Index ← 1888 CFJ 1889 1890a → text
=========================  Criminal Case 1889  =========================

    Zefram violated Rule 2149 in the above message by making the
    statement "I intend to deputise for BobTHJ to deregister em." while
    not reasonably believing it to be true.


Caller:                                 Wooble
Barred:                                 Zefram

Judge:                                  woggle
Judgement:                              UNIMPUGNED



Called by Wooble:                       01 Feb 2008 14:14:33 GMT
Defendant Zefram informed:              02 Feb 2008 21:38:59 GMT
Pre-trial phase ended:                  04 Feb 2008 11:09:53 GMT
Assigned to woggle:                     04 Feb 2008 11:49:45 GMT
Judged UNIMPUGNED by woggle:            11 Feb 2008 03:05:10 GMT


Gratuitous Arguments by Zefram:

Firstly, as woggle has noted, the charge is improper.  Rule 2149 does
not require reasonable belief, but merely belief.  On this ground the
case can be judged UNIMPUGNED.

Secondly, I assert that I did in fact intend to attempt deputisation in
the manner that I described, and so I actually (and reasonably) believed
that I intended it.  I point to the fact that I have subsequently done so.

Thirdly, there is the question of whether it is feasible for me to
have believed that the deputisation that I described would be possible,
which is probably necessary in order for me to believe that I intended
to deputise.  I assert that I did (and still do) believe that it would
be possible.  I point to the dialogue between me and Wooble following
eir initiation of this case.  Rule 2160 does not put any explicit limits
on its concept of "position", and as an experienced Agoran judge I think
it would be difficult for the courts to rule that neither an individual
person nor a person's membership in a contract were a "position".
CFJ 1897 will decide the meaning of "position" in due course; it is
controversial, and whichever way it goes I am reasonable in expecting
the particular outcome that I have expressed.

In summary, I did in fact believe that the deputisation in question
was possible, and I did in fact intend it.  My belief was both actual
(as required by rule 2149) and reasonable (contrary to the charge).
The prosecution has disagreed with my opinion on the possibility, but
has not presented any reason to doubt that I believed it.  I am clearly


Gratuitous Evidence by Zefram:

|From: Geoffrey Spear 
|Subject: Re: DIS: Re: BUS: deputy
|Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2008 09:27:49 -0500
|On Feb 1, 2008 9:17 AM, Zefram  wrote:
|> Geoffrey Spear wrote:
|> >I initiate a criminal CFJ with Zefram as the defendant, alleging e
|> >violated Rule 2149 in the above message by making the statement "I
|> >intend to deputise for BobTHJ to deregister em." while not reasonably
|> >believing it to be true.
|> On what grounds do you think I didn't intend it?
|On the grounds that BobTHJ isn't a position and there's no reason to
|believe you can deputize for an individual player whose obligations
|aren't a result of holding a position.

|From: Zefram 
|Subject: Re: DIS: Re: BUS: deputy
|Message-ID: <>
|Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2008 14:32:19 +0000
|Geoffrey Spear wrote:
|>On the grounds that BobTHJ isn't a position
|I think e is, and so is eir membership in the Vote Market.  "Position"
|is a very broad term, which is why I voted against proposal 5414.

|From: Zefram 
|Subject: Re: BUS: deputy
|Message-ID: <>
|Date: Sun, 3 Feb 2008 21:55:24 +0000
|I wrote:
|>I intend to deputise for BobTHJ to deregister em.  (E is required to
|>deregister emself by virtue of being BobTHJ, a party to the Vote Market
|>who has thereby contracted an obligation to deregister.  Eir week to
|>deregister has long expired.)
|Deputising for BobTHJ, I hereby deregister BobTHJ.
|Interpretation note in case of my words being twisted in the course of
|legal proceedings: this message is not to be interpreted in any way such
|that it directly results in Zefram ceasing to be a player.


Judge woggle's Arguments:

Rule 2149 requires belief, not reasonable belief as Wooble alleges
here. Zefram could have committed the alleged act without having
committed a violation of R2149's prohibition on stating things one
does not believe.

Because we can't read defendents' minds and because of our reasonable
doubt standard (for SLIPPERY), some sort of reasonableness
determination is ordinarily made for a judgement of guilty in these
cases. But a standard of "reasonable belief" is plainly different. If
it's possible to show that a defendant truly held even a logically
inconsistent belief (which admittingly is very difficult, but could
perhaps be alleged to a point of SLIPPERY through a sufficiently
illogical-looking pattern of actions and expressed flawed reasoning),
then rule 2149 may not violated by even a logically inconsitent
statement -- but under a "reasonable belief" standard, it would pretty
clearly have been violated. Less hypothetically, a statement informed
by an honest but flagrant misinterpretation of the rules would clearly
be acceptable under the "belief" standard (though difficult to prove)
but fail under "reasonable belief" standard.

Generally, a "reasonable belief' standard would suggest that evidence
should be primarily based upon the implausibility of an interpretation
of reality with evidence as to the defendant's state of mind having
less importance. Requiring such evidence would expand the burden of
R2149 on players from one of honesty to one requiring due diligence to
ensure justification.