========================= Criminal Case 1950 =========================
Wooble breached Rule 2157 by failing to ensure that the panel met
all of its obligations in appeal case 1932a. Specifically, the
panel failed to meet its obligation to assign an appropriate
judgement in that case.
Called by root: 13 May 2008 06:33:03 GMT
Defendant Wooble informed: 16 May 2008 05:14:56 GMT
Pre-trial phase ended: 16 May 2008 17:56:34 GMT
Assigned to pikhq: 18 May 2008 11:20:27 GMT
pikhq recused: 30 May 2008 07:28:00 GMT
Assigned to OscarMeyr: 30 May 2008 07:37:11 GMT
Judged INNOCENT by OscarMeyr: 30 May 2008 23:03:05 GMT
The judgement assigned by the panel in 1932a was REASSIGN, which per
R911 is "appropriate if there is serious doubt about the
appropriateness of the prior judgement". This was not established by
the panel. The closing paragraph of the panel's judgement found that
there was serious doubt as to the "reasonableness" of the prior
judgement, but this is not sufficient; for the prior judgement to be
inappropriate, it must fail to be "reasonably equitable", not
It may be the case that Panelist Goethe was simply careless with eir
words in that paragraph and meant "reasonably equitable" wherever e
wrote "reasonable". But even correcting those words leaves us with
this puzzling statement: "...whether or not [the contract in
question] is [reasonably equitable] as a whole, the direct and obvious
bribery and resulting collusion by the judge is sufficient grounds to
question the [reasonable equity] of the judgement..." Huh?
In fact, what seems to be the case is that the panelists simply wish
to penalize the prior judge for eir participation in the scam, so they
point to obvious collusion in forming the prior judgement (which is
not illegal per se) as evidence that the judgement was inequitable,
ignoring that the equitability of that judgement was in fact an
important goal for the conspirators, and despite that the nature of
the scam provided no motive whatsoever to assign an inequitable
This evidence is therefore exceedingly flimsy, and no other is
provided. In the preceding paragraphs, the panel convincingly argues
that equitability is to be determined by a "reasonable disinterested
observer", not by a party to the contract, but they provide no
argument either that the prior judge held any unreasonable interest in
the equitability of eir judgement, or that any other "reasonable
disinterested" third party might actually consider the judgement
inequitable. In fact, panelist Murphy even suggested a replacement
judgement that would use the *exact same* clause to equitably resolve
the state of affairs that led up to CFJ 1932 in the first place.
In summary, the members of the panel in CFJ 1932a have assigned a
judgement that requires there be "serious doubt" but have failed to
establish that such exists; and moreover, they have done so not with
the honest intention of establishing a more equitable resolution to
CFJ 1932, but rather in the political hope of providing the judge of
criminal case 1938 with the precedent e needs to get a conviction.
This is a clear abuse of the panel's authority as an appeal judge, and
this court should not stand for it.
Gratuitous Arguments by Wooble:
I'm utterly INNOCENT. I acted in good faith to ensure that the panel
met its obligation to assign an appropriate judgment in the case.
There was certainly serious doubt about the appropriateness of the
original judgment, at least in the minds of the panelist. Doubt
cannot, by definition, exist objectively, so R911's requirement that
doubt exist must refer to doubt in the mind of some individual or
group of individuals.
I'd argue that a judgment of REASSIGN or REMAND is *always*
appropriate in an appeals case that was brought with 2 support, as the
existence of 3 players willing to appeal the judgment is prima facie
evidence that doubt exists.
I'd also like to point out that the panel considered assigning
OVERRULE with a replacement judgment, which shows that the members
bordered on not just serious doubt about the appropriateness of the
judgment but on certainty that the judgment was, in fact, wholly
inappropriate. REASSIGN was chosen to avoid the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the panel, since 1 of the panelists was the
appellant and another brought a criminal case against the original
judge, and it seemed better for Agora as a whole to not have such a
panel assign an unappealable replacement judgment.
Judge OscarMeyr's Arguments:
CFJs 1948 - 51 all address the appeal panel in Appeal 1932a ruling
REASSIGN on CFJ 1932, and whether this was a criminally inappropriate
I consider the act of challenging a judge over the performance of eir
duty must be held to the highest standards available. The caller of
1948 - 50 makes a good case that REASSIGN may not have been the best
ruling in 1932a. However, I consider REASSIGN a valid ruling under
the circumstances, and therefore appropriate. I am strongly swayed
by Wooble's defense in CFJ 1950 in support of my opinion.