============================== CFJ 2878 ==============================
Due to Rule 2215, it would be illegal for me to make an unqualified
public statement that is identical to this statement.
Called by Bucky: 05 Oct 2010 03:12:59 GMT
Assigned to omd: 06 Oct 2010 15:57:03 GMT
Judged UNDECIDABLE by omd: 17 Oct 2010 20:17:43 GMT
I am aware of CfJ 1887, which says that stating the liar paradox would violate
Rule 2215. Since this statement is similar in nature to the liar paradox, its
truth follows directly from CfJ 1887. This does not, however, mean that it
isn't a paradox.
Judge omd's Arguments:
As much as it would be in the interests of the game not to allow such
a simple rule as "don't make statements unless you believe they're
true" to cause actions to have logically indeterminate legality, I
cannot think of any good interpretation of the current rules that
avoids this. The basic problem with this statement, as well as with
the alternatives proposed by Warrigal, e.g. the quine, is that it
does not allow the use of logical indeterminacy as an "escape hatch":
assuming that the statement is true makes it false, assuming it's
false makes it true, and /assuming it's indeterminate makes it true/.
And unlike "this statement is false" or any other trivial paradox,
this statement speaks directly about the legality of a particular
action which anyone could easily perform. You cannot say with a
straight face that whether some action is illegal is indeterminate,
therefore that action is illegal...
How can I even judge UNDECIDABLE without admitting that the statement
cannot be accurately described as true or false, which by definition
means it is not true, and therefore that it is true?
Perhaps the sane solution is some kind of "no backtracking" rule: in
our attempts to contain logical uncertainty into a little bubble, once
the bubble has been closed, we shall not reopen it with new
conclusions even if they would make the statement no longer
Or simpler, a legal hack: any statement which substantially depends on
its own truth value is not considered true, regardless of how it would
otherwise be evaluated. The 'substantially' is what makes it a hack,
but it is necessary to work around the quine.
Maybe one of these solutions should be written directly into the Rules?
Well, for now I judge UNDECIDABLE.
On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 6:37 PM, Warrigal wrote:
> Due to Rule 2215, it would be illegal for me to make an unqualified
> public statement consisting of the following string (expect with the
> number 3000 incremented), followed by a quotation mark, followed by
> the same string again, followed by another quotation mark: "Due to
> Rule 2215, it would be illegal for me to make an unqualified public
> statement consisting of the following string (except with the number
> 3000 incremented), followed by a space, followed by a quotation mark,
> followed by the string again, followed by another quotation mark: "
Gratuitous Arguments by ais523:
(copied from ##nomic):
[21:23] comex: Bucky's CFJ is unambiguously TRUE, I've intended
[21:24] posted to the thread
[21:24] and if so, why didn't you say so before?
[21:24] Bucky cannot consistently believe that the statement is
[21:24] * comex waits to receive it
[21:24] but that doesn't preclude the statement
actually /being/ true
[21:24] why? you just said it was true
[21:24] comex: Bucky cannot believe it's true != the statement
is not true
[21:24] see the difference?
[21:25] Bucky is not infallible, after all
[21:25] oh, that's nonsense
[21:25] no it isn't
[21:25] you just said "assuming Bucky has enough logical
[21:25] e presumably has
[21:25] yes, exactly
[21:25] therefore, e believes the statement is true iff it is
[21:25] with the opposite assumption, Bucky can resonably
believe the statement is true due to not having enough logical ability
to notice there's a paradox
[21:25] so the CFJ comes out FALSE
[21:25] neither way, though, is it undecidable
[21:25] I suppose he has to believe one way or the other
[21:25] wait, no
[21:26] that doesn't work
[21:26] e /reasonably/ believes the statement is true iff it is
[21:26] Bucky's belief status is undecidable; the statement as
a whole, therefore, is true
[21:26] what e actually believes is irrelevant
[21:26] because e does not believe it is true, e does not
reasonably believe it is true
[21:26] (and it is reasonable to believe the statement in
question true - unless you're Bucky)
[21:26] Bucky's belief status is undecidable; the statement as a
whole, therefore, is true...therefore a reasonable person would believe
it was true
[21:26] comex: unless that person was Bucky
[21:27] is Bucky an exception?
[21:27] a statement being true does not force a reasonable
person to believe it is true
[21:27] especially, if it would lead to a paradox
[21:27] is that reasonable?
[21:27] Bucky's an exception because for em to believe it's
true causes a paradox
[21:27] while for anyone else to believe it's true, doesn't
[21:27] you could construct a statement for any other given
[21:27] that had the same effet
[21:29] since Bucky called the CFJ, we can assume e (actually)
believed the statement is indeterminate
[21:29] indeed, or e wouldn't have called it
[21:29] and as a result, the statement is actually true
[21:29] did e reasonably believe so? if the statement is
actually indeterminate, e did
[21:29] if it is not, e didn't-- the belief was unreasonable
[21:30] I suppose that since he didn't believe the statement was
true, e did not reasonably believe it was true regardless of whether it
[21:30] but that doesn't really help
[21:30] I suppose that since he didn't believe the
statement was true, e did not reasonably believe it was true regardless
of whether it was true... <-- exactly
[21:30] you believe that the statement is true
[21:30] you could make the same CFJ
[21:31] and then it would work better
[21:31] then it would be a different statement
[21:31] as "me" would have a different referent
[21:31] you would not believe that statement is true?
[21:31] what would you believe about it?
[21:31] I believe "Due to Rule 2215, it would be illegal for
Bucky to make a public statement that is identical to the statement of
[21:31] that's the statement of CFJ 2878, when you substitute
[21:32] and I hope you see there's no issue with me, or really
anyone but Bucky, believing that's true?
[21:33] if you replace "Bucky" with "ais523", things become
rather more confusing from my point of view, but not really from anyone
[21:33] because I can no longer logically consistently believe
the statement is true, even if anyone else can
[21:34] what do you think about "Due to Rule 2215, it would be
illegal for ais523 to make a public statement that is identical to this
[21:35] I guess you could be not sure
[21:35] my instant reaction is "that's TRUE, but I can't
publically make the statement"
[21:35] which is ofc a self-contradictory opinion
[21:35] people tend to react badly to inconsistent beliefs
[21:35] well. whether you say it publicly is irrelevant
[21:36] hmm, perhaps it isn't true? I fail to assign the
statement a truth value
[21:36] whilst simultaneously conceding that it is actually
true from anyone else's point of view
[21:37] may I post the discussion as arguments in the CFJ? It's
[21:41] I agree that this particular CFJ should be TRUE, as you
[21:42] although I think Bucky deserves a win for this
[21:42] and how can a statement's truth value depend on who's
looking at it?
[21:43] it doesn't; the statement is true, just Bucky can't
consistently believe it
[21:46] I mean the statement from your perspective
[21:46] if that's the case for that statement, well, you just
stated you believe it
[21:47] hmm, I think I can, under certain circumstances,
believe a contradiction
[21:48] but it's unreasonable for me to do so
[21:48] I'm not sure this isn't just a diversion, by the way.
[21:48] so my verdict: the statement in question with "ais523"
substituted is true, self-contradictory, and it's unreasonable that I
[21:48] but I believe it anyway
[21:49] For example, what if you made the statement as part of
officer's duties? does it violate R2143?
[21:50] that's a different issue; because R2143 doesn't fire on
belief, it becomes self-contradictory without a belief loop like that,
and is, I think, genuinely undecidable
[21:50] it's when statements themselves talk about belief that
this weirdness happens
[21:50] either directly, or indirectly by referring to R2215