============================== CFJ 2120 ==============================
The Speaker CAN assign prerogatives for August 2008.
Called by G.: 04 Aug 2008 18:08:49 GMT
Assigned to woggle: 09 Aug 2008 14:34:08 GMT
Judged TRUE by woggle: 14 Aug 2008 01:17:31 GMT
Fact: No speaker (there were two technically eligible) assigned
prerogatives in a timely manner before the beginning of August 2008.
These cases are being called a few days into August, 2008.
There are two orthogonal questions revolving around R2019. The first
question is whether the SHALL in R2019, applying the precedent of CFJ
1765's general "SHALL => CAN by announcement" precedent means:
1: "SHALL asap" => "(SHALL and CAN) asap"
2: "SHALL asap" => "(SHALL asap) and CAN"
Long Agoran custom is in strong favor of #2, that the expiration of
a SHALL time limit doesn't end the ability or duty to perform an action,
it just means the performer has broken a rule and done the task late.
Strict literalism (also an Agoran custom) says (I think) #1, which may
Break Things. For example, interpretation #1 would break deputisation,
as it would mean, once the time limit expired that the following from
(d) it would be POSSIBLE for the deputy to perform the action,
other than by deputisation, if e held the office.
wouldn't be POSSIBLE under most conditions.
The second question is whether the "upcoming month" referent in R2019
fixes on "August 2008" when the obligation arises before August begins,
or switches to "September 2008" once the month begins. I argue that
it fixes on the actual obligation of August. The obligation arises prior
to August and remains tied to that month.
Rule 2019 [excerpt]
In a timely fashion before the beginning of each month, the
Speaker SHALL randomly assign each Player who bears the patent
title Minister Without Portfolio a different Prerogative for the
upcoming month by announcement. If there are more members in
one set than the other, then e SHALL randomly choose which
members of the larger set take part in the assignment.
Judge woggle's Arguments:
The caller's arguments suggest that "strict literalism" suggest that
we must interpret the "ASAP SHALL ... by announcement" as "ASAP (SHALL
and CAN) ... by announcement". Fortunately, this is not really true
when we have to read in the "CAN", since strict literalism can't give
us actual bounds on how often the CAN is permitted. (In fact, strict
literalism would say SHALL but CANNOT, which precedent has apparently
already rejected.) In the interest of the deputization rules working
and the tradition that they apparently do work, it is reasonable to
interpret the end of the extent as open-ended when the obligation is
not properly fulfilled in time. There is, however, no compelling
reason to interpret it as open-ended in the opposite direction.
Therefore, I judge CFJ 2120 TRUE and CFJ 2121 FALSE.