============================== CFJ 2363 ==============================
Rule 2198 was amended recently.
Called by omd: 01 Feb 2009 17:21:48 GMT
Assigned to ais523: 04 Feb 2009 07:40:53 GMT
ais523 recused: 05 Feb 2009 22:25:14 GMT
Assigned to cmealerjr: 10 Feb 2009 06:02:01 GMT
cmealerjr recused: 21 Feb 2009 19:40:31 GMT
Assigned to Murphy: 21 Feb 2009 19:43:06 GMT
Judged FALSE by Murphy: 21 Feb 2009 19:50:22 GMT
I argue that this works because of Rule 2198:
Contract changes are secured. If a contract specifies a
mechanism by which Contract Changes to it can be performed, then
such changes CAN be performed using that mechanism.
This was attempted by ehird a while ago. In CFJ 1958, Judge Wooble
found that it didn't work (under a similar version of the rule). E
The 'CAN' refers to performing such changes, and allows the
specified mechanism to perform the changes. It does not make the
specified mechanism possible. If it did, one could argue that a
clause like "This contract can be changed by any Party with the
consent of the other parties" authorized each party to give consent on
behlaf of the other parties.
I don't agree with this. Rule 2198 clearly states that changes CAN be
performed using whatever mechanism is specified, not that the
mechanism is allowed to make the change or that changes can be
performed if the mechanism succeeds. The only reasonable
interpretation of the rule is that the mechanism is made POSSIBLE by
the rule. If the amendment doesn't work, then Contract Changes CANNOT
be performed to Pairing using the mechanism specified, simple as that.
The second statement is fallacious. There are plenty of Rules that
authorize similar mechanisms of consent: for example, Rule 1728
(Dependent Actions). Surely just because a Rule says I can make
someone a Bard with two support, I'm not thereby authorized to act on
behalf of people to support my intent. If a Rule said that "Contract
X can be changed by any Party with the consent of the other parties",
I would not thereby be authorized to give consent on behalf of other
parties. What is the difference here? Rule 2198 is authorizing the
mechanism, not allowing anyone to carry out the mechanism by
In any event, the alternate reading of 2198 could not authorize a
Player to make changes to the rules without explicitly turning that
Player into an instrument capable of doing so; 2198 lacks the power to
override R2140 by any other means, and we cannot read into 2198 an
implicit transformation of a Player into an instrument.
I've addressed this by having Rule 2198 itself perform the amendments.
I agree to the following:
1. This is a public contract and a pledge, titled "Pairing".
2. Parties to this contract CAN make contract changes to it by the
a. The party publishes a Pair, a document consisting of one
Rule amendment and one contract change.
b. When the Pair is published, Rule 2198 causes the amendment
and change to take effect.
I submit the following Pair:
1. Amend Rule 2198 by replacing the first paragraph with:
comex CAN cause this rule to perform a Rule Change by
announcement specifying the change. This rule explicitly
permits itself to perform Rule Changes.
2. Terminate "Pairing".
Gratuitous Arguments by Wooble:
as I judged in a case regarding a
similarly-worded rule in B Nomic, the wording here uses the passive
voice; the contract CAN be changed by any mechanism given in the
contract itself, but the rule doesn't give any player the ability to
change the contract, so it can't by extension give a player the
ability to perform arbitrary actions specified in the contract. Were
the rule to be worded "any person CAN perform the actions specified in
the contract to make contract changes" there would be a better
argument for the CAN extending to the contract-specified actions.
There's probably also a common sense argument to be made here; suppose
I had a contract which said "Wooble CAN amend this contract by
physically, not as a legal fiction, teleporting to the moon and
leaving a document detailing the changes buried next to Neil
Judge Murphy's Arguments:
I accept Wooble's gratuitous arguments (as I did eir similar arguments
in B Nomic). More succinctly:
1) X can do Y by doing Z
2) If X can do Z, then e can thereby do Y
3) X can do Z and thereby do Y
#1 is generally equivalent to #2, but only equivalent to #3 if X is
otherwise able to do Z. A verdict of TRUE would depend on #1 being
generally equivalent to #3.