INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM ESSAY -- DRAFT 2
Throughout the years that I have been teaching
librarianship, I have been responsible for explaining the concept
of intellectual freedom to students. A typical explanation
includes a statement of what the concept means and a brief
discussion of why the librarian has a professional obligation to
support it. During the discussion I have also emphasized that not
everyone in the society agrees with the primacy of intellectual
freedom. This means that the librarian must be prepared to defend
that principle against censorship of all sorts. The conflict is
set in the form of a morality tale. The librarian in shining
armor repels the forces of darkness that threaten our right to
read. The dark force is embodied in the scurrilous person of the
censor.
As time has passed, I have witnessed numerous formal and
informal encounters between defenders of the librarians' faith
and those who argue for censorship. (include some examples) When
I have reflected on the nature of these encounters, two strong
impressions have gradually infiltrated my consciousness. The
first is that there is never any meeting of minds in these
encounters. There is no evidence that either party ever
understands the position of the other. They just talk at one
another.
The other impression that has emerged is the observation that the
censor sees himself as a figure in shining armor who struggles to
repel the forces of darkness represented by the scurrilous figure of
the librarian. I have been surprised to find that the morality play is
as real for our adversaries as it is for us, but the masks are
reversed. Each of us, censor and librarian, is the hero in defense of
a pure idea. For each, the opponent is misguided at best, at worst a
villain.
I have always been a relativist, uncomfortable with absolutes. It
has been a shock to recognize that the absolutism I have deplored in
the censor has its mirror image in the arguments I have provided in
defense of the librarian's commitment to intellectual freedom. This
insight has left me exceedingly uneasy. It has shattered the
persuasive power inherent in the imagery of the morality play. This
has led to the search for a new foundation for the defense of
intellectual freedom.
I began to seek some more satisfactory explanation for the
dynamics of the relationship between librarians and intellectual
freedom and eventually arrived at writings which treat the underlying
concept of freedom in general.
Now "freedom", as you know, is not an idea that lends itself to
easy distillation. As a philosophical concept it is one of the
fundamental building blocks that contribute to the perennial
consideration of those characteristics that describe the human
condition. Other such philosophical imponderables include "reality",
"truth", "goodness", "knowing", and "beauty". One of the features of
each of these concepts which renders it of continuing interest to the
speculative thinker is the range of possibilities which the idea
embraces. These are intellectual constructs whose meanings have eluded
a consensus of agreement despite millenia of intense debate.
Another consideration which complicates the evaluation of
the idea of freedom is the fact that for most people, freedom is
a loaded word. Rare is the philosopher or polemicist who is
prepared to argue that "freedom", however defined, is an
undesirable characteristic, and the occasional exception is
inevitably considered to be satirical or perverse. This means
that whatever the commentator's attitude toward those elements of
political or social activity that are being considered, the term
"freedom" is likely to be used to describe some dimension of the
activity that is being advocated while it is denied by definition
to the other side, which is characterized as misusing the term.
(example here?)
Anyone who seeks to study the nature of freedom as an abstract
idea is soon made aware that there are turbulent controversies that
surround its meaning. Philosophers disagree concerning the nature of
freedom, they disagree about how freedom relates to other social
values, and they disagree about the effects of various proposals for
achieving freedom. (fn 7 INTFREE) Any analysis of the meaning of
freedom as a concept requires some method for imposing order on the
vast body of conflicting opinion that has accumulated throughout the
more than two thousand years that span the history of recorded thought
on the subject. With a topic as rich and value-laden as the idea of
freedom, classification of the meanings attributed to the term has
been neither easy nor uncontroversial. (fn 8 INTFREE)
Whatever the ultimate conclusion of the particular analysis, one
distinction emerges with some regularity. In its most simplified form,
this is a distinction between (1) freedom as the absence of coercion
and (2) freedom as the capacity to act according to some ideal. The
differences between these two categories of freedom may not be
readily apparent, but in fact the distinction not only has
significance for advancing the abstract understanding of freedom
as a force in intellectual history. It suggests an explanation
that can be used to construct a more helpful new model for the
ongoing struggle between supporters of intellectual freedom and
would-be censors. Let me explain.
Freedom as the absence of coercion has acquired such labels as
"negative freedom" and the "circumstantial freedom of self-
realization". Freedom as the capacity to act according to some ideal
has been called "positive freedom" and "the acquired freedom of self-
perfection".(fn 9 & 10 INTFREE) Since the labels have themselves
become grounds for controversy, (fn 11 INTFREE) the two categories
shall be referred to as F1 and F2 during this discussion.
F1 is concerned with the capacity of the individual to act as an
independent agent. It provides that each person shall not be deprived
from pursuing his/her own interest, wherever such interest may lead.
It is the freedom to which philosophers like John Stuart Mill refer
when they speak optimistically of what they perceive as the necessary
connection between the opportunity to act independently and the
advancement of the society toward a more perfected condition. F1 is
the Jeffersonian ideal of freedom which is most prominently expressed
in the political documents of the American revolution. It is the
freedom whereof civil libertarians speak when they call for the right
to pursue any idea, and it conveys the librarian's sense of
intellectual freedom. (examples?)
F2 is concerned with the capacity to act according to an ideal.
This freedom consists of being one's own master, not in the sense of
being able to carry out any action that the individual desires, but
rather in the sense of learning to live in a way that conforms to a
defined pattern of right thinking. The person acquires dominance over
his passions and conquers the impulse toward self-destructive behavior
in order to achieve some set of goals. These goals are often defined
by an external standard rather than being conceived in the mind of
the individual with whose freedom we are concerned. Kant seems to be
referring to F2 when he says that "Virtue, therefore, in so far as it
is based on internal freedom, contains a positive command for man,
namely, that he should bring all his powers and inclinations under
his rule (that of reason) . . . since, unless reason takes the reins
of government in its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the
master over the man." (fn 12 INTFREE) Any person who feels that true
freedom derives from living successfully according to the golden rule
embraces F2. So does the individual who believe that spiritual freedom
is achieved through the practice of some defined discipline of
meditation, exercise and renunciation of material values. Every
philosophy that has some prescription for living at its core advocates
a kind of F2.
It should be quite clear by now that F1 and F2 involve distinctly
different conceptions of freedom. How would someone who espouses F2 be
likely to react to a description of F1? Individual responses would
surely differ, but many persons who feel that true freedom consists of
the capacity to act according to a specialized ideal would not find
the F1 ability to take action without constraint to be worth much. In
fact, the person who is working toward the realization of an F2 ideal
through a program of disciplined self-control is quite likely to
perceive the blandishments of values associated with F1 as a threat, a
siren song of anarchy. And what of the F1 believer? To this person,
the argument that freedom is a direct consequence of the surrender of
will to some externally derived program of action would seem to be an
invitation to subjugation. In each case, freedom for one is apt to
seem like unfreedom to the other.
The careful reader has noted by now that the positions
associated with these two definitions of freedom reflect the
morality play of intellectual freedom versus censorship. The F1
freedom to pursue one's own interest wherever it leads provides a
script where the librarian is center stage and the hero of the
piece. Her duty is to provide all the information that is
relevant to a customer's need without questioning the use to
which the information will be put or the moral correctness of the
information sources. The villain is the would-be censor who lurks
around the fringes of the set, seeking an opportunity to
interdict the flow of information to persons of whom he does not
approve or to filter the information to remove impurities that
may endanger the customer's moral good health. He is the
coercer, who would limit the freedom of the librarian and the
customer to pursue their own information related interests. It is
F1 freedom that is celebrated here.
In the alternative scenario, the star of the show is the
kindly, wise and concerned censor. Through some combination of
grace, good works and self-discipline he knows the truth about
life. His freedom is defined by the degree to which he can
successfully conform to the goals that are defined by his
discovered ideals of right living. The star of this play does not
necessarily follow ideals which include the need to act as a
censor. In theory, the ideals that determine his behavior could
demand impeccable respect for everyone else's right to destroy
themselves through exposure to corrupting doctrines. In fact,
however, a significant number of people who have found the truth
which has made them free are strongly motivated to interfere with
the flow of information in society.
For one thing, this person knows the truth. A position of
such moral certainty may well create a virtual obligation to
attempt to save others from the mischief that will result by
making false information available. Secondly, the person may wish
to proselytize others to join the elite group of those who have
been made free by the truth. Part of this process would involve
enhancing access to true information while interdicting that
which is false. Finally the person may be insecure in his
allegiance to the true way. He may wish to act the censor to
avoid exposure to information that would tempt him into
backsliding.
Whatever the particular motive of the star in this
morality play, it can be sure that there are good reasons for him
to act the role of the censor. The victims of the piece, then,
become any persons who are persuaded of the truth of false ideas,
and the villains are the persons who are responsible for the
production of such ideas and individuals, like librarians, who
promote and disseminate them. Of course, the stars of the play
are not always in agreement about which ideas are the most
truthful. That depends on the particular truths that have been
revealed to them. They often can agree, however, on a set of
ideas that they all consider false. This provides the foundation
for a coalition of censorship against the villains, including the
librarian, who would interfere with F2 freedom by promoting
information that is threatening to the ideals from which that
freedom derives.
At this point, it may be appropriate to ask what has been gained
by the work that has been done this far. The search for an explanatory
model of the conflict between censor and librarian has been advanced
to the degree that each of the morality plays which dramatize the
conflict can be seen to derive from a legitimate but contrasting
definition of freedom. This advance may be even more significant than
that, because if it is sound, it disposes of the question of which
position is right. It has been noted that both definitions of freedom
have a long historical tradition of accepted use that has been
carefully documented. (fn 15 INTFREE) This suggests that both
positions are valid.
In fact, our careful reader will also have noted by now that the
two attitudes regarding freedom represent extreme positions in the
continuum that exists along the axis of social attitudes
conventionally labeled liberal and conservative. F1 represents a
classic statement of the nature of freedom as it is defined at the
liberal pole of the continuum. F2 is a conservative statement of the
same concept. We all know that the dynamic interaction between
conservative and liberal attitudes is central to our political system.
Many thoughtful persons have been intuitively aware that the struggle
between the ideal of intellectual freedom and the forces of censorship
had been related to differences between liberal and conservative
political attitudes.
What this advanced model of the conflict demonstrates is that the
struggle can be defined in more specific terms related to differing
legitimate conceptions of the meaning of freedom. This insight
suggests that further exploration of the relationship between F1 and
F2 may provide our conflict model with an external power of
explanation. While the meanings of F1 and F2 are distinct and may
even be mutually exclusive, it is not necessarily correct to assume
that they have no relationship to one another. Furthermore, the
persistence of each suggests that society's well-being requires
manifestations of both orders. What is the nature of the relationship
that binds F1 and F2? What do the two concepts of freedom have in
common that commands the ongoing interest of society? The definitions
that have been offered for the two concepts should offer a beginning
for the consideration of these questions. The most obvious point that
each definition shares is the power to act in some way without
interference from external agents. In the case of F1, the power
is to act as one chooses in the pursuit of individual good as it
is perceived by the actor. In the case of F2, the power is to act
according to one's acquired wisdom in pursuit of a moral ideal.
Other points that the definitions have in common are related to
polar opposites. The power to act is directed in F1 toward the pursuit
of diversity. In F2, it is directed toward the pursuit of unity. In
the case of F1 the barrier to action is external coercion. In F2 the
barrier to action is insufficient personal integrity or wisdom to
pursue successfully the specified moral ideal. This is an internal
obstacle. F1 requires only that the individual exercise his/her active
will in order to initiate an action. F2 requires that the individual
exercise an acquired virtue or wisdom in order to initiate action.
Historically, the two conceptions of freedom have been treated by
most philosophers as independent, distinctive and unique. Discussion and
debate have dealt with some form of one or the other while the
opposing form has been excluded. The foregoing analysis, however,
demonstrates that F1 and F2 seem to be related structurally. The two
definitions either share characteristics, as in the question of the
capacity to act without interference, or they are concerned with
consequences whose polar opposition suggests a set of mirror images:
unity versus diversity; external versus internal conditions;
inherent versus acquired capability.
These similarities between F1 and F2 definitions recall the
intuitive connection between liberal and conservative attitudes about
freedom that was noted earlier. They reinforce the suspicion that the
term "freedom" is not merely a word that happens to be used to
describe similar but unrelated discrete concepts of F1 and F2. I think
the construction of a useful model for conflicts related to
intellectual freedom can be enhanced if F1 and F2 are considered
elements that comprise a more intricate representation of freedom.
Suppose that the concept of freedom refers to a multidimensional
holistic complex of characteristics, a dynamic action oriented system
in a state of tension between diversity and unity, between external
and internal controls, between will and wisdom as motivating forces.
Call this freedom complex Fc. Fc, with its set of opposing forces in
tension, can be considered a homeostatic system.
The incorporation of the homeostatic Fc component completes the
explanatory model that is being constructed to advance understanding
of the conflict between intellectual freedom advocates and censors.
(fig. x illustrates the finished model) F1 and F2 are two distinctive
definitions of freedom that provide the elements for a pair of
morality plays about the role of freedom and information in our
society. In the first play, F1 is used to justify an argument for the
sanctity of intellectual freedom in the society against the incursions
of the villainous censor. In the second play, F2 is used to justify an
argument for the responsible exercise of censorship to protect society
against the excesses of villainous purveyors of dangerous
misinformation. The two conflicting morality plays oppose one another
in a homeostatic system. The system is driven by energy that is
provided by political input from citizens with varying degrees of
liberal and conservative attitudes toward the nature and amount of
freedom that should prevail in the society.
If this model is valid, the F1 ideal of intellectual freedom,
where any individual has the power to express or pursue any idea
without interference, is protected from becoming the semantic or
ideological equivalent of the tower of babel by the countervailing
effect of F2 principles which provide for the expression of only those
ideas that are judged to be right by an ideal standard arrived at
through wisdom or virtue. Protection against the oppressive
consequences of a narrowly determined course of action that might
result from extreme applications of F2 principles is provided by the
wide range of choices that is a condition of F1.
If this model is a reasonable reflection of reality, there is a
temptation to say that the issue of responsible action for librarians
and others concerned with protecting the role of intellectual freedom
in our society is merely hypothetical. It can be argued that the
system is in place and being regulated by forces over which
individuals have little control. Such an attitude, however, fails to
take into account the fact that all the actions in this philosophical
drama are also elements in the energy field that provides the power to
drive the homeostatic model. If individuals are not active advocates
of a particular position, the system loses vitality and flexibility in
its capacity to maintain stability.
As a practical matter, the model that has been described here
does not operate in isolation. The question of the degree of
intellectual freedom that shall be in effect within the society is a
political issue. In order to illuminate successfully the application
of this model to the professional responsibility of librarians, it is
necessary to provide some common understanding of the political
environment in which the responsibility will be exercised.
In our political system, attitudes are measured and given
authority through the legislative process. The decision of elected
officials are guided by the declared needs of those whom they
represent. Because there are always conflicting interests among
constituencies, the political process is an adversary procedure. Those
who wish to have an effect must succeed in capturing the attention of
government decision makers, and the most visible and aggressively
presented views are those which are most likely to be reflected in
government action. Moderate elements tend to be overwhelmed and
ignored when other perspectives are presented with fervent conviction.
In the case of matters related to intellectual freedom, pressures
for political action are generated by constituencies which are strong
supporters of F1 and F2 positions. If the efforts of these lobbying
groups are within a similar range, the system will maintain a balance
which incorporates significant elements of F1 and F2. If support for
either dimension falters, the balance will shift toward the opposite
pole. If the shift goes too far in one direction, the theory of
homeostatic systems holds that the system will tumble out of control
into an even more extreme condition. Librarians and others who have a
strong interest in maintaining a societal balance which includes a
healthy degree of intellectual freedom must be prepared to engage in
organized and ongoing political activity to support the particular
dimensions of that freedom if they wish to preserve the system in
equilibrium.
This argument for political activism is particularly crucial in
the case of the freedom conflict because of certain characteristics
associated with attitudes displayed by F1 and F2 advocates. Those who
support F2 precepts naturally attempt to live according to those
principles. Their freedom, after all, depends on how successfully they
conform to their moral ideal. Although it is not true of all such
pathways, some prescriptions for living according to a moral standard
declare that theirs is the only legitimate course of action. Those who
have accepted such a set of values will believe that individuals
who have chosen other alternatives to guide their lives are
making a mistake. They are likely to consider it their moral
responsibility to attempt to correct such mistakes by every means
that is legally at their disposal. This is the motivation that
encourages them to act as censors for society. The morality play
in which they see themselves as playing a role does not encourage
open-mindedness.
Librarians and other F1 supporters of the ideal of intellectual
freedom do not possess the same kind of single-minded dedication to
political activism. Our guiding morality play features an ideal of
respect for everyone's interests. We are inclined toward a laissez-
faire political attitude. What we need to understand, however, is that
if the model that has been developed here is valid, we do not have the
luxury of indulging our liberal ideals within the political arena.
Successful prosecution of our professional mission to provide society
with access to a full range of ideals depends on F1 values. These
values will remain secure only if there is a balance between F1 and F2
in the society. Political activists motivated by an exclusive and
narrowly defined set of F2 principles are going to continue to bring a
high level of intensity to their political support for those
principles. If librarians and other F1 supporters are going to
maintain a healthy homeostatic balance within the Fc system,
we need to match that intensity with a strong commitment of our
own.
The thinking that informs this essay was originally
triggered by dissatisfaction with the conventional rationale for
a librarian's professional obligation to support the ideal of
intellectual freedom as an abstract principle. The argument
seemed to be based on the need to accept completely an ideal
associated with a particular morality play, but the reasons
usually provided by the library profession have taken the form of
a moral imperative. They have not been accompanied by convincing
persuasion. As a consequence, there have been a lot of rhetorical
flourishes, but little that would encourage cooperation from a person
who is suspicious of the dangers associated with unchecked F1 freedom.
The analysis that has been offered here is intended to provide a
basis for a more practical foundation.
Let me try to summarize the argument that has been sketchily
developed here. It begins with the realization that the morality play
that motivates librarians to embrace the idea of free access to
information is matched by a conflicting morality play that highlights
the positive societal benefits of censorship. This suggests the
description of a model that attempts to incorporate the conflicting
positions represented by the two morality plays. An investigation of
philosophical literature on freedom reveals that definitions of
freedom can be divided into two discrete categories. The first, here
labeled F1, defines freedom as the capacity to act without coercion.
It seems to be the freedom that is celebrated in the morality play
that is associated with intellectual freedom. The other category, F2,
defines freedom as the capacity to act in accordance with a defined
ideal of right action. This seems to be the freedom that underlies the
morality play which guides the actions of the censor.
The enduring presence of both concepts of freedom within Western
society suggests that both kinds of freedom are essential elements of
the culture. I have labeled the combination of F1 and F2 freedoms the
Fc complex. For purposes of advancing a hypothetical model that will
include both F1 and F2, I have advanced the idea of Fc as an example
of a homeostatic system, in which F1 and F2 balance one another to
avoid extreme social emphasis on either F1 or F2. The model presumes
that both F1 and F2 are necessary ingredients for a self governing
society, and that each serves as a check against the destructive
excesses associated with the domination of the other. F2 deters F1
practice from deteriorating into license while F1 holds F2 from
developing into tyranny.
The last step in this discussion requires application of the
proposed model in a practical political context that refers
specifically to the intellectual freedom related interests of
librarians.
-------------
BIBLIOGRAPHY FROM INTFREE (DRAFT 1) -- (draft 1 apparently has
not been saved in machine-readable form printed copies are on
file)
1. John S. Robotham
and Gerald Shields. Freedom of
Access to
Library
Materials.
2. "Intellectual Freedom and Censorship." Encyclopedia of
Library and Information Science. vol. 12. Chicago, American
Library Association, 1983. p.169.
3. Edwin Castagna. "Censorship, Intellectual Freedom and
Libraries." Advances in Librarianship.
vol. 2.
Press, 1971. p. 217.
4. David Berninghausen. Flight From Reason. Chicago, American
Library Association, 1975. p. xiv.
5. Intellectual
Freedom Manual. Second Edition,
Library Association, 1974. p. vii
6. Georg Wilhelm Hegel. The Philosophy of History in Great Books
of the Western World. vol.
46.
1952. p. 161.
7. Gerald C. McCallum, Jr. "Negative and Positive Freedom."
Philosophical Reviews 76 (1967) p. 312.
8. See, for example, Isaiah
Four
Essays on
pp. 118-172; Bernhard P. Dauerhauer, "Relational Freedom," Review
of Metaphysics 36 (September 1982) 77-101; P.H. Partridge,
"Freedom," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Glencoe, Free Press, 1967,
pp.221-225; Felix E. Oppenheim, Dimensions
of Freedom, an
Analysis,
Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom: a
Dialectical Examination
of the Conception of Freedom, Garden City, Doubleday, 1958.
9.
10. Adler
11. Dauenhauer, p. 77 ff.
12. Immanuel Kant, Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical
Elements of Ethics, with a Note on Conscience in Great Books of
the Western World, vol. 42. p. 378.
13. John Stuart Mill. On
World. vol. 43. pp. 267-323.
14. John Milton. Areopagitica in Great Books of the Western
World. vol. 32. pp. 379-412.
15. Adler
16. Legal remedies may be invoked, but they do not constitute
examples of corrective energy in themselves. The energy resides
in society's movement toward F2, creating the momentum for new
laws, as well as other appropriate countermeasures.
17. "Public" as used here refers to all libraries supported by
public funds, whether they are associated with educational
institutions, other governmental enterprises or are free
community libraries.
18. Dauenhauer. p. 95.
19. It was only in this context that I began to understand the
wisdom of presidential candidate Barry Goldwater's 1964 remark,
"Extremism in the defense of liberty is no
vice." The
Times. July 17, 1964. p. 1.
----------------------------
NOTE:
freedom -- "a spiritual dimension involving transcendent values .
. ." p. 36.
NOTE: DAVIS, DONALD G. "INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM AND EVANGELICAL
FAITH." CHRISTIAN LIBRARIAN (NOV.1985/FEB. 1986) pp. 3-6 for
discussion of evangelical point of view in favor of intellectual
freedom. copy in INTFREET file
also : JOHNSON, JAMES R. "A RATIONALE FOR CENSORSHIP IN CHRISTIAN
LIBRARIES." THE CHRISTIAN LIBRARIAN (FEB. 1981) pp. 28-34, which
includes a "concise summary of the Christian view of intellectual
freedom by John R Stott --pp. 30-31 -- which maps very well into
the F2 definition. copy in INTFREET file
[rev. 1/04; © j.a. nelson 2004]