Index ← 3767 CFJ 3768 3769 → text
===============================  CFJ 3768  ===============================

      A party to the contract in evidence CAN act on behalf of the other
      party to transfer a coin.


Caller:                        Jason Cobb

Judge:                         omd
Judgement:                     FALSE



Called by Jason Cobb:                             03 Aug 2019 22:15:39
Assigned to Trigon:                               10 Aug 2019 11:57:39
Trigon recused:                                   25 Aug 2019 19:03:35
Assigned to omd:                                  25 Aug 2019 19:03:35
Judged FALSE by omd:                              28 Aug 2019 02:41:50


Caller's Evidence:


Consent of a second party:

Excerpt from Rule 1742/21 ("Contracts"):

    A party to a contract CAN perform any of the following actions
    as permitted by the contract's text:

    * Act on behalf of another party to the contract.

    * By announcement, revoke destructible assets from the contract.

    * By announcement, take liquid assets from the contract.


Caller's Arguments:

The contract exists because two parties (G. and I) have consented to it,
and neither has ceased being party to the contract.

The contract states that

    If "this statement is false" is a true statement, each party to this
    contract is permitted to, and CAN, once, and only once, act on
    behalf of the other party to transfer one (1) Coin to this contract.

This contract, subject to a conditional, permits a party to act on
behalf of another party to it. Thus, whether or not Rule 1742 states
that I CAN act on behalf of another party is directly dependent on the
conditional specified by the contract. However, this conditional is a
paradoxical statement (the liar paradox). Thus, whether the Rule states
that I CAN act on behalf depends on a paradoxical statement. The other
part of the requirements is fulfilled, as I have not acted-on-behalf of
G. pursuant to this contract before.

Considering the possible outcomes:

FALSE: To reach this outcome one would need to find that "this statement
is false" is false, which is not a valid assessment of that statement's
truthfulness (it is a paradox); FALSE is not appropriate.

TRUE: As above, but would need to find the statement true; TRUE is not

IRRELEVANT: Whether or not I can act on behalf of G. is absolutely
relevant because it is on the permissibility of an action that affects a
quantity that the Treasuror must keep track of; I make this further
relevant by actually attempting to perform this action later in the
message in which I submit this case. This is therefore relevant to the
game; IRRELEVANT is not appropriate.

INSUFFICIENT: I have (hopefully) given the judge everything that e needs
to issue a judgement; INSUFFICIENT is not appropriate.

DISMISS: I argue that PARADOXICAL is appropriate, so DISMISS is not

PARADOXICAL: "appropriate if the statement is logically undecidable as a
result of a paradox", I argue that this is in fact true, as the
statement depends on the truthfulness of the liar paradox; I argue that
PARADOXICAL is appropriate.


Judge omd's Arguments:

FALSE by the precedent of CFJ 3728.  (If I can't have it, neither can you! 

CFJ 3728:
> Suppose that omd pledged not to state any falsehoods and then stated
> "omd violated Rule 2450 by saying this sentence." Whether this is a
> violation is not easily ascertainable because it is a paradox; in fact
> it is simply a slightly abstracted version of the most basic
> self-reference paradox "This sentence is false."
> So, moving out a layer, is it LEGAL to create a proposal that contains a
> paradoxical statement after vowing to not create any proposals
> containing false statements? No.