============================== CFJ 2118 ==============================
A judicial finding has determined that X, for the purposes of R2125
and R2161, if and only if a CFJ directly inquiring into the veracity
of either X or not X has a judgment of TRUE or FALSE respectively.
Called by Wooble: 04 Aug 2008 13:01:43 GMT
Assigned to Quazie: 09 Aug 2008 14:32:43 GMT
Quazie recused: 23 Aug 2008 16:44:41 GMT
Assigned to BobTHJ: 26 Aug 2008 23:30:10 GMT
BobTHJ recused: 27 Aug 2008 14:41:31 GMT
Assigned to ais523: 08 Sep 2008 01:32:44 GMT
ais523 recused: 08 Sep 2008 18:15:54 GMT
Assigned to G.: 14 Sep 2008 01:29:41 GMT
Judged FALSE by G.: 15 Sep 2008 06:20:46 GMT
"judicial finding" is not defined by the rules. However,
the best interests of the game and common sense dictate that such a
finding should not include a judge's statement that e "finds" X in the
reasoning behind a judgment completely unrelated to X, but rather an
appealable direct judgment into the veracity of X.
Gratuitous Arguments by Machiavelli:
Consider what would happen if, in judging a criminal case, a judge
said, "The defendant has stated that e has no intention to follow this
rule in the future. Since ignoring this rule forever is a very serious
offense, I sentence em to EXILE for 60 days; this sentence covers not
only this offense but any future time the defendant breaches this
rule. Therefore, e CANNOT be punished for violating it again."
Judge G.'s Arguments:
CFJ 1690 set out a principle that an extended set of indirect inferences
is insufficient to result in a direct judicial finding in cases where the
Rules require one. In that example, a judgement finding or challenge Y
that requires several steps of inference to get to X (e.g. Y -> P -> Q -> X)
does not sufficiently constitute a judicial finding of X.
However, this CFJ statement is too strict in the other direction. For
example, if X is inarguably and clearly a member of set P, and a judicial
finding is clear that all members of set P are regulated, this "single step"
inference would satisfy a finding of X. In essence, just as in determining
clarity of communication, the directness of the inference must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
While this court generally errs in the direction of this CFJ being true
in *most* cases, the "if and only if" statement in conjunction with the
broad and hypothetical nature of this CFJ statement would even disallow
the most strong and obvious inferences; if only to prevent these strong
and obvious inferences from failing due to strict technicality, this court