============================== CFJ 1329 ==============================
neil is Speaker-Elect.
Called by neil: 21 Nov 2001 00:23:21 GMT
Assigned to G.: 25 Nov 2001 06:28:19 GMT
Dismissed by G.: 28 Nov 2001 18:55:37 GMT
Appealed by Crito: 29 Nov 2001 14:51:43 GMT
Judge G.'s Arguments:
The following clause in Rule 1647 (Power=1) [The Speaker-Elect]:
This rule takes precedence over all other Rules defining the
characteristics of the Office of Speaker-Elect.
grants Rule 1647 precedence over a wide range of Power=1 Rules governing
the office of Speaker-elect (Rule 1030; Power=3; Precedence between Rules
with Equal Power). Those Rules considered in making this judgement, over
which Rule 1647 has precedence, include:
Rule 402/9 (Power=1) Speaker Transition
Rule 681/11 (Power=1) Giving Up Speakership
Rule 786/13 (Power=1) Order of Succession for Speaker-Elect
Rule 790/11 (Power=1) Filling Vacant Offices
Rule 1006/8 (Power=1) Definition of Office
Rule 1445/15 (Power=1) Defaults for Elections
Rule 1555/7 (Power=1) Electees and Removal from Office
Rule 1558/5 (Power=1) Defaults for Elections for Offices
Rule 1648/4 (Power=1) When the Speaker Is Tainted
One interesting note is that the definition of 'Office' doesn't occur
until midway through the list (Rule 1006). The definition includes:
Each Office is always held by exactly one Player (called an
In other words, Rules with higher precedence than 1006 (1647, along with
Rules for Speaker Transition in 402, 681, 786, and 790) may conspire to
create situations in which there are zero, or more than one Holder of the
Office of Speaker-Elect. It doesn't matter if Rule 1006 is argued to
contain the very definition of Office and thus have a certain "precedence
by definition", i.e.,
CFJ 858: If a low-Power Rule attempts to define a term used in
a Rule of higher Power to mean something other than its ordinary
English meaning, that may or may not constitute a conflict;
whether it does must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
This preceeding is laid out partially for the purpose of determining the
Holder(s) of the Office of Speaker-elect, should the Court be asked to
perform such a duty. However, the Court is not required to perform this
duty, it is required to ascertain whether "neil IS the Speaker-Elect."
(emphasis added). However, in cases where the Office may have multiple,
or zero, Holders, can the statement 'is the Speaker-Elect' be
It is clear that Neil is not a/the Holder of the Office of Speaker-Elect.
One of the highest portions of the Rules in this precedence chain (Rule
1647 itself) states near the beginning:
The Speaker can never hold the Office of Speaker-Elect.
Neil, via Speaker Transition, was clearly the Speaker (by all Rules
definitions of Speaker) when e made this CFJ. Therefore, e did not hold
the Office of Speaker-Elect, because as the Speaker, e never could. The
subject of whether e's the Electee to the Office is subject to a
concurrent CFJ. So is e the Speaker- Elect?
The simple 'to be' construct is the most semantically-fraught in the human
language. It invites us to make an analogy, to place an equals sign
between two items. But which analogy is most apt? Is the Electee the
Office, or is the Holder the Office? The Rules strongly suggest that, for
general Offices, the Electee and the Holder of an Office are never
different individuals, and as soon as an Electee is created e becomes the
Holder (Rule 1555). In other words, whenever there is an Electee, the
Electee is also the Holder, so in ALL senses the Electee IS the Office.
However, the precedence of 1647 breaks this Electee=Holder relationship
for the Speaker-Elect, and this breakage occurs at a higher precedence
than the simple definition (Rule 1006) "holder = IS". Who is the true
heir to the title of "IS the Speaker-Elect", the Holder(s) or the Electee?
Each of these individuals (Holder and Electee) has characteristics of the
Office recognized in the Rules listed above (and elsewhere).
For example, the suggestion that a non-Electee Holder of the Office
becomes 'Tainted' when e succeeds to Speaker (Rule 1648) suggests that the
Electee, shoud e exist, is the "true" bearer of the Office. Moreover, the
very words 'Speaker-Elect', interpreted in the 'ordinary English meaning'
of CFJ 858, in the higher precedence of Rule 1647 over 1006, suggest
'Election', which suggest that the true mantle of IS belongs to the
Electee. For (in ordinary English) how can one be an "-Elect" without
being an "Electee"?
So, in the Case before the Court, it is not clear which analogy is more
apt: "holder=IS" or "Electee=IS" or, whether it is even possible to say
there IS a Speaker-Elect. There is an Electee and one or more Holders.
But either one may or may not be "IS."
The Court finds that this question can not be judged in the form it was
presented. Let the Court be perfectly clear for future precedent: neil is
NOT the Holder of the Office of Speaker-Elect, and would find false any
Statement that e is the Holder.
It is possible, though, that by being the Electee, if e is the Electee
but not the Holder, the "IS" analogy is more apt for Neil than other
entities, or it is possible that it is apt for no-one.
The Court Moves that the Case be DISMISSED.