CHAPTER 07
SELF-PRESENTATION

I. THE NATURE OF SELF-PRESENTATION ... 3

A. WHY DO PEOPLE ENGAGE IN SELF-PRESENTATION? ... 3
B. WHEN AND HOW DO PEOPLE MANAGE IMPRESSIONS? ... 5
C. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SELF-PRESENTATION ... 7

II. CREATING DESIRED IMPRESSIONS ... 11

A. WHAT IMPRESSIONS DO PEOPLE TRY TO CREATE? ... 11
B. WHAT CONSTITUTES A DESIRABLE IMPRESSION? ... 13
C. IDENTITY PREDICAMENTS ... 17
D. IDENTITY-REPAIR TACTICS ... 20

III. SELF-PRESENTATIONS AND PRIVATE SELF-CONCEPTIONS ... 20

A. ROLE INTERNALIZATION ... 21
B. CARRY-OVER EFFECTS IN SELF-PRESENTATION ... 22
C. SYMBOLIC SELF-COMPLETION THEORY ... 24

IV. SELF-PRESENTATION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ... 26

A. SELF-PRESENTATION AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT ... 26
B. SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY VERSUS PRETENSE AND DECEIT ... 30

V. CHAPTER SUMMARY ... 32

CHAPTER 07
SELF-PRESENTATION

> There will be time, there will be time, to prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet.
>
> T.S. Eliot, The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock

The self-concept seems like a very private phenomenon. After all, people's thoughts about themselves are hidden and are often highly personal. Yet the self-concept is also very much a social phenomenon. It has social roots (e.g., reflected appraisals, social comparison), it includes social identities and roles, and it guides our perception of others and our behavior in social settings.

In this chapter we will explore the social side of the self in the context of self-presentational behavior. Self-presentational behavior is any behavior intended to create, modify, or maintain an impression of ourselves in the minds of others.[1] According to this definition, whenever we are attempting to lead people to think of us in a particular way, we are engaging in self-presentation.

Because much of our time is spent in the company of other people, self-presentation is a pervasive feature of social life. We even engage in self-presentation when we are alone; for example, we rehearse what we are going to say or do in public, molding our behavior to an imaginary or anticipated audience. Sometimes this rehearsal is deliberate and noticeable (as when we prepare for a job interview or a public speaking engagement); other times it is automatic and almost imperceptible (as when we mindlessly check our hair in the mirror before stepping out the front door).

Self-presentation is not only a prevalent aspect of our lives, it is also a very important one. Our success at leading others to believe we possess various characteristics has a profound influence on our outcomes in life (Hogan & Briggs, 1986). Who we marry, who our friends are, whether we get ahead at work, and many other outcomes depend, to a great extent, on our ability to convince people that we are worthy of their love, their friendship, their trust, and their respect. Undoubtedly, this need to create a positive impression is one reason that people spend billions of dollars a year on cosmetics and other personal-appearance products. Self-presentational concerns also lead people to engage in behaviors that enhance their appearance to others but simultaneously jeopardize their own physical well-being (e.g., overexposure to the sun; excessive dieting) (Leary, Tchividijian, & Kraxberger, 1994). Self-presentational concerns can even underlie self-destructive behaviors, such as cigarette smoking and substance abuse (Sharp & Getz, 1996).

The chapter begins by considering the nature of self-presentational behavior. Why do people engage in self-presentation, and when and how do they go about creating impressions of themselves in the minds of other people? In the second section of the

---

[1] The term impression management has also been used to describe people's efforts to manage the impressions others form of them. Although the two terms (self-presentation and impression management) differ in certain respects (see Schlenker, 1980), I use them interchangeably throughout this chapter.

chapter, we will look at the kinds of images people create and the obstacles they face when trying to create these images. Here, we will also examine some of the things people do when they fail to make a desired impression. The third part of the chapter explores the close connection between public behavior and private self-conceptions. We will see that people are very often audiences for their own behavior, and in the course of trying to convince others that they possess particular qualities, they end up convincing themselves. Finally, we will consider the extent to which public behavior is a faithful reflection of what people really think about themselves.

I. The Nature of Self-Presentation

A. *Why Do People Engage in Self-Presentation?*

We begin our discussion by considering why people engage in self-presentation. Why do we bother to lead people to see us in one way or another?

1. *Facilitate Social Interaction*

The most basic function of self-presentation is to define the nature of a social situation (Goffman, 1959). Most social interactions are very role governed. Each person has a role to play, and the interaction proceeds smoothly when these roles are enacted effectively. For example, airline pilots are expected to be poised and dignified. As long as they convince their passengers that they possess these qualities, their passengers remain calm and behave in an orderly fashion. (Imagine, for example, how unsettling it would be if your airline pilot acted like the character “Kramer” on the television show Seinfeld!)

This function of self-presentation was first highlighted by Erving Goffman (1959). Goffman noted that social life is highly structured. In some cases, this structure is formalized (e.g., state dinners at the White House are characterized by strict rules of protocol), but most often it is informal and tacitly understood (e.g., norms of politeness and etiquette guide our social interactions).

Among these norms is one that mandates that people support, rather than undermine, one another’s public identities. Goffman refers to these efforts as face work. Each participant in an interaction is obliged to honor and uphold the other person’s public persona. Toward this end, people may misrepresent themselves or otherwise refrain from saying what they really think or feel. For example, people publicly claim to like the presents they receive, find another person’s new clothes or hairstyle attractive, or make excuses for why they cannot get together for some social encounter. This kind of self-presentational behavior seems to be primarily driven by a desire to avoid social conflict and reduce tension (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996).

2. *Gain Material and Social Rewards*

People also strive to create impressions of themselves in the minds of others in order to gain material and social rewards (or avoid material and social punishments). As discussed earlier, it is usually in our best interests to have others view us in a particular way. Employees generally have a material interest in being perceived as bright, committed, and promising. To the extent that they are successful in inducing these impressions in the minds of their employers, they are apt to be promoted and given raises. Social rewards also depend on our ability to convince others that we possess particular qualities. Being

liked entails convincing others that we are likable; being a leader involves convincing others that we are capable of leading.

Jones (1990; see also, Tedeschi & Norman, 1985) notes that this type of strategic self-presentation represents a form of social influence in which one person (the self-presenter) attempts to gain power over another (the audience). This approach assumes that we are in a better position to influence the nature of social interaction in a manner that suits our purposes if we are able to control how others see us. This emphasis is apparent in many popular books, that carry titles like *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (Carnegie, 1936) and *Winning through Intimidation* (Ringer, 1973).

To some, the idea that people actively strive to manipulate how they are viewed by others conjures up images of duplicity and Machiavellianism. This need not be the case, however. Strategic self-presentation does not necessarily mean that we are trying to deceive others (though sometimes we are). It can also involve genuine attempts to bring our (self-perceived) positive qualities to the attention of others. In fact, for reasons to be discussed later, misrepresentation and lying tend to be the exception rather than the rule. Most of the time, strategic self-presentation involves "selective disclosures and omissions, or matters of emphasis and timing, rather than blatant deceit or dissimulation" (Jones, 1990, p.175).

3. ***Self-Construction***

Another reason we try to create impressions of ourselves in the minds of others is to construct a particular identity for ourselves (Baumeister, 1982b; Rosenberg, 1979; Schlenker, 1980). This type of self-presentational behavior serves a more private, personal function. Convincing others that we possess some quality or attribute is a means of convincing ourselves.

Sometimes, self-construction is initiated in order to create an identity. Rosenberg (1979) notes that this is particularly prevalent during adolescence. Adolescents routinely try out different identities. They adopt the dress and mannerisms of various social types (e.g., the sophisticate; the rebel), and studiously note people's reactions to these displays in an attempt to fashion an identity that fits. Other times, self-construction is undertaken to confirm an already established self-view. The successful Wall Street banker may wear suspenders, carry a beeper, and drive a Lexus to signal to others that he is indeed a man of "wealth and taste." Swann (1990) calls this form of self-construction "self-verification," and Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) refer to such behavior as "self-symbolizing."

Self-enhancement needs also underlie self-construction. Most people like to think of themselves as being competent, likable, talented, and so forth. By convincing others that they possess these positive attributes, people are better able to convince themselves. This, in turn, makes people feel better about themselves. In this sense, we can say that people seek to create impressions in the minds of others because it makes them feel good about themselves to do so.

Finally, self-construction can serve a motivational function. People are expected to be who they claim to be (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980). When they publicly announce an intention or otherwise stake a claim to an identity, people experience additional pressures to make good on their claims. The reformed alcoholic who proclaims his sobriety is utilizing this function. By publicly renouncing the use of alcohol, he increases

his commitment to stay sober. We also see this in the world of sports. Before the 1968 Super Bowl, Joe Namath boldly predicted that his New York Jets would beat the Baltimore Colts (which they did). The great boxer, Muhammad Ali, also routinely predicted the outcomes of his fights. Under some circumstances, this kind of public boasting can serve to make the idea a reality.

4. *Summary*

In this section, we distinguished three functions of self-presentation. Although conceptually distinct, the three functions often operate simultaneously in the real world. For example, airline pilots project an air of dignity because doing so (1) makes the plane ride go smoother; (2) helps them retain their jobs; and (3) leads them to think of themselves as dignified people, which in turn makes them feel good about themselves.

B. *When and How Do People Manage Impressions?*

People form impressions of us whenever we are in public, but we are not always actively monitoring or regulating those impressions. In many situations, our self-presentations are automatic or habitual, and we are devoting little conscious attention to how we are being perceived by others. In other situations, we become acutely aware of the impressions we are creating, and we actively strive to take control of these impressions (Leary, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). In this section, we will discuss factors that influence when we are most likely to actively engage in self-presentation and what it takes to successfully present ourselves to others.

1. *Situational Variables That Influence Impression Motivation*

The first component of self-presentation is a motivational one. Before we can create a desired impression, we have to be motivated to do so. Several factors can arouse this motive. One of the most important occurs when desired external rewards depend on the judgments of others (Buss & Briggs, 1984; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). Job interviews and first dates are two prototypic examples. In these situations, we are highly concerned with making a positive impression and we try to "put our best foot forward."

The motivation to engage in self-presentation also tends to increase when we are the focus of other people's attention. For some people, speaking in front of a group or audience is an aversive experience, in part because it causes them to become highly aware of their public identities. Certain stimuli, such as cameras and tape recorders, can also make us aware of our public appearance, as they remind us of how we are seen by others (Carver & Scheier, 1985; Scheier & Carver, 1982b).

Paradoxically, perhaps, being ignored or shunned by others can also increase self-presentational concerns (Buss, 1980). Think of how you would feel if you were being ignored by others at a party. Chances are this would make you feel acutely aware of yourself and motivate you to make a positive impression. This occurs, in large part, because being alone at a party is not a desired identity. In more general terms, we can say that a motive to actively engage in self-presentation increases whenever we encounter obstacles to creating a desired impression (Schlenker, 1985, 1986).

Familiarity with an audience is another factor that influences the nature of self-presentational behavior (Leary, Nezlek, Downs, Radford-Davenport, Martin, & McMullen,

1994; Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). Although there are exceptions, people are generally more attentive to the impressions they are creating when they are interacting with casual acquaintances and business associates than when they are interacting with close friends, family members, and loved ones. Many people, for example, walk around the house with their hair uncombed, but they wouldn't go out to a business meeting that way. People also tend to be more modest and authentic when interacting with those they feel close to (particularly those of the same sex) than when interacting with people they don't know well. In the vernacular of the 1960s, people are more apt to "let their hair down and be themselves" when they are in the company of people they feel comfortable with and know well.

2. *Social Acuity*

Once we are motivated to create a particular impression, we need to possess an awareness of how that impression can best be created. This cognitive ability is called social acuity (Hogan & Briggs, 1986). Social acuity refers to our ability to know what we would need to do in order to successfully create a desired impression. Usually this involves adopting the perspective of other people and inferring what particular behaviors will give rise to a particular impression in their minds. Imagine, for example, that I want to convince you that I am witty. In order to do so, I must figure out what is required. I need to know what behaviors I must execute in order to create the desired impression. This perspective-taking ability is what we mean by social acuity.

Mead's influence is apparent here. As discussed in Chapter 4, Mead (1934) argued that in order to communicate effectively, people must be able to anticipate how their own symbolic gestures will be interpreted by others. The same is true for successful self-presentation. To create a desired impression, we must put ourselves in other people's shoes and discern what behaviors would produce a given impression. If we are inept at adopting the other person's perspective, we are unlikely to create the impressions we desire.

3. *Behavioral Skills*

Behavioral skills are the third component of successful self-presentation. People need to be capable of performing the behaviors they believe will create a desired impression. To return to an earlier example, I may be motivated to create the impression that I have the wit of Noel Coward, and I may recognize that in order to create this impression I need to toss out one bon mot after another. But wanting to create a particular impression and knowing what it would take do not guarantee that I can pull it off. I also need to be able to enact the desired behavior.

Numerous tactics are used to create a desired impression. Verbal claims are perhaps the most common strategy. People selectively disclose, accidentally mention, or overtly boast as a means of creating a particular impression. Like actors, we also use props to establish our characters. Our hair, physique, figure, and clothing all serve to create particular impressions of us in the minds of others. Although we may deny that self-presentation is the most important consideration that guides our decisions in such matters, few people claim that such decisions are made without any regard for the social consequences. Those that do make such claims are typically trying to create an impression

of nonconformity or independence (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990)!

Even our movements signal to others what we are like. People draw inferences about what we are like from observing our mannerisms and gestures and the way we stand and walk (McArthur & Baron, 1983). Aware of this, people actively regulate their movements to control the impressions others form of them. For example, unattached people at a party or bar typically carry themselves differently than do those who are accompanied by someone. Their behavior signals to others that they are available.

4. *Summary*

To summarize, successful self-presentation involves a mix of motivation and ability. People can be motivated to make a particular impression, but they may fail to do so because they are unaware of what behaviors are needed or because they aren't able to perform the appropriate behaviors. Viewed in this way, it can be seen that successful self-presentation is a complicated affair. It requires a good deal of skill and sophistication. Recognizing this complexity, Schlenker and Leary (1982a) theorized that social anxiety arises when individuals are motivated to make a positive impression but they see little likelihood that they will do so. In extreme cases, these doubts can be paralyzing and lead to social phobias.

C. *Individual Differences in Self-Presentation*

Although everyone engages in self-presentation, people vary with respect to how concerned they are with their public image and with the kinds of impressions they try to convey. Before reading further about these differences, complete the scale shown in Table 7.1. When you are through, return to the text and learn more about this issue.

Table 7.1. **The Self-Monitoring Scale**

Please answer each of the following items True or False by circling T or F.

1.	T	F	I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2.	T	F	My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.
3.	T	F	At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
4.	T	F	I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
5.	T	F	I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
6.	T	F	I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
7.	T	F	When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues.
8.	T	F	I would probably make a good actor.
9.	T	F	I rarely seek advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.
10.	T	F	I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am.
11.	T	F	I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.
12.	T	F	In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
13.	T	F	In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
14.	T	F	I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
15.	T	F	Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.
16.	T	F	I'm not always the person I appear to be.
17.	T	F	I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor.
18.	T	F	I have considered being an entertainer.
19.	T	F	In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else.
20.	T	F	I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
21.	T	F	I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
22.	T	F	At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
23.	T	F	I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should.
24.	T	F	I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
25.	T	F	I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

Note: To determine your score, give yourself 1 point if you answered true to items 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, and 25, and 1 point if you answered false to items 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, and 23. Add up your total score. Scores of 12 or less are characteristic of a low self-monitor; scores of 13 or more are characteristic of a high self-monitor. (Source: Snyder, 1974, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *30*, 526–537.)

1. *Self-Monitoring*

Mark Snyder (1974) developed the scale shown in Table 7.1 to measure the degree to which people monitor and control their behavior in public situations. High self-monitors regard themselves as highly pragmatic and flexible people who strive to be the right person for every occasion. When entering a social situation, they try to discern what the model or prototypic person would do in that situation. They then use this knowledge to guide their

own behavior. Low self-monitors adopt a different orientation. They regard themselves as highly principled people who value consistency between who they are and what they do. When entering a social situation, they look inward and use their attitudes, beliefs, and feelings to guide their behavior. Instead of striving to be the right person for the situation, they strive to be themselves in social settings.

Individual differences in self-monitoring influence a wide range of social behaviors (see Snyder, 1979, 1987, for reviews). In comparison with low self-monitors, high self-monitors (1) pay more attention to the behavior of others in social situations; (2) prefer to enter situations that provide clear guidelines for behavior; and (3) are more attracted to careers that emphasize the importance of public behavior, such as acting, sales, and public relations. High self-monitors also (4) are more adept at reading other people's facial expressions, and (5) are better at communicating a wider variety of emotions than are low self-monitors.

High self-monitors also exhibit less congruence between their underlying attitudes and their public behavior. They might, for example, say or do things they don't believe in if doing so seems like the appropriate thing to do. This is less true for low self-monitors. These individuals value congruence between their attitudes and their behavior. What they say and do is more often a faithful reflection of what they truly believe. To illustrate these differences, imagine that you and another person are discussing recent movies, and that the person tells you she liked a particular movie that you did not like. What will you do? Basically, you have three choices. You can (1) say you also liked the movie, even though you didn't; (2) voice your true opinion and admit that you didn't like the movie; or (3) avoid taking a stand, perhaps by changing the subject. All else being equal, high self-monitors are more apt to choose the first option than are low self-monitors.

Friendship patterns are also influenced by differences in self-monitoring. High self-monitors tend to have many different friends, each suitable for a different activity. For example, they play sports with one friend, go to the theater with another, and talk politics with yet another. This pattern allows them to express their characteristic orientation to be a different person in different situations. In contrast, low self-monitors have relatively few friends, and they engage in multiple activities with each one. They are more inclined to play sports, go to the theater, and talk politics with the same friend. This pattern is conducive to being the same person in all situations.

Table 7.2 summarizes the different orientations of high self-monitors and low self-monitors with reference to the three components of self-presentation we discussed earlier. High self-monitors are social chameleons. They enjoy being different people in different situations, and they possess the cognitive and behavioral skills needed to play many roles. In contrast, low self-monitors think of themselves as highly principled individuals who cherish being "true to themselves" in various situations. They are also somewhat less adept at reading the character of the social situation and their acting skills are not as well developed.[2]

---

[2] Important questions have been raised about the self-monitoring construct and the scale Snyder (1974) developed to measure self-monitoring. A thorough discussion of these issues can be found in Briggs, Cheek, and Buss (1980) and Gangestad and Snyder (1985).

Table 7.2. Comparing high self-monitors and low self-monitors.

Component Processes	High Self-Monitor	Low Self-Monitor
Goals	Be the right person for the situation.	Be *me* in this situation.
Social Acuity	Highly adept at reading the character of the situation and the behavior of others, and able and willing to use this knowledge to construct a prototype of the model person for the situation.	Less adept at reading the character of the situation and the behavior of others. They based their behavior on personal attitudes, values, and dispositions.
Acting Ability	Superior acting ability allows them to modify their behavior to match the requirements of the situation.	Limited acting skills lead them to play similar roles in various situations.

2. *Public Self-Consciousness*

Related to differences in self-monitoring are differences in public self-consciousness. In Chapter 6, we noted that people differ in the degree to which they focus on their private, internal states. Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) used the term private self-consciousness to refer to these differences, and they developed a scale to measure them. Fenigstein et al. also developed a scale to assess the degree to which people focus on the public, observable aspects of themselves (see Table 7.3). People who score high in public self-consciousness are very aware of themselves as a social object and think a lot about their public appearance. Those who score low in public self-consciousness are less aware of themselves as a social object and do not think as much about their public appearance (Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1985; Scheier & Carver, 1982b).

Table 7.3. The Public Self-Consciousness Scale

Please indicate the extent to which each of the following items describes you by choosing one number on the rating scale next to each item.

0	1	2	3	4
extremely uncharacteristic				extremely characteristic

	Item					
1.	I'm concerned about my style of doing things.	0	1	2	3	4
2.	I'm concerned about the way I present myself.	0	1	2	3	4
3.	I'm self-conscious about the way I look.	0	1	2	3	4
4.	I usually worry about making a good impression.	0	1	2	3	4
5.	One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror.	0	1	2	3	4
6.	I'm concerned about what other people think of me.	0	1	2	3	4
7.	I'm usually aware of my appearance.	0	1	2	3	4

Public self-consciousness and self-monitoring share some similarities, and people who score high in self-monitoring tend to also score high in public self-consciousness (Tomarelli & Shaffer, 1985). The two constructs are not identical, however. Self-monitoring is a motivational orientation. High self-monitors strive to be the right person for the situation. Public self-consciousness is not a motivational orientation. People who score high in public self-consciousness don't necessarily try to be the right person for the situation; they simply are highly aware of themselves in social situations. Another key difference is that high self-monitors enjoy opportunities for social interactions that allow them to display their (self-perceived) acting skills, but people who are high in public self-consciousness do not necessarily seek out opportunities to "put on a show."

II. Creating Desired Impressions

A. *What Impressions Do People Try to Create?*

The number of impressions people try to create of themselves in the minds of others is almost limitless. At the same time, these impressions tend to fall into a smaller number of classes. Jones (1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982) distinguished five common self-presentational strategies (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4. Five Common Self-Presentational Strategies

Self-Presentational Strategy	Impression Sought	Prototypic Behaviors	Self-Presentational Risks
Ingratiation	Likable	Compliments, favors	Insincere, deceitful
Self-Promotion	Competent	Boasting, showing off	Conceited, fraudulent
Intimidation	Powerful, ruthless	Threats	Reviled, ineffectual
Exemplification	Virtuous, moral	Self-denial, martyrdom	Hypocritical, sanctimonious
Supplication	Helpless	Self-deprecation	Manipulative, demanding

1. *Ingratiation*

Ingratiation is probably the most familiar impression management strategy. The goal of ingratiation is to get the other person to like you. Since we tend to like people who agree with us, say nice things about us, do favors for us, and possess positive interpersonal qualities (e.g., warmth and kindness), it should come as no surprise that ingratiation can be accomplished through imitation, flattery, doing favors for someone, and displaying positive personal characteristics (Jones, 1990).

Ingratiation may backfire if it is too blatant. If your audience knows you are trying to manipulate them, they may come to distrust or dislike you. This problem is rarely acute. People want to believe they are likable and are liked by others. Consequently, they are disinclined to believe that a show of admiration or affection from another person is inauthentic or derives from an ulterior motive, even when such a motive is obvious to an impartial observer (Jones & Wortman, 1973). For this reason, ingratiation (if it is at least somewhat subtle) is often a highly successful self-presentational ploy.

2. *Self-Promotion*

Self-promotion is another common self-presentational strategy. Here we seek to convince people of our competence. This is not the same as ingratiation. With ingratiation, we are trying to get people to like us. With self-promotion, we are trying to get people to think we are capable, intelligent, or talented.

In many situations, it is beneficial to be seen as both likable and competent. In academia, for example, job offers are extended to applicants who are perceived as highly competent and pleasant to be around. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to simultaneously display both of these qualities. For example, modesty can be an effective form of ingratiation, but it rarely instills a perception of competence. Conversely, blowing one's own horn may convince people that you are competent, but it rarely leads to strong feelings of liking. For this reason, people are often forced to blend or balance these two self-presentational strategies. Many braggarts do not seem to understand this point, or else they are willing to sacrifice being liked for being considered competent.

3. *Intimidation*

Ingratiation and self-promotion are the most common self-presentational strategies. But there are others. Sometimes people want to be feared. This is intimidation. An employer, for example, might want to be viewed as tough, powerful, or ruthless. These views might serve to increase her workers' productivity and soften their demands for salary increases and other benefits. Former White House aide John Sununu once remarked that he didn't care if he was disliked as long as he was respected and feared.

4. *Exemplification*

Another form of self-presentation is exemplification. With exemplification, people attempt to create the impression that they are morally superior, virtuous, or righteous. Exemplification is often portrayed by exaggerating the degree to which one has suffered poor treatment at the hands of others or has endured excessive hardships.

5. *Supplication*

A final form of self-presentation is supplication. Supplication occurs when people publicly exaggerate their weaknesses and deficiencies. For example, in earlier times, women were expected to play helpless (rather than appear competent) in order to attract a mate. Men do this as well, of course, as when a husband claims to not know how to use the dishwasher or washing machine. The more general point is that people will sometimes exaggerate their incompetence and frailties if doing so gets them what they want. In extreme cases, these tendencies may underlie depression and other psychological difficulties (Gove, Hughes, & Geerken, 1980; Leary & Miller, 1986).

B. *What Constitutes a Desirable Impression?*

No matter which impressions people try to convey, these impressions will be effective only if they are accepted by others. Schlenker (1980, 1985; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) has proposed that successful self-presentation always involves a trade-off between two considerations: (1) beneficiality (presenting the most advantageous image possible) and (2) believability (making sure the image you present is believable). To return to an earlier example, job candidates strive to be seen as competent and diligent. But if they go overboard and describe themselves in almost superhuman terms, they risk arousing suspicion and inadvertently creating a bad impression.

1. *The Role of Accountability*

Several factors influence the believability of a self-presentational claim. These factors include the acting ability of the self-presenter (highly skilled actors can make more self-aggrandizing claims) and the ambiguity of the performance domain (the more ambiguous the domain, the more self-aggrandizing a person can be). Accountability is another important factor. People are accountable when their claims can be checked against relevant facts. It is one thing to boast that you are an expert at chess if no one is around to challenge you to a game; it's quite another if there is a chess board handy and another person waiting to test your claims. The broader point is that people's self-presentational claims should be more truthful when audiences are able to assess the veracity of these proclamations.

Schlenker (1975) tested this hypothesis. In this study, participants were led to

believe that they would do very well or very poorly on an upcoming test. They were then given the chance to present themselves to other people who either would or would not learn how they did on the upcoming test.

Figure 7.1 displays some of the findings from this investigation. The figure shows that the only condition in which participants did not present themselves in highly positive terms (e.g., as having high ability at the task) was when they expected to do poorly and believed the audience would learn how they did. When participants believed the audience would not know how they performed, they publicly claimed high ability even when they privately doubted that their ability was high.



Figure 7.1. Accountability and self-presentation. **The only condition in which participants did not present themselves as competent was when they expected to do poorly and believed the audience would learn how they did. If they thought they could get away with claiming high competence, they did. (Source: Schlenker, 1975, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 32, 1030–1037)**

2. *Audience Reactions to Self-Presentational Claims*

Presumably, the participants in Schlenker's (1975) study modified their claims in the public performance condition because they feared being evaluated negatively if their positive claims were shown to be nothing more than hollow boasts. Schlenker and Leary (1982b) conducted a follow-up investigation to see whether such a pattern does, in fact, evoke condemnation. Using a simulational methodology, they had participants evaluate students whose claims about a test varied in their positivity. In some conditions, the participants were told whether these claims were consistent with the student's actual

performance (e.g., the student said he had done well and participants knew he had or hadn't); in other conditions, the participants were given no information about how the student had actually performed (e.g., the student said he had done well and participants didn't know whether he had done well or not).

The upper portion of Figure 7.2 shows participants' evaluations (judgment of liking) for the student under the various conditions. It can be seen that participants generally admired congruence between public claims and performance. Students whose performance claims matched their performance were evaluated more positively than were students whose performance claims did not match their performance. Participants particularly disliked students who falsely claimed to have high ability.

Figure 7.2. Accountability and Evaluations. The top half of the figure shows that audiences generally admire congruence between claims and performance. The bottom half of the figure shows that audiences base their judgments of competence on test performance information if it is available, but on self-presentational claims of ability if test performance data are not available. (Source: Schlenker & Leary, 1982, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 18, 89–104)





The situation is different when it comes to competence ratings (see the bottom portion of Figure 7.2). Performance claims had little effect here. Instead, students who did well were judged to be more competent than students who did poorly, and it really didn't

make much difference whether the students claimed that their ability was high or low.

There is one interesting qualification to this conclusion, however. Notice that in the unknown performance condition, students who claimed to have high ability were considered more competent than students who claimed to have medium or low ability. Apparently, in the absence of any contradictory information, people take a person's self-presentational claims at face value: If you say you have high ability, people assume you do have high ability. From a purely self-presentational point of view, then, the data suggest that it will often be to your advantage to present yourself as reasonably competent and able. Unless the audience knows you are deliberately misrepresenting yourself, they will give you the benefit of the doubt and believe your claims.

3. *Self-Promotion versus Self-Protection*

The preceding analysis assumes that the benefits of making a positive impression outweigh the costs of making a negative impression. This is not always the case, however. In politics, for example, the candidate who wins an election is often the one with the lowest negative rating rather than the one with the highest positive rating. This is why politicians often equivocate or refrain from taking stands; it is often more important to avoid alienating a block of voters than it is to favorably impress one.

Arkin (1981) has noted that individuals also differ in this regard. Some individuals are especially motivated to avoid making a negative public impression. Such individuals tend to "play it safe" in social situations, presenting themselves in relatively neutral, modest, or noncommittal terms. This protective self-presentational style rarely leads to highly favorable interpersonal reactions, but it also rarely leads to highly negative ones.

Several personality variables are thought to incorporate a heightened concern for public self-protection. These personality variables include shyness (Arkin, 1987), low self-esteem (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990), depression (Hill, Weary, & Williams, 1986), and social anxiety (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987). In rare cases, fear of negative public evaluations can lead to social isolation (e.g., agoraphobia) or excessively self-defeating behavior patterns (Baumeister & Scher, 1988; Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991).

C. *Identity Predicaments*

Try as they might to avoid them, most people confront situations in which their public identity is threatened. Some of these situations are relatively minor—what the French call a contretemps: We slurp our soup, get caught singing aloud in the car, or otherwise embarrass ourselves by making a gaffe or faux pas. (Judging from how many terms they have, it seems that this happens a lot in France!) Ordinarily, people extricate themselves from such situations with only minimal effort.

Other identity predicaments are more consequential. One such situation occurs when people are seen as responsible for bringing about a negative event or outcome (Schlenker, 1982; Snyder, 1985; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). You might, for example, keep people waiting by coming late to an important meeting; forget your spouse's birthday; or get caught in a "white lie" regarding your absence from a social engagement.

1. *Account Giving*

People call upon a number of ingenious artifices to mitigate the negative implications of these identity predicaments (Schlenker, 1980, 1982; Scott & Lyman, 1960). Table 7.5 shows five such strategies in the context of an all-too-common situation that arises in my house—the case where one brother accuses the other of hitting him.

Table 7.5. Account Giving

Actor's Account	Underlying Aim	Example
Claim of innocence	Deny responsibility	I didn't hit him. He fell on his face reaching for the remote control.
Reinterpretation	Alter the meaning of the event	I didn't *hit* him. I was patting him on the face for being such a good brother.
Justification	Legitimize behavior	Yes, I hit him, but he hit me first.
Excuse	Excuse behavior by reducing intentionality	Yes, I hit him, but I have been under a lot of stress lately and haven't had time to take my medication.
Apology	Accept responsibility and seek forgiveness	Yes, I hit him. I'm sorry. I won't do it again.

The first line of defense people use when confronting a threat to their identity is often a claim of innocence. Here, people completely deny responsibility for a negative outcome by asserting that they played no role in producing the event. If that doesn't work, they might attempt to reinterpret the event in positive terms. This is a common ploy among politicians, who habitually try to put a positive spin on a seemingly negative outcome. ("Yes, we came in third, but that's a victory for us. We were vastly outspent and had hoped only to finish fifth. So actually, we won.")

In the next two accounts (justification and excuse), people admit responsibility for a negative event, but they attempt to escape punishment by altering the audience's perception of the circumstances that surrounded the event. With justification, the person attempts to legitimize the negative behavior by making it seem warranted; with excuses, the person attempts to rationalize the behavior by making it seem accidental or inadvertent. Finally, when all else fails, one can admit full responsibility, apologize, and throw oneself on the mercy of the court.

The saga of former Senator Bob Packwood provides a real-world example of these strategies. Numerous women accused the senator of making unwanted sexual advances over a period of many years. Initially, Packwood denied the events took place (or at least remembering that they ever took place). He then attempted to reinterpret the events. "These were not lascivious sexual advances," he argued, "but friendly kisses, no different than when two men shake hands with one another." After it became evident that these kisses were not platonic in nature, Packwood attempted to justify his behavior. "I come from a different generation," he said, "one in which men were expected to be macho and force themselves on women." When this account failed to appease the nation, Packwood

tried to excuse his behavior, claiming he was an alcoholic and wasn't responsible for his actions. Finally, in a last ditch attempt to salvage his career, Packwood accepted responsibility and apologized to any of the women he "may have offended." Alas, even this (belated) apology failed to mollify his critics, and Packwood was forced to resign from the U.S. Senate in disgrace. (But don't feel too sorry for him. He's now a well-paid lobbyist, peddling influence in the very Senate corridors he once walked.)

2. *Preemptive Excuse Making*

In the examples just discussed, account giving occurred after the behavior in question had taken place. People also engage in preemptive excuse making. ("I should probably warn you, I'm not very good at this sort of thing."). Sometimes this excuse making involves pointing out to others that we possess a characteristic that negatively affects performance. Consider, for example, a study by Baumgardner, Lake, and Arkin (1985). The participants in this study were led to believe that they would do poorly on an upcoming memory test. Half of the participants (those in the experimental condition) were further told that a bad mood could negatively affect their performance; other participants (those in the control condition) were given no information about whether mood affected performance. All participants then rated their moods before taking the test. The results showed that participants in the experimental group reported being in a worse mood than did control participants. Presumably, publicly claiming a bad mood allowed them to preemptively excuse their expected poor performance on the upcoming task.

Snyder and Smith (1982) suggested that many clinically relevant conditions, such as depression, substance abuse, and anxiety, serve a similar function (see also, Hill, Weary, & Williams, 1986). An investigation by Smith, Snyder, and Perkins (1983) illustrates this effect. These investigators hypothesized that hypochondriacs use self-reports of physical illness and symptoms as a preemptive excuse-making strategy. To test this hypothesis, they led participants to believe that poor health either could or could not negatively affect one's performance on a test. All participants then filled out a questionnaire that assessed their health. Hypochondriacal participants complained more than nonhypochondriacal participants only when they believed that poor health could explain a poor performance. These and similar findings (e.g., Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982; Snyder, Smith, Augelli, & Ingram, 1985) suggest that some people use chronic symptoms to escape responsibility for an anticipated negative performance or outcome.

3. *Self-Handicapping Behavior*

In some situations, people may even go so far as to actively create an excuse for failure. This is self-handicapping behavior (Berglas & Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978). As discussed in Chapter 3, self-handicapping behavior occurs when people create obstacles to their own success. Consider, for example, an athlete who fails to prepare properly for an upcoming competition. Lack of preparation makes success less likely, but it also gives the person a ready-made excuse for failure.

Self-handicapping was originally thought to be a private phenomenon that occurred independent of the social context (Berglas & Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978). More recent research suggests, however, that self-handicapping is most apt to occur under public performance conditions (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985). For example, Kolditz and Arkin

(1982) found that only participants who believed their performance would be known to others actively handicapped themselves on an upcoming task.

As a self-presentational tactic, self-handicapping is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, creating an impediment to success makes it less likely that people will assume you have low ability if your performance is poor. At the same time, people disapprove of those who fail to maximize their potential by creating obstacles to their own success (Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991; Rhodewalt, Sanbonmatsu, Tschanz, Feick, & Waller, 1995; Weiner, 1993). For these reasons, public self-handicapping would seem to be a last-ditch impression-management tactic, useful only when success is highly unlikely and being disliked is less aversive than being seen as incompetent.

D. *Identity-Repair Tactics*

Active attempts to repair a tarnished public identity are a final way of dealing with an identity predicament. An investigation by Baumeister and Jones (1978) illustrates this effect. The participants in this study were told that another person had negative information about some of their personality characteristics (e.g., the other person had learned the participant was somewhat insensitive or immature on the basis of some personality scales the participant had completed earlier). The participants were then given the opportunity to describe themselves on a questionnaire that was to be shown to the other person. Some of the items on the questionnaire were relevant to information the other person allegedly had; other items were new ones. Baumeister and Jones found that participants tried to compensate for an initially bad impression by elevating their ratings on the unrelated items. For example, if the other person thought the participant was insensitive, the participant described herself as very mature; conversely, if the other person thought the participant was immature, the participant described herself as very sensitive. In this manner, participants attempted to rebuild a favorable public image without contradicting the information the other person had about them (see also, Baumeister, 1982a).

An additional way to restore a negative public image is to point out a connection you share with another person who is somehow special or exemplary. For example, I might tell you I once had dinner with Bob Dylan's mother (now, aren't you impressed?!). Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini & De Nicholas, 1989; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980; Cialdini et al., 1976) call this strategy basking in reflected glory. In an early demonstration of this tendency, Cialdini et al. (1976) found that students were more likely to use the pronoun we when discussing a football game their university team had won ("We won!") than when talking about a game their team had lost ("They lost"). Moreover, this tendency was most apparent after students had first experienced a public failure, suggesting that it represented an attempt to restore a positive social identity.

III. Self-Presentations and Private Self-Conceptions

To this point we have focused exclusively on the public side of self-presentational behavior. But self-presentational behavior also has a very private side. Most obviously, how people think about themselves influences how they present themselves to others. For example, the person who thinks he is a connoisseur of fine wines is the one who is most apt to try to impress his friends with his knowledge of a fine Bordeaux. Although theorists

disagree about just how strong this relation is, none deny that people's ideas about themselves are one factor that determines the public impressions they try to create.

More interesting, perhaps, is the manner in which public behavior influences private self-conceptions. People are audiences for their own behavior. Just as our behavior might convince others that we possess a given quality or attribute, so, too, might we convince ourselves. Research from a variety of different quarters supports this claim.

A. *Role Internalization*

> Everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role. . . . It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves. (Park, 1926, p.137)

We all play many roles in social life. We are children, siblings, and parents; students, friends, and employees; and so on. These roles figure prominently in the way people think about themselves. When asked to describe themselves, people often respond with reference to the social roles they play (e.g., I am a professor, a father, a husband).

This tendency to define ourselves in terms of our social roles is not the only link between social roles and self-conceptions, however. Each role we play carries with it a set of behavioral expectations (e.g., judges are expected to uphold the law) and assumptions about personal characteristics (firefighters are expected to be brave). These personal characteristics are of concern here. In the course of playing social roles, people often come to internalize role-relevant personal characteristics. They come to see themselves as possessing the qualities suggested by the roles they play (McCall & Simmons, 1966; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Stryker & Statham, 1985).

Role internalization occurs for many reasons. According to the reflected appraisal process (see Chapter 3), social interaction is essential to the development of self-conceptions. People form views of themselves based on the (perceived) reactions of others. Before too long, the police officer who sees fear in the eyes of those she arrests comes to regard herself as strong and powerful. Self-perception processes (Bem, 1972) also operate here. People are often passive observers of their own behavior. A teacher who helps struggling students with their homework might reasonably infer that he is a caring, helpful person.

Of course, people gravitate toward roles that allow them to express their self-perceived qualities, so the road between self-conceptions and roles goes in both directions. But sometimes people's self-views are initially at odds with the roles they adopt. Imagine an employee who regards herself as a shy and deferent person. What becomes of such self-views when she is promoted to a managerial position? Very often, she comes to adopt the attitudes and beliefs that accompany her new title. She comes to think of herself as tough and demanding—because this is how she thinks others perceive her (reflected appraisals), because this is how she is behaving (self-perception), or because to do otherwise would create psychological inconsistency (or cognitive dissonance) between her actions and self-relevant beliefs.

In summary, people thrust into new social roles often come to view themselves as having the very qualities that the role demands. In effect, by playing the role, they become

the part. This does not mean, however, that individuals passively adopt the labels implied by their social roles. Although the expectations of some roles are rigid and unyielding, most are pliant and allow room for interpretation. This allows people to bring their own distinctive stamp to the roles they play. The same is true in the theater. All actors who play Hamlet are obliged to recite his famous "To be or not to be" soliloquy, but each actor is allowed to emphasize different facets of the character. In more general terms, we can say that people both create and are created by the social roles they play (Backman & Secord, 1968; Stryker & Statham, 1985). This is why expectations for social roles can change over time. With every new role occupant, the role is reinvented (although the core expectations tend to remain relatively constant).

B. *Carry-Over Effects in Self-Presentation*

Further evidence that public behavior alters private self-conceptions comes from experimental research on carry-over effects in self-presentation. In these studies, participants are asked to present themselves in specified ways to an audience. For example, some participants might be asked to convince an interviewer that they are extraverted and sociable; other participants are asked to convince an interviewer that they are introverted and reserved. Later, as part of an ostensibly unrelated investigation, participants are asked to evaluate themselves along this dimension. The typical finding is that self-presentational behavior carries over to affect private self-conceptions. People who present themselves to others as outgoing and gregarious subsequently regard themselves as more sociable than do those who present themselves to others as shy and retiring (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Tice, 1992).

1. *Theoretical Explanations*

At least two explanations for this carry-over effect can be distinguished. One possibility, which we'll call the cognitive accessibility model, traces the effect to a private, intrapsychic process. According to this account, presenting oneself to others in a certain manner (e.g., as sociable) activates or makes accessible certain behaviors and beliefs consistent with that presentation (e.g., times we have behaved sociably). When people are later asked whether they possess these qualities, the greater accessibility of these recently enacted behaviors leads them to believe that they do. Note how this explanation views public behavior as largely incidental to the carry-over effect. The effect reflects greater cognitive accessibility, which is a private, intrapersonal process, not a public, interpersonal one. Presumably, privately reviewing our past behaviors would produce a comparable effect.

Another explanation, which we'll call the reflected appraisal model, views public behavior as essential to the carry-over effect. This account builds on the notion that people's ideas about themselves are forged in the crucible of social life; that is, we come to know ourselves by imagining how we appear in the eyes of others. According to this view, public behavior is more consequential than private behavior. Publicly presenting ourselves to another and seeing ourselves through that person's eyes has a greater impact on the way we see ourselves than does private behavior.

2. *Empirical Findings*

In a test of these competing explanations, Tice (1992, Study 2) had participants portray themselves as either extraverted or introverted. Half of the participants did this publicly, in the context of a one-on-one interview; the other half did this privately, by anonymously completing a questionnaire while seated alone in a room. The accessibility model predicts carry-over effects in both conditions, whereas the reflected appraisal model predicts that carry-over effects will be especially strong in the public condition.

Figure 7.3 presents the results of this investigation. In support of the reflected appraisal model, it can be seen that carry-over effects were much stronger among participants who presented themselves to another person than among participants who merely completed a questionnaire under private and anonymous conditions (see also Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994). These results suggest that public behavior is uniquely potent when it comes to producing self-concept change. Perhaps this is why many self-help therapies (such as Alcoholic Anonymous) operate in a group setting, where people are asked to stand and publicly commit themselves to a course of action.



Figure 7.3. Carry over effects in self-presentation**. Carry-over effects were stronger when self-presentations were made in public than when they were made in private. (Source: Tice, 1992, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63, 435–451)**

This does not mean, however, that public behavior drastically changes the way people think about themselves. Those who regard themselves as outgoing do not suddenly claim to be wallflowers after presenting themselves as socially awkward. Instead, the person's self-view simply shifts a bit in the direction implied by the behavior. Moreover, to

be effective, the self-presentational behavior must be at least somewhat consistent with how the person already thinks of herself. Finally, the more certain you are of where you stand on a given trait, the less likely it is that public behavior will alter your self-view (Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990).

C. *Symbolic Self-Completion Theory*

The link between public behavior and private self-conceptions is also the focus of Wicklund and Gollwitzer's (1982) symbolic self-completion theory. Before turning to the specifics of this theory, let's review a point we made earlier in this chapter. When discussing the various functions of self-presentational behavior, we noted that people sometimes engage in self-presentational behavior in order to privately establish an identity for themselves (Schlenker, 1980). We called such behavior a form of self-construction (Baumeister, 1982b). With self-construction, people use audiences as a means to an end. They seek to convince others that they possess particular qualities because doing so helps them convince themselves.

1. *Social Validation of Identities*

Symbolic self-completion theory builds on this function of self-presentational behavior. The theory assumes that most important identities require social validation. Before individuals can fully lay claim to possessing an identity (and experience a sense of self-completion in the words of the theory), other people must recognize and acknowledge their right to claim the identity. As an example, consider what it means to be a physician. To be a physician in the truest sense of the word, other people need to acknowledge your expertise and consult you in matters of personal health. Otherwise, you are a physician in name only. This type of social validation is most obviously needed for the various social roles we play, but it is also true for many personal identities. It is difficult for a person to think he is popular if no one ever seeks his company.

Because most identities require social validation, people actively try to convince others that they are entitled to claim the identity. According to symbolic self-completion theory, one way they do this is by displaying socially defined, identity-relevant symbols (hence the name, symbolic self-completion). In the case of a physician, this might entail wearing a white lab coat, draping a stethoscope around one's neck, and learning to write a prescription in an unintelligible scrawl! When recognized by others, these identity-relevant symbols give people a sense of self-completion; they give people the sense that they truly possess an identity or characteristic.

Gollwitzer (1986) tested the hypothesis that symbolic activities are more effective in furnishing people with a sense of self-completion when these symbols are noticed and recognized by others. Medical students were given a number of problems frequently confronted by physicians and were asked to suggest some possible solutions (e.g., How would you deal with a diabetic patient who refuses to follow the diet you prescribe?). There were 45 such problems, and the students were told they could work on as many or as few as they wanted. Shortly after the students had begun working on the problems, a confederate appeared. In the social recognition condition, the confederate read through the problems the student had completed and then addressed the student as a physician. In the control condition, the confederate did not take notice of the completed problems and

did not address the student as a physician. The results revealed that students in the social recognition condition chose to work on fewer problems than did those in the control condition. Presumably, this occurred because being addressed as a physician by another person provided these medical students with a sense of self-completion.

2. *Seeking Symbolic Self-Completion*

Symbolic self-completion theory makes another interesting prediction. Because self-completion is most apt to occur when self-symbolizing efforts are recognized by others, people committed to attaining an identity should be especially interested in finding an audience for their symbolic activities. This should occur, according to the theory, even though doing so might not be an effective self-presentational strategy at the time. Perhaps you have encountered such a situation when chatting with another person at a party. The person seems bent on convincing you that he possesses a certain characteristic (e.g., he is rich, scholarly, dashing, or athletic), even though doing so is making a bad impression. According to symbolic self-completion theory, this occurs because being liked is not the person's goal. Instead, the person is seeking social validation for a desired identity and is using the audience in a self-centered fashion to achieve this goal, without regard for what the social costs might be.

> Self-symbolizing individuals are not at all selective with respect to the people they address. Nor are they interested in engaging in meaningful interactions with the audience at their disposal. Rather, [they] appear to see in audiences nothing more than passive witnesses of identity-related goal striving. (Gollwitzer, 1986, p.149)

> [They] focus only on demonstrating to others that they are in possession of an intended identity, irrespective of others' wishes, needs, or potential responses. (Gollwitzer, 1986, p.154)

Gollwitzer (1986) reports a study relevant to this issue. The participants were students committed to various academic identities (e.g., mathematician, biologist). During the first part of the experiment, some of the students were led to focus on experiences that suggested they were not well suited for these professions; other students were led to focus on experiences that suggested they were well suited for these professions. These manipulations were intended to arouse different needs for self-completion in the two groups, with those in the negative feedback condition being more in need of self-completion than those in the positive feedback condition.

In the second part of the experiment, the students were told they would engage in a get-acquainted conversation with another student in which they would discuss various topics. Allegedly, the other student had already indicated a preference for certain topics by completing a questionnaire. These preferences revealed a strong disinterest in talking about topics related to the participants' interests (e.g., if the participant was a biology major, the other student indicated that he or she was not interested in discussing biology). Finally, the participants indicated which topics they wished to discuss. The results showed that participants whose needs for self-completion had been raised by the negative feedback were more eager to discuss topics related to their major, even though doing so risked making a bad impression with the other person. One explanation for this finding is that needs for self-completion were more powerful in this situation than were needs for social

approval.[3]

IV. Self-Presentation and Social Behavior

The central theme of this chapter—that people actively monitor and regulate their public identities—is relevant to understanding a good deal of social behavior. It also has broad implications for psychological research. Most psychological research occurs in a social context. Experimenters and other participants are often present in the situation, and participants are almost always aware that their responses will be known to others. The public nature of the experimental setting raises the possibility that participants' behavior is driven by a deliberate (or unconscious) desire to manage a particular social identity, rather than by more spontaneous or private psychological processes.

Although this possibility has been known for some time (see, for example, Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Edwards, 1957; Erdelyi, 1974), interest in this topic blossomed in the 1970s. At that time, many social psychological phenomena that had previously been understood in terms of intrapsychic processes were reinterpreted in terms of self-presentational behavior (Alexander & Knight, 1971). A paper by Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1971) illustrates this perspective. These theorists were interested in the nature of cognitive dissonance effects (see Chapter 5). Numerous studies had shown that participants change their attitudes when they behave in ways that contradict their values or beliefs. According to cognitive dissonance theory, this occurs because people find inconsistency between beliefs and behavior to be aversive (Festinger, 1957). As a result, they change their attitudes in order to reduce this internal state of distress.

Tedeschi et al. (1971) offered a different explanation (see also, Schlenker, 1982). Instead of tracing attitude change to internal inconsistency, these theorists suggested that people publicly change their attitudes in order to avoid looking like a hypocrite to others. This perspective shifts the emphasis away from the mind's inability to tolerate psychological inconsistency toward a concern with maintaining a positive social identity. Baumeister (1982b) subsequently applied a similar analysis to a wide range of social behavior, including conformity, helping, aggression, and social facilitation effects. In each case, concerns with creating, maintaining, or restoring a positive public identity were invoked to explain effects previously attributed to more private, internal processes.

A. *Self-Presentation and Self-Enhancement*

Self-enhancement biases were another topic reinterpreted in self-presentational terms (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). As noted throughout this book (see especially Chapter 3), people evaluate themselves in very positive terms (Taylor & Brown, 1988). If, for

---

[3]Symbolic self-completion theory shares some similarities with Swann's (1990) self-verification theory. As discussed earlier (e.g., Chapter 3), self-verification theory assumes that people seek social validation for their self-conceptions and strive to get others to see them as they see themselves. The key difference between Swann's approach and symbolic self-completion theory centers around whether the identity in question is desired from the person's point of view. Swann argues that people seek to verify desired and undesired identities, whereas symbolic self-completion theory maintains that people seek social validation only for desired identities.

example, you ask people "How kind, thoughtful, intelligent, and attractive are you?" the majority will tell you that they are kinder, more thoughtful, more intelligent, and more attractive than most other people. People also accept greater responsibility for their successes than for their failures, a phenomenon known as the self-serving bias in causal attribution.

Originally, these biases were thought to stem from a motivated desire to feel good about oneself (a desire we have called the self-enhancement motive). In the mid-1970s, alternative explanations emphasizing cognitive processes were developed (see Chapter 5). Toward the end of the 1970s, self-presentational explanations were developed to explain these effects.

Weary Bradley (1978) was one of the first psychologists to articulate this point of view. Weary Bradley noted that in most investigations in which participants accepted greater responsibility for success than for failure, their performance and attributions were known to others. This raised the possibility that participants were merely claiming greater responsibility for success than for failure in a self-presentational attempt to convince the experimenter of their competence.

Despite its plausibility, research testing this claim has generally not found that attributions are more self-serving in public than in private. In fact, just the opposite is true: Self-serving attributions are generally stronger in private than in public (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982; Smith & Whitehead, 1988; Weary, Harvey, Schweiger, Olson, Perloff, & Pritchard, 1982). This also occurs for other self-serving biases, such as the tendency to view oneself in more positive terms than one views most other people (Brown & Gallagher, 1992) and the tendency to preferentially seek positive self-relevant information (Brown, 1990).

Along with related work (Riess, Rosenfeld, Melburg, & Tedeschi, 1981; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985), these findings are inconsistent with the claim that self-serving biases reflect nothing more than public posturing. People genuinely believe their self-serving claims. At the same time, people are not oblivious to the impressions they are creating. They modify their public claims, but this modification is generally in the direction of greater public modesty, not greater self-aggrandizement.

An investigation by Frey (1978) reveals the nature of these effects. The participants in this study experienced either success or failure on an alleged intelligence test. Half the participants believed the experimenter was aware of how they had performed (public performance condition); the other half believed the experimenter was unaware of how they had performed (private performance condition). Participants then rated the test's validity under public conditions (they thought the experimenter would see their responses) or under private conditions (they thought the experimenter would not see their responses). In this fashion, Frey independently varied (1) whether the participants' performance was public or private, and (2) whether the participant's assessment of the test's validity was public or private.

The results of this investigation are shown in Figure 7.4. The data show that the self-serving tendency to disparage the validity of the test after failure was strongest when performances were public and evaluations were made in private. This corresponds to the situation in which others know how you have performed on a test and you privately explain your performance to yourself. Under such circumstances, people's judgments are

most self-serving (see also, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985).



Figure 7.4. Public Performance and Private Reactions**. Evaluation of a test's validity under public performance conditions (panel 1) and private performance conditions (panel 2). The data show that the self-serving tendency to belittle the validity of a test after failure is most apparent when the performance is public and the evaluation is private. (Source: Frey, 1978, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *14*, 172–179)**

The pattern displayed in Figure 7.4 is quite consistent with other evidence we have reviewed in this chapter. It shows again that public behavior is more compelling than is private behavior. In the privacy of their own homes or minds, people are free to try out different behaviors, opinions, and beliefs with little regard for the consequences. This is much less true in public. When we publicly state an opinion or behave in a given fashion, we are expected to be the person we claim to be (Goffman, 1959); and when we display our qualities to others or others are aware of our performance in some domain, we see ourselves reflected in their eyes and these qualities and outcomes assume greater psychological reality. For these reasons, social consensus and public validation bind and strengthen our self-views (Gollwitzer, 1986; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Schlenker, 1986; Swann, 1990).

B. *Sincerity and Authenticity versus Pretense and Deceit*

The final topic we will consider in this chapter is the extent to which people's self-presentations faithfully reflect how they think about themselves. It is obvious that people sometimes misrepresent themselves (and some people do this more than others). But how prevalent is this dissimulation? Do the faces people wear in public generally mask how they privately see themselves, or is pretense and deceit the exception rather than the rule?

Trilling (1971, cited in Baumeister, 1986) notes that interest in this issue was particularly acute during the sixteenth century. At that time, Europeans became virtually obsessed with the disparity between public behavior and private beliefs. This is the era of Machiavelli and of Shakespeare, when the theater abounded with characters whose evil intentions were known to the audience but not to the other actors.

The notion that people cannot be trusted to be who they claim to be persists today. Avon ladies flatter, used car salesmen wheedle, and con men and bunco artists cheat and swindle by hiding their true intentions behind a facade of civility and sincerity. Clearly, people are not always what they seem to be.

But whether most people typically present a false front to others is questionable. After carefully considering this issue, several theorists (e.g., Buss & Briggs, 1984; Leary, 1993; Schlenker, 1986; Tesser & Moore, 1986) have concluded that, in their day-to-day lives, most people present a public identity that corresponds with how they privately view themselves. There are at least two reasons that this is so.

1. *The Risks of Presenting a False Impression*

Accountability is one relevant factor. Individuals who present an insincere or inauthentic impression to others run the risk of being exposed as a fake or liar if their attempts to create a false impression are discovered. Being regarded as a fake is not a valued identity. Consequently, this concern keeps people's self-presentations in line with their private self-views.

This concern is particularly acute when future interaction is anticipated or when audiences have knowledge of our past (Schlenker, 1980). These conditions

generally exist with people with whom we spend most of our time—our friends, colleagues, and loved ones. It therefore follows that most of our self-presentations are genuine and authentic.

2. *A Desire for Social Validation*

The need for social validation is another factor that yields convergence between public behavior and private beliefs. People generally believe positive things about themselves (e.g., that they are intelligent, kind, and generous), and they want others to think they possess these qualities as well. Often, their public behavior is in service of this goal. They actively strive to bring their (self-perceived) positive qualities to the attention of others. For both of these reasons, then, it may generally be the case that "appearances made in the world are not veils but guides to the authentic self of the wearer" (Sennett, 1978, p. 153; cited in Tedeschi, 1986, p.6).

V. Chapter Summary

"All the world's a stage," Shakespeare tells us, "and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and their entrances, and one man in his time plays many parts" (As You Like It, act II, scene VII). And so it is. Much of our time is spent in the company of others, and much of this time we are playing a role.

In this chapter we explored the connection between these public displays and private self-conceptions. We began by considering the nature of self-presentation—the functions it serves and the manner in which people go about trying to create an impression of themselves in the minds of other people. We also noted that people differ in regard to how actively they monitor and regulate their public behavior.

We then looked more closely at the kinds of impressions people typically try to convey. Here we noted that, in order to be successful, self-presentations must be believed. We then discussed various tactics individuals use when their self-presentational attempts go awry.

In the third part of the chapter, we examined the association between public behavior and the way people privately think about themselves. For a variety of reasons, people often come to view themselves in ways that are consistent with the persona they publicly display.

Finally, we explored the extent to which behavior in social situations can be accounted for in self-presentational terms, paying particular attention to self-enhancement biases and the extent to which people are genuine or insincere in their public behavior. We noted that people's positive self-presentations are generally believed, and that outright dissimulation and deceit are the exceptions rather than the rule in people's day-to-day lives.

- Self-presentation is any behavior that is intended to create, modify, or maintain an impression of ourselves in the minds of other people.
- Self-presentation serves three important functions: (1)it helps facilitate social interaction; (2)it enables individuals to attain material and social rewards; and (3)it helps people privately construct desired identities.
- There are three components of successful self-presentation. First, individuals must be motivated to create a particular impression in the minds of other people. Second, they must possess the cognitive ability to know what particular behaviors will give rise to that impression. Finally, they must be able (and willing) to enact the desired behaviors.
- People differ in their self-presentational styles. High self-monitors enjoy being different people in different situations, and they possess the cognitive and behavioral skills needed to adapt their behavior to match the requirements of the situation. In contrast, low self-monitors value congruence between their actions and their underlying attitudes and are less apt to tailor their behavior to match the requirements of the situation.

- Five common self-presentational strategies were identified: (1)ingratiation (we strive to get other people to like us); (2)self-promotion (we attempt to convince other people of our competence); (3)intimidation (we try to lead others to believe we are tough and ruthless); (4)exemplification (we aim to create the impression that we are morally virtuous and righteous); and (5)supplication (we seek to convince others that we are weak and helpless).
- Successful self-presentation involves a balance between beneficiality (presenting the most beneficial image for the situation) and believability (making sure the image is believed by others). Aware of these factors, individuals generally modify their behavior to match an audience's knowledge and expectations.
- Accountability is one factor that strongly influences believability. The more accountable people are for their actions, the more likely they are to present themselves in ways that match relevant facts.
- People call upon a variety of strategies when they fail to make a desired impression. These include accounts (people attempt to reinterpret, excuse, or justify their actions) and image repair tactics, such as compensating for a bad impression in one area by inflating the positivity of alternative qualities.
- People are often audiences for their own behavior. In seeking to convince others that they possess particular qualities, they often wind up convincing themselves. Sometimes this process is a rather passive one (as when the roles we play filter down to affect the way we see ourselves), and sometimes it is a very active one (as when we purposefully set out to create a private identity by publicly behaving in a particular fashion).
- People often seek to convince others that they possess positive qualities. For the most part, these attempts genuinely reflect the way people privately think about themselves, rather than representing insincere attempts to deceive or mislead.

For Further Reading

Baumeister, R.F. (1986). (Ed.). *Public self and private life*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York: Anchor Books.

Schlenker, B.R. (1980). *Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relationships*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Schlenker, B.R. (1985). (Ed.). *The self and social life*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Snyder, M. (1987). Public appearances/private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring. New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.

References

Alexander, N. C., & Knight, G. W. (1971). Situated identities and social psychological experimentation. *Sociometry*, *34*, 65-82.

Arkin, R. M. (1981). Self-presentation styles. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research* (pp. 311-333). San Diego, CA: Academic Press

Arkin, R. M. (1987). Shyness and self-presentation. In K. Yardley & T. Honess (Eds.), *Self and identity: Psychosocial perspectives* (pp. 187-195). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Arkin, R. M. & Baumgardner, A. H. (1985). Self-handicapping. In J. H. Harvey & G. Weary (Eds.), *Basic issues in attribution theory and research* (pp. 169-202). New York: Academic Press.

Backman, C. W., & Secord, P. F. (1968). The self and role selection. In. C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), *The self in social interaction* (pp. 289-296). New York: Wiley.

Baumeister, R. F. (1982a). Self-esteem, self-presentation, and future interaction: A dilemma of reputation. *Journal of Personality*, *50*, 29-45.

Baumeister, R. F. (1982b). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. *Psychological Bulletin, 91*, 3-26.

Baumeister, R. F. (1986). *Identity: Cultural change and the struggle for self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Baumeister, R. F., & Jones, E. E. (1978). When self-presentation is constrained by the target's knowledge: Consistency and compensation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*, 608-618.

Baumeister, R. F., & Scher, S. J. (1988). Self-defeating behavior patterns among normal individuals: Review and analysis of common self-destructive tendencies. *Psychological Bulletin, 104*, 3-22.

Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self-presentational motivations and personality differences in self-esteem. *Journal of Personality*, *57*, 547-579.

Baumgardner, A. H., & Brownlee, E. A. (1987). Strategic failure in social interaction: Evidence for expectancy disconfirmation processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*, 525-535.

Baumgardner, A. H., Lake, E. A., & Arkin, R. M. (1985). Claiming mood as a self-handicap: The influence of spoiled and unspoiled social identities. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11*, 349-358.

Berglas, S., & Jones, E. E. (1978). Drug choice as a self-handicapping strategy in response to noncontingent success. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*, 405-417.

Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in*

experimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1-63). New York: Academic Press.

Briggs, S. R., Cheek, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1980). An analysis of the self-monitoring scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38,* 679-686.

Brown, J. D. (1990). Evaluating one's abilities: Shortcuts and stumbling blocks on the road to self-knowledge. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *26*, 149-167.

Brown, J. D., & Gallagher, F. M. (1992). Coming to terms with failure: Private self-enhancement and public self-effacement. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *28*, 3-22.

Buss, A. H. (1980). *Self-consciousness and social anxiety*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co.

Buss, A. H. & Briggs, S. R. (1984). Drama and the self in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47*, 1310-1324.

Carnegie, D. (1936). *How to win friends and influence people*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1985). Aspects of self, and the control of behavior. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 146-174). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Cialdini, R. B., & De Nicholas, M. E. (1989). Self-presentation by association. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*, 626-631.

Cialdini, R. B., & Richardson, K. D. (1980). Two indirect tactics of image management: Basking and blasting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *39*, 406-415.

Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976). Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *34*, 366-375.

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1964). *The approval motive: Studies in evaluative dependence*. New York: Wiley.

DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in everyday life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 979-995.

Edwards, A. L. (1957). *The social desirability variable in personality assessment and research*. New York: Wiley.

Erdelyi, M. H. (1974). A new look at the new look: Perceptual defense and vigilance. *Psychological Review, 81*, 1-25.

Fazio, R. H. Effrein, E. A., & Falender, V. J. (1981). Self-perception following social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41*, 232-242.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical*

Psychology, *43*, 522-528.

Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.

Frey, D. (1978). Reactions to success and failure in public and private conditions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14*, 172-179.

Gangestad, S., & Snyder, M. (1985). "To carve nature at its joints": On the existence of discrete classes in personality. *Psychological Review, 92*, 317-349.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York: Doubleday.

Gollwitzer, P. M. (1986). Striving for specific identities: The social reality of self-symbolizing. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 143-159). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Gove, W. R., Hughes, M., & Geerken, M. R. (1980). Playing dumb: A form of impression management with undesirable side effects. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 43*, 89-102.

Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). Compensatory self-inflation: A response to the threat to self-regard of public failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *49*, 273-280.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1982). The self-serving attributional bias: Beyond self-presentation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *18*, 56-67.

Greenwald, A. G., & Breckler, S. J. (1985). To whom is the self presented? In B. R. Schlenker (Eds.), *The self and social life* (pp. 126-145). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hardin, C., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective objective. To appear in R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.,) *Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol*., 3, pp. xxx-xxx). New York: Guilford.

Hill, M. G., Weary, G., & Williams, J. (1986). Depression: A self-presentation formulation. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 213-240). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Hogan, R., & Briggs, S. R. (1986). A socioanalytic interpretation of the public and the private selves. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 179-188). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Jones, E. E. (1990). *Interpersonal perception*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Co.

Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attributions about the self through self-handicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of under-achievement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 200-206.

Jones, E. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 1, pp. 231-262). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Jones, E. E., Rhodewalt, F., Berglas, S., & Skelton, J. A. (1981). Effects of strategic self-presentation on subsequent self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41*, 407-421.

Jones, E. E., & Wortman, C. (1973). *Ingratiation: An attributional approach*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Kelly, A. E., & Rodriguez, R. R. (2006). Publicly committing oneself to an identity. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28,* 185-191.

Kolditz, T. A., & Arkin, R. M. (1982). An impression management interpretation of the self-handicapping strategy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43*, 492-502.

Leary, M. R. (1993). The interplay of private self-processes and interpersonal factors in self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 4, pp. 127-155). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1990). Impression management: A literature review and two-component model. *Psychological Bulletin*, *107*, 34-47.

Leary, M. R., & Miller, R. S. (1986). *Social psychology and dysfunctional behavior*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Leary, M. R., Nezlek, J. B., Downs, D., Radford-Davenport, J., Martin, J., & McMullen, A. (1994). Self-presentation in everyday interactions: Effects of target familiarity and gender composition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 664-673.

Leary, M. R., Tchividjian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B.E. (1994). Self-presentation can be hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk. *Health Psychology*, *13*, 461-470.

Luginbuhl, J., & Palmer, R. (1991). Impression management aspects of self-handicapping: Positive and negative effects. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17*, 655-662.

McArthur, L. Z., & Baron, R. M. (1983). Toward an ecological theory of social perception. *Psychological Review*, *90*, 215-238.

McCall, G. J., & Simmons, J. L. (1966). *Identities and interactions*. New York: The Free Press.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Park, R. E. (1927). Human nature and collective behaviour. *American Journal of Sociology*, *32*, 733-741.

Rhodewalt, F., & Agustsdottir, S. (1986). Effects of self-presentation on the phenomenal self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50*, 47-55.

Rhodewalt, F., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Tschanz, B., Feick, D. L., & Waller, A. (1995). Self-handicapping and interpersonal trade-offs: The effects of claimed self-handicaps on observers' performance evaluations and feedback. *Personality*

and Social Psychology Bulletin, *10*, 1042-1050.

Riess, M., Rosenfeld, P., Melburg, V., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1981). Self-serving attributions: Biased private perceptions and distorted public descriptions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41*, 224-231.

Ringer, R. J. (1973). *Winning through intimidation*. Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Publishing.

Rosenberg, M. (1979). *Conceiving the self*. New York: Basic Books.

Sarbin, T. R., & Allen, V. L. (1968). Role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 488-567). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Scheier, M. F. & Carver, C. S. (1982b). Two sides of the self: One for you and one for me. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol.. 2, pp. 123-157). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Schlenker, B. R. (1975). Self-presentation: Managing the impression of consistency when reality interferes with self-enhancement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*, 1030-1037.

Schlenker, B. R. (1980). *Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relationships*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Schlenker, B. R. (1982). Translating actions into attitudes: An identity-analytic approach to the explanation of social conduct. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 15, pp. 193-247). New York: Academic Press.

Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 65-99). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schlenker, B. R. (1986). Self-identification: Toward an integration of the private and public self. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 21-62). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Schlenker, B. R., Dlugolecki, D. W., & Doherty, K. (1994). The impact of self-presentations on self-appraisals and behavior: The power of public commitment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*, 20-33.

Schlenker, B. R. & Leary, M. R. (1982a). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization and model. *Psychological Bulletin, 92*, 641-669.

Schlenker, B. R. & Leary, M. R. (1982b). Audiences' reactions to self-enhancing, self-denigrating, and accurate self-presentations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18*, 89-104.

Schlenker, B. R. & Trudeau, J. V. (1990). The impact of self-presentations on private self beliefs: Effects of prior self-beliefs and misattribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 22-32.

Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1989). Goals and the self-identification process:

Constructing desired identities. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Goal concepts in personality and social psychology* (pp. 243-290). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. (pp. 243-271 only)

Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1990). Self-consciousness and self-presentation: Being autonomous versus appearing autonomous. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 59, 820-828.

Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1992). Interpersonal processes involving impression regulation and management. *Annual Review of Psychology, 43*, 133-168.

Schlenker, B. R., Weigold, M. F., & Doherty, K. (1991). Coping with accountability: Self-identification and evaluative reckonings. In C. R. Snyder & D. F. Forsyth (Eds.), *Handbook of social and clinical psychology*: *The health perspective* (pp. 96-115). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.

Schlenker, B. R., Weigold, M. F., & Hallam, J. R. (1990). Self-serving attributions in social context: Effects of self-esteem and social pressure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *58*, 855-863.

Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1960). Accounts. *American Sociological Review*, *33*, 46-62.

Sennett, R. (1978). *The fall of public man: On the social psychology of capitalism*. New York: Vintage.

Sharp, M. J., & Getz, J. G. (1996). Substance use as impression management. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*, 60-67.

Smith, S. H., & Whitehead, G. I., III. (1988). The public and private use of consensus-raising excuses. *Journal of Personality, 56*, 355-371.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Handelsman, M. M. (1982). On the self-serving function of an academic wooden leg: Test anxiety as a self-handicapping strategy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*, 314-321.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Perkins, S. C. (1983). The self-serving function of hypochondriacal complaints: Physical symptoms as self-handicapping strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44*, 787-797.

Snyder, C. R. (1985). Collaborative companions: The relationship of self-deception and excuse making. In M. W. Martin (Ed.), *Self-deception and self-understanding*: *New essays in philosophy and psychology* (pp. 35-51). Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Snyder, C. R., & Smith, T. W. (1982). Symptoms as self-handicapping strategies: The virtues of old wine in a new bottle. In G. Weary & H. R. Mirels (Eds.), *Integration of clinical and social psychology* (pp. 104-127). New York: Oxford University Press.

Snyder, C. R., Smith, T. W., Augelli, R. W., & Ingram, R. E. (1985). On the self-serving function of social anxiety: Shyness as a self-handicapping strategy. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 970-980.

Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30*, 526-537.

Snyder, M. (1979). Self-monitoring processes. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 12, pp. 85-128). New York: Academic Press.

Snyder, M. (1987). *Public appearances/private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Co.

Stryker, S. & Statham, A. (1985). Symbolic interaction and role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 311-378). New York: Random House.

Swann, W. B., Jr. (1990) To be adored or to be known? The interplay of self-enhancement and self-verification. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Motivation and cognition* (Vol. 2, pp. 408-448). New York: Guilford Press.

Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin*, *103*, 193-210.

Tedeschi, J. T. (1986). Private and public experiences and the self. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 1-20). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Tedeschi, J. T. & Norman, N. (1985). Social power, self-presentation, and the self. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 293-322). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratiocination or public spectacle? *American Psychologist, 26*, 685-695.

Tesser, A., & Moore, J. (1986). On the convergence of public and private aspects of self. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private life* (pp. 99-116). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Tetlock, P. E., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1985). Impression management versus intrapsychic explanations in social psychology. *Psychological Review*, *92*, 59-77.

Tice, D. M. (1992). Self-concept change and self-presentation: The looking glass self is also a magnifying glass. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*, 435-451.

Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M. B., & Stillwell, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: Differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*, 1120-1138.

Tomarelli, M. M., & Shaffer, D. R. (1985). What aspects of self do self-monitors monitor? *Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23*, 135-138.

Trilling, L. (1971). *Sincerity and authenticity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weary, G., Harvey, J. H., Schwieger, P., Olson, C. T., Perloff, R., & Pritchard, S. (1982). Self-presentation and the moderation of self-serving attributional biases. *Social Cognition*, 2, 140-159.

Weary Bradley, G. (1978). Self-serving biases in the attribution process: A reexamination of the fact or fiction question. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36*, 56-71.

Weiner, B. (1993). On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social motivation. *American Psychologist*, *48*, 957-965.

Weiner, B., Amirkhan, J., Folkes, V. S., & Verette, J. A. (1987). An attributional analysis of excuse giving: Studies of a naïve theory of emotion. *Journal of Personality and* Social *Psychology*, *52*, 316-324.

Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1982). *Symbolic self-completion*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.