============================== CFJ 3219 ==============================
GUILTY (regardless of the sentence) is never an appropriate judgment
on a criminal case where the defendant is a Slave Golem.
Called by Bucky: 27 May 2012 18:00:15 GMT
Assigned to G.: 03 Jun 2012 17:45:27 GMT
Judged TRUE by G.: 08 Jun 2012 17:03:40 GMT
"GUILTY with a valid sentence, appropriate if the judge finds, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that ALL of the following are true...
(d) the Accused could have reasonably believed that the alleged act did
violate the specified rule;
(e) the Accused could have reasonably avoided committing the breach without
committing a different breach of equal or greater severity."
Slave Golems are mindless legal constructs, and therefore incapable of
believing anything. They also lack free will; their actions are entirely
determined by the actions of other persons. Therefore, in any cases where a
slave golem violated a rule, that golem could not have acted any differently
and therefore could not have avoided violating that rule.
Gratuitous Arguments by Machiavelli:
I think we can define "X can do Y" as "if X wanted to do Y,
X would do Y". Therefore, in order to assess a Slave Golem's ability
to avoid violating a rule, we must consider what the Slave Golem would
do if it wanted to violate the rule. In order to do this, we must
define what it means for a Slave Golem to want something. Since Slave
Golems are a fictional concept, we can define this however we want. I
suggest that we use the following definition: if X is a Slave Golem, X
wants to do Y if and only if X's owner wants X to do Y.
Judge G.'s Arguments:
First, in terms of "avoiding" breaches, it is IMPOSSIBLE for a slave
golem to avoid an order, so this clause does not apply one way or the
other - R1504(e) only applies if the entity "could" (e.g. it was
POSSIBLE for em) to take a different action.
Now, for R1504(d), it is sometimes/often misunderstood. It is not
whether the defendant emself believed the act was a violation, but
whether a typical reasonable entity in eir situation could so believe.
So in this case, the question is whether we should apply this standard
assuming slave golems are typical players (e.g. "any player should know
that the act was a crime" or assuming they are typical golems (who can
not "know" anything).
While, as gratuitant Machiavelli states, we *could* define a golem's
beliefs however we wanted, this is a case where we haven't explicitly
done so in the Rules. Given the rules' silence, it is in keeping with
justice and principles of legal constructs, to assume to assume that
slave golems know nothing; that is, they CANNOT "reasonably believe"
anything, as they lack reason.
This is in keeping with broad precedents on what we call second-class
persons: "Corporations cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor
excommunicated, for they have no souls." - Sir Edward Coke; or - though
more appropriate for enslaved first-class persons - see June 7, 1781
"Petition Concerning the Slave Billy", Library of Virginia, on the
logic of property committing treason.
Therefore, TRUE. HOWEVER.
This does not mean a crime (a rules breach) has not been committed!
In keeping with CFJs 1890 and 3209, a crime by the act of a slave golem
does still have a causal agent; the first-class person publishing the
slave golem's orders. In particular, for a slavemaster to be GUILTY of
the Class-N Crime of Not Doing Your Own Dirty Work (R2361), the fact
of whether a rule was actually violated by a slave's actions is
salient, but the extenuating circumstances (R1504d-e) are applied to the
slavemaster, not the slave, so a first-class slavemaster can still be
convicted for the slave's rules breach - and, by induction, any chain
of such rules breaches through slaves owning slaves ultimately applies
this crime to the originating first-class player.