============================== CFJ 1377 ==============================
The passage of Proposal 4318 created at least one legal VE debt.
Called by G.: 28 May 2002 03:03:17 GMT
Assigned to root: 28 May 2002 04:48:27 GMT
Judged TRUE by root: 04 Jun 2002 01:57:01 GMT
Appealed by Taral: 04 Jun 2002 02:31:24 GMT
Proposal 4318 took effect on our about 27-May-2002, and reads as follows:
ALL PLAYERS ARE BILLED FOR THEIR CURRENT HOLDINGS OF VOTING ENTITLEMENTS,
INDULGENCES, AND PAPYRI.
ALL VOTING ENTITLEMENTS, INDULGENCE, AND PAPYRI OWNED BY ORGANIZATIONS ARE
THE PAYROLL CLERK IS ORDERED TO ASSESS A 50% TAX ON STEMS.
Agruments for CFJ 1:
Rule 1479 reads:
Whenever a Rule requires a Player to bill an entity for one or
more Properties, that entity shall incur a debt to the Bank for
those Properties, and the named Player shall, as soon as
possible, post a public notice of the debt.
which does not specifically define that a debt is created when "billing"
is ordered by a Proposal. However, it is clear that Proposals may create
changes in the gamestate if the Rules generally allow. For example, past
Proposals have specifically detroyed currencies, even though the
Rules do not state "Proposals may destroy currencies."
The statements in Proposal 4318 are clearly Legislative Orders. R1981
states "(b) The effect of adopting a Proposal which contains Orders is
to execute those Orders." This does not require the agency of Players---
the orders are simply executed.
Legislative Orders should not be lightly ignored or interpreted to be
ineffective. They make use of the primary mechanisms of the Rules
(voting) in order to affect changes that are necessary for play, but
could not otherwise occur.
So these Orders, which were offered for voting in a clear manner, must be
executed by means allowed within the Rules, even if those means are not
specifically defined (as long as they are not explicitly forbidden).
While the definition of "bill" as performed by Proposals is not specifically
defined, the definition of "billing" provides a commonsense, reasonable,
and not forbidden method for carrying out those orders, by assuming that the
Proposal performs the Billing.
To suggest that an additional agency (for example, a Player) is required
to be authorized to do the billing and thus create the debt
is to fly in the face of the idea of Legislative Order, which is
a method of changing the gamestate using allowable (but not necessarily
As above, the Orders to Tax should be treated directly. R1853 allows
taxation, but R1917 requires an Intent to Levy be published. However,
it is reasonable to suppose, in this case, that the Proposal above
served as a reasonable notice/intent to levy and therefore reasonably
satisfied the requirement in 1917. The Order requires this levy be
conducted ASAP, which is impossible if an additional intent is required.
The way out of this problem is to interpret the Proposal, which has
been public for a considerable amount of time, as an implicit intent.
Judge root's Arguments:
"The passage of Proposal 4318 created at least one legal VE debt."
The caller suggests that the sentence of P4318 which reads:
ALL PLAYERS ARE BILLED FOR THEIR CURRENT HOLDINGS OF VOTING
ENTITLEMENTS, INDULGENCES, AND PAPYRI.
constitutes a Legislative Order, and as such causes the proposal
to bill all the players. However, Rule 1793 reads, in part:
An Order is a command, executed by a Player and directed to some
entity requiring that entity to perform exactly one action, or
to refrain from performing one or more actions.
If we assume that the action required by the Order is that of billing
each player, then there is no entity to which the Order is directed.
I reject the notion that the Order is directed to the proposal itself;
Rule 1891 establishes that a Legislative Order is deemed to be
executed by the proposal containing it, but there is no reason to
believe that the "default target" of a Legislative Order is the
Proposal (NB: executing an order and obeying it are not the same thing;
the execution of the order is merely the action that causes its legal
mandate to be realized).
Likewise, if we assume that the action required by the Order simply
that of transferring currencies to the Bank, and that the order is
directed at all Players, we again fall short of R1793, which does not
provide for Orders with multiple targets.
The provision, then, is not a Legislative Order, but merely a regular
provision. This does not mean it is without effect, however. Rule
594 reads, in part:
When a Proposal is adopted, its Power becomes equal to its
Adoption Index, and the provisions contained in the text of the
Proposal are implemented to the maximal extent permitted by the
and later on:
For the purpose of the Rules, the application of an adopted
Proposal is a legal procedure for changing Nomic Properties.
Debts are Nomic Properties, so a provision of a proposal is capable of
creating, modifying them, or destroying them. It does not need to be
a Legislative Order.
Proper billing, as defined by Rule 1479, involves some Player being
equired to bill an entity for one or more Properties. In this case,
the "biller" does not exist, so the billing employed by the proposal
cannot be the same billing action defined by R1479.
However, we can easily interpret the provision naturally. It seems
reasonable enough that by "billing" each Player, the provision would
simply require each Player to transfer the specified properties.
Since no recipient is indicated for the transfers, we can infer from
typical Agoran usage that the intended recipient is the Bank, as it
would be for "normal" billing.
Therefore, the provision obligates each Player to transfer properties
to the Bank, which by Rule 1596 is the definition of a debt to the
Bank. Since at least one player had VEs in eir possession at the time
the proposal was adopted, I Judge the statement TRUE.
Appellant Taral's Arguments:
I call for the Appeal of this Judgement (CFJ 1377). There is no
indication in the Rules that debts are Nomic Properties. In fact, a
Nomic Property is, by definition, a property with a value. It is quite a
shoehorn to make debts (which are obligations) fit this particular mold.