Index ← 1236 CFJ 1237a 1237 → text
============================  Appeal 1237a  ============================

Panelist:                               Wes
Decision:                               REASSIGN

Panelist:                               Steve
Decision:                               REVERSE

Panelist:                               Murphy

Panelist:                               Kelly
Decision:                               REASSIGN



Appeal initiated:                       19 Aug 2000 02:57:39 GMT
Assigned to Wes (panelist):             20 Aug 2000 20:49:30 GMT
Assigned to Steve (panelist):           20 Aug 2000 20:49:30 GMT
Assigned to Murphy (panelist):          20 Aug 2000 20:49:30 GMT
Wes moves to REASSIGN:                  21 Aug 2000 03:38:46 GMT
Steve moves to REVERSE:                 25 Aug 2000 05:11:25 GMT
Murphy recused (panelist):              30 Aug 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Assigned to Kelly (panelist):           30 Aug 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Kelly moves to REASSIGN:                02 Sep 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Final decision (REASSIGN):              02 Sep 2000 00:00:00 GMT


Gratuitous Arguments by Taral:

[date approximate]

I will provide Arguments against the Appeal. CotC, if the Appeal goes
through, please include these.

The case of an assumed "respectively" would be appropriate except for
the case that the connective is "or" in the first part and "and" in the
second. Chuck would have us believe that the intended statment is:

Whatever is not prohibited or regulated by the Rules is permitted or
unregulated, respectively, ...

However this is not the case. Since the second connective is "and", the
reasonable interpretation is that which the Judge originally put
forward. The "exception" listed is, in my opinion, merely a
safeguard in case the Rules ever were to deregulate Rule Changes. Keep
in mind that this Rule is the oldest Rule in the Ruleset (IIRC).


Gratuitous Arguments by Taral:

[date approximate; Eris allegedly assigned to the appeal at some point]

Although the arguments for both sides are very verbose, they fail to take
into account one important fact: Private Orders are unregulated. There is
not _one_ Rule that specifies what a Player can or cannot Order another
Player to do.

There is, of course, the ability to get an Order Vacated by reasons of
propriety. However this CFJ does not address that issue. I therefore move


Panelist Wes's Arguments:

We find Chuck's Arguments in this case to be extremely persuasive. We
find Oerjan's Arguments to be likewise persuasive, except for one
small thing.

Oerjan appears to Argue that since various other activities regarding
Orders are regulated, such as Amending them, Vacating them and
enforcing them, that all activities regarding Orders would therefore
be considered to be regulated. We reject this assumption.

There are many Rules regulating what a Player can and cannot do. They
are allowed to perform some actions, disallowed from performing other
actions. There are FAR more Rules regulating the actions of Players
than there are regulating the function of Orders. But this by NO
means causes all actions that a Player can make to be regulated -
only those actions which are addressed in the Rules.

Likewise, while we can find many Rules regulating various actions
having to do with Orders, we can find no Rule regulating the actual
creation of Private Orders. Since this is not regulated, and also
not prohibited, we find that it is quite allowed.

Luckily, as Chuck points out, a valid Order is not necessarily a
proper Order, and since Orders which are not proper (a term which
seems to rely entirely upon the opinion of the Judge) can be
Vacated by CFJ, this provides a counterbalance which we find quite

We therefore OVERTURN this Judgement and assign it to another Judge.


Panelist Steve's Arguments:

Chuck's Order (see the Evidence attached) was a Private Order as defined
by Rules 1793 and 1794, and according to R1808, these are effected by
submitting them to the Player whom the Order commands, in this case
presumably the Executor of the Bank.

Since the validity of this Private Order has been challenged by a CFJ,
we turn to R1796, where we find that:

      In order to be proven valid by CFJ, the Rules must permit the
      Player who executed the Order in question to execute such an
      Order, that the execution of the Order must have been required
      by or permitted in the circumstances which existed at the time
      it was executed, and that the Order has not been rendered
      invalid by the operation of any other Rule.

Setting aside the slightly odd grammatical structure of this paragraph,
there are three questions to be answered here:

1. Was Chuck permitted in a general way to execute Private Orders?
2. Was Chuck permitted to execute this particular Private Order at the
   time he executed it?
3. Was the execution of Chuck's Order rendered invalid by the operation
   of any other Rule?

The third of these questions is the easiest to answer, and the answer is
'no': no other Rule rendered the execution of this Order invalid. If the
answer to the first questions is 'yes', then the Order was validly

In search of a direct answer in the Rules to the first two questions
about permissions, Chuck turned to Rule 101, which states that:

      Whatever is not prohibited or regulated by the Rules is
      permitted and unregulated, with the sole exception of changing
      the Rules, which is permitted only when the Rules explicitly or
      implicitly permit it.

Chuck argued that this should be read as:

      Whatever is not prohibited or unregulated by the Rules is
      permitted and unregulated [respectively]...

and that this could be further unpacked as:

      Whatever is not prohibited is permitted, and whatever is not
      regulated is unregulated...

Since no Rule prohibited Chuck from executing his Order, this would be
sufficient ensure that Chuck's order was permitted, and so answer the
first two questions affirmatively.

Judge Øjan, however, interpreted R101 differently:

      Whatever is [not prohibited or regulated] by the Rules is
      [permitted and unregulated]...

Thus, in order for the execution of Chuck's Order to be permitted by
R101, it would have to be both not prohibited *and* not regulated by the
Rules. Taral provided further support for this interpretation when he
pointed out that if Chuck's interpretation were correct, then one might
have expected the second connective to be 'or' rather than 'and'. Judge
Øjan professed to find a great deal of regulation of Orders generally
in the Rules, and on that basis concluded that Rule 101 does not permit
the execution of Chuck's Order.

Justice Wes' argues, convincingly in my view, that Øjan's argument that
the making of Private Orders is regulated because Orders generally are
regulated is too quick. The regulation of other kinds of Orders is not
relevant here.

Nevertheless, my first substantial finding of this Judgement is that the
making of Private Orders *is* regulated - by Rule 1808. I cannot order
Jack to do something by sending a message to Jill, and the fact that I
cannot do so is due to the regulation of Private Orders contained in
Rule 1808.

Furthermore, after careful reflection, I am persuaded (against my wishes
that it be otherwise) that Øjan's reading of R101 is correct. Chuck's
Order is regulated by Rule 101, and hence is not permitted by that Rule.
This is the second substantial finding of this Judgement.

But from the fact that the execution of Private Orders is not permitted
by Rule 101, it does not follow that it is not permitted at all. As
Judge Øjan himself noted in his Judgement, we have no Rule which states
that what is not permitted is prohibited.

This is the part of Øjan's Judgement that I find the most difficult to
understand. Having pointed out that we have no Rule which states that
whatever is not permitted is prohibited, he immediately goes on to
conclude, on the basis of R1796, that the execution of Chuck's Order was
indeed prohibited, or at least, not permitted. I do not see how this is

Indeed, and somewhat surprisingly, it seems to me that Rule 101 is
ultimately irrelevant to the case at hand. For while it is true that one
cannot establish the permissibility of making Private Orders on the
basis of Rule 101, it is equally true that Rule 101 is not required to
establish that permission. It seems to me that the permissibility of
making Private Orders follows directly from Rules 1794 and 1808, which
together define Private Orders and establish the means by which they are

My third substantial finding in this Judgement is therefore that Chuck
was (and is) generally permitted to execute Private Order, and that the
execution of this particular Order was permitted in the circumstances
that existed at the time it was executed. The Order was therefore
validly executed.

I therefore OVERTURN the Judgement and Judge the Statement TRUE.


Panelist Steve's Evidence:

Chuck's message (excerpt):


Subject: Re: BUS: Proposals
From: Charles E. Carroll (view other messages by this author)
Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2000 15:23:18

Charles E. Carroll wrote:
>I transfer 8 P-Notes to the Bank to increase the Priority of
>"My Votes Are My Own" by 10.
>I transfer 8 P-Notes to the Bank to increase the Priority of
>"Remove Proposal Number Reference from R1770" by 10.
>I transfer 8 P-Notes to the Bank to increase the Priority of
>"Fix Patronage" by 10.

The Bank is ordered to pay me 24 P-Notes in return for the 24 P-Notes
transfered above, which were without effect.



Panelist Kelly's Arguments:

In the matter of the Appeal of CFJ 1237

This Appeal seeks review of a Judgement holding that a specific Private
Order was invalid.

The Order in question was issued by Chuck in order to recover Properties
transferred to the Bank for the ostensible purpose of paying a Fee which in
fact e was unable to pay.  This Order was satisfied by the Bank and Chuck
was in fact paid back his 24 P-Notes.  Taral challenged Chuck's Private
Order as having no basis in the Rules and thus invalid.  The trial court
held that the Rules regulate the making of Orders generally, thereby taking
the act of making any Order outside of the scope of those things generally
permitted by Rule 101.  (Subsequently, a different Judge granted a Motion to
require Chuck to reimburse the Bank for the return of his P-Notes.)

In this case, the primary question is whether "the execution of the Order in
question was required or permitted in the circumstances in which it was
issued".  Rule 1796.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
circumstances required Chuck to execute this Order, so the question devolves
to whether Chuck was permitted to execute this order in the circumstances in
which it was issued.

The lower court correctly noted that the Rules provide no explicit
authorization for the execution of this Order.  Of course, this does not end
the inquiry, since Rule 101 creates a clear bias in favor of permissibility,
except where Rule Changes are at issue.  Even if we accept that the making
of Private Orders is regulated (which is a fair conclusion), we cannot
conclude from Rule 101 that the making of any given Private Order is
forbidden merely because not explicitly authorized.  Rule 101 provides clear
indication for a contrary conclusion, in fact; if Rule 101 worked in this
manner, then Rule 101 would not explicitly create a different standard for
Rule Changes.  With the exception of Rule Changes, Rule 101 is clearly
silent on the question as to whether a regulated activity may be engaged in
without explicit authorization in the Rules.

Nor does Rule 1796 provide any basis for concluding that the Order is
disallowable; Rule 1796 merely states that an Order is valid if it is
permitted.  Using Rule 1796 to find that an Order is not permitted because
it is not permitted (as the trial court did) is circular reasoning.  Rule
1796 sets a standard of review only; it provides no substantive guidelines
for determining whether permission exists.  The trial court erred in reading
a standard of review as substantive law.

The question of whether a given Private Order is permissible, when that
Order is neither required by the Rules nor prohibited by them, is a question
which requires a full examination of the circumstances in which the Order
was executed.  The trial court is required to apply such standards as are
reasonable in the circumstances in deciding whether an Order was
permissible; in this case, matters as to whether the Order furthers justice,
equity, or fairness would be pertinent in making this decision.  Had the
trial court made an thorough examination of the facts of the situation and
found the Order invalid based on such an examination, I would defer to that
court's judgement.  But no such examination has been made.  I therefore find
error in the trial court's failure to analyze the facts of the situation to
determine whether this Order should be permitted to be executed.

I therefore recommend that the original Judgement be vacated, and that the
matter be remanded to the trial court for further consideration not
inconsistent with this opinion.

Submitted this 2nd day of September,

Kelly Martin, Justice (sitting by designation)