An Order, as defined in Rule 1793, and of whatever type, is "a Nomic
Entity created in accordance with the Rules" in the sense of Rule
1513 and as such is subject to the limitations set forth in that
Rule, and in particular that Orders derive coercive power from some
Rules and that the Rules take precedence over Orders whenever an
Order conflicts with a Rule.
Eligible: Antimatter, Blob, Chuck, elJefe, General Chaos,
Harlequin, Kolja A., Michael, Murphy, Oerjan, Steve,
Disqualified: Crito (by choice)
On hold: -
Selection of second Judge
Eligible: Antimatter, elJefe, General Chaos, Kolja A., Michael,
Murphy, Oerjan, Steve, Swann
Disqualified: Blob, Chuck, Crito (all by choice), Harlequin
On hold: -
Called by Morendil, Thu, 21 May 1998 17:23:42 +0100
Assigned to Harlequin, Fri, 22 May 1998 09:20:52 +0100
Assigned to Oerjan, Wed, 3 Jun 1998 12:31:57 +0100
Judged FALSE, Tue, 9 Jun 1998 16:06:16 +0200
Published, Mon, 15 Jun 1998 09:41:20 +0100
Reasons and arguments:
Rule 1586 defines:
A "Nomic Entity" is any entity which has no discernible
existence without the Rules, only existing by virtue of the
Rules defining it to exist. No two Nomic Entities (including
Players) shall have the same name or nickname.
Rule 1793 defines:
An Order is a command, executed by a Player and directed to some
entity requiring that entity to perform exactly one action, or
to refrain from performing one or more actions.
It is my view that a command as above clearly has discernible
existence without the rules - it would be quite possible to make such
even if Rule 1793 did not exist. Thus the part of the statement
'An Order, as defined in Rule 1793, and of whatever type, is "a Nomic
Entity created in accordance with the Rules" in the sense of Rule 1513
and as such is subject to the limitations set forth in that Rule,'
It is equally clear that the validity and coercive power (through
penalties) of an Order is derived from the Rules. So the part of the
'and in particular that Orders derive coercive power from some Rules'
While the above suffices to determine the Judgement, there are more
subtle issues here, which I wish to detail. Rule 1513 says:
It is legal for the Rules to grant the power to require Players
to perform (or not perform) actions to Nomic Entities created in
accordance with the Rules.
It is my view that the Rules do _not_ grant such power to Orders.
Compare the situation for Orders with that of Subordinate Legal Codes:
>From Rule 1591:
A SLC has the power to constrain the actions of Players in
the same manner as the Rules.
>From Rule 1594:
A Player who is within the Jurisdiction of a SLC is required to
abide by it while e remains within its Jurisdiction, unless
doing so would violate either the Rules or another SLC with
For SLCs, there is a clear granting of powers and requirements. For
Orders, however, there are only defined Crimes for non-compliance.
In my view, a Crime is not automatically a Rule violation, and thus
the Rules do not in fact require Orders to be followed in the same way
as an SLC.
Thus, the part of the statement
'and that the Rules take precedence over Orders whenever an Order
conflicts with a Rule.'
is true, in the sense that Players, in order to comply with the Rules,
may have to commit a Crime by disobeying an order; however not in the
sense that the entire Order and its penalty is escaped because of the
I know that several Players think that Crimes should be automatic Rule
Violations, but I think that matter is better settled by legislation.
However, regardless of this issue in particular, at least one part of
the statement is false.
I therefore judge FALSE.
I can easily predict that we'll have a hard time dealing with
Swann's recent posts unless we hare a clear notion of how to deal
with Orders as a whole. I propose the above principle, with Orders
being NREs deriving coercive power from, specifically, Rules 1810 and
1811 (although that may be debated, which is why I didn't make the
CFJ dependent on that).
The rationale for that principle is that insofar as the Rules can be
said to "compel" or "prohibit" certain actions which are non-
retractable Moves, the instrument of such coercion is the threat of
being cited for a Crime or Infraction. Thus a Rule which makes a
Crime or Infraction of some action or inaction which is defined in
some body of text other than the Rules themselves can be said to
grant coercive power to that body of text, which brings it under the
purview of Rule 1513.
Thus, an Order prohibiting a Player from Calling for Judgement,
which is what the Orders in "Here we go..." effectively do, is in
conflict with Rule 911, and as such shall be deemed invalid; most
of Swann's other Orders are dealt with similarly, or at the least
innocuuous given that the higher-precedence judicial framework
is preserved by the NRE principle. Conversely, the NRE principle
does not rob other Orders of their effectiveness, and will not
require huge patching up of the Orders Rules to close supposed