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POLS 410 LECTURE NINE 
Science,Technology and the Military"


I. Dominant configurations 
   A. = Patterned relationships between arenas; institution. 
   B. Why? 
	1. Large-scale tech. projects 
	     expensive, time-consuming, require extensive cooperation, 
	     pol. clout, risky 
	     >> good to reduce spread the risk 
   C. Drawbacks 
	1. Not democratic; poor accountability 
 	2. May not be efficient (Pentagon & semiconductors) 
	3. May spur "technological imperative" 

II. Mil-industrial complex 
   A. Mil services, DOD, lg. military corps., scientists & engineers 
   B. Explanation for why arms race seemed to have a momentum of its own:
      interests of 3 arenas push tech., not strategic considerations 
   C. R&D structure: state-of-the-art weapons take many years to design,
      test, deploy (MX research began in 1960's) 
	>> R&D funding decisions for weapons must be made long before the
 	   exact nature of the threat the w. will be designed to counter
 	   is known 
	>> planning not just based upon adversary's current arsenal, but on
 	   projections of what they might do (usually based upon our own
 	   potential capabilities, 
	   e.g., Manhattan Project & Nazi threat; H-bomb dec., 
	-- U.S. had tech. lead throughout arms race (except ICBMs), always
 	   based on premise that Soviets might dev. w's.

III. Corporate-managerial & Executive Arenas 
     Very close rels. among def. industries & govt: 
	"Government relations offices" 
     Revolving door: based upon technical expertise & experience, not
 	inherently corrupt 
	Ex-Pentagon officials have knowledge of dec-mking procedures &
 	continue relationships w/ current Pentagon officials. 
     Defense contractors hire DoD civilian employees & retiring mil.
 	officers (Career mil. officers begin retiring at 50; gov't.
 	employees may take early retiremt. too) 
     Trade associations; arms conventions (intra-arena cooperation among
	corporate-managerial actors to pool resources; overall goal is to
	keep mil. spending high) 
     Advisory committees: provide technical advice to DoD & armed services;
 	relies heavily on academic-professional arena. 

IV. Corporate-managerial & legislative arena 
    Funding 
	Major congressional committees: Armed Services, 
	  Appropriations, Sci & Tech. 
        Lobbying, PAC's, honoraria. 
    2nd revolving door: ex-Congress members & ex-staff work for defense
 			contractors 
	Best for Corporate-managerial arena to concentrate or spread out
 	  subcontracts for large weapons projects? 
	-- Spread out: jobs in as many districts & states as possible. 
    Iron Triangle: defense corps., exec. & legislative arenas. (Gordon Adams)

V. Corporate-Managerial & Academic-Professional Arenas 
   30% of U.S. scientists & engrs in defense. 
   Many in university labs 
   Benefits: 
	Paid better, 
	more technologically sophisticated, 
	bigger budgets 
	(50% U.S. R&D funds go to defense) 
   Disadvantages: 
	Secrecy >> little interaction w/ colleagues 
	Vulnerable to defense budget cuts (Econ. conversion) 
   Some indivs. are influential (Teller), 
	but academic-professional arena as a whole is far less influential
 	  than others. 
	-- Not agenda-setter, but reacts (mobilization against SDI)

VI. Defense contracting 
   A. Mil. corporations: risk minimizers 
	-- focus on modifications of existing tech. 
	   (engineering over pure research) 
   B. Very concentrated, dominated by a few big companies 
	-- many subcontractors 
	Overhead costs high from accounting & security documentation
 	  required by Congress & Pentagon 
   C. Cost-plus contracting encourages cost overruns 
   D. Production contracts much larger that R&D, go to R&D contractor on a
        noncompetitive basis. 
   E. Govt- supported R&D programs
	>> little risk to contractors for private R&D.

VII. MIRV 
    "Technological community" -- met needs of many actors 
	(mil. services, Pentagon,researchers, corp-managerial) 
	McNamara: cheap way of expanding aresenal 
    Not a new system; dev'd from engineers tinkering 
	(technological imperative) 
    Arms control: U.S. ahead in tech., so opposed Soviet move to 
      prohibit MIRVs in SALT I 
	-- Backfired: Soviet heavier missiles >> more MIRVs in 70's 

VIII. Does military spending benefit the civilian economy? 
   A. Yes: 
	1. Lg. R&D budgets expand frontiers of knowledge 
	2. Spin-offs: Apollo program, Tang, 
	3. mil. is creative first user -- gets prices down. 
   B. No: 
	1. Diverts scientists & engrs. fr. civilian economy; competition for
 	   experts drives cost of tech. up 
	2. Not competitve on civilian market (expensive) 
	3. Distort markets to have Pentagon as major purchaser 
	4. Civ. mkts will be larger in long run: semi-conductors 
	5. Empirical: If econ. benefits of mil. prominence outweighed costs,
 	   U.S. tech. superiority in 1960s & 70s shd. have increased. Instead,
 	   U.S. high tech industries were eclipsed by Japan & Europe. 
	6. Empirical: Few patents from military R&D because little basic
 	   research (Pentagon favors large firms which are less innovative;
 	   secrecy inhibits market-ization of new tech., e.g., inventor of
 	   transistor tried to prevent Pentagon from getting it.) 
   C. Case study: Japan dev'd strong indus. w/o mil. subsidies 
	How? 
	1. Protected 
	2. Licensed U.S. tech. (U.S. firms cd. not get access to mkts.,
	   so licensed) 
	   a. EX: Sony licensed transistor for approx. $100,000 
	3. Coordinated R&D: "Industrial policy" (MITI)

IX. Nuclear proliferation: Nye

X. Militarization of space: Deudney 
	Globalism vs. Nationalism