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THE POWER OF PROTEST

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student-centered and to help future generations of students get a better education had been attacked as a threat to students.

How much was learned from these experiences is difficult to say. Perhaps the most important lesson was that virtually no support was forthcoming from our colleagues in the social and behavioral sciences. Indeed, a number of colleagues were openly opposed to the study, and virtually no social scientists except those directly connected with the study openly defended our research. Eventually, the best response we came to hope for was indifference or neutrality. While there is no way of knowing whether a similar degree of collegial hostility and nonsupport can be expected in future studies of controversial social problems, a careful appraisal of the probable response from colleagues should probably be a routine part of the planning for such research.

II

OVERVIEW OF THE UNREST ERA

Student activism and campus unrest are nothing new in this country. Almost since their founding, American colleges and universities have gone through periods of turmoil and disruption. During the nineteenth century, discontent usually focused on such issues as poor food, inadequate housing, and excessively strict parietal rules; thus it was generally apolitical and parochial (Scranton Commission, 1970, pp. 21-22). In the early years of this century, radical and liberal student groups—usually affiliated with and dominated by adult political organizations and reflecting trends in the larger society—began to appear on college campuses. The Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS), founded in 1905, drew most of its members from higher education institutions on the eastern seaboard; it opposed rearmament and United States involvement in World War I and supported free speech on campus, immigration, and the

World Court. The Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), organized in 1907, was closely connected with the Socialist Party and worked for the election of its candidates. The Student Christian Volunteer Movement (SCVM), which included the YWCA and YWCA, at first concentrated on foreign missionary work but later took up such domestic causes as women's rights. All these groups were primarily educational rather than activists: they invited controversial speakers to campus, distributed literature, and carried out other projects well within the scope of peaceful and non-disruptive dissent. Nevertheless, World War I diverted their energies, and the Red scare that followed the war further curbed their activities (Altbach and Peterson, 1971, p. 3).

The 1920s saw renewed student activism, grounded partly in rebellion against the conventions of society and partly in criticism of the university itself. It was accused of being too big and bureaucratic and of ignoring and alienating students—charges that again became familiar during the 1960s. Many of the groups active during this period—the National Student Federation of America, the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID, which in 1959 changed its name to Students for a Democratic Society), and SCVM—were pacifist; they supported disarmament and protested American military incursions into Mexico and Nicaragua. The anti-war theme persisted into the 1930s, giving rise to "the first mass student movement in American history" (Altbach and Peterson, 1971, p. 6). This movement drew most of its support from metropolitan campuses, but it involved large proportions of students (more, perhaps, than the movement of the 1960s, although a much smaller proportion of young people attended college in the earlier decade, of course).

The outbreak of World War II put an abrupt end to the radical student movement. Indeed, even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the political left, including the Communist party, was rent by internal dissensions that vitiated its strength. Following that war, efforts to organize students on a national scale were unsuccessful. Returning veterans were more concerned with taking up their studies and making good in the working world than with pursuing political goals. Moreover, the cold war and the atmosphere of the McCarthy era frustrated the attempts of the radical left—and even

of liberals—to muster widespread student support. There was some faint interest on campus in such internationalist movements as the United World Federalists, some concern over civil rights (particularly after the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school desegregation), some worry about the threat of nuclear war, but the college students of the 1950s deserved the appellation "the silent generation" and the characterization "apathetic." The forties and fifties were atypical, however; radicalism and activism among students have deep historical roots. What distinguishes the past decade from earlier periods is that recent campus unrest has been student-initiated and student-centered, it has involved large numbers (if not necessarily larger proportions) of students, and it has been the subject of intensive scrutiny and widespread publicity.

Turning Points

What was it, during the early 1960s, that roused college students from their apathy? Why was the silent generation succeeded by a generation of students not merely vocal but even vociferous? While a number of underlying causes—political, economic, social, and psychological—have been proposed by many writers and theorists, our concern here is with the more immediate situational causes of extensive and dramatic campus unrest. This unrest was presaged by a number of events and undercurrents in the years immediately preceding the initial Berkeley protests. Three major issues predominated.

Early Stirrings, 1960-1964. The first—and undoubtedly the most important—issue was civil rights. In February 1960, four black students staged a sit-in at a segregated lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. Their act set the pattern of nonviolent resistance that was to characterize the early stages of the civil rights movement. Soon many white students were traveling to the South to work with such organizations as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in freedom marches and voter registration drives. In the North, students circulated petitions, collected money, and picketed chain stores whose southern branches discriminated against blacks. Most students, whether activists or not, felt a strong sense of identity and sympathy with the cause.

The second major issue during this period was atmospheric nuclear testing. Antitwar sentiment is a recurrent theme in our history, and its manifestation in the ban-the-bomb movement of the early 1960s represents a thread of historical continuity in the student movement. These demonstrations generally ceased when atmospheric testing was ended in 1963.

The third issue that sparked student activism was the witch-hunting of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The passive, and even craven, response of many intellectuals and academicians in the heyday of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy was changing to anger, resistance, and a reawakened concern for free speech, always a favorite campus issue. In the summer of 1960, HUAC arrived in the San Francisco Bay Area to seek out subversives, dupes, and fellow travelers. It was there confronted by loud and antagonistic crowds, among whom were students from the University of California at Berkeley and San Francisco State College. The results were the forcible removal, and subsequent arrest, of large numbers of demonstrators; the dissemination of a HUAC-sponsored film called *Operation Abolition*, which alleged that the demonstrators were Communist-inspired and that the demonstrators initiated a violent confrontation by leaping over barricades and attacking the police (the latter charge was disproved in the only case that actually came to trial); and the creation, on the Berkeley campus, of a high level of political awareness and commitment, a suitable atmosphere for the first major outbreak of campus unrest in the 1960s.

Flare-up at Berkeley, Fall 1964. The incident that touched off major unrest on the Berkeley campus was an announcement by the administration on September 16, 1964, that off-campus political groups could no longer make use of a previously "open" area—a narrow strip of university property—to hand out "advocative" literature, collect money, and solicit membership. Groups at every point on the political spectrum immediately reacted to this new stricture (actually, the revival of an old and long-unenforced rule) by forming a united front and requesting that the area be kept open. They offered to make a survey of the traffic flow (since the administration maintained that the tables manned by these off-campus groups impeded pedestrians coming to and from campus); they

agreed not to solicit funds; and they volunteered to police the area to see that no group violated university regulations about posters. The administration quickly rejected the request to keep the area open. Throughout the rest of the month, students demonstrated by holding all-night vigils, staging marches, picketing the chancellor, and using other nondisruptive tactics to protest the decision. In addition, five students deliberately violated the new rules, three others supported this act of civil disobedience, and all eight were put on indefinite suspension. At this point, the Free Speech Movement (FSM) was born, with Mario Savio—one of the eight suspended students—as its spokesman.

On October 1, the most attention-getting incident in the protest took place. A nonstudent was arrested for soliciting funds for the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the police car that arrived to carry him off was surrounded by hundreds of students. It remained immobilized for thirty-two hours while students gave speeches to the crowd, often climbing on the car and using it as a stage. (Eventually, students collected money to pay for damage done to the police car during this period.) October, November, and December saw continued chaos: committees were formed that issued lists of usually unheeded recommendations, the administration alternately granted concessions and imposed penalties, and students engaged in acts of protest that became more and more unruly and uncivil. A general faculty-student strike took place in December. The administration building was occupied in a sit-in, and mass arrests were made. The chancellor took a leave of absence and was later replaced. President Kerr and the acting chancellor announced, then retracted, resignations, though Kerr did indeed leave the following year. Mario Savio was suspended, jailed for 120 days by civil authorities, and later refused readmission to the university.

Although it is difficult to generalize out of this welter of events, certain significant tendencies emerge. First, as has been pointed out by a number of writers, the FSM was a kind of spin-off from the civil rights movement. Many Berkeley students had been involved in action groups in the South. Savio, who had worked in the Mississippi Summer Project of 1964, remarked: "The same rights are at stake in both places—the right to participate as citizens in a democratic society and the right to due process of law" (quoted

by Wallerstein and Starr, 1971, p. xiii). Rightly or wrongly, many students viewed the administration decision of September 16 as directed primarily against civil rights groups. The tactic they used to counter this move by the university was the tactic employed in the South, namely civil disobedience. Moreover, they were convinced of the righteousness of their cause and thus of the repressiveness of the university.

The situation was difficult for the administration to handle because, in addition to campus issues, it involved off-campus issues over which the university had no control. The protesters' interference with the rights of others (for example, their occupation of the administration building and their "capture" of the police car) led the administration to call in the civil police, which bolstered the radicals' charge that the university was repressive and drew in large numbers of liberal or politically neutral students who might not otherwise have joined the protest.

The fsm actually accomplished very little institutional change. As Nathan Glazer said, four years later, "the world does look very different, and the fsm looks like a prophetic turning point; but the University of California looks very much the same"; Glazer infers from this paradox that "it is rather easier to change the world than to change the university" (1970, p. 193).

The unrest at Berkeley was exploited to the fullest by the mass media—usually with the happy consent of the protesters—and probably the extensive coverage given to the fsm, particularly to the more flamboyant and disorderly incidents, helped to account for the next stage of the student movement.

Spread of the Movement, 1964-1968. It is a gross oversimplification to attribute the spread of the student movement entirely to the press and television, however. For one thing, student activists at campuses across the nation have a way of keeping in touch with one another without the help of the mass media, and this was particularly true when Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) expanded into a powerful national organization. For another, public reaction against campus unrest, repressive legislation (or the threat of it) by the federal and some state governments, and punitive civil and institutional measures taken against protesters all served to provoke students into greater rebellion. What is most important, the

drift of events in the world outside the walls of academe created concern among students and, in many cases, led to disillusionment with society as a whole and with the American political and social system in particular, thus changing the tone of student protest.

In 1964 and 1965—the years when Congress passed two bills that actualized some of the goals of the civil rights movement—the Democratic National Convention refused to seat the Mississippi Freedom Democratic delegation, Malcolm X was assassinated, and the Watts riots erupted. In 1966, when Stokely Carmichael expelled the whites who had worked with sncc in earlier years, and Huey Newton and Bobby Seale formed the Black Panther Party, the movement turned sharply from emphasis on integration and equality of opportunity to emphasis on black separatism, black pride, and black power. During these years, too, the treatment of other minority groups—Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans—came to be viewed by both radicals and liberals as another harsh example of the inequities permeating American society.

The bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 sparked further anger among students. O'Brien (1971) saw protest over the war as falling into two distinct periods. The first, from February 1965 to the middle of 1967, was characterized by traditional nondisruptive tactics, including teach-ins (which originated at the University of Michigan), circulation of petitions, and mass demonstrations. During this period, support of the antiwar movement increased dramatically, and the April 1967 mobilizations in New York and San Francisco attracted three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand demonstrators. Then, beginning about mid-1967, the issues expanded to the selective service system and to university involvement—through government defense contracts and military and industrial recruiters on campus—in the war. Spontaneous protests broke out on campuses around the nation. Milder forms of dissent gave way to illegal and obstructive actions, such as interference with military-industrial recruiting and burning draft cards. The moral tone of the antiwar movement changed significantly. As the Scranton Commission (1970, p. 31) put it: "From having been a 'mistake,' the war was soon interpreted by radical students as a logical outcome of the American political system. . . . The university, too, came to be seen as part of 'the system,' and therefore it

became a target—as opposed as an accidental arena—of antiwar protest.”

At the same time, a new counterculture had grown up. The hippies and flower children, “youthful dropouts from middle-class environments” (O'Brien, 1971, p. 21), were themselves largely apolitical, but their existence—and the marked difference between their life-style and conventional American norms—provided a supportive base for student radicals and emphasized their antagonism to the establishment.

Between 1964 and 1968, then, campus unrest increased. At first centered in large, prestigious, highly selective institutions, it gradually diffused to colleges and universities of all types. At the same time, the scope of campus unrest enlarged to cover broad social problems rather than single-campus issues, and its direction changed. Wallerstein and Starr maintained that, after the events of 1965, the movement “began to turn against liberalism and those who embodied it—the government, the Democratic Party, and eventually college professors” (1971, p. xiii). Young people had come to distrust the political system. Many had grown discouraged about the possibility of working rationally and nonviolently to bring about necessary change, a feeling later reinforced by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, the riots at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, and the failure of the Eugene McCarthy forces. Finally, some had come to view the university itself as an evil instrument of the system. Thus, the stage was set for Columbia.

University as Enemy: Columbia, Spring 1968. Campus unrest at Columbia University was evident as early as spring 1965, when about two hundred students participated in an antiwar protest; such demonstrations continued in 1966 and 1967, and criticism became more sharply directed at the university itself, because of its connection with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), a consortium of higher education institutions that carried out research for the Department of Defense. In February 1968, ground was broken for the construction of a new gymnasium, a project that called for the displacement of black residents of the ghetto area surrounding Columbia. At that time, the campus remained quiet, though a few neighborhood groups protested. It was not until April

23 that unrest broke out on campus. A group of black students occupied Hamilton Hall (where the administration offices of the college are located), SDS quickly joined the demonstration, and a total of five buildings were occupied and held until a week later, when city police were summoned to remove the demonstrators by force. In the ensuing melee, 707 persons were arrested, and 148 were injured. During that week, classes were suspended, and the campus remained uneasy throughout the remainder of the academic year. Late in May, white students again occupied Hamilton Hall, this time in response to the suspension of SDS leaders. The police were once more called in, and, although the buildings were cleared quickly, there was subsequent violence between students and police, with injuries on both sides. According to the Scranton Commission, the underlying issues of the protest “were Columbia’s relations with the surrounding black community and [its] links with American foreign policy” (1970, p. 36).

The protest at Columbia succeeded in its immediate aims: in June the IDA severed its relations with Columbia, and in February 1969 the administration announced that plans for the new gym would be suspended indefinitely. What is more important, SDS succeeded in its aim of “radicalizing” the students—an intention allegedly announced by SDS leader Mark Rudd as early as October 1967. Daniel Bell (1968, p. 80) summarized the situation as follows: “The significance . . . was not in the number of demonstrators involved—in the first three days there were not more than two hundred fifty people in the buildings, about fifty of whom were outsiders—but in the *double* nature of the actions: tactically, the student actions had ‘leaped’ five years, by adopting the latest methods of these several civil rights and peace movements, which had passed, in ‘five hot summers,’ from protest to confrontation to resistance and to outright obstruction; even more startling, the university as a general institution, itself, was now regarded as *the enemy*, the target for disruption.”

The protest at Columbia had far-reaching consequences on the course of campus unrest. During the occupation of Low Library, protesters had entered President Kirk’s office and ransacked his files; later, during the second occupation of Hamilton Hall, they burned the notes of a history professor. Such actions set a pattern of prop-

erty destruction and vandalism; in subsequent protests on other campuses, similar acts were committed, often at the ROTC building. Violence—on the part of protesters, counterprotesters, and police—became almost commonplace. Terroristic acts—including bomb threats, planting of bombs, and attempts to intimidate administrators and unsympathetic faculty members—also grew more frequent. Ultimately, the events at Columbia resulted in fierce public and legislative reaction against campus unrest. "By mid-1970, over thirty states had enacted a total of nearly eighty laws dealing with campus unrest," most of them punitive (Scranton Commission, 1970, p. 40).

Another significant feature at Columbia was the SDS "cooptation" (to borrow one of its favorite terms) of the protest, which had been initiated by black students. During this period and shortly thereafter, SDS was at the height of its power. By the end of spring 1969, it drew support from an estimated "fifty to seventy-five thousand students at least loosely affiliated with its hundreds of campus chapters" (O'Brien, 1971, p. 23). Then, at its June convention, members of the organization quarreled over ideology and tactics and finally split into a number of factions, the most notable being the Weathermen, a group whose extremism was repudiated by most student activists and whose deeds of terrorism and violence quickly drove it underground. Though SDS retains an organizational structure and even held a convention in 1972, it is at present moribund.

Black Militancy: Cornell, Spring 1969. Beginning about 1965, many northern colleges and universities—particularly the more prestigious—initiated active recruitment programs to enroll larger proportions of blacks, many of whom came from disadvantaged family and educational backgrounds. All too often, however, these institutions failed to plan adequately for this abrupt influx of "atypical" students, who consequently felt isolated on predominantly white campuses, neglected by the administration, and rejected by faculty members and other students. Their frequent lack of adequate preparation in high school and their relatively poor academic records and test scores—coupled with failure on the part of the institution to provide remedial courses, special programs, tutoring, and counseling—led them to feel depression, resentment,

and open hostility. These feelings expressed themselves in charges of "institutional racism" and "curricular irrelevance."

As noted, whites were no longer welcomed by such organizations as SNCC. Similarly, black students on many northern campuses, impelled by a drive for separatism, presented the administration with lists of nonnegotiable demands for black studies programs, black cultural facilities, special admissions for black students, and more black faculty and staff members.

This change in mood and direction created schisms within the black community itself. For example, writing in *Newsweek* (February 10, 1969), Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, argued against this separatist tendency on the part of some blacks, contending that, "in demanding a black Jim Crow studies building within a campus and exclusively black dormitories or wings of dormitories, they are opening the door to a dungeon" (quoted by Wallerstein and Starr, 1971, p. 318). On the other side, Georgia legislator Julian Bond, pointing to the "continuing failure of the white minority of peoples in the world to share power and wealth with the nonwhite majority," maintained that black demands for separate facilities were reasonable (Wallerstein and Starr, 1971, pp. 311-319). Black students themselves were divided in their feelings; many, interested primarily in the upward mobility offered by a college education, objected to being pressured into pursuing a course that might alienate them from white society but at the same time feared being called "Toms."

Certain northern institutions that had long prided themselves on being in the vanguard of the fight against racial discrimination were suddenly faced with the allegation that they themselves were prime purveyors of a deep-rooted racism in American society. White student activists were caught in an even greater dilemma. Though in large part they owed the very existence of their organizations to the civil rights movement, though they felt a strong identification with blacks and a deep conviction about the rightness of the cause, though they had often been the victims of racist persecution in the South, they now found themselves excluded and even reviled as interfering liberal white pigs. Many continued to give support to black demands—and, in the case of SDS, to take over protests initiated by blacks—but they suffered guilt feelings and developed an

almost masochistic attitude, castigating themselves for whatever part they might have played in furthering racism while refusing to drop out of the black movement.

As early as the summer of 1966, a powerful Black Student Union (BSU) was organized at San Francisco State College, and, as a result of its efforts, a black arts and culture series was established within the framework of the experimental college at that institution. But the addition of this program was considered insufficient, and demands for the establishment of a black studies program within the regular college continued. By the end of the 1967-1968 academic year, the administration had accepted the need for such a program and appointed a special coordinator, Nathan Hare, an outspoken militant whose ideas conflicted sharply with the traditional standards of the academic community. Hare proposed drastic changes in the criteria for appointing faculty members to the program and stressed that black students should be given academic credit for field work in the black community (Bunzel, 1969).

Signs of growing militancy among black students were also evident. In November 1967, a group of blacks allegedly broke into the offices of the campus newspaper and beat up the student editor. On December 6, members of the BSU occupied the administration building; police were called in, and additional violence resulted. Indeed, the troubles at San Francisco State continued through 1969, the issues expanded to cover the demands of another group (the Third World Liberation Front), and a number of secondary issues emerged—the dismissal of a faculty member who had participated in the December takeover of the administration building, police brutality, institutional sanctions against protest participants, and a ban on all demonstrations. Other campuses around the nation experienced similar explosions. In the spring of 1968, for example, Northwestern University was the scene of turmoil that had its roots in black militancy.

It was, however, the unrest at Cornell University in the spring of 1969 that brought home most strongly to the American public the element of black militancy in campus protest. Cornell was a hotbed of racial discontent. In 1963, President James Perkins had set up the Cornell Commission on Special Educational Projects, designed to recruit and provide scholarship aid to blacks. Un-

fortunately, Perkins made this decision without consulting faculty members and students. Consequently, the blacks enrolled under the program found themselves outside the mainstream of campus life, which was heavily dominated by fraternities and sororities. Because the university was far from large cities and the atmosphere of Ithaca was inhospitable, the black students were physically and psychologically isolated and could find a sense of community only among themselves. To add to the tension, a visiting professor of economics made a supposedly racist remark on the day of Martin Luther King's assassination; members of the Afro-American Society (AAS) demanded that he be forced to apologize, reprimanded, and dismissed; the administration investigated the matter (thus provoking the ire of the faculty, who felt their academic freedom threatened) but took no action against the professor in question (thus intensifying the frustration and resentment of the blacks).

Though plans were made in September 1968 for a black studies program, "the first to be established by a major American university" (Cohen, 1970, pp. 5-6), the newly elected president of the AAS considered that the administration was moving too slowly and presented a nine-point ultimatum demanding separate facilities. This was rejected by the university, and in response the blacks staged demonstrations that involved property disruption and the manhandling of university officials. Six activists were ordered to appear before the Cornell Student-Faculty Board on Student Conduct; the all-white composition of this judicial body exacerbated the hostility of the blacks. The citation of these students "was the turning-point in black-white relations at Cornell. For almost two months, since the militant demands for an autonomous college of Afro-American studies, interracial communications had almost exclusively taken the form of threats and insults" (Cohen, 1970, p. 8).

A crisis erupted on April 18, 1969, when a cross was burned in front of a black women's cooperative; the residents called on the administration for protection, and a single campus policeman was assigned to patrol the area. At six o'clock the next morning, black students took over Willard Straight Hall, the student union, and later that day issued a statement calling for dismissal of the charges against the cited students, separate housing facilities for blacks, and a thorough investigation of the cross-burning and of what they felt

to be inadequate handling of the situation by campus police. Meanwhile, someone telephoned into the student union building to say that it was going to be bombed and that armed fraternity men were on their way to expel the blacks by force. On the strength of these threats, the occupiers had guns and other weapons brought in to them by supporters outside.

The matter was temporarily settled by negotiations between AAS leaders and the administration. Shortly after four o'clock on Sunday afternoon, the blacks left Willard Straight Hall. "The sight of students wearing bandoliers and waving rifles and shotguns dramatically demonstrated that the failure to cope with student demands might result in the loss of life and the collapse of a university community" (Cohen, 1970, p. 1).

The unrest at Cornell was by no means at an end, and the issues became even more complicated, broadening to include conflict between black students (who demanded that faculty members exhibiting racist attitudes be fired) and the faculty (who charged that their academic freedom was being violated); demands by black and white students alike for more "participatory democracy" in all aspects of institutional governance; and condemnation by all sides of administrative high-handedness in making decisions and carrying out actions without consulting other members of the academic community. But it was the widely publicized photograph of the armed blacks that stamped the deepest impress on the public mind.

Reaction and Attention. As the incidence and intensity of protest at the nation's colleges and universities grew, as disruption and violence became more typical, as demonstrators became more inflammatory and radical in their criticism of American society, public alarm and hostility increased, fanned by often sensational accounts in the mass media. No doubt the visual impact of television also helped to stir anxieties. Officials viewed protests with alarm, students and faculty members gave firsthand accounts of protest events at particular campuses, pundits of varying degrees of expertise sought to analyze the events and place them in historical context. No longer was it possible to dismiss this phenomenon as an offshoot of youthful high spirits or to blame it on a handful of wild-eyed radicals or black malcontents. Serious attention had to be paid to

student protest; consideration had to be given to the possibility that charges made against the university might have some validity.

In June 1969, the board of directors of the American Council on Education created the Special Committee on Campus Tensions (known as the Linowitz Committee). Taking as its text an earlier ACE statement that "if colleges and universities will not govern themselves, they will be governed by others," the committee sought to describe the crisis, to analyze the complaints and desires of various collegiate constituents (students, faculty, administrators, trustees), and to make practical recommendations about what colleges and universities could do to restore order. At the same time, it recognized that "the higher education community cannot help to solve all the problems that create campus tensions. It cannot alone stop war, eliminate poverty, rebuild cities, or expunge racism" (Nichols, 1970, p. 36). As the Linowitz Committee was setting about its work, the administration in Washington predicted that there would be fewer disorders in the 1969-1970 academic year (*Newsweek*, September 1, 1969, p. 12). Indeed, judged solely by reports in the mass media, the fall semester was relatively calm. This "cooling down" of the campuses was more apparent than real, however, as later studies showed (for example, Bayer and Astin, 1971). Much of the protest was directed at agencies or events beyond the control of the institution rather than against institutional policies. Of particular note are the widespread observance of Earth Day (at almost two-thirds of United States institutions) and the less solid but still impressive support of the October, November, and December antiwar moratoria (discussed in detail later in this chapter). It seems obvious that students were still very much concerned not just with local campus issues but also with larger social issues—ecology and environmental pollution being relatively new themes—and, in particular, that they were still opposed to the American military presence in Southeast Asia.

Cambodia, Kent State, April-August 1970. The events of May 1970 give ample evidence of the depth of student concern and of the prematurity of predictions that "the worst of the disruption lies behind . . . or is a seasonal phenomenon" (Nichols, 1970, p. 6). On April 30, the Nixon administration announced the in-

vasion of Cambodia. On May 4, the killings at Kent State University (Ohio) took place, followed ten days later by the killings at Jackson State College (Mississippi). The President's Commission on Campus Unrest (Scranton Commission) was established in June 1970 in direct response to these incidents. According to its report (Scranton Commission, 1970, pp. 17-18), issued in September, "During the six days after the president's announcement of the Cambodian incursion, but prior to the deaths at Kent State, some twenty new student strikes had begun each day. During the four days that followed the Kent killings, there were a hundred or more strikes each day. A student strike center located at Brandeis University reported that, by the tenth of May, 448 campuses were either still affected by some sort of strike or completely closed down."

The commission found (1970, p. 234) that "compared with other American universities of its size, Kent State had enjoyed relative tranquility prior to May 1970, and its student body had generally been conservative or apolitical." There had been some protest activity in the fall of 1968 and the spring of 1969—and in both cases, SDS was involved—but neither protest was directly related to the events of May 1-4, nor is there any evidence that SDS or any other group of "agitators" was behind these events. President Nixon's announcement on Thursday was followed by an orderly antiwar rally on Friday and then by a weekend of restlessness, "trashing," and property destruction, climaxed by complete incineration of the ROTC building on Saturday. The mayor proclaimed a state of civil emergency, the governor backed him by issuing a number of hard-line statements, and the National Guard was called in on Sunday. The students, in the meantime, were confused by the imposition of ambiguous curfew regulations. In addition, both the authorities and the students were uncertain about the permissibility of peaceful assemblies in protest of the United States invasion of Cambodia and of the National Guard "invasion" of Kent State (as many students perceived it).

What happened shortly after noon on Monday, May 4 can be attributed in part to overreaction by public officials, in part to the lack of a clear direction and position by the university administration, and in part to growing antagonism between National Guardsmen and students. (Many guardsmen later reported that they

feared for their own safety, having been the target not only of jeers and obscenities but also of stones and other missiles; many students who had previously been neutral or indifferent became resentful at having an "army" on the campus that ordered them around.) Accounts differ on the exact events that precipitated the barrage of gunfire. Despite reports immediately following the shooting, no sniper seems to have been at work, and it is doubtful that an official order to fire was given. The outcome, however, was clear enough: at least sixty-one shots were fired, leaving four students dead, nine wounded, and a nation in shock.

The events at Jackson State College ten days later were no less shocking. Indeed, it is arguable that, because the county grand jury that later investigated the incident made every effort to whitewash the city police and highway patrolmen involved in the shootings, Jackson State represents an even greater tragedy in American life than does Kent State, and one that has deeper roots than anti-Vietnam sentiment. The Scranton Commission (1970, p. 444) noted: "Jackson State is a black school situated in a white-dominated state. This is a starting point for analyzing the causes of the student disorders of May 13 and 14, 1970. The stark fact underlying all other causes of student unrest at Jackson State is the historic pattern of racism that substantially affects daily life in Mississippi." The college had been the scene of long-standing tensions: between black students and "corner boys" (black youths who were not students but who lived in the surrounding neighborhood) and between blacks and passing white motorists (the main road connecting downtown Jackson and the white residential areas runs past the college). Rock-throwing incidents were common on the part of blacks; and harassment of blacks was common on the part of city police.

The unrest at Jackson State had no direct connection with Cambodia or with Kent State, though there had been a peaceful anti-Vietnam protest on May 7. Indeed, it is not known precisely what triggered the situation on the evening of May 13, when rock throwing began, large crowds of students gathered to jeer at law enforcement officers, two trash trailers were set afire, an attempt was made to burn down the ROTC building, and rumors abounded. On the evening of May 14, three separate law enforcement groups—each with its own perception of the situation and its own training

and tactics—were on the campus: the highway patrol, the city police, and the National Guard. Soon the arena of action shifted to the area outside Alexander Hall, a women's dormitory.

As at Kent State, accounts vary on the factors that precipitated the fusillade of at least one hundred fifty rounds that was fired at both the inside and the outside of the dormitory, penetrating every floor and resulting in the death of two persons and the wounding of twelve others, all black. The size of the crowd, the threat it posed, and the possible presence of a sniper on the third floor are all in dispute, but it is evident that the law enforcement officers acted without proper precaution. Moreover, their attitude was, according to newsmen on the scene, one of levity about the shooting and of contempt for blacks. Though the killings at Jackson State did not receive the same amount of attention from the media and did not have the same shock effect on the national sensibilities as those at Kent State, they were part of a pattern that turned students—many of them innocent bystanders—into the victims of the establishment, as represented by the police and the National Guard.

That pattern suffered a reversal later that summer, when a University of Wisconsin building that housed the Army Mathematics Research Center—proclaimed by radicals to be instrumental in doing research that “has killed literally thousands of innocent people” (quoted in *Newsweek*, September 7, 1970, p. 33)—was wrecked by a bomb. Not only were the computer demolished, the physics and astronomy departments seriously damaged, and the scholarly work of both professors and graduate students destroyed, but also four persons were injured and one was killed. Though bombings and bomb threats were not new to American campuses, the incident at Madison was the most extreme act of terrorism yet carried out, and, again, the one that received the most coverage from the news media. Kenneth Keniston marks the Madison disaster as a turning point, in that it brought student activists to the realization that violence and the murder of innocents were not limited to the military-industrial establishment and its academic “lackeys”; protesters themselves were capable of perpetrating outrages. Students' reactions went beyond depression and exhaustion; the mood became one of shame and embarrassment. Keniston (1971, p. 208) commented: “The emergence of violence within the movement has

in turn pushed its members to reexamine their earlier self-justifying assumption that destructiveness characterized their adversaries but not themselves.” It was this reexamination, according to Keniston, that accounted for the apparent calm—or, to use Kingman Brewster's phrase, “ecic tranquility”—on campus during the 1970-1971 and 1971-1972 academic years.

Incidence

That campus unrest was on the rise from the late 1950s through the late 1960s is evidenced by Hodgkinson's fall 1968 survey (1970a, 1970b) of all presidents of higher education institutions (with a 46-percent response rate). Hodgkinson asked them to judge retrospectively whether or not they had experienced an increase in student protests during the preceding ten years. Thus, the survey extended from a period of calm on the nation's campuses (the 1957-1958 academic year) to a period of great unrest (the 1967-1968 academic year): Only 22 percent reported that no student protests had occurred at their institutions during the decade. Another 44 percent said there had been “no change,” an ambiguous response that may mean, at least in some cases, no unrest. The remaining one-third reported a change in the incidence of unrest over the decade, with fewer than 2 percent of the presidents indicating a decrease rather than an increase.

Unfortunately, precise information of the prevalence of unrest at American institutions of higher education is simply not available for the years before 1968, though data from the Educational Testing Service (ETS) surveys for the 1964-1965 and 1967-1968 academic years provide a minimum estimate. These surveys did not cover two-year colleges, nor did they report the aggregate number or proportion of institutions experiencing protest. Rather, they reported in detail the incidence of protests about twenty-seven separate issues. For instance, in 1964-1965, the most prevalent issue was civil rights, with about two-fifths (38 percent) of all institutions in the survey reporting such protests. In 1967-1968, the most prevalent issue was Vietnam; again, 38 percent of the institutions surveyed reported antiwar protests. Peterson (1968a, pp. 31-32) notes that, between these two periods, not only did the absolute number of student

protesters grow, but also the number of baccalaureate-granting institutions that experienced protest on each of the listed issues generally increased.

In the 1968-1969 academic year, Gaddy (1970), surveying the national population of junior colleges, found that two-fifths (38 percent) had experienced one or more incidents of organized student protest, a figure identical to the minimal estimates for universities and four-year colleges in the earlier years.

The incidence of campus unrest continued to rise after 1968-1969. According to the ACE survey of 1969-1970, fully 45 percent of the four-year colleges experienced at least one incident of war-related protest. Four-fifths (80 percent) of the four-year institutions, and two-thirds (67 percent) of all institutions, including junior colleges, had protest incidents over some issue. That academic year—in which Earth Day, the Vietnam moratoria, the Cambodian crisis, and the Kent State and Jackson State killings took place—undoubtedly marks the zenith of protest activity on American campuses to date.

The next two years did not see a sharp drop in protest incidence and a return to a state of calm. The ACE survey for 1970-1971 shows that over a thousand campuses—43 percent of higher education institutions—experienced at least one protest incident. Though no comparable data are available for the entire 1971-1972 academic year, an ACE survey for the week of April 17 to 24, 1972, indicates that more than one-fourth (27 percent) of the entire academic community of some 2500 institutions had experienced protest incidents. By comparison, in the highly publicized "crisis" period of May 1-10, 1970, 16 percent of the institutions experienced protest after the Cambodian invasion, and 24 percent after the deaths at Kent State.

In spite of continuing unrest, "newsworthy" incidents have been rare since Cambodia. In part, the decline of news coverage can be attributed to the diffusion of campus unrest to institutions previously unaffected by it—smaller, less selective, and therefore less prestigious institutions—which held less interest for the national news media. The ACE surveys revealed that 40 percent of the institutions experiencing severe unrest in 1968-1969 received press coverage; in contrast, only 10 percent of those experiencing severe

unrest in 1970-1971 were covered by the press. Of the 232 relatively unselective institutions (those whose students were only average or below average in academic ability) that experienced severe protest in 1970-1971, not one was mentioned in the national media. Of the 230 institutions in the high or high-intermediate selectivity range, fully forty-eight (21 percent) were the subject of reports in the news media. Although national data on the incidence of unrest since 1972 do not exist, it is clear that an era has ended.

Severity. No systematic statistical evidence on the modes, tactics, and severity of protest is available for the period before 1968. The press accounts during this period suggest that incidents of major disruption, property destruction, and personal violence were rare. In contrast, a casual reading of press accounts for the 1968-1969 academic year seems to indicate that many colleges and universities were coming apart at the seams and that higher education in general was on the brink of chaos. The ACE survey for that year, however, indicates that the mass media gave a badly distorted picture. Violence (defined by such acts as damaging or destroying buildings, furnishings, papers, records, and files and physically injuring persons) and disruption (defined by acts such as occupying buildings, holding college officials captive, interrupting classes, speeches, meetings, and other university functions, and holding general campus strikes or boycotts) were atypical modes of protest in 1968-1969. Only 6 percent of the institutions experienced any violent incidents; an additional 16 percent suffered some kind of disruptive incident.

According to the ACE survey for the "peak year" of 1969-1970, property damage and other physical violence occurred at an estimated 9 percent of American campuses. (No comparable figures are available for disruptive acts.) By 1970-1971, violence and disruption had declined—albeit only slightly—from the levels of the preceding two years: fewer than one in five of all institutions experienced either a violent or a disruptive protest. By 1971-1972, the frequency of extreme incidents was even slighter: the ACE survey of the critical week in April that followed the renewed bombing of North Vietnam indicated that no institutions had completely closed down—in contrast to the situation following Cambodia and Kent State (Scranton Commission, 1970, p. 18)—and that property had

been damaged or destroyed at fewer than 2 percent of the colleges and universities.

Comparing specific modes of protest for the 1968-1969 and the 1970-1971 academic years, some acts (such as destruction of papers, occupation of buildings, and marches resulting in violence) declined at least slightly in frequency, one mode (burning of buildings) increased slightly, and other types of property destruction were as prevalent as they had been. Protests involving injury to persons were less common, as were those involving the interruption of school functions and general campus strikes or boycotts.

Institutions where severe protests took place were more likely to experience other forms of protest as well. Threats of physical violence and bomb scares, for example, occurred much more frequently at institutions that had severe protests than at other institutions. Nevertheless, at all institutions, most protest acts were mild, taking the form of presentation of demands or grievances to an established institutional body (27 percent in 1970-1971); staging of peaceful marches, picketing, or rallies (20 percent); and circulation of petitions (19 percent). Similarly, in April 1972, the most prevalent mode of protest over the renewed bombing of North Vietnam was the staging of peaceful marches or rallies (at 394 of the 685 institutions that had protests during that week); other common protest events were teach-ins and special discussion groups or seminars (126 institutions), silent vigils (99 institutions), and distributions of antiwar literature or petitions (55 institutions).

Issues: National estimates of the proportions of student protests focusing on specific issues are available for four academic years: the ERS surveys provide information on protests at baccalaureate-granting institutions (but not two-year colleges) for 1964-1965 and 1967-1968; the ACE surveys provide information on protests at all types of institutions for 1969-1970 and for 1970-1971. Although the population bases are not the same for the different years, and although the lists of issues varied slightly, the surveys are sufficiently similar to permit the identification of broad trends and changes in the issues of protest.

Clearly, the roots of the student movement do not lie primarily in antiwar sentiment; indeed, in no single year was United States involvement in Vietnam the target of protest at the majority

of institutions experiencing unrest, although in 1967-1968 it was the target at a plurality (38 percent) of these institutions. According to the ERS study of 1964-1965, only one in five (21 percent) of baccalaureate-granting institutions had a protest incident about United States policies in Vietnam. Protests about civil rights, parietal rules, and food services were decidedly more common. By 1967-1968, the Vietnam issue had become dominant, but even then only 38 percent of the universities and four-year colleges had protests about this issue. Comparative data for junior college protests in the following academic year (Gaddy, 1970) indicate that, while some protest incident arose on 38 percent of junior college campuses, on only 13 percent was the Vietnam War the issue.

Even in the peak year of 1969-1970—when antiwar sentiment took the form of moratoria observances and when unrest broke out following the Cambodian invasion—protests about environmental pollution were more frequent than protests about any other single issue. Earth Day was observed at close to two-fifths (39 percent) of all institutions, more than those observing the October moratorium (32 percent), protesting war-related campus issues (11 percent), protesting general United States policy in Southeast Asia (25 percent), or protesting the Cambodian invasion (16 percent). A total of 44 percent of the campuses experienced protests resulting from the combination of Cambodia, Kent State, and Jackson State, and normal institutional activities ceased for at least a day at one-fifth (21 percent) of the institutions (Peterson and Biorusky, 1971).

In 1970-1971, only one in five institutions had a protest about a war-related issue (United States military policy, selective service policy, or such on-campus issues as ROTC, military and industrial recruiting, and defense research). Slightly more common were protests about facilities and student life (at 22 percent of the institutions) and student power (at 27 percent). However, in April 1972, the renewed bombing of North Vietnam triggered campus unrest, primarily of a nondisruptive and legal nature, at approximately one-fourth (27 percent) of American institutions (Bayer and Astin, 1972). In short, although United States military policy (particularly in Southeast Asia) and war-related issues have been a steady source of grist to the activist mill, all other categories of

issues, taken together, have evoked more protests in each academic year under consideration.

Academic and student life—a category that includes student power (a voice in decision-making), services to students, and parietal rules—has provided a focal point for student unrest in recent years. The two ERS studies show that, in 1964–1965, dormitory regulations and food services were issues of protest at one-fourth to one-third of all four-year colleges; one-fifth of these institutions experienced protests about dress regulations. In the junior colleges during 1968–1969, “situations including food service, rules on dress and appearance, student publications, and student representation in policy-making were most subject to protest activity” (Gaddy, 1970, p. 4). Moreover, accounts in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* suggest that facilities, student life, and student power have continued to be recurrent themes of protest in the academic years since 1970.

The sharpest decline over the years occurred in protests about racial issues. Civil rights (in the off-campus, local area) was the most prevalent theme of protest (at 38 percent of all baccalaureate-granting institutions) in 1964–1965; in 1967–1968, the proportion had dropped to 29 percent. On the other hand, protests about alleged racial discrimination on the part of institutions (for example, in admissions) rose from 5 percent of baccalaureate-granting institutions in 1964–1965 to 18 percent in 1967–1968. In 1969–1970, only about one in six (16 percent) of all higher education institutions had a protest about a campus issue involving race; the Jackson State killings, which occurred that same year, elicited protests at only 2 percent of the institutions. In 1970–1971, only 8 percent of the campuses experienced protest about minority group issues, usually involving special programs and special admissions policies. Of the 110 protest incidents reported in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* for 1971–1972, only 5 percent were related to racial issues.

Settings

Campus unrest was at first concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions of a particular type. An early study by Peterson (1968b) showed that such institutions tended to be large, highly

selective, private, and permissive in their policies. Moreover, they attracted “protest-prone” students. What this means, as indicated in other studies (such as Astin and Bayer, 1971), is that large proportions of the students were exceptionally able academically, came from Jewish backgrounds, tended to have no current religious preference, were verbally aggressive, considered themselves political liberals, and were self-confident about their intellectual abilities. Moreover, the quality of the faculty was unusually high (as measured by the percentage who held doctoral degrees). These institutions tended to be located in the northeast or on the west coast.

Later, campus unrest became a nationwide phenomenon, spreading to various types of colleges that had not previously been affected, resulting in a “flattening out” of the relationship between institutional characteristics and protest. Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, many of the same college attributes were consistently associated with the occurrence of protests on campus, particularly (in the later years) severe protests (those that involved violent incidents, such as injuries, deaths, or significant destruction of property, and those that involved nonviolent but disruptive incidents, such as the interruption of normal institutional functions and the occupation of buildings). Table 1 shows the estimated percentages of various types of institutions that experienced severe campus protest in 1968–1969 and 1970–1971, as well as the percentage that experienced protest of any kind in 1970–1971. (Data for the earlier academic year focused on violent and disruptive acts, so that no percentages are available on all types of protests.) The incidence of severe protest decreased at public universities, private universities, and four-year private nonsectarian colleges (the types of institutions that had been hardest hit in 1968–1969); it remained the same at four-year Protestant colleges; and it increased at four-year public colleges, four-year Catholic colleges, and public and private two-year colleges (the types that had previously been relatively unaffected by severe protest). Nonetheless, the rank order of institutions remained just about the same for severe protest in the years considered.

Universities, particularly private ones, were most susceptible to protests, including severe protests that often erupted in violence. Though four-year public colleges and private colleges switched their

Table 1. INCIDENCE OF PROTEST BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION 1968-1969 AND 1970-1971

Type of Institution	Population (N)	Sample (N)		Percentage Having Severe Protest		Percentage Having Any Protest
		1968-1969	1970-1971	1968-1969	1970-1971	1970-1971
Public universities	249	54	55	43.0	35.7	73.9
Private universities	61	28	28	70.5	52.5	82.0
Four-year public colleges	343	44	45	21.7	29.4	54.8
Four-year private nonsectarian colleges	391	85	79	42.6	19.7	45.3
Four-year Protestant colleges	321	49	50	17.8	17.8	44.2
Four-year Catholic colleges	229	43	42	8.5	13.1	35.4
Two-year private colleges	230	25	22	0.0	5.2	16.1
Two-year public colleges	538	54	48	10.4	11.9	29.7
Total	2362	382	369	22.4	19.6	43.1

Sources: 1968-1969 data from Bayer and Astin, 1969, pp. 337-350; 1970-1971 data from ACR survey.

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rank-order positions between 1968-1969 and 1970-1971, they too were very vulnerable to protests of all kinds. In private nonsectarian colleges, however, outbreaks of violence were rare. Protestant colleges were more likely to experience protest than were Catholic colleges, though the incidence of severe protest at the latter rose between 1968-1969 and 1970-1971, and violent incidents were proportionately more likely to occur. The two-year colleges, especially the private ones, were least susceptible to protest. These findings on the relation of educational level and type of administrative control to the occurrence of protest at an institution held fairly constant throughout the years of campus unrest.

Curricular emphasis was another characteristic found to be related to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of protest. Complex and heterogeneous institutions, such as multiversities, and (to a lesser degree) liberal arts colleges were more likely to experience protest than such specialized and single-purpose institutions as technological schools and teachers colleges. These differences are probably attributable in large part to differences in the characteristics of students and faculty members at these schools. Specialized institutions attract both students and faculty members who are more career-oriented and more conservative politically. Moreover, there is survey research evidence (see Chapter Three; Creager, 1971) that persons who major in (or teach) engineering and education are much less inclined to participate in, or even to approve of, campus demonstrations than those in the social sciences, the arts, and the humanities.

Two other institutional characteristics have been consistently related to the occurrence of unrest: size and selectivity. In general, the larger the institution, the greater the likelihood that it will experience unrest of some kind and that the unrest will involve violence and disruption. The consistent exception is the universities; those of moderate size (one thousand to five thousand students) were more protest-vulnerable than those of large size (over five thousand). This inconsistency is explained by the fact mentioned earlier that private universities, which are usually of intermediate rather than large size, were more likely to have major protests than public ones, which are larger.

Two explanations may be offered to account for the apparent causal relation between institutional size (which is closely linked to

university status) and the occurrence of protest. One, labeled the "critical mass" hypothesis, was suggested by the finding (Astin and Bayer, 1971) that the *proportion* of black students at a predominantly white institution was not related to the occurrence of protests over racial policies but that the *absolute number* of black students was. The implication with respect to all students is that large institutions will be more likely to have a "critical mass" of potential activists capable of organizing a protest. A second explanation (not necessarily antithetical to the first) is that the environments of larger institutions (particularly universities) have been shown to be cold and impersonal, marked by a lack of cohesiveness and by little interaction between students and faculty members, who are often more interested in their own research or in working with graduate students than in teaching undergraduates (see Astin, 1968). Thus, students feel alienated and discontented, and these feelings may manifest themselves in protest activity.

Selectivity (the average academic ability of the student body, measured by mean scores on standardized tests) is an extremely important predictor of campus unrest, particularly severe protest (Bayer and Astin, 1969). In 1968-1969, none of the least selective universities experienced severe protest, but the incidence of protest rose sharply at each successive selectivity level; by 1970-1971, 20 percent of the least selective universities experienced severe protest, and 40 percent experienced protest of some kind, but the highly selective universities still tended to suffer protest more frequently, though the increase at each selectivity level was not as pronounced. The same was generally true for the four-year colleges. The only reversal occurred among two-year institutions in the 1970-1971 academic year: the higher the selectivity level of these institutions, the smaller the likelihood of protest. This apparent inconsistency is explained by the additional fact that protest was more likely to occur at large, public junior colleges than at small, private ones, which are usually the more selective.

The close connection between selectivity (which can be considered an aspect of student input as well as an attribute of the institution itself) has also been explained in several ways. First, the students attracted by highly selective institutions are, almost by definition, more intellectual and thus probably more aware of and

concerned about political and social problems; such students may use protest to express their concern. Secondly, because it brings together a large concentration of highly able students, perhaps for the first time, the highly selective institution is likely to have an extremely competitive academic atmosphere in which students are under heavy pressure to make high grades. Their resultant feelings of stress and frustration may be channeled into activist behavior. In addition, highly selective institutions attract and recruit faculty members who may influence the protest behavior of students in two ways: their frequent neglect of teaching in favor of research may create a cold and unfriendly atmosphere (like that of large institutions) that leads students to revolt; and such faculty members may also give student activism their approval or actually join in protests, further stimulating student activism (Bayer, 1971 and Lipset, 1972).