

AA 598B Special Topics

Decision-Making & Control for Safe Interactive Autonomy

Instructor: Prof. Karen Leung

Autumn 2024

<https://faculty.washington.edu/kymleung/aa598/>



Announcements

- Proposal feedback – can revise and resubmit by Friday.
 - Leave a comment on Canvas
- Homework 2 due (recommended)
- Start your project!

Last time

- Quick intro to game theory

$$\forall i \in [N] \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \min_{X^i, U^i} J^i(\mathbf{X}, U^i; \theta^i) \\ \text{s.t. } x_{t+1}^i = f^i(x_t^i, u_t^i), \forall t \in [T-1] \\ x_1^i = \hat{x}_1^i \\ {}^p g^i(X^i, U^i) \geq 0 \\ {}^s g(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{U}) \geq 0. \end{array} \right.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla_x \mathcal{L}(x^*, \mu^*, \lambda^*) &= 0 \\ \nabla_\mu \mathcal{L}(x^*, \mu^*, \lambda^*) &= 0 \\ \nabla_\lambda \mathcal{L}(x^*, \mu^*, \lambda^*) &= 0 \\ \mu^* &\geq 0 \\ \text{KKT conditions} \end{aligned}$$

- Nash equilibrium: $J_i(u_i^*, u_{-i}^*) \leq J_i(u_i, u_{-1}^*) \quad \forall u_i \in U_i$

$$\mathbf{G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}) := \begin{bmatrix} \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} J^i + \boldsymbol{\lambda}^{i\top} \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}) \\ \nabla_{\mathbf{u}^i} J^i + \boldsymbol{\lambda}^{i\top} \nabla_{\mathbf{u}^i} \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}) \\ \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}) \end{bmatrix}_{(5)} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \max_{\theta, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}} & p(\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}) \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}; \theta) = \mathbf{0}. \end{array}$$


Today

- Wrap up game theory
- Sampling-based methods for planning
- Start Module #3: Controls

Finding Nash equilibria

Generally difficult to find

- Iterated best response



Wang et al 2021 https://msl.stanford.edu/papers/wang_game-theoretic_2021.pdf

Stackelberg games

Leader-follower structure

- Two players & one acts first and the second, after observing the first player's action, acts afterwards.

For any function $f : Z \times W \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$,

$$\sup_{z \in Z} \inf_{w \in W} f(z, w) \leq \inf_{w \in W} \sup_{z \in Z} f(z, w)$$

First **Second**
player player

First **Second**
player player

What if we can't compute gradients easily?

- So far, the methods relied on some sort of gradient descent
 - SQP assumes differentiability
 - KKT conditions
- Don't have a differentiable model for human prediction, cost, constraints, etc.
- We can consider searching over the space via a sampling-based approach
 - Leverage computation!

Robot conditioned human trajectory predictor





Fig. 2. CVAE architecture for sequence-to-sequence generative modeling of future human actions $\mathbf{y} = u_h^{(t+1:t+N)}$ conditioned on joint interaction history $(x^{(0:t)}, u^{(0:t)})$ and candidate robot future actions $u_r^{(t+1:t+N)}$ (together, \mathbf{x}). The random variable \mathbf{z} is a latent mixture component index.

Planning with ego-conditioned prediction

Multimodal Probabilistic Model-Based Planning for Human-Robot Interaction



Search over a pre-computed trajectory tree




Fig. 5. 4096 candidate robot action sequences scored each planning loop.



Sampling to estimate gradient

Model Predictive Path Integral (MPPI)

(Homework 2)

1. Start with nominal trajectory
2. Add noise to it to generate many trajectories
3. Evaluate cost of each trajectory
4. Compute weight for each trajectory
5. Compute weighted sum over controls to compute control


<https://sites.gatech.edu/acds/mppi/>

W

Potential drawbacks? Advantages?


Planning with rules

Receding Horizon Planning with Rule Hierarchies for Autonomous Vehicles



Rank	Satisfied Rules
1	ϕ_1, ϕ_2, ϕ_3
2	ϕ_1, ϕ_2
3	ϕ_1, ϕ_3
4	ϕ_1
5	ϕ_2, ϕ_3
6	ϕ_2
7	ϕ_3
8	\emptyset


TABLE I: Illustration of trajectory ranks for three rules.



$$R(\rho) := \sum_{i=1}^N \left(a^{N-i+1} \text{sigmoid}(c\rho_i) + \frac{1}{N} \rho_i \right)$$

Planning with rules

Two-step optimization: trajectory tree + local refinement



$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u_{0:T}} \quad & -R \circ \hat{\rho}(x_{0:T}, w) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & x_{t+1} = f(x_t, u_t), \text{ for } t = 1, \dots, T \end{aligned}$$

<https://github.com/UW-CTRL/stljax/>

Signal temporal logic

$$\phi ::= \begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c} \top & \mu_c & \neg\phi & \phi \wedge \psi & \phi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi \\ \hline \text{True} & \text{Predicate} & \text{Not} & \text{And} & \text{Until} \end{array}$$

Boolean Semantics


$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x} \models \mu_c &\Leftrightarrow \mu(x_0) > c \\ \mathbf{x} \models \neg\phi &\Leftrightarrow \neg(\mathbf{x} \models \phi) \\ \mathbf{x} \models \phi \wedge \psi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{x} \models \phi) \wedge (\mathbf{x} \models \psi) \\ \mathbf{x} \models \phi \vee \psi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{x} \models \phi) \vee (\mathbf{x} \models \psi) \\ \mathbf{x} \models \phi \Rightarrow \psi &\Leftrightarrow \neg(\mathbf{x} \models \phi) \vee (\mathbf{x} \models \psi) \\ \mathbf{x} \models \Diamond_{[a,b]} \phi &\Leftrightarrow \exists t \in [a, b] \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{x}_t \models \phi \\ \mathbf{x} \models \Box_{[a,b]} \phi &\Leftrightarrow \forall t \in [a, b] \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{x}_t \models \phi \\ \mathbf{x} \models \phi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi &\Leftrightarrow \exists t \in [a, b] \text{ s.t. } (\mathbf{x}_t \models \psi) \\ &\quad \wedge (\forall \tau \in [0, t], \mathbf{x}_\tau \models \phi) \end{aligned}$$

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.00097>

Quantitative Semantics (Robustness Formulas)

$$\begin{aligned} \rho(\mathbf{x}, \top) &= \rho_{\max} \quad \text{where } \rho_{\max} > 0 \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \mu_c) &= \mu(x_0) - c \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \neg\phi) &= -\rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi \wedge \psi) &= \min(\rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi), \rho(\mathbf{x}, \psi)) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi \vee \psi) &= \max(\rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi), \rho(\mathbf{x}, \psi)) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi \Rightarrow \psi) &= \max(-\rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi), \rho(\mathbf{x}, \psi)) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \Diamond_{[a,b]} \phi) &= \max_{t \in [a,b]} \rho(\mathbf{x}_t, \phi) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \Box_{[a,b]} \phi) &= \min_{t \in [a,b]} \rho(\mathbf{x}_t, \phi) \\ \rho(\mathbf{x}, \phi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi) &= \max_{t \in [a,b]} \left\{ \min \left(\min_{\tau \in [0,t]} \rho(\mathbf{x}_\tau, \phi), \rho(\mathbf{x}_t, \psi) \right) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$


Differentiable STL




<https://github.com/UW-CTRL/stljax/tree/main>

Safe control


Module #3




Motivating example: Traffic-weaving



Planning and control stack




What if the human does something unexpected?
What if the prediction model makes a “mistake”?
Do we trust our prediction model + planner?




We need a *safety filter*


- **Safety filter:** A module that checks the computed controls and adjusts the control as needed.

How to define safety? What to adjust it to?






Autonomous
car



Human driver

To brake or
not to brake?

Well, it depends...




What constitutes as *reasonable* behavior?

Different stakeholders
make different assumptions




Examples of safe control strategies

Velocity obstacles




Van der Berg et al 2008

Contingency planning




Kuwata et al 2009

Hamilton-Jacobi reachability




Leung et al 2020

Safety force field (SFF)



NVIDIA

Forward reachable sets




Kousik et al 2017

Responsibility sensitive safety



MobileEye


Planning and control stack




A safety concept helps determine (1) how safe and (2) what are allowable safe controls to take



World state






Measure of safety



Set of allowable safe controls

Hamilton-Jacobi reachability



Sequential decision-making

Dynamic programming

$$\min_u \int_0^T c(x(t), u(t)) dt + F(x(T))$$

Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

$$u \in \mathcal{U}$$

$$x(0) = x_0$$

$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min_u \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u) + c(x, u) \right\} = 0$$

$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$


But we only care if we reach the target set

$$\min_u \int_0^T c(x(t), u(t)) dt + F(x(T))$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{x} = f(x, u)$$

$$u \in \mathcal{U}$$

$$x(0) = x_0$$



Backward reachable set

Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation

$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min_u \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u) + c(x, u) \right\} = 0$$

$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$

The value function represents the terminal cost of the system at the final time.

$$F(x) \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow x \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$F(x) > 0 \Leftrightarrow x \notin \mathcal{T}$$


$V(x, -T) < 0 \Rightarrow$ System will end up in \mathcal{T}

Adding disturbances


Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs Equation

$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min_u \max_d \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u, d) \right\} = 0$$

$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$



Backward reachable tube



Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs Equation


$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min(0, \mathcal{H}(x, t)) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{H}(x, t) = \min_u \max_d \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u, d) \right\}$$

$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$

“Take the minimum value along the trajectory”

Backward reachable tube



Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs Equation


$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min(0, \mathcal{H}(x, t)) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{H}(x, t) = \min_u \max_d \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u, d) \right\}$$

$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$

“Take the minimum value along the trajectory”

Also consider *avoiding* the target set




Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs Equation


$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \max_u \min_d \left\{ \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u) \right\} = 0$$
$$V(x, 0) = F(x)$$

Dubins car example (avoid)

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{x} \\ \dot{y} \\ \dot{\theta} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} v \cos \theta \\ v \sin \theta \\ u + d \end{bmatrix}$$




With (yellow) and without (red) disturbance



Can apply to *relative dynamics*

Hamilton-Jacobi reachability



Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equation

$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min \left\{ 0, \max_{u \in U} \min_{d \in D} \frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u, d) \right\} = 0 \\ V(x, 0) = v(x)$$

Measure of safety




Robot avoids collision




Human seeks collision

Aircraft collision avoidance




$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{x}_{\text{rel}} \\ \dot{y}_{\text{rel}} \\ \dot{\theta}_{\text{rel}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -v_a + v_b \cos \theta_{\text{rel}} + y_{\text{rel}} u_a \\ v_b \sin \theta_{\text{rel}} - x_{\text{rel}} u_a \\ u_b - u_a \end{bmatrix}$$



Planning and control stack



Using HJ BRTs as safety filters



Unification of Safety Concepts via Optimal Control Theory

Depends on the assumptions you make about other agents when evaluating safety


Hamilton-Jacobi Reachability

Open-loop
“non-reactive” policies


Closed-loop
“reactive” policies




Consider all possible behaviors
Full forward reachable set



Consider only a subset of possible behaviors
e.g., hard-braking (SFF)



Guard against all possible policies
Including worst-case outcomes




Guard against a subset of possible policies
Assumptions on other agent's behaviors

What are “reasonable” assumptions about how other agents behave?

Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equation

$$\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial t} + \min \left\{ 0, \max_{u \in U} \min_{d \in D} \left(\frac{\partial V(x, t)}{\partial x} \cdot f(x, u, d) \right) \right\} = 0$$

$V(x, 0) = v(x)$



Overly-conservative assumptions
lead to impractical safety concepts!

How to pick “reasonable” choices for U and D ?