============================ Appeal 1321a ============================
Appeal initiated: 19 Sep 2001 18:33:28 GMT
Assigned to Syllepsis (panelist): 19 Sep 2001 21:01:02 GMT
Assigned to Oerjan (panelist): 19 Sep 2001 21:01:02 GMT
Assigned to Steve (panelist): 19 Sep 2001 21:01:02 GMT
Oerjan moves to SUSTAIN: 19 Sep 2001 21:50:08 GMT
Steve moves to REASSIGN: 25 Sep 2001 07:22:49 GMT
Syllepsis moves to SUSTAIN: 25 Sep 2001 21:41:56 GMT
Final decision (SUSTAIN): 26 Sep 2001 02:41:56 GMT
Panelist Oerjan's Arguments:
My decision is to sustain the Judgement. I find the language of Rule 1966
quite clear in describing ongoing properties rather than properties at
creation, and although it may not be exactly what was intended, I do not
see the necessity of or opportunity for contorting its interpretation in
the style of Crito's CFJ 1320 Judgement.
I also think there are few substantial effects, given that Rule 1972
causes the Bonds to be simultaneously redeemed.
As for Caller Goethe's additional arguments, I do not think that 1966(a)
requires the issuer to exist at any time when the Bond doesn't.
Panelist Steve's Arguments:
A slightly unusual case: we have to deal not only with CFJ 1321, but
also with CFJ 1320, in which Crito has essentially delivered precisely
the opposite Judgement to Peekee in this CFJ. Which Judgement is to be
The issue turns on how we interpret the requirement in R1966 that the
issuer of a Bond must _be_ a Player, or entity with an Executor. Crito
interprets this requirement restrictively, as implying only that the
issuer of the Bond must be a Player at the time the Bond was issued. The
Caller neil argued for, and Judge Peekee accepted, an unrestricted
interpretation: the issuer of a Bond must continue to exist in order for
the Bond to continue to exist.
I note, however, that the argument given by neil and accepted by Peekee
does not automatically establish the truth of the Statement of the CFJ.
Even if we accept the unrestricted reading of R1966, it does not follow
that any Bonds issued by David do not exist. For all that has been said
so far, it is possible that the Bonds have continued to exist, although
without an issuer.
True enough, R1996 defines a Bond as something that has an issuer, and
so it might well be argued that nothing that lacks an issuer could be a
Bond. But other answers to this question are possible. For example, one
could argue that although the entities issued by David no longer have an
issuer, they retain enough of the other properties of Bonds to be
sufficient deservers of the name 'Bond'. Alternatively, one might argue
that there now exists some entity, which for lack of an issuer, is not
now a Bond, but which nevertheless used to be a Bond issued by David.
This might be enough to make the Statement true.
I neither endorse nor contest Crito's Judgement in CFJ 1320, but I find
enough reason for doubt about the Judgement in CFJ 1321 to rule that
Peekee's Judgement be overturned, and the CFJ assigned to a new Judge.
The new Judge should consider the new lines of argument I've raised
here, as well as the question which interpretation of R1966 is
Panelist Syllepsis's Arguments:
I judge the statement "There do not exist any Bonds issued by David." to
be TRUE, and thus move to sustain the judgement.
It is clear to me that by Rule 1967, David, who had Syllepsis as an
executor, had Bond Issuance Authority and created three Bonds.
By Rule 1966, these Bonds were each a fungible Property, and thus each
an entity. At The time of issuance, David was legally capable of issuing
bonds, and thus did so.
Rule 1966 states that any Bond has three characteristics, one of which is
an issuer that has an executor.
The Rule DOES NOT state that the three characteristics are needed for the
Property to remain in existence or continue to be a Bond, but that a
legally issued Bond HAS the three characteristics. This statement could be
taken to mean that the characteristics are needed for it to remain a bond,
it depends on how you read it.
It could be interpreted that legally these three characterstics must hold
for as long as the bond exists. I will call this interpretation (1).
Since I sent a message to the PF with the following text:
H. Usuror neil,
Acting on behalf of David, David creates 3 Bonds with a Face Value of 100
Stems and a Maturity Date of 9/7/2001. David transfers 20 Stems to the
Bank to pay the fee for creating these bonds. David transfers these three
Bonds to Syllepsis.
David is legally to be considered the sender as the text was a message
from David to the Usuror. Thus David is the issuer of the three Bonds, by
Note that Rule 1478 states:
(c) A Player is always eir own Executor. Other entities have
Executors (or Limited Executors) only as and when the Rules
Then by interpretation (1), David must have an Executor even though the
rules do not specify who that Executor is.
A second interpretation of Rule 1966 is that it takes precedence over Rule
1967 by stating that an issuer must be an entity with an executor and thus
David, even though e issued the Bonds, is no longer a proper issuer and so
the properties in question are no longer bonds. This makes better sense as
it does not leave David with an indeterminate Executor.
I will also interpret the time issues with Rule 1966 as being concurrent,
that is, a property issued as a bond is a bond at a given time if the
property satisfies the three characteristics of a Bond listed in R1966.
I go with interpretation (2) as it leads to a more sensible result.
I think that once David lost eir executor, the three properties owned by
me ceased to be Bonds.