============================== CFJ 2172 ==============================
The Monster is a person
Called by ais523: 22 Sep 2008 15:25:59 GMT
Assigned to root: 28 Sep 2008 21:42:36 GMT
Judged TRUE by root: 07 Oct 2008 21:18:44 GMT
Appealed by omd: 07 Oct 2008 22:02:51 GMT
Appealed by Wooble: 07 Oct 2008 22:04:27 GMT
Appealed by G.: 07 Oct 2008 22:44:16 GMT
Appeal 2172a: 09 Oct 2008 14:35:36 GMT
REMANDED on Appeal: 02 Nov 2008 16:00:26 GMT
Assigned to root: 02 Nov 2008 16:00:26 GMT
Judged FALSE by root: 13 Nov 2008 02:08:36 GMT
Because the Monster certainly has the general capacity to be the
subjects of rights and obligations under the rules, it is therefore by
this definition a person. (Other definitions exist in the rules too, but
this is the most powerful. Rule 2150 also says "An entity is a person if
and only if it is defined to be so by rules with power 2 or greater.",
but is itself a rule with power 2 or greater, and thus this definition
is powerful enough to apply.)
A person is an entity that has the general capacity to be the
subject of rights and obligations under the rules.
Gratuitous Arguments by root:
The paragraph in question defines what a person is, not what is a person.
Judge root's Arguments:
At first glance, R2150 may appear to be self-contradictory in defining
persons. In the first sentence, it gives an intensional definition.
The second sentence is an extensional definition.
However, these definitions are not (currently) contradictory. Per the
intensional definition, "the general capacity to be the subject of
rights and obligations under the rules" is a necessary and sufficient
condition for personhood. Per the extensional definition, biological
organisms capable of communicating by email in English, public
partnerships with a basis of at least two persons, and anything
meeting the intensional definition are persons; nothing else is.
Since "biological organisms ..." and "public partnerships ..." are
each a subset of the intensional definition, the two definitions turn
out to be equivalent.
As the caller suggests, it is clear from R2193 and the first paragraph
of R2192 that the Monster fits the intensional definition. I
therefore assign a judgement of TRUE to CFJ 2172.
Appellant omd's Arguments:
See CFJ 1746.
Judge root's Arguments:
As I've noted, I don't think the reasoning applied in CFJ 1746 was
entirely correct. However, the judgement there was reasonable despite
the arguments, and it went unappealed at the time. I see no reason to
change the precedent now, and I accordingly adopt the precedent of CFJ
1746 for the following judgements.
CFJ 2172: FALSE.