Index ← 1684 CFJ 1685 1686 → text
==============================  CFJ 1685  ==============================

    root's keyboard is a player.


Caller:                                 G.
Barred:                                 root

Judge:                                  Zefram
Judgement:                              FALSE



Called by G.:                           31 May 2007 19:45:28 GMT
Assigned to Zefram:                     07 Jun 2007 21:06:19 GMT
Judged FALSE by Zefram:                 08 Jun 2007 00:31:49 GMT


Caller's Arguments:

   I expect this to be judged false.

   1.  If the keyboard is not a person, e has no ability to register.

   2.  If the keyboard is a person, then by R101(iv), there is no
       evidence of the keyboard's explicit, willful consent to become
       bound by the rules.  By R101(iv), silence is refusal.

   This is a very different case from a partnership whose "will"
   and "consent" mechanisms are specified in the agreement that
   constitutes it.


Caller's Evidence:

root's message on or about 31-May-07:

On 5/31/07, Kerim Aydin  wrote:
> > by R101, assuming a priori and without adjudication that an
> > entity is not a person would abridge that entity's rights

Hrm.  You could take that argument further and claim that the mere act
of adjudication that an entity is not a person would abridge that
entity's R101 rights.

My keyboard hereby registers as a player, and none of you can judge otherwise.


Rule 101/5 (Power=3)
Agoran Rights and Privileges

      The rules may define persons as possessing specific rights or
      privileges.  Be it hereby proclaimed that no binding agreement
      or interpretation of Agoran law may abridge, reduce, limit, or
      remove a person's defined rights.  A person's defined privileges
      are assumed to exist in the absence of an explicit, binding
      agreement to the contrary.  This rule takes precedence over any
      rule which would allow restrictions of a person's rights or

         i. Every person has the privilege of doing what e wilt.

        ii. Every player has the right to perform an action which is
            not regulated.

       iii. Every person has the right to invoke judgement, appeal a
            judgement, and to initiate an appeal on a sentencing or
            judicial order binding em.

        iv. Every person has the right to refuse to become party to
            a binding agreement.  The absence of a person's explicit,
            willful consent shall be considered a refusal.

         v. Every person has the right to not be considered bound by
            an agreement, or an amendment to an agreement, which e has
            not had the reasonable opportunity to review.

        vi. Every player has the right of participation in the fora.

       vii. Every person has the right to not be penalized more than
            once for any single action or inaction.

      viii. Every player besides the Speaker has the right to
            deregister rather than continue to play.

      Please treat Agora right good forever.


Gratuitous Arguments by root:

Well, since you've gone and CFJed it, I gratuitously submit the
argument that another message sent on or around May 31, 2007 provides
evidence as described in 2. above, as excerpted below:

> Of course not.  But my keyboard has my full consent to act through me.
> The fact that my keyboard shares my email, signs off as me, and
> chooses to refer to itself in the possessive third person and to me in
> the first person is pure coincidence.


Judge Zefram's Arguments:

While we have a great tradition of not being speciesist regarding
personhood (CFJ 1614 et al), the phrase "root's keyboard" proposes
an entity in a certain position of servitude with respect to root.
The nature of the typist/keyboard relationship is such that the latter
has no discretion as to the subject matter and semantics of the text
that the pair collectively output.  Conventionally the keyboard is an
entirely automatic, or even passive, vehicle for the expression of the
typist's will.

On the presumption that root and eir keyboard fulfill these conventional
aspects of their assigned roles, it appears that the message that
purportedly came from root's keyboard actually originated in the mind
of root.  root's keyboard may or may not have a mind; either way it is
presumed not to be the origin of the registration message.  Therefore,
presumptively, root's keyboard has not sent a registration message.

Furthermore, an entity that engages in the conventional typist/keyboard
relationship in the latter position might be presumed not to have a
mind worthy of the term "person".  In the light of CFJ 1614 we must be
careful not to prejudge this issue based on the particular manner of
hardware that constitutes root's keyboard.  This judge has, therefore,
pointedly not enquired as to the phylogenetic nature of root's keyboard.
But the prior jurisprudence does not rule out a presumption based on
occupation, which seems eminently appropriate to this judge.

One who professionally engages in the role of keyboard (much as one
who is a professional stenographer or spokesman) does not require the
application of a mind, and indeed is professionally obliged to bypass
any mind that might be available.  Therefore, even if root's keyboard
has a mind, it is presumptively not applied in the present situation,
and so root's keyboard is not a person (and so not capable of registering
emself) in the ordinary course of eir professional duties.

This judge recognises that both branches of this reasoning are based
on presumption, and are not conclusive.  A remand from an appeal board
would be welcome if evidence were to arise that seriously challenged
any of the presumptions involved.