========================= Criminal Case 3316 =========================
Machiavelli, by publishing the statement cited in Evidence, has
violated Rule 2170 (Who am I?) by making a public statement
intended to mislead others as to the identity of its publisher.
Judgement: NOT GUILTY
Called by G.: 29 Apr 2013 17:16:46 GMT
Defendant Machiavelli informed: 29 Apr 2013 17:16:46 GMT
Assigned to scshunt: 05 May 2013 19:37:59 GMT
Judged NOT GUILTY by scshunt: 12 May 2013 02:13:30 GMT
On Mon, 29 Apr 2013, Tanner Swett wrote:
> djanatyn (a first-class person who has never been a player before, and
> who has authorized me to act on his behalf for approximately the next
> six month or until he declares otherwise) registers.
Assertion A: While Machiavelli tries to make it clear that e is publishing
something on behalf of someone else, the fact that this is ISID means
Machiavelli is misleading us... the registration has not actually been
published by djanatyn. It's likely important to consider the following
part of R2170 "Rules regarding persons pertain to those persons directly,
not to ... other entities representing those persons within Agora." This
implies that announcement rules do NOT apply to representatives (so
no registration occurred).
If A is not true (e.g. the court finds it would be POSSIBLE to register
on behalf of someone if the court has proof that the someone exists), the
secondary purpose of the Criminal Case is to determine whether the strictest
standard of proof is required to determine the alleged existence of first-
class player djanatyn, and particularly whether such an agreement exists.
I suggest that Machiavelli has not yet provided sufficient evidence on
djanatyn's existence to prove emself innocent of the charge beyond a
Gratuitous Arguments by omd:
> Assertion A: While Machiavelli tries to make it clear that e is publishing
> something on behalf of someone else, the fact that this is ISID means
> Machiavelli is misleading us... the registration has not actually been
> published by djanatyn.
There is a long history of precedent favoring act-on-behalf
in general, e.g. CFJ 1719.
> I suggest that Machiavelli has not yet provided sufficient evidence on
> djanatyn's existence to prove emself innocent of the charge beyond a
> reasonable doubt.
E's innocent unless guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not the other way
Gratuitous Arguments by Machiavelli:
NOT GUILTY, because I believed
that my action succeeded by the same mechanism that allowed
partnerships to act back in auld lang syne. To my memory, that
mechanism has not been removed or altered in any way (although since
it is encoded in game custom, not in the rules, it's possible that it
I would like to see some really thorough arguments here; it seems like
there's a lot of stuff to consider.
Gratuitous Arguments by scshunt:
The cases before the court are all driven by the same underlying issue: is it
within the power of a person to give another individual the authority to act
on their behalf of Agora.
As the outcomes of the inquiries 3315 and 3317 materially affect the
disposition of criminal case 3316, I will defer my analysis of that case until
after I have analyzed the other cases.
The facts of the case appear to be as follows:
1) A person, known as djanatyn, stated in a Discussion Forum "In Agora, I
hereby authorize [Machiavelli] to act on my behalf for the next six months or
until I declare otherwise."
2) Machiavelli subsequently published a message which included, with
parentheticals omitted, the statement "djanatyn registers".
The cases 3315 and 3317 are related but have subtly different meanings. 3315
asks whether an agreement exists that would allow Machiavelli to act on behalf
of djanatyn to register em, and 3317 asks whether or not djanatyn successfully
registered. The mechanism of registration is "publishing a message that
indicates reasonably clearly and reasonably unambiguously that [the player in
question] intends to become a player at that time." (Rule 869) As such, it is
conceivable that djanatyn may be construed to have published such a message by
way of Machiavelli without actually granting Machiavelli any ability to act on
The Court shall therefore begin its focus on CFJ 3315, to determine whether or
not an agreement exists as described in the inquiry. The first question is
whether djanatyn's statement can be found to constitute an agreement under
Agoran law, as without that necessary predicate, we cannot accurately evaluate
the rest of the inquiry.
The word "agreement" appears six times in the text rules. Similar terms such
as "contract", "memorandum of understanding", "lease", "terms of service", or
"license" do not appear. Four of the appearances of the word "agreement" are
in R101, all of which relate to an individual's rights against being bound or
limited a binding agreement. The Court concludes that these occurrences in
R101 has no bearing on this case. In particular, as with most of R101, much is
contemplated that is not necessarily present in the rules, so R101 does not
imply that binding agreements are necessarily recognized by Agoran rules.
One occurrence of "agreement" is R107, referring to the standard of a
description of a class of eligible voters. It clearly has no bearing on this
The remaining case of the word "agreement" in the rules is in Rule 2328, which
states "An agreement between two or more players is a person if all of the
following are true:" and lists a series of conditions. While this does not
provide any assistance in determining the nature of any agreement, it does
contemplate the existence of agreements explicitly, and recognizes that they
may be given personhood. Notably, since its enactment in March 2011, the rules
have not explicitly defined what constitutes an agreement, so Rule 2328 has
always been referring to a concept not entrenched in the game rules.
Rule 1742, Contracts, as it existed before its repeal on February 20, 2010,
stated "Contracts are binding agreements governed by the rules." and
explicitly contemplated the notion of a single-party contract. Noting again
that the word "agreement" failed to be defined, even the rules relating to
contracts referred to an external concept of an agreement. Rule 2191,
Pledges, provided a form of contract requiring only one party.
There is little to indicate that the word "agreement" should be interpreted
disharmoniously with the interpretation it had in the Contracts era. The word
is hardly used primarily in legal or mathematical contexts (though it is of
great significance in the legal world) and consequently Rule 754, before its
repeal, would have provided that the word have "its ordinary-language
meaning". There is currently no guideline for interpretation other than that
provided in Rule 217: that "Where the text is silent, inconsistent, or
unclear, it is to be augmented by game custom, common sense, past judgements,
and consideration of the best interests of the game."
This suggests an extremely broad interpretation of "agreement". In particular,
given the lack of reference to agreements within the rules, it appears to be
that the interpretation of "agreement" in this CFJ and in the rules should be
given maximum latitude, so djanatyn's statement can be interpreted as an
agreement (such an interpretation being of questionable value for any purpose
other than the analysis of this inquiry, however).
The next, more significant question, is whether this confers upon Machiavelli
the power to act on behalf of djanatyn. This is not an easy question to
answer. While the rules are silent on this, the game's historical custom is
more than slightly confusing. CFJ 1719, in 2007, affirmed that a player could
send messages on behalf of another. Under the regime of contracts, actions on
behalf of another had long been permitted before the power of attorney was
codified. However, the power of attorney was repealed, as were contracts. An
additional mechanism, Promises, was created to allow one player to allow
another to act, and the mechanism of directly causing another entity to act,
rather than acting on behalf of the other entity, was used both in Slave
Golems and the long absentee dictatorship of the Prince of Andorra. CFJ 2334
is also particularly applicable, having ruled quite sweepingly that no
contract was necessary to authorize another to act on behalf of oneself, and
CFJ 2601 also relates in indicating that an individual could take an action e
intended to act on behalf of another without any rules-recognized agreement to
that effect. CFJ 1856 relates specifically to contracts, binding under the law
of Agora, and thus does not apply since Agora does not, at the present
juncture, recognize agreements to be binding under its own authority.
While the game custom is strong in this regard, Agora has, for what is
probably a longer period of time, forcefully rejected the notion that
something is possible without an explicit description, in the rules, of the
mechanism for doing so.
In order to provide an accurate ruling, the Court will return to first
principles. Rule 217 says that the text of the rules takes precedence. It has
already been observed that in order to register, an individual must publish a
message. The Court turns to Rule 478, which indicates that a person
'"publishes" or "announces" something by sending a public message.' While Rule
478 is strangely silent as to what relation exists between the thing announced
or published, and the message, it is not relevant in this case. The text of
the rules provides an exhaustive definition of "publishing" and, consequently,
no person can register, or indeed take any actions by announcement, without
sending a public message. The custom of the game in this regard fall to the
clear definitions found in Rule 478.
It seems worth adding, at this point, that this does not preclude a person
sending a message by an intermediary, as "A public message is a message sent
via a public forum, or sent to all players and containing a clear designation
of intent to be public." While the message must travel via a public forum,
there is no requirement as to what other intermediaries may or may not be
present, in particular a person or computer program such as cron. The
definition of an Executor, in Rule 2170, is helpful in this context, but not
Given the historical context of the term "to act on behalf of another", as
meaning one individual being permitted to, of their own initiative, cause
another to take actions, The Court will assume that there are no other
potentially-relevant agreements made by djanatyn and judge CFJ 3315 FALSE.
For 3317, it is additionally required to determine whether or not djanatyn had
sent a message via Machiavelli to the public forum. The evidence before the
Court indicates, however, that djanatyn has little or no knowledge of the
Public Fora, and there is certainly no evidence that e intended for eir intent
to register to be conveyed to Agora. As such, the Court judges CFJ 3317 FALSE.
The Court turns lastly to the criminal case 3316. The requirements for a
guilty sentence are the criteria laid out in Rule 1504, and which will not be
reproduced here for brevity. The Court must first address whether or not
Machiavelli did, in fact, make a public statement intended to mislead others
as to its publisher, the specific statement being that djanatyn registers. Of
note, there is no defence of fact. The requirement is that the statement was
intended to mislead. The caller argues that "Machiavelli tries to make it
clear that e is publishing something on behalf of someone else." The Court
finds that there is not sufficient evidence or argument that Machiavelli
intended to mislead anyone, particularly in light of eir arguments, and
accordingly harbours a reasonable doubt that criterion (a) is not satisfied.
Accordingly, the Court judges CFJ 3316 FALSE.
Gratuitous Arguments by Machiavelli:
If I remember correctly, it was
previously judged that the sender of a message is the person who
authorized it to be sent, regardless of whether or not e actually saw
the message and consented specifically to its exact content; and that,
furthermore, something like "I authorize X to act on my behalf to do
A" is a synonym of "I authorize X to send a message on my behalf
stating that I do A". scshunt's judgement contradicts this previous
judgement; I think a new definition of "sender" fitting this new
judgement would be "the person who gave eir informed consent to the
exact content of the message".