including in addition to killing, "deliberately inflicting on the groups conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."

[5] In support of the race-based genocide claim, Chirot and McCauley (2006:89) insist that "some of the worst ethnic genocides of the twentieth century involved targeting groups that were difficult to differentiate on physical or cultural grounds from the perpetrators."

coalition, the scholar-activist Eric Reeves, and the *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof). In 2008, the ICC charged Sudanese President Al-Bashir with genocide, but the short 10-page supporting document focused broadly on ethnicity rather than specifically on race (Office of the Prosecutor 2008).

The ICC's hesitancy followed from the concern about legally demonstrating an *intent beyond a reasonable doubt* by the president of Sudan to target *racially* protected groups. Sutherland (1940, 1945, 1949) confronted similar challenges in introducing the concept of white-collar crime. He insisted on a probabilistic approach for social science purposes, which corresponds more closely to civil than to criminal law standards. As we do for genocide, Sutherland emphasized the *collective* aspect of white-collar crime and the need to understand how business groups developed "differential definitions" that collectively framed their intentions and behaviors as acceptable to both law enforcers and themselves.

Political entrepreneurs use ideology to collectively frame and mobilize groups. In particular, explaining mass atrocities in Darfur requires recognition of the socially constructed and dehumanizing process of collective *racial* framing. We demonstrate that an Arabization ideology, the social construction of racial categories, and an organized process of racial dehumanization using racial epithets were catalysts of a shift from a "normal" to a "crisis" frame (Oberschall 2000) for genocidal attacks. The UN Commission did not consider that racial divisions, both real and imagined, are often socially constructed in the period leading to a genocidal conflict.

Racial epithets are important for both legal and sociological analysis because they capture attackers' motivation and intent. The frequently cited *Akayesu* decision in Rwanda (UN 1998) and the *Jelisi* decision in Bosnia (UN 1999) both emphasize the importance of spoken language as evidence of genocide. The words and phrases used by perpetrators to dehumanize victims play similar roles in genocide and hate crimes (Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001; Horowitz 2001; Jenness and Broad 1997). In both, dehumanizing language diminishes moral and practical constraints on participants and bystanders, and this is an intrinsically important collective action process. We hypothesize that an essential element in the explanation of the severity of the Darfur genocide is the dehumanizing impact of the collectivized motivation and intent expressed in the racial epithets shouted by the Janjaweed militia and Sudanese military while attacking black African groups. Our goal is to better understand how the racialization of this collective dehumanization process influences the contexts and severity of genocide.

Using a Darfur refugee survey, we empirically illuminate top-down macro-level and bottom-up micro-level mechanisms underlying severe forms of genocidal victimization. The top-down collective framing in Darfur involved a government-led Arab supremacist ideology that devalued black Africans. This ideology started a process that demeaned and ultimately excluded black African groups from a protected universe of moral humanitarian obligation, leaving them vulnerable to victimization. The bottom-up collective framing was activated by the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets that degraded and fundamentally dehumanized black African groups, leading to frenzied attacks by combined Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militias on targeted black African villages. Our critical collective framing perspective identifies this succession of "macro-micro-macro" mechanisms that drove state-led genocide in Darfur.

A CRITICAL COLLECTIVE FRAMING MODEL OF GENOCIDE

Our critical collective framing approach posits the Sudanese genocidal state as an endogenous system that emerged as the transformed macro-level result of collective action. This approach both diverges and converges with six past explanatory approaches.

First, our attention to racial symbols and identification diverges from a state insecurity approach that focuses on justifiable reactions to insurgent threats (e.g., Posen 1993). We demonstrate that threats of rebel or insurgent groups were wrongly perceived and exaggerated in Darfur. Our approach similarly diverges from a second primordial explanation that emphasizes hatreds so long-standing that they are considered exogenous (e.g., Kaplan 1993). While we acknowledge past hostilities, we emphasize that their influences are contingent on time and place.

A third contextual consideration is the competition for life-sustaining resources in the population–resource perspective (Diamond 2005; Tubiana 2007). This perspective sees settlement density not simply as concentrations of people but also as the presence of desirable property: possessions, livestock, and the settled land itself. Opportunities and incentives are greatest, and resources most strained, in densely settled areas. The influence of population and resources is also contingent and mediated by racial dehumanization.

Among the most important contingencies we consider are choices highlighted in a fourth instrumental perspective featuring state-based ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who advance their interests by cultivating public fear and disrespect of subordinate groups (see Hardin 1995; Valentino 2004). These feelings are often stimulated with invidious socially constructed racial attributions. Our approach further overlaps with a fifth constructionist approach that emphasizes racial symbols and identity manipulation by elites (e.g., Kaufman 2001). Finally, we draw from a sixth cognitive framing approach that identifies the shifts that appear during emerging conflicts as ranging from "normal" to "crisis" scripts or frames (Oberschall 2000).

Our synthesis is a critical collective framing perspective (displayed in Figure 1), built on the scaffold of Coleman's (1986) social action theory and drawing on Sampson's (2006) and Matsueda's (2007) concepts of collective and social efficacy. Sampson (2006:55) reintroduces Coleman's theory of social action in a discussion of the "transformation problem": the problem of how systems—in our case, genocidal state systems—emerge from the interdependent and purposive actions of individuals. Coleman (1986:1321) writes that this transformation "is the process through which individual preferences become collective choices; the process through which dissatisfaction becomes revolution; through which simultaneous fear in members of a crowd turns into mass panic." Coleman's emphasis is on the dynamics of collective transformation.

Following Matsueda (2007), we focus on the social efficacy of local government and militia leaders as ethnic entrepreneurs of racial dehumanization and collective transformation leading to organized genocidal victimization of specific groups. Coleman's work underscores the need to understand the social and collective efficacy of what he calls "Type 3" relations that transform micro-level social action into macro-level systems. We assess the collective motivations and intentions involved in the Type 3 relations together with quantitative data from the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) introduced below. First, though, we discuss Link 1 as the foundation for Coleman's Type 3 linked relations and our critical collective framing approach. We discuss the crucial Link 2 role of



Figure 1. Transformation Model of Genocide: Macro-Micro-Macro Mechanisms

local leaders last, within our findings section, to emphasize the importance of social efficacy in our model.

LINK 1: STATE-LED ETHNOPOLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP USING IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS FRAMES

An Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology gained a strong foothold in Darfur's politics in the mid-1980s. Link 1 in Figure 1 depicts this entrepreneurial and state-supported, macro-level role of ideology. We conceptualize this ideology within the framework of political process theory (McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996) and as the foundation for a genocidal political opportunity structure in Darfur.

The leadership of the Sudanese government used a transformational crisis framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Oberschall 2000) to reconfigure the political demography of Darfur (Jok 2007). More specifically, Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology served as an instrument of domination that demeaned black African groups. Although Darfur is almost entirely Muslim, the state-led ideology distinguished between Arabs and black Africans and took the side of Arabs in land disputes.

Comparative analyses reveal the broader global importance of changing ethnopolitical ideologies and state-level entrepreneurship in framing Link 1 of genocidal processes. For example, Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (2006:797) indicate that ethnic intolerance was not initially salient in the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia, but only became so after the war began. This shift was orchestrated by the Milosevic government's elite manipulation of public images and events. Incorporating constructionist themes, Oberschall (2000) indicates that cognitively framed "normal" attitudes in post-Tito Yugoslavia gave way as they were overwhelmed by an elite Milosevic-instigated "crisis framing."[6]

John and Jean Comaroff (1997:406) similarly note that in South Africa, an elite-driven crisis atmosphere of group conflict provoked distancing and separation between blacks and whites, and that at such crisis moments "cleavages, real and imaginary, reassert themselves." Brubaker (1996) calls this a process of "unmixing,"[7] which aptly describes Rwanda. Although the Hutu and Tutsi often intermarry and are frequently indistinguishable, the Rwandan government led a propaganda campaign with a crisis frame and forced the use of identity cards (Prunier 1997). This advanced the process of racially marking the Tutsi for genocide.

In Darfur, national ethnopolitical entrepreneurs provoked deadly racial distinctions through an ideological shift from normal to crisis frames (Deng 1995). The 1970s saw more normal periods of relative optimism about a Sudanese identity joining Arab and African groups (Doornbos 1988). At the time, it was common to assert that "Dar Fur was an African kingdom that embraced Arabs as equals" (Flint and de Waal 2005:3). Burton (1991:514), however, finds a history of slavery that "left deeply engrained animosities." Appiah (2007:17) identifies the salience of the slavery trope, noting that "because people almost always think of slaves as belonging to a kind—a race, a tribe, a class, a family—that is suited to enslavement, the slave status tends to survive the abandonment of the formal institutions of slavery." Slavery reemerged as a background theme, signaling a racial redefinition that was moving from demeaning to degrading.

The 1980s "Arabization" policy of "Arab-Islamic imperialism" aroused the latent hostilities of a crisis frame with its evolving supremacist ideology and its assault on traditional African cultures (El-Battahani 2006). This assault included the rejection of the independent status of women, tribal dancing, alcohol consumption, bartering practices, and traditional modes of dress. These were replaced with the teaching and speaking of Arabic, restrictions on women, rejection of alcohol, a cash economy, and Arab traditions of dress, including the *jellabiya* for men and the *taub*

[6] Oberschall (2000:989) defines a cognitive frame as "a mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others" (drawing on Snow et al. 1986; see also Benford and Snow 2000).

[7] This contrasts with the reframed "normalization" and mixing of U.S. Jewish (Brodkin 1998) and Irish (Ignatiev 1995) identities as "white."

for women (Flint and de Waal 2005:14–15). The process was demeaning to the traditions of black African groups.

There were at least two added macro-level and highly politicized sources and phases to this Arabized crisis framing in Darfur. One source involved the Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi who brought guns into Darfur during the famine of 1985. He hoped to create an "Arab belt" and to support an "Arab Gathering" across sub-Saharan Africa. A second source involved the 1986 campaign to elect Sadiq al-Mahadi as Prime Minister of Sudan to create an "Arab and Islamic Union" (Harir 1994). The Union explicitly sought to subordinate black Africans to Arab Muslim rule.

As part of this subordination process, Arab intellectuals wrote Sudanese Prime Minister al-Mahadi a widely publicized letter in 1987 celebrating the "Arab race" for the "creation of civilization in the region" (cited in Flint and deWaal 2005:52) and demanding greater government control and representation (Rabbah 1988). From this period on, Arabs replaced Africans in Darfur's civil service (International Crisis Group 2004).

The 1993 military coup that installed current President al-Bashir backed these policies with belligerence and brutality. Earlier demeaning policies were now imposed with a more open and degrading use of force. The crisis frame intensified in response to the Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) publication in 2000 of *The Black Book,* which documented Arab dominance in Sudan's government. When the allied Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) subsequently launched several attacks against government forces in Darfur in early 2003 (Flint and de Waal 2005), the Sudanese state responded with a heightened crisis sense of insecurity about the threat of racial insurgency.

El-Battahani (2006:38) describes how "the rulers in Khartoum have mastered a technique of divide and rule, of disrupting and co-opting ethnic, regional elites." More broadly, he concludes that "of all ideological weapons used in African warfare, . . . ethnicity . . . has proved by far the superior" (p. 35). The Sudanese government used Arab militias for nearly 20 years in the south, sometimes even supplementing them with black African recruits from Darfur. In 2003, the latter recruitment ended, and Bashir shifted the militias to attacks on the settled black African agricultural groups in Darfur. The government also took advantage of rising racial tensions between Darfur's settled African agriculturalists and landless nomadic Arab pastoralists who were growing increasingly desperate for access to water and pastures for their livestock in an ecosystem of advancing desertification (Harir 1992; Suliman 2000).[8]

LINKS 3A AND 3B: AGGREGATION AND CONCENTRATION OF COLLECTIVE DEHUMANIZATION

The ultimately crucial steps in the dehumanizing collective framing process are Links 3a and 3b in Figure 1. Hinton (2002:36) suggests the term "genocidal priming" to refer to the transformative dynamics represented by these links. We further incorporate Hinton's point that "when the priming is 'hot' and genocide takes place, there is almost always some sort of 'genocidal activation' that ignites the charge" (p. 37). Our thesis is that this kind of racial spark or ignition is observed in the aggregation and concentration of the collectively framed racial epithets shouted during attacks in Darfur. It is this aggregation and concentration of racial dehumanization that ignites the collective effect of genocidal activation.

Our framing perspective also draws from work on ethnic conflict and domestic violence. Brubaker and Laitin (1998:427) call for such cross-level and subfield linkage when they suggest that "we may have as much to learn about the sources and dynamics of ethnic violence from the literature on criminology (Katz 1988) as from the literature on ethnicity or ethnic conflict." This reference invokes Katz's (1988) account of the role of cursing in "righteous slaughters" of intimates and acquaintances:

> Consider cursing. Most of the studies of impassioned violence reveal a great deal of attendant cursing. Although impassioned attacks sometimes

[8] It is important to distinguish the nomadic Arab groups of North Darfur, the Abbala, from the Arab groups in South Darfur, the Baggara. Four of the larger Baggara Arab tribes have land rights and have not engaged in the recent Darfur conflict (Abdul-Jalil 2006). Many Abbala Arabs explain their role in the current conflict in terms of this 250-year-old search for land.

> occur without verbal forewarning, it seems natural to move into assaults with shouts of "bitch," "you fucking asshole," "rat bastard," "punk motherfucker," "nickel-and-dime drunk." . . . Why? . . . They curse, not in the superficial sense, . . . but . . . to effect degrading transformations. . . . Symbolically transforming the offending party into an ontologically lower status. . . . Curses draw on the communal language and its primordial sensibility about the relationship between the sacred and the profane. . . . Cursing sets up violence to be a sacrifice to honor the attacker as a priest representing the collective moral being. (Katz 1988:36–37)

The challenge is to generalize from this transformational role of curses in the specific ontology of interpersonal crimes to collective racialized domains of genocidal violence.

This is where group identity again becomes salient. It is the "us" versus "them" intensification of group conflict that raises "righteous slaughters" to mass atrocities. Katz (1988) argues that disabling the moral inhibition against murdering a "loved one" is accomplished by person-specific cursing—mass murder raises the stakes from individual denouncement to group dehumanization. This higher-order transformation in Darfur involved a collectivized process of racial dehumanization.

"Such extreme dehumanization becomes possible," Kelman and Hamilton (1989:19) observe, "when the target group can be readily identified as . . . a distinct racial, religious, ethnic, or political group regarded as inferior or sinister." They explain that this is how killing can feed upon itself and become genocidal, with perpetrators "coming to believe that the victims are subhuman and deserve to be rooted out" (p. 20). Fein (1979, 2007) and Gamson (1995) explicitly link this racial dehumanization to genocide. Gamson (1995:3) writes that "the cultural contest is over who is the 'we,' to whom specific moral obligations apply, and who is the 'they,' to whom they do not." This framing contest maps out what Fein (1979) envisions as the "universe of obligation."

We argue that the racial epithets heard during attacks in Darfur are transformed into collective motive and intent as they are aggregated and concentrated in selected settlements and begin to take on a frenzied dimension in Link 3a. Coleman argues that this kind of transformative (i.e., Type 3) process is weakly developed in other sociological theories. The importance of this process is reflected further in Link 3b, which depicts the collective frenzy that connects hostile racial motivation and intent to genocidal violence. This lethal victimization is the lasting scar of the genocidal state.

The collective frenzy represented in Link 3b is the culmination of racial dehumanization. Forces shouting racial epithets undertook ground attacks on African villages. These epithets in Darfur involve tropes of slavery and subhumanity:

> "They called her Nuba [a derogatory term for black Africans] dog, son of dogs, and we came to kill you and your kids."
> "You donkey, you slave; we must get rid of you."
> "You blacks are not human. We can do anything we want to you. You cannot live here."
> "We kill our cows when they have black calves—we will kill you too."
> "All the people in the village are slaves; you make this area dirty; we are here to clean the area."
> "You blacks are like monkeys. You are not human."
> "Black prostitute, whore; you are dirty—black."
> "We will kill any slaves we find and cut off their heads."

These words and phrases shouted by the perpetrators are explicit evidence of dehumanizing motivations and intentions during attacks on black African villagers.

The racial component of the epithets is the motivational element. The intentional element includes the targeted references to killing, raping, assaulting, looting, and destroying group life. We shorten this reference to "collective racial intent" in the following tables and figures. The further critical dimension, of course, is that when targeted by state-based ethnic entrepreneurs, such expressions of violent racism acquire an aggregated and concentrated force that rises above each individual expression and leads to collective genocidal victimization. Prunier (2005:165) concludes that "since Darfur had been in a state of protracted racial civil war since the mid-1980s, the tools were readily available; they merely needed to be upgraded. It was done and the rest is now history." We demonstrate below how the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets significantly increased the severity of genocidal victimization in Darfur.

THE ATROCITIES DOCUMENTATION SURVEY

Explanations of genocide are mostly presented in comparative historical case studies (e.g., Midlarsky 2005) rather than quantitative analyses (but see Gurr and Harff 1994). Our goals are both integrative and quantitative. The critical integrative aspect of our approach involves empirically connecting state-led ethnic entrepreneurship with cognitive framing and genocidal violence.

In June of 2004, a U.S. official let Sudan know that their activities in Darfur were under satellite observation (AAAS 2004), although "the images are not hard evidence until . . . corroborated by testimony of witnesses on the ground." That summer, aides convinced Secretary of State Colin Powell to substantiate charges of genocide with survey evidence. The State Department authorized the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) interviews of 1,136 Darfur refugees in Chad.[9] A brief summary of the survey with several tables and maps (U.S. Department of State 2004) formed the background for Powell's September 2004 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the genocide in Darfur.

The ADS is based on a multistage cluster sample of 1,136 Darfur refugees in 20 camps and settlements in eastern Chad (see Howard 2006). The UN organized its camps by lettered grids, with each sector led by a sheikh. The ADS team identified all sectors in the camps and sampled them proportionately by size and ethnicity. They then sampled "households" and adults within them randomly for interviews. Because camps and settlements were organized around sheiks, their social geography reflected the settlement clusters (hereafter "settlements") from which refugees fled. With the State Department's geospatial technology, cartographers, and translators, interviewers were able to locate 90 percent of the originating settlements.

We used the ADS field atlas to locate respondents in the 22 originating settlements (see Map 1) that had 15 or more respondents each; this included 932 of the 1,136 respondents. We calibrated the circles on Map 1 in quartiles of persons who reported hearing racial epithets. The sample was designed to proportionately represent the population of refugees from adjoining areas of Darfur. An evaluation for the State Department indicated that the sample "captured the entire scope of the Darfuri refugees in Chad."[10]

The ADS data uniquely and extensively measured victimization during attacks. We know of only one other systematic study of pre-camp violence in Darfur (Depoortere et. al 2004), and none that include sexual violence. Since the beginning of the conflict about 18 months earlier, refugees were asked when, how, and why they had left Darfur and if, when, and how they, their family, or fellow villagers were harmed. The survey mixed the closed-ended format of health surveys with the semistructured format of legal witness statements (Respini-Irwin 2005). We cross-checked and supplemented the ADS data by reading and coding the extensive narratives recorded in the interviews (see also Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker 2005).

The data include the age, gender, and group memberships of the displaced individuals, the separate and combined government and Janjaweed militia attacking groups, the forms of attacks, their particular reported targets, the density of settlement clusters, measures of rebel activity (supplemented with a media study measure), and reports of hearing the racial epithets described above.

We next describe the dependent measure of severity of victimization. Descriptive details for the independent variables are presented in Table 1 and the Appendix.

Our measurement of severity of victimization uses a section of each survey that recorded up to 20 victimization incidents. Respondents reported attacks on themselves, their families, and their settlements involving bombings,

[9] Funding for the State Department survey flowed through the American Bar Foundation. The first author received permission and support to work with these data through his association with the American Bar Foundation. We altered identifying characteristics and used pseudonyms to protect ADS respondents' anonymity.

[10] This description of the ADS sample is based on interviews with the field supervisor and lead survey methodologist for this study, as well as the detailed account provided by the latter (Howard 2006).



Map 1. Settlement Map of Racial Epithets: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer 2004

killing, rape, abduction, assault, property destruction, and theft leading to displacement. Every respondent reported for both themselves and their settlements.

The victimization severity score is based on the common law seriousness (see Hindelang 1978) of the incidents reported. We aggregated the incidents experienced or witnessed by each

Table 1. Individual and Settlement Cluster Statistics: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer 2004

	Mean	SD
Individual Level		
Respondents' Attributes		
Age	37.100	14.634
Gender (Male = 1)	.400	.491
Zaghawa	.527	.500
Fur	.055	.288
Masalit	.275	.447
Jebal	.045	.208
Attacking Groups		
Janjaweed	.100	.300
Sudanese	.188	.391
Sudanese and Janjaweed	.672	.470
Rebel Activity		
Rebels in Town	.017	.130
Missing Rebel Data	.562	.496
Particular Targets		
Women	.070	.260
Racial Intent		
Individual Racial Intent	.343	.475
Attacks		
Bombing	.829	.727
First Peak	.266	.442
Second Peak	.499	.500
Victimization Severity	34.232	6.317
Settlement Cluster Level		
Settlement Density	.182	.151
Collective Racial Intent	.312	.144
Bombing	.861	.369
Rebel News Accounts	.318	.497

Note: N = 932 individuals (Level 1) and 22 settlement clusters (Level 2).

respondent in the settlement and assigned the following values: five = reported killings, four = sexual violence or abductions, three = assaults, two = property destruction or theft, and one = displacement.[11] Below, we briefly summarize more specific results based on numbers of reported killings and rapes,[12] however, the measurement properties are more attractive for the severity scale than for the numerical count scales. This is probably because of the limited opportunities for respondents to actually count or even estimate these numbers. Chirot and McCauley (2006) note that it is self-defeating to try to define mass murder in a precise numerical way. It is also impossible to gauge the exact amount and value of property theft and destruction. Meanwhile, the severity scale is nearly normal in its distribution, while the frequency counts are predictably skewed with many zeros. The victimization severity scores range from 20 to 56, with an average score of just over 34.[13] As noted below, the severity scale performs well in terms of reliability.

HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS OF GENOCIDE VICTIMIZATION IN DARFUR

We use hierarchical linear models (HLM) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to estimate variation in outcomes within and between settlements, with adjustments for nonindependence resulting from clustering within settlements. For example, our final within-settlement model of severity of victimization regresses individual-level reports of victimization severity by the 932 respondents on their individual reports of hearing racial epithets and other independent variables. Our between-settlement model regresses the average victimization severity

[11] To illustrate the coding, consider a Masalit woman who scored 52. Sudanese troops and Janjaweed militia attacked her village. Her report included 20 incidents from that day involving her, her family, and her village. During the attack, she was beaten, abducted, and raped; her father was beaten and abducted; other village women were abducted, with some held and others not, but they were beaten and raped before being released. Another group of women were raped. Additional villagers were beaten, shot, and stabbed. The woman witnessed dead in the village, and her village was pillaged and destroyed. She was displaced to Chad.

[12] Respondents reported an average of 1.72 rapes and 5.18 killings resulting from attacks on their settlements.

[13] We explored sources of retrospective measurement error. It is plausible that less serious and less frequent events occurring earlier in the time frame would be less fully recalled. However, the correlations between the time since respondents fled Darfur and the reported seriousness of victimization and frequency of killings are respectively .017 and –.018 ($p > .10$). It is also plausible that older respondents would have heard racial epithets less frequently, but the correlation between age and epithets is .005 ($p > .10$). The ADS interviews focused on recall of objective information (Hagan and Palloni 1986, 2006).

scores for the 22 settlements—after the individual-level variables are taken into account—on the proportion of respondents who report having heard racial epithets and other variables in each of the settlements.

From the resulting joint analysis, we learn not only about individual-level sources of variation in victimization in Darfur, but also about the influence of differences in the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets between settlements on victimization, with the individual-level variables controlled. It is in this sense that we regard the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets in this analysis as a collective measure (Link 3b, Figure 1) of the influence of racial motivation and intent on victimization.[14]

The within-settlement model of victimization severity as our ultimate outcome is the following:

$$\text{Victimization Severity}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \Sigma\sum_{q=1}\beta_q X_{qij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where β_{0j} is the intercept and X_{qij} is the value of covariate q associated with respondent i in settlement-level j. β_q denotes the partial effects on victimization severity of a respondent's age and gender; rebels in the town; missing rebel data; attacking Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces; victimized Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, or Jebal groups; bombing; targeting of women; attacks during the first or second displacement peaks; and hearing racial epithets. The error term ε_{ij} is the unique contribution of each individual, which is assumed to be independently and normally distributed with constant variance σ^2.

The between-settlement equation is the following:

$$\beta_{0j} = \theta_{00} + \theta_{01}\,(\text{collective racial intent}) + \ldots. + U_{0j}$$

where θ_{00} is the overall average standardized victimization severity score, and θ_{01} is the regression coefficient of the effect of racial epithets, measured as a settlement-level mean score, on total victimization. Additional settlement-level covariates are incorporated as further controls, and we include significant cross-level interactions. Because the individual-level covariates at Level 1 are centered about the sample means, β_{0j} is the standardized mean total victimization in a settlement after covariates have been controlled. U_{0j} is the settlement-level error term, assumed to be normally distributed with a variance of τ.

A preliminary concern is the reliability of the outcome measure of severity of victimization that results from partitioning of the variance within and between settlements. The settlement measure of differences in this outcome yields a .733 degree of reliability. The intraclass correlation is .23 and statistically significant, indicating that about one-fourth of the victimization severity scale's variance is between settlements, comparable to that found in analogous multilevel studies of organizations or schools.

MULTILEVEL STRUCTURAL MODELS OF GENOCIDE VICTIMIZATION

We first consider several models of the mediating concept of racial motivation and intent at the center of our critical collective frame analysis. The dehumanizing racial epithets represent the constructionist framing of the conflict in Darfur into "us" and "them" motivational terms. Chirot and McCauley (2006:73) write that "hate seems to us best understood as an extreme form of negative identification." This extreme negative identification is racially dehumanizing. Because our measure of racial motivation and intent is a binary report of whether a respondent heard shouted racial epithets during the attack that preceded flight to the refugee camp, we estimate the models with the logistic regression equations presented in Table 2.

The first of these equations shows that these epithets are heard significantly more often when Sudanese and Janjaweed forces are combined in an attack. This suggests the Sudanese forces' primary instrumental role and is consistent with Chirot and McCauley's (2006:8) proposition

[14] We adapted a dictionary definition of *aggregation* as "a combined whole" and a military definition of *concentration* as the massing of forces in a particular area in preparation for planned operations. Our point in linking these terms is to focus on both the joining of the epithets and their targeted assembly in particular places in preparation for attacks. This is a classically sociological collective process resulting in settlement-wide violent consequences greater than could be expected from solely individual shouts of racial epithets. The collective consequences include the heightened vulnerability and fanatical fury that lead to genocidal violence.

Table 2. Individual and Settlement Cluster Level Logistic Regression Models of Racial Intent: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer 2004

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b(se)	Odds	b(se)	Odds	b(se)	Odds
Individual Level						
Respondent						
Age	–.005	.994	–.005	.995	–.005	.995
	(.005)		(.005)		(.005)	
Gender	.660**	1.934	.666***	1.947	.685***	1.983
	(.178)		(.169)		(.170)	
Zaghawa			.528	1.696	.565	1.759
			(.296)		(.344)	
Fur			.890*	2.434	–.834	2.302
			(.430)		(.420)	
Masalit			.733**	2.081	.692**	1.996
			(.281)		(.285)	
Jebal			.819**	2.268	.899**	2.445
			(.325)		(.356)	
Attacking Groups						
Janjaweed	.194	1.214	.186	1.205	.302	1.353
	(.331)		(.338)		(.328)	
Sudanese	–.316	.729	–.397	.672	–.348	.706
	(.340)		(.324)		(.302)	
Sudanese and Janjaweed	.517**	1.677	.410*	1.508	.467*	1.595
	(.197)		(.209)		(.229)	
Rebel Activity						
Rebels in Settlement	–.977*	.376	–.946*	.388	–.941	.390
	(.457)		(.493)		(.502)	
Missing Rebel Data	–.352	.703	–.289	.749	–.275	.760
	(.225)		(.251)		(.250)	
Particular Targets						
Women	.296	1.322	.243	1.275	.239	1.269
	(.347)		(.369)		(.376)	
Attacks						
First Peak			–.628***	.534	–.649***	.523
			(.186)		(.186)	
Second Peak			.243	1.275	.232	1.261
			(.232)		(.234)	
Settlement Cluster Level						
Settlement Density					.603	1.828
					(.796)	
Rebel News					.138	1.142
					(.335)	
Cross-Level Interaction						
Sudanese and Janjaweed × Rebel News					.190	1.209
					(.301)	
Sudanese and Janjaweed × Settlement Density					2.063**	7.873
					(.845)	
Intercept	–.725		–.725*		–.736	

Note: N = 932 individuals (Level 1) and 22 settlement clusters (Level 2).
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

that "large scale genocides need the organizational power of government," as anticipated by Link 1 and the role of the state in Figure 1.

The first equation also shows that rebels are less likely to be in the villages where racial epithets are heard. This negative finding strongly suggests direct racial targeting of civilians rather than of suspected rebels, which would be expected in a more legally justifiable self-defense, counter-insurgency strategy.[15] One survivor interviewed in the ADS survey noted the difference between the current conflict and past conflicts: "Ten years ago there was fighting between Zaghawa and Arab. But this is a targeting of civilians, this is different. They want to commit genocide."

The second model in Table 2 introduces the African groups expected to be targets of the racial epithets in Link 2 of Figure 1 and during the two peak periods of attacks. Three of the four African groupings—the Fur, Masalit, and Jebal—are significantly more likely to have heard racial epithets, while only the Zaghawa are not. This may be because racial epithets are more likely to be heard in ground attacks, and a separate analysis indicates that the Zaghawa were subjected to bombing more often than the other groups. Meanwhile, controlling for the African group memberships in the second model reduces the effect of the combined Sudanese and Janjaweed attacks by about 20 percent, offering further evidence that these joined forces instrumentally directed their attacks with a socially constructed racial focus on these particular African groups. Finally, a significant negative effect from the first peak of attacks suggests that racialization of the attacks increased during the conflict, which is consistent with the emergence of a crisis frame in Darfur.

The third model estimated in Table 2 adds both settlement-level and cross-level interactions to the analysis. There are no significant main effects for either settlement density or rebel news (i.e., indicated by media reports). The bottom panel of Table 2, however, indicates that there is a significant cross-level interaction effect of settlement density with the combined involvement of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces on the hearing of racial epithets. This concentration of racial motivation and intent in densely populated areas is consistent with the population perspective on group competition for life-sustaining resources indicated at the origin of the model in Figure 1. Figure 2 clarifies the meaning of this cross-level interaction, showing average estimates of combined Sudanese and Janjaweed attacks on racial epithets at the higher and lower quartile levels of settlement density.

Recall that we measured both of the interacting variables in Figure 2 in terms of variation from their sample means. The results indicate that increased population density makes racial epithets more likely when Sudanese and Janjaweed forces attack together. When the Sudanese or Janjaweed forces attack separately, increased population density diminishes the likelihood of hearing racial epithets. The effect of the combination of forces in the higher quartiles of population density approximately doubles the hearing of racial epithets from about 20 percent to over 40 percent. As anticipated by Links 1 and 2 in Figure 1, this is compelling evidence of the instrumental role of the Sudanese state in intensifying the expression of a socially constructed racial motivation and intent by joining with the Janjaweed in attacks on densely settled areas of Darfur.

Table 3 explores the socially constructed influence of racial motivation and intent—measured at the individual and settlement levels by racial epithets—in increasing the severity of genocidal victimization. The OLS regression equations estimated in Table 3 take into account statistically the influence of individual-level correlates previously included in Table 2, as well as bombing, on the victimization severity. Model 1 again supports predictions following from Link 1 in Figure 1. This model shows the instrumentally combined salience of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces, this time in predicting victimization severity. To a lesser degree, Sudanese forces acting alone also significantly increase this victimization, while Janjaweed forces acting alone do not. These results document the leading role of the Sudanese state in the genocidal violence. Meanwhile, rebels' presence in a settlement does not significantly increase victimization severity. This null finding under-

[15] Table 2 also indicates that men are more likely than women to hear the epithets ($B = .660$, $p < .001$). This is probably because women are less likely to know Arabic.



Figure 2. Cross-Level Interaction of Separate and Combined Forces with Settlement Density (mean centered) on Individual Racial Intent

mines the self-defense, counter-insurgency justification for the attacks, and it is consistent with comments from respondents like the following: "My village was not defended and how could we defend? There was no equality in power. There were no rebels nearby."

The dummy variable representing the first two weeks of the survey when rebel questions were not asked (i.e., the missing rebel data variable) indicates that less severe victimization was reported during this period. This implies that asking these questions in the early weeks would not have resulted in the rebel variable being significant. Finally, Model 1 shows that severity of adult victimization decreases with age, as is true more generally in crime research (see Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983).

Model 2 introduces the specific African groups as socially constructed targets, as well as the targeting of women, bombing, the peak attack measures, and the measure of individual-level racial motivation and intent. Again, as predicted by Link 2 in Figure 1, the Fur, Masalit, and Jebal are at significantly higher risk for more severe victimization, while the Zaghawa are not. In the open-ended survey narratives, the Fur respondents report extreme dehumanizing experiences of torture: people were cut, brains removed, sexual organs cut off, and skin removed (see also Human Rights Watch 2005). Women are also a specifically targeted group. Respondents report that the Janjaweed and Sudanese military troops specifically targeted women by raping and abducting them. Like the racial epithets, the words and phrases spoken by the perpetrators during attacks provide insight into their motivation and intent. One respondent reports hearing the perpetrators say, "We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race." Another respondent was raped, branded, and told, "You are now Arab wives." In these examples, the intention is to change the race of the offspring.

The effect of combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces is reduced by about 15 percent in the second equation, while the Sudanese force effect is essentially unchanged. This again suggests the instrumental role of the Sudanese in targeting and unleashing victimization when they attacked in conjunction with the Janjaweed, as anticipated in Link 1 of Figure 1. The two peak attack variables are significant. Finally, the individual-level racial epithet measure of racial motivation and intent has a strong and highly significant effect on victimization severity, as predicted in Link 3a of Figure 1.

Table 3. Individual and Settlement Cluster Models of Victimization Severity: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer 2004

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	b(se)	b(se)	b(se)	b(se)	b(se)	b(se)
Individual Level						
Respondent						
Age	–.005**	–.004*	–.004*	–.004*	–.004*	–.004*
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Gender	–.057	–.138**	–.140**	–.132*	–.130*	–.136**
	(.056)	(.055)	(.056)	(.058)	(.059)	(.058)
Zaghawa		–.023	–.023			
		(.105)	(.104)			
Fur		.321**	.257			
		(.125)	(.153)			
Masalit		.265**	.012			
		(.099)	(.167)			
Jebal		.224***	.256***	.174***	.261***	.214***
		(.050)	(.060)	(.031)	(.047)	(.056)
Attacking Groups						
Janjaweed	.157	.162	.144	.145	.143	.137
	(.178)	(.183)	(.184)	(.194)	(.189)	(.191)
Sudanese	.375**	.386**	.372**	.375**	.365**	.374**
	(.156)	(.150)	(.151)	(.151)	(.151)	(.152)
Sudanese and Janjaweed	.509***	.432***	.422***	.428***	.416***	.425***
	(.110)	(.116)	(.117)	(.121)	(.123)	(.125)
Rebel Activity						
Rebels in Settlement	.138	.228	.229	.215	.204	.210
	(.239)	(.209)	(.211)	(.212)	(.217)	(.218)
Missing Rebel Data	–.330**	–.306***	–.295***	–.314***	–.290**	–.286**
	(.111)	(.085)	(.085)	(.094)	(.089)	(.088)
Particular Targets						
Women		.448***	.442***	.467***	.462***	.457***
		(.086)	(.087)	(.093)	(.095)	(.094)
Attacks						
First Peak		.223**	.216**	.210**	.189**	.199**
		(.078)	(.079)	(.078)	(.075)	(.078)
Second Peak		.190*	.189*	.189*	.211**	.220**
		(.093)	(.091)	(.091)	(.090)	(.090)
Bombing		.061	.067	.054	.051	.058
		(.045)	(.045)	(.043)	(.037)	(.041)
Racial Intent						
Individual Racial Intent		.387***	.387***	.394***	.365***	.367***
		(.067)	(.087)	(.085)	(.083)	(.084)
Settlement Cluster Level						
Settlement Density				.686*	.449	.243
				(.316)	(.299)	(.405)
Bombing						–.137
						(.288)
Rebel News						–.032
						(.115)
Collective Racial Intent			1.225*		1.107*	1.066*
			(.565)		(.553)	(.518)
Cross-Level Interaction						
Bombing × Collective Racial Intent					.781**	.747*
					(.306)	(.341)
Bombing × Settlement Density					.131	.133
					(.156)	(.166)
Intercept	–.023	–.011	–.077	–.013	–.012	–.014

Note: N = 932 individuals (Level 1) and 22 settlement areas (Level 2).
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Model 3 in Table 3 adds the mean settlement-level racial epithet measure of collective racial motivation and intent, which, as predicted in Link 3b, is statistically significant. The addition of only this variable in Model 3 has the further effect of reducing the size and eliminating the significance of the African Fur and Masalit group measures. Consistent with the focus of our critical collective framing perspective, this means that settlement-level differences in collective racial motivation and intent account for the greater severity of victimization of the Fur and Masalit groups in Darfur. Further analysis at the settlement level can add clarity to this finding. To maintain the robustness of the significance tests, we removed the African group measures that are statistically insignificant with the inclusion of the racial motivation and intent variable in the model.

Models 4 and 5 in Table 3 bring settlement density into the victimization analysis. When settlement density is introduced alone at the settlement level, it is statistically significant. This indicates that severity of victimization increases in densely settled areas of Darfur—the areas the population perspective argues have the greatest opportunities and incentives for attacks and where resources are potentially the most strained. Recall too, however, that the sequence in Figure 1 indicates that collective racial motivation and intent is a crucial and socially constructed mediating mechanism through which settlement density would exercise its exogenous influence.

Our data uniquely reflect the respective exogenous and endogenous roles of population density and racial motivation and intent. When the main effect of collective racial motivation and intent is added alone or in cross-level combination with bombing, the effect of settlement density is reduced by about one-third or more and becomes nonsignificant. The mediating effect of collective racial motivation and intent in removing the significance of the effect of settlement density on severity of victimization is striking evidence of the salience of race as the mediating—Link 3b—mechanism in this conflict.

The cross-level interaction effect of collective racial intent with bombing on victimization severity adds another dimension to these results. Because the bombing is entirely under Sudanese state control, and because we saw earlier that the instrumental joining of the Sudanese with the Janjaweed in the attacks drives the racial epithet measure of racial motivation and intent, this cross-level interaction further points to the instrumental role of the Sudanese state. Model 6 demonstrates that including both individual- and settlement-level measures of rebel activity in the villages does not account for these effects.

The cross-level interaction of Sudanese bombing with collective racial motivation and intent (measured with settlement-level differences in racial epithets) is particularly striking evidence of the instrumental use of state power to divide and victimize the socially constructed identification of subordinate target groups. The impact of this cross-level interaction is further clarified with the graphical capacity of HLM in Figure 3.

As in Figure 2, we measure both of the interacting variables in Figure 3 in terms of variation from their sample means. At the lower quartiles of collective racial motivation and intent, the effect of increased bombing is associated with decreasing levels of victimization severity. In the higher quartiles of collective racial intent, increased bombing elevates the severity of victimization. We previously argued that the Sudanese government instrumentally directed the Janjaweed forces and channeled their socially constructed racial hostility toward African groups as a means of more effectively gaining control over the Darfur region, partly out of insecurity and fear that this region was escaping government control (see Flint and de Waal 2005). Figure 3 supplements Table 3 in showing how in densely settled areas, the concentration of bombing and collective racial hostility against specific African groups, such as the Fur and Masalit, produces an elevated severity of genocidal victimization.[16] The fact that the government directed the bombing and enlisted the

[16] Although reported frequencies of killings and rapes are less reliable than the severity scale, the results of using these measures are interesting. The cross-level interaction effect of collective racial motivation and intent and bombing is stronger and more significant when numbers of killings is substituted for the severity scale as the outcome. However, this cross-level interaction is weaker and nonsignificant for numbers of rapes (both killings and rapes are estimated from 1 to 10 or more). For rape, the main



Figure 3. Cross-Level Interaction of Collective Racial Intent with Bombing on Victimization Severity

Janjaweed in racially animated attacks that intensified the severity of victimization indicates that the Sudanese state intentionally took a command role in the collective enactment and perpetration of genocide, as hypothesized with the combination of links identified in Figure 1.

LINK 2: LOCALLY-ORGANIZED ETHNOPOLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS OF RACIAL DEHUMANIZATION

We turn finally to the interstitial role of local leadership in our model, which we illustrate with further narratives from the ADS interviews. As Mertonian strain theorists (e.g., Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Messner and Rosenfeld 1993) emphasize, and as anticipated in our discussion of political process theory, the integration of legitimate (e.g., government authorized) with illegitimate (e.g., gang and militia organized) opportunity structures can activate and advance collective action, organized criminality, and even genocidal victimization. In genocides, state entrepreneurs often recruit local agents who possess the social efficacy (Matsueda 2007) needed to transform individual initiative into collective action. Authorities' activation of ethnic attacks from "above" requires locally led "resonance from below" (Mamdani 2007).

By further incorporating Matsueda's (2007) collective action approach, we address the classic question of how authorities enlist civilians in locally organized and targeted mass atrocities. Official and unofficial community leaders in Darfur, such as Musa Hilal, effectively organized Arab civilians into "war according to the crisis script." In this kind of "us" and "them" script, "once the young man 'took out a gun' he became encapsulated in a quasi military unit subject to peer solidarity and ethnic loyalty" (Oberschall 2000:997–98; see also Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004).

In Darfur, authorities integrated local outlaw Janjaweed militia with the reservist Public

effect of collective racial motivation and intent remains salient. Note that while bombs obviously can kill, only persons can rape.

Defense Forces of the Armed Forces and the Police (Office of the Prosecutor 2007:40). Locally-organized indoctrination included instruction in "us" and "them" distinctions that escalated from demeaning and degrading to dehumanizing characterizations. These included attributions of subordinate, slave, and subhuman statuses. Racial epithets constituted the hooks for the dehumanization leading to genocide. The incentive was clear, for as Dower (1986:89) brutally explains and our analysis starkly confirms, "it is . . . easier to kill animals than fellow humans."

Narrative descriptions of attacks recorded in the ADS interviews and information from the legal brief of the Office of the Prosecutor (2007) specifically demonstrate how the racial framing of the political opportunity structure in the Darfur genocide was locally mobilized. The first of two major government offensives began in mid-2003 when the locally infamous Arab leader Musa Hilal was released from prison to organize militias. Hilal and other militia leaders—including Hamid Dawai, Ali Kushayb, and Abdullah Shineibat—were frequently identified by eyewitnesses in the ADS interviews.

Until recently, Arab nomadic groups traversed a changing landscape of diminished life chances. Almost overnight, socially efficacious (Matsueda 2007) local sheiks such as Hilal, Dawai, Kushayb, and Shineibat were newly empowered by the Sudanese state as leaders of Janjaweed militias. They became personal embodiments of the kind of mobility that can follow from the integration of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures in a genocidal setting.

These militia leaders organized attacks in which racial epithets were the collectively framed vocabulary of motive and intent. Map 2 shows the approximate areas of their operations. These are also the areas with high reports of racial epithets and attacks, as we saw in Map 1 and the quantitative analyses.

The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (2007) identified Ahmad Harun, then a Deputy Minister in charge of the "Darfur Security Desk," as the official responsible for mobilizing local Janjaweed militia leaders like Hilal. Harun had previously mobilized tribes in the 1990s in the Kordofan area to the east of Darfur. Beginning in 2003, he mobilized Janjaweed militias in Darfur.

Hilal, with Harun's support, rallied attacks on black African villages with a collective vocabulary of dehumanizing motivation and intent that was racially framed.[17] More specifically, an eyewitness from the ADS survey reported seeing Hilal speak to a mixed crowd of Arabs and black Africans in June 2003 in a market town near a militia training camp. Hilal arrived in a four-wheel drive car with tinted windows and a mounted machine gun. An interviewer summarized the eyewitness account:

> Musa Hilal said he was sent by the Government of Sudan, and he told the people that we are going to kill all the blacks in this area, and that if you kill people, nobody will be prosecuted. Also if you burn [i.e., homes], nobody will prosecute or "question" you. Animals you find are yours. . . . He said he will clear the land.

Hilal was accompanied by a man who appeared to be a government official and who explained Hilal's recent arrest and return to North Darfur:

> He wasn't from the area. He said Musa Hilal had been arrested, "but we brought him back for your safety." He instructed the people to "understand" what Musa Hilal said, "to obey his orders," and to use him as a "reference."

This eyewitness provided accounts of subsequent attacks and burnings.

Another ADS respondent was certain of Hilal's identity, recognizing him from prior interactions. This respondent recalled standing in the middle of the market when Hilal arrived with armed men. Hilal announced that "the government gave me the order and I came here. The government gave me cars and uniforms. The government gave me the order to start killing the people here—all the blacks from here to Karnoi and Tine and up" (see Maps 1 and 2). Hilal indicated that he was told to "kill all the blacks in the area" and that his forces should "give the Arab people freedom" by "clear[ing] the land."

Two additional ADS respondents described Hilal's training camp. The first respondent located the camp near Misteriha, and the second described, in racially explicit terms, the threat

[17] Several sources (see Flint and de Waal 2005:106; Steidle and Wallace 2007:188) also cite documentary evidence of state instigation and authorization of these racialized attacks led by Hilal.



Map 2. Janjaweed Militia Leaders' Areas of Operation

posed by the camp. The interviewer summarized her story:

> She lived in a nearby village . . . where Musa Hilal trained his men. They trained there for 25 days with weapons. . . . During the training, the Arabs shopped at the market in the black villages and they said they were going to kill all the blacks. . . . On the 26th day of the training, someone spoke over the microphone. He said that you have trained for

> 25 days and now you should kill the people in the nine villages nearby. . . . While she was fleeing, she was chased and caught by men. . . . The women were raped.

The interviewer reported that the respondent was obviously traumatized.

The Office of the Prosecutor's (2007) presentation of evidence for charges against Harun and Kushayb documents a July 2003 speech Harun gave in Darfur with Hilal, in which he implies protection for attacks on racially-targeted African villagers:

> On that day, Harun's speech was preceded by that of the notorious militia/Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. Hilal's speech was characterized by the witnesses who heard it as "very racist." . . . Hilal's remarks were followed by Harun's announcement that the President had handed him the Darfur Security Desk and that he had the power and authority to kill and forgive . . . in Darfur. Harun himself indicated that he spent more than four months in Darfur. (P. 53)

Harun was present at a meeting near Nyla when a militia/Janjaweed leader boasted that the Arab tribes "can wipe out the areas of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit in a matter of one month." Harun was heavily involved in the distribution of weapons and money and the development of training camps. He reportedly had an "unlimited and unaudited" budget, and he repeatedly said in speeches that he held the power "to kill or forgive whoever" in Darfur (Office of the Prosecutor 2007:53–70).

Harun encouraged attacks on civilian populations he associated with rebels, and he said they were ready "to kill three quarters of Darfur in order to allow one quarter to live." His defense of the indiscriminate policy was that the "rebels infiltrate the villages" and thus the villages "are like water to fish." Harun encouraged taking from "all the Fur and what they had," which he characterized as "booty," and further identified the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit as the primary targets of attack (Office of the Prosecutor 2007:53–60).

COLLECTIVE DEHUMANIZATION IN CRIMINALLY ORGANIZED ACTION

In sum, dehumanizing expressions of racial motivation and intent in the form of racial epithets most commonly occurred during joint attacks of the Sudanese government with Arab Janjaweed forces on black African groups in Darfur. These racial expressions played an elevated role in areas densely settled by African groups, and individual and collective expressions of racial motivation and intent increased the severity of genocidal victimization. These findings, and further evidence that Sudanese bombing associated with the shouting of racial epithets increased the severity of genocide victimization, support the claim that the Sudanese state's Arab supremacist ideology was an important source of the dehumanization process that led to genocide in Darfur.

We found no evidence that the presence of rebel groups is associated with severity of victimization, whereas there is significant evidence that the victimization of African groups by the Sudanese state is militarily unjustifiable as counter-insurgency against rebel attacks. Such findings question primordial and counter-insurgency explanations while supporting aspects of the instrumental, population–resource, constructionist, and cognitive perspectives that form the foundation of a critical collective framing account of genocidal victimization.

There is especially strong evidence that racial motivation and intent, expressed with racial epithets during attacks, formed a consequential crisis frame in Darfur. This dehumanization process placed black African groups in Darfur outside a bounded universe of moral obligation and left them vulnerable to targeted genocidal victimization. Treatment of groups as dehumanized and contemptible makes them vulnerable to displacement and destruction. We found compelling evidence that collective processes of racial motivation and intent influenced the severity of victimization across settlements, above and beyond this influence at the individual level, and that this collective frame mediated the concentration of attacks on densely settled areas and particular African groups. This evidence documents the kinds of organized social processes increasingly emphasized in international criminal law and is relevant to a social scientific determination that genocide did occur in Darfur.

Specifically, our findings are consistent with a sociological theory of what international law recognizes as "criminal organization," "common purpose," and "joint criminal enterprise." International criminal prosecutions are saturated with assumptions about collective action (Meierhenrich 2006). A notable example is the

prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic (recently aborted due to his death) for his involvement in a "joint criminal enterprise" to commit genocide in the former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003).

Osiel (2005:1768), a prominent legal scholar, emphasizes the need to better understand the "kind of influence . . . participants in such criminality actually exercise over one another, through what organizational devices and interactional dynamics." Our analysis of the emergence of collective racial motivation and intent provides direct evidence of the "interactional dynamics" involved in Darfur. The further sociological backdrop to this state-organized criminal enterprise is the integration of legitimate government military and illegitimate paramilitary opportunity structures. These structures were built around Arab Janjaweed militias in Darfur by leadership figures partially identified in Map 2.

In the interest of maintaining its control over Darfur, the Sudanese government integrated the Janjaweed into its military strategy. The key to this integration was that the enlisted and newly empowered Arab Janjaweed forces were members of landless nomadic groups increasingly in need of arable land. This is the population–resource-based ecological context of a collective action and opportunity structure that uses an "us" and "them" crisis framing of collective racial motivation and intent to direct the unfolding of genocidal victimization. Our findings indicate that racism was used in Darfur as an instrument for the collective framing of organized terror that amplified the severity of genocidal victimization. In Coleman's terms, this socially organized and instigated terror was a transformative "Type 3" process with the features of a killing frenzy, or fanatical fury, which linked targeted racial motivation and intent to genocidal violence.

There are, of course, limitations to the data analyzed in this article. The data come from surviving refugees whose former settlements were close enough to the Chad border to allow their escape. There is notable evidence, though, that these data are representative (see the Appendix). Attacks were reported retrospectively, and it would be preferable to have separate sources for the measures of racial epithets and victimization. Nonetheless, legally-trained interviewers made special efforts to document the racial epithets in precisely reported phrases, and the violence and victimization were specifically recorded in the style used by police investigators taking statements for use in court.

As a follow-up effort to obtain further corroboration for our findings, the first author conducted interviews with the Darfur Investigation Team at the new International Criminal Court in The Hague during three weeks in October 2006 (more than 100 hours of fieldwork). During a particularly instructive interview, the African Head of the Investigation Team received a cell-phone call from an investigator the first author had interviewed the previous day in The Hague and who now was interviewing a Janjaweed defector in London. Within weeks, the BBC released a parallel interview with an anonymous Janjaweed defector. Either the two interviews were with the same defector or they corroborated one another's accounts. The interview described much that is statistically documented in our data analysis, for example, that Janjaweed fighters were instructed with racial epithets and orders such as "kill the blacks," that the Janjaweed did not fight without Sudanese orders, that Sudanese bombing characteristically preceded Janjaweed ground attacks, that abductions and rapes were common, and that civilians, more than rebels, were the intended targets of the attacks.[18] This interview also includes an important assertion of repeated visits to the training camps by a Sudanese Minister of the Interior.

Such evidence about the conflict in Darfur might make its prosecution as racial genocide seem certain. Between 200,000 and 400,000, maybe more, have died (Hagan and Palloni 2006; Hagan et al. 2005), and 2 to 3 million people have been forcibly displaced. Yet neither the European Union, which is the main funding source for the new International Criminal Court (ICC), nor the UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur (2005), which recommended referral of the Darfur case to the ICC, nor the first brief filed by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (2007) called this conflict genocide. They instead characterized Darfur as a lesser crime against humanity. A second brief filed by the ICC

[18] The interview can be heard at http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolavconsole/ukfs_news/ and read at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6060856.stm.

Prosecutor in 2008 charged Sudanese President Al-Bashir with genocide, although with an ethnic rather than racial focus.

It is possible that racism is not only a significant force in genocidal victimization, but is also present in the language and naming of conflicts. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004:21) emphasize that "collective denial" and "misrecognition" are prerequisites for genocide. *Misrecognition* is Bourdieu's term for collective denials so deeply embedded in our socially induced unconsciousness that they become a matter or habit, what Bourdieu called habitus (Bourdieu 1977). We noted distinctive parallels between genocidal victimization in Europe and Africa. Yet, perhaps with regret born of his own misrecognition as the UN Secretary-General during the genocide in Rwanda, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2004) cogently observed that "a genocide in Africa has not received the same attention that genocide in Europe or genocide in Turkey or genocide in other parts of the world. There is still this kind of basic discrimination against the African people and the African problems." We suggest that the rejection of the role played by race in Darfur, again led by the UN in its influential Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, is a form of misrecognition and denial by an institutionally embedded and culturally powerful voice using "techniques of neutralization" (Alvarez 1997; Sykes and Matza 1957).

Like Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word *genocide,* Edwin Sutherland argued that it is important to identify white-collar crime as a crime, for purposes of both public discourse and scientific study. Sutherland understood the importance of applying probabilistic rather than criminal law reasoning to white-collar crime and of incorporating a collective conceptualization for its explanation. Genocide demands the same understanding. Legal reasoning has obscured the recognition of genocidal victimization and allowed an underestimation of the role of the state in its collective racial framing. As noted at the outset, Fein (1990:7) believes sociologists are inhibited by a lack of boldness on this topic. More than 50 years after Sutherland added white-collar crime to the agenda of public sociology, it is time to do the same with Lemkin's concept of genocide.

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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Sample Selection Issues

Although death is a source of selectivity in our data, it is mitigated by individuals' reports about their *villages* and the HLM modeling of the *collective* violence and its effects. Furthermore, because the victims are almost exclusively black Africans victimized at the hands of Arabs, and because this victimization increases in association with state involvement and racial epithets, the potential mortality bias is almost certainly either negligible or conservative with regard to the relationship of victimization to state involvement and racial epithets.

We compared the population pyramids we constructed from this refugee sample with samples from displacement camps inside Darfur (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2007: Figures 5 and 6). These pyramids are similar in terms of age and gender composition. For example, in both Chad and Darfur there is a disproportionate absence of fighting-age men who are disproportionately reported killed. There are thus no indications that the Chadian refugees differ in significant ways from internally displaced

Darfuris in the bordering areas of Sudan and Chad.

It is commonly said that the border between Chad and Darfur is literally "little more than a line in the sand." Movement back and forth across this border is very common, which is why the State Department/USAID was interested in investing nearly a million dollars in this survey in Chad. It is also noteworthy that this sample includes both camps and resettlements, rather than camps alone. Finally, note that many of the respondents in this survey are not victims in the sense of direct violent victimization. This is not "merely" a survey of victims, although all respondents are displaced. For that matter, almost the entire black African population of Darfur has been displaced, regardless of which side of the uncertain border they are on now. This makes the displaced on either side of the border an appropriate population to sample.

A much greater consideration than sample selection bias is being able to ask sensitive questions, which the Sudanese government does not want asked, about rape and pre-camp violence in the internal displacement camps. This is the more important and unique value added by the ADS data from the Chadian side of the border.

Independent Variable Measures

Males make up 40 percent of the sample and have an average age of 37 years. Females probably predominate because they are more likely to be raped yet survive. Nearly 10 percent of respondents reported that women were specifically targeted in the attacks. Just over half of the African individuals self-identified as Zaghawa group members, just over a quarter are Masalit, and Fur and Jebal represent about five percent each.

We read and coded each survey narrative to determine whether the attacking group was made up of Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces. About two-thirds of the attacks were joint Sudanese and Janjaweed operations, while nearly one-fifth involved only Sudanese and about one-tenth involved only the Janjaweed. The remaining attacks form the omitted comparison group. Making the Janjaweed the omitted category produced similar substantive results.

During the second two weeks of the survey, an item was added asking if there were rebels in a respondent's town or surrounding villages. Less than 2 percent of the sample reported a rebel presence, with these reports concentrated disproportionately in several northern settlements. Half of the sample were not asked this question and thus were coded zero. We included a variable reflecting these missing data. A media study identified seven of the settlements as experiencing rebel activity, and this was included as a cluster-level measure (Petersen and Tullin 2006). The settlement-level correlation between the respondent reports and the media survey classification is .4. We incorporate both measures in our analyses.

There were two peak periods of displacement in Darfur after February 2003 (Office of the Prosecutor 2007: Annex 3). We include two variables that indicate the first (June through August 2003) and second (December 2003 through March 2004) peak months of the conflict. The second peak is thought to include the high point in Sudanese–Janjaweed attacks in Darfur.

The survey provides considerable detail in recording the shouting of racial epithets, our measure of racial motivation and intent, during the attacks. We recorded the content of the epithets as a detailed string variable, and we assigned each individual a binary code indicating the hearing of racial epithets. About one-third of the respondents reported racial epithets during the attacks. These epithets were explicit and offer concrete, first-person evidence of dehumanizing racial motivation and intent.

We analyze racial epithets at both the individual and mean settlement levels to indicate individual and collective racial motivation and intent predicted in Links 3a and 3b of Figure 1. The individual scores are binary "yes" or "no" reports of hearing racial epithets. The settlement scores are means of these reports, reflecting variation in the aggregation and concentration of these dehumanizing racial epithets at the settlement level.

In addition to news of rebel activity in an area and the mean level of racial epithets, we include the density of settlements as a third cluster-level measure. The Darfur Investigation Team at the ICC provided this measure to the first author. We use UN reports of the number of settlements in an area as the numerator, with square kilometers of the area as the denominator. We multiplied this measure of settlement

density per square kilometer by 10 to make its metric consistent with other measures in the analysis.

The population–resource perspective does not regard settlement density as simply a control variable, but rather as a meaningful measure of criminal opportunity and incentive (Cohen and Felson 1979; Osgood et al. 1996) that reflects the presence of desirable property, such as possessions, livestock, and the settled land itself. Settlement of a land area effectively constitutes ownership in Darfur, and in a time of desertification, access to settled land is often a crucial resource for sustaining life. We therefore expect that victimization will increase in densely settled areas, where opportunities and incentives are greatest and resources are potentially the most strained. This hypothesis is consistent with the Malthusian view of population growth that Diamond (2005) applies to the Rwandan genocide.

Because bombing as a method of attack is both a means and a form of victimization, we chose to treat bombing as an independent variable. Only the Sudanese state possesses planes and bombs, and bombing is therefore a unique measure of the state's instrumental role in genocide. Individuals reported being bombed up to a maximum of seven times, with a mean of about one. The mean bombing score for each settlement is our fourth cluster-level measure.

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