Index ← 3695 CFJ 3696 3697 → text
===============================  CFJ 3696  ===============================

      D. Margaux has fulfilled eir obligation, detailed in the rule
      entitled 'Space Battles', to 'once communicate to the resolver the
      amount of Energy [e wishes] to spend" in Space Battle 0001.

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Caller:                        twg
Barred:                        D. Margaux

Judge:                         G.
Judgement:                     FALSE

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History:

Called by twg:                                    15 Jan 2019 23:52:12
Assigned to G.:                                   16 Jan 2019 00:05:16
Judged FALSE by G.:                               29 Jan 2019 23:02:32

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Judge G.'s Arguments:

Let's say D. Margaux and twg had the following private conversation:

twg:  I've picked a secret number - I'll call it tau.  Here's a hash so
you know that I've chosen what tau is ahead of time.

D. Margaux:  Sure, I'll bite:  I wish to spend tau+1.

twg:  Right, I now know exactly how much you wish to spend.

Then when twg later publishes both sides, e reveals the hash contents,
and tau has a reasonable, appropriate value.

Now there's two ways to adjudicate this:

1.  "communicate to the resolver the amount of Energy" must be judged
strictly with all the onus of communication on the combatant.  That is,
D. Margaux's messages alone must contain sufficient information to
communicate a value to any typical Agoran observer privy to D. Margaux's
messages (but not privy to the contents of the hash).  This would result
in false.

2.  "communicate to the resolver [twg]" can include context known to
twg. Here, D. Margaux of eir own free will communicated sufficient
information to twg for the value to be determined by the resolver.
While risky on D. Margaux's part, it was eir risk to take, of eir own
free will.  This would result in true.

In general, for private conversations, we've tended to lean towards #2:
allowing lingo and context to evolve, or allowing private contracts /
communications to work.  That allows for more flexible, enjoyable game
play (where "clever arrangements" are part of that).  However, if we
find this works in all cases, consider the following communication:

twg:  Your opponent has told me how much energy e wishes to spend.
Let's call that number tau.

D. Margaux:  I wish to spend tau + 1.

And of course, twg's communication isn't necessary, D. Margaux could
simply say "I wish to spend whatever the other combatant spent, +1".
This clearly defeats the intent of the combat; moreover, allowing this
sort of conversation allows the combatant to act on unknown information
that's required (by rule) to be kept from em.

To allow for flexible play, then, without using others' secrets,
requires something of a middle ground.  To that end, I would suggest the
following:  that if the person originating the "wished/desired" spending
doesn't have reasonably sufficient information (at the time of
communication) to know eir wish, then e cannot actually communicate eir
wish.  This allows some degree of encoding that's only known to the
resolver - e.g. the resolver can say "use my public key to encode your
spend and I'll use my private key to decode it".  But the fundamental
"wished value" has to be known to D. Margaux (as an absolute value, not
in reference to unknown values) for em to communicate it to twg.

So, since this sort of communication wouldn't work in the "pure" case
(where the value is provably set-in-advance via a resolver's hash), we
don't have to delve into situations where the encoding was less
provable, as in this one.  I find FALSE.

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