

Meaning making with artificial interlocutors and risks of language technology

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- Humans are remarkably quick to make meaning of language we encounter and to imagine the mind behind that language
- Artificial agents have at best limited capacity for communicative intent
 - And some natural language systems have none
- Mitigating the risks of language technology requires recognizing and accounting for the above
 - ... rather than taking advantage of it

Outline

- Meaning making in human-human conversation
- Computers and communicative intent
- Humans and computer generated text
 - Failure modes and risks
- Mitigation strategies



(Halliday 1970, Partee 1991)






No muddy paws for me! No one told me I had to bring a dog!

(Halliday 1970, Partee 1991)



(Halliday 1970, Partee 1991)



The meaning is not in the text



- What does this sentence mean?
- What does the speaker mean by uttering this sentence?

先生によると男の子よりも女の子がポケモンがすきだ。[jpn] 先生 によると 男の子 よりも 女の子 が ポケモン が すき だ。 Sensei ni yoru to otokonoko yorimo onnanoko ga pokemon ga suki da. teacher (.) boy (.) girl (.) Pokemon (.) like (.)

teacher according to boy than girl nom Pokemon nom like cop.pres



The meaning is not in the text

- With linguistic (grammatical, lexical) knowledge, speakers can get from a text to a 'standing' or 'conventional' meaning (Grice 1968, Quine 1960), but that's only the first step.
- Standing meaning + commonsense + coherence relations gives *public* commitments (Hamblin 1970, Lascarides & Asher 2009, Asher & Lascarides 2013)
- Public commitments + further reasoning gives perlocutionary consequences
 - A: I wonder whether I should take my umbrella. Is it raining?
 - B: Yes.
 - A: Oh, so you do think I should take my umbrella.
 - B: I didn't say that.

(Bender & Lascarides 2019:13)

Conversation as a joint activity: Clark 1996 (p37-38)

Participants A joint activity is carried out by two or more participants.

Activity roles The participants in a joint activity assume public roles that

help determine their division of labor.

Public goals The participants in a joint activity try to establish and

achieve joint public goals.

Private goals The participants in a joint activity may try individually to

achieve private goals.

Hierarchies A joint activity ordinarily emerges as a hierarchy of joint

actions or joint activities.

Procedures The participants in a joint activity may exploit both

conventional and nonconventional procedures.

Boundaries A successful joint activity has an entry and exit jointly

engineered by the participants.

Dynamics Joint activities may be simultaneous or intermittent,

and may expand, contract, or divide in their personnel.

Communication as intersubjective awareness (Baldwin 1995, p.132)

Technically speaking, joint attention simply means the simultaneous engagement of two or more individuals in mental focus on one and the same external thing. Put this way, joint attention is likely a ubiquitous occurrence for all organisms that boast a complex central nervous system. For instance, two bushbabies, alerted by a predator's call, are caught in an instant of joint attention prior to pursuing their separate avenues of escape. Or to take a human case, perhaps you and I once unwittingly happened to watch "Dr. Strangelove" on the same night in the same time zone, thereby satisfying the criteria for joint attention. Clearly, this notion of simultaneous engagement fails to capture something central to our experience—the aspect of intersubjective awareness that accompanies joint attention, the recognition that mental focus on some external thing is shared. And of course, it is just this aspect of the joint attention experience—intersubjective awareness—that makes simultaneous engagement with some third party of such social value to us. It is because we are aware of simultaneous engagement

that we can use it as a springboard for communicative exchange.

Meaning making at a distance: in time & space



- Face-to-face, small group communication is the most well-studied (and probably the most basic)
 - but we also communicate asynchronously and distantly
 - and apply the same skills in doing so
- Theory of mind developmental milestones linked to reading comprehension (Atkinson et al 2017, Dore et al 2018)
- Ricœur 1973 (hermeneutics): "Not that we can conceive of a text without an author; the tie between the speaker and the discourse is not abolished, but distended and complicated." (p.95)
- In interpreting texts, we lack the ability to confirm & repair understandings (Dingemanse et al 2015), but we still project a model of mind

Making meaning in human-human interaction: Summary

- Communication is a joint activity
 - in which we use language (among other signals)
 - to convey and understand communicative intents
- We do this even when not co-present with our interlocutors



Can computers have communicative intent?

- Does the "dogs must be carried" sign have communicative intent?
 - No: it's just a piece of metal, with not even any moving parts
 - It represents some person or group of people's communicative intent
- Does a calculator have communicative intent?
 - Can produce answers to different questions
 - Probably still best understood as representing some group of people's intent: to provide accurate answers given a system of rules

Can computers have communicative intent?

- How about a slot-filling dialog agent (e.g. ATIS, Hemphill et al 1990)?
 - Intent: Elicit information about parameters of flight scheduling request that map to concepts in its database
 - Intent: Provide information about flights from database matching parameters of the request
- How about conversational chatbots like ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1966) & co?
 - Intent: Output text that is engaging and on-topic (?)
 - Tenuous and too far removed from the standing meaning of said text

Can computers have public commitments?

- Standing meaning + commonsense + coherence relations gives *public* commitments (Hamblin 1970, Lascarides & Asher 2009, Asher & Lascarides 2013)
- These are called public commitments because we are on record as having 'said' them
 - Even those due to covert coherence relations (Lascarides & Asher 2009)
- If a person's public commitments turn out to be false, they are either lying or misinformed
- Who or what is accountable for a machine's utterances?

Can computers recognize communicative intent?

- "Dogs must be carried" sign:
 - No.
- Calculator:
 - Limited (I wish to know what this expression evaluates to)

- Slot-filling dialogue system/virtual assistant:
 - Limited to the range of actions it is able to take
- Language model as chatbot (e.g. ChatGPT):
 - No.

Can computers recognize communicative intent?

- Kopp & Krämer (2021): work on "conversational AI" has taken a behavioralist turn
- ... and fails to model the aspects of human-human interaction that make it a joint activity: co-construction and mentalizing

If an agent can only recognize pre-programmed communicative intents, it cannot engage in the fullness of intersubejctive joint activities.

Interlude:

"But aren't people just stochastic parrots too?"

- An argument that is frequently proposed to me (on Twitter, over email)
 - "How do I know that you aren't just reflecting back patterns of language use?"
 - "Isn't that just what people do?"
- This argument is inherently dehumanizing:
 - Surely, the person making the argument perceives their own agency in speaking and otherwise
 - But asking this question at best casts doubt that their interlocutor has similar agency, i.e. full humanity


=> Bender 2024

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Making meaning: We can't help ourselves

 Heider & Simmel (1944): people attribute personality characteristics to shapes and construct a narrative based only on movements




• Mitchell (2021): if we'll do that much interpretation of just shapes, how much more do we do with language? [https://bit.ly/TWiML-467]

Meaning making: We bring our own context

 Not only will we make meaning of text/speech/sign from languages we know, we will do so based on the context that we bring to the situation

Including our interpretation of what the computer is doing




Meaning making in our context: Examples

- The following slides have examples where things have gone or could go wrong
- In some cases, the resulting artifacts are offensive or otherwise difficult to see (stereotypes regarding Black Americans, machines urging self-harm, stereotypes about the Kannada language, dehumanization of Native people, stereotypes about Arabs, especially Palestinians)
- My point here is to alert you to the fact that these (and others) exist, but I
 realize that there is some harm in repeating them, even with that framing
- Open to feedback on how to convey this message, if there is something any
 of you have the energy and inclination to articulate

Ex 1: Templatic generation, with automatic placement of text

 Sweeney 2013: African-American sounding names triggered different version of ad copy than white sounding names



(Sweeney 2013:46-47)

Ex 1: Templatic generation, with automatic placement of text

- What, if any communicative intent does the machine or the corp behind it have?
 - Click here, so we can get paid
 - Elicit viewer behavior, in order to choose among different versions of ad
- What are the perlocutionary consequences?
 - Cast suspicion about the person being searched for, regardless of the search context

Ex 2-6+: Untethered generation


- Microsoft's Twitter chatbot Tay (March 2016), <u>yanked within 24 hours</u>, for parroting back sexist, racist, and other bigoted remarks
- GPT-3 (Brown et al 2020) powered "PhilosopherAI" was used by a third party to <u>automate responses on Reddit</u>, detected because it was too prodigious
 - Engaged on sensitive topics including conspiracy theories and suicide
- May 2023: The National Eating Disorder Association replaced its helpline with a chatbot that promptly started offering harmful advice
- In October 2023, NYC set up chatbot for answering legal questions and of course it gave out false information
- Feb 2024: AirCanada must <u>honor a bereavement fare policy</u> output by a chatbot

Ex 2-6+: Untethered generation

- What, if any, communicative intent does the machine have?
 - Engagement, without commitment to content / provide plausible continuation
- How does public commitment/accountability function here?
 - With no control over specific content, which human/org would want to be accountable for it?
- Perlocutionary consequences:
 - Varied & drastic, especially in scenarios where the machine is presented as possibly human or even artificial but knowledgable

Ex 7: Search snippets

- March 2020, seeking to help an older relative with a medical question, I searched for "urgent care nurse line"
- Ran into a really unfortunate confluence of the US's broken healthcare system and Google search returning snippets out of context



Ex 7: Search snippets

- What, if any, communicative intent does the machine have?
 - Provide string which answers user's question, by highlighting most relevant snippet
- Who is publicly committed to the message?
 - Underlying text, with its full context: UW Medicine/UMP
 - Coherence relation of 'answer': Google

- Perlocutionary consequences:
 - Wasted time on hold with the wrong service

24-Hour Nurse Care Line

Our nurses can help you decide whether you need to see a doctor, go to an **urgent care clinic** or **emergency** room or **care** for yourself at home.

Call 855.520. 9500 to speak with one of our nurses now.

UW Medicine > aco > welcome-guide

Urgent Care | UMP Plus – UW Medicine

Accountable Care Network

About Featured Snippets

Feedback

Ex 8: Incorrect answers presented authoritatively

About 2,550,000,050 results (1.05 seconds)

The first colony was founded at Jamestown, Virginia, in **1607**. Many of the people who softed in the New World came to escape religious persecution. The Pilgrims, founders of Plymouth, Massachusetts, arrived in **1620**. In both Virginia and Massachusetts, the colonists flourished with some assistance from Native Americans.


www.americaslibrary.gov > colonial > jb_colonial_subj

Colonial America (1492-1763)



Source: @hankgreen on Twitter


Ex 8: Incorrect answers presented authoritatively



Source: @hankgreen on Twitter

Ex 8: Incorrect answers presented authoritatively

- What, if any, communicative intent does the machine have?
 - Provide answer to user's question, from linked document, pulling out most relevant snippet
- Who is publicly committed to the message?
 - Underlying text, with its full context: US Library of Congress
 - Coherence relation of 'answer': Google
- Perlocutionary consequences: What might the searcher learn from this answer? Consider especially Native and non-Native children in the US




Kannada

What is the **ugliest language in Udia**? The answer is Kannada, a **language** spokes by around 40 million people in south **India**.



Source: @PCMohanMP on Twitter



The Palestinian keffiyeh (Arabic كوفية, koofiyyeh) is a chequered black and white warf that is usually worn around the neck or head

W https://en.m.wikipedia or ม / บห่

Palestinian keffiych - Wikipedia

Source: @swagmaster40000 on Twitter





- What, if any, communicative intent does the machine have?
 - Provide answer to user's question, from linked document, pulling out most relevant snippet
- What about public commitments?
 - Answering a question with invalid presuppositions implicitly accepts those presuppositions into the common ground (Lascarides & Asher 2009, Kim et al 2021)
 - By answering, Google is committing to there being some language that recognized as the ugliest and some characteristic headgear for terrorists
 - Google is further committing to the specific answers

- Perlocutionary consequences:
 - For someone holding the beliefs presupposed in those questions, reinforcement of those beliefs
 - For someone subject to the stereotype, psychological harm of the stereotype being repeated
 - ... plus the sense that "everyone" must think so, for Google to be reflecting it back so

Not just decontextualizing, but also recontextualizing

Already a problem with search results as a list of web pages:

In essence, the social context or meaning of derogatory or problematic Black women's representations in Google's ranking is normalized by virtue of their placement, making it easier for some people to believe that what exists on the page is strictly the result of the fact that more people are looking for Black women in pornography than anything else. This is because the public believes that what rises to the top in search is either the most popular or the most credible or both. (Noble 2018:32)

Not just decontextualizing, but also recontextualizing

- Already a problem with search results as a list of web pages
 - Similarly problematic with image search results
- Exacerbated with 'snippets' pulled out from pages
- Exacerbated with 'answer boxes'
- Exacerbated with chatbots as replacements for search (see Shah & Bender 2022, 2024)

- A nuanced view of how meaning making happens
 - · Neither questions nor answers are just text strings, nor even 'logical forms'
- People will interpret strings in languages they know
 - By building a model of mind of a person/entity/group behind the text
 - Using the context the string appears in
 - Using the context they bring to the interaction

- Who will be encountering and interpreting the text?
- Consider many different kinds of people/experiences (Friedman & Hendry 2019)
 - Children
 - People with strong prejudices
 - People subject to the stereotypes at hand
 - People with limited understanding of fallibility of computers
 - · People who are stressed, busy, tired, not paying much attention

- Who is accountable for what is said?
 - When, if ever, is untethered generation appropriate?
 - Who will people encountering the text attribute it to?
 - When should an organization be comfortable with untethered or even partially guided natural language generation being done in its name?
 - What about cases where people unleash bots without an obvious responsible operator?

- Curation of training data:
 - Don't hoover up garbage, knowing that it can be spat back out and interpreted by humans
- Transparency by design & visibility to users:
 - Bare minimum: always be clear that the interlocutor is a machine
 - What are its affordances?
 - Where does the information come from? (see Bender & Friedman 2018, Gebru et al 2021, Bender, Gebru et al 2021)
 - In what ways might it be inaccurate?

- Transparency by design & minimal claim to authority
 - "Google" shouldn't be answering questions
 - Don't present the Web as total or so big it must be representative
 - There are some applications/tasks which might not be appropriate at all (e.g. robo-therapist)
- Resist, rather than leaning into, the human reflex to imagine a mind behind the text

- As appealing as conversational interfaces seem to be, sometimes (often?) the answer is: don't
- A successfully conversational interface will elicit credence
- ... while likely being very opaque about its actual affordances
- ... and modern LLM-driven chatbots very successfully mimic conversation
- NYC example: What was needed was a search interface to ~2000 city web pages, NOT a chat bot that made stuff up while pointing to them

At a policy level, consider:

- How do we create information systems for the public good, rather than for advertising & other corporate interests? (see Noble 2018)
- How do we avoid amplifying biased views, especially those held by the majority/those in power? (see Alkhatib 2021, Birhane 2021)
- How do we require transparency (recognizably synthetic media, disclosure of training data) and accountability (for the content expressed)?
- Without making it the only solution, how do we promote information literacy, in the face of these technologies?

Finally: Don't be too impressed

 Just because that text seems coherent doesn't mean the model behind it has understood anything or is trustworthy

Just because that answer was correct doesn't mean the next one will be

• When a computer seems to "speak our language", we're actually the ones

doing all of the work



https://www.maxpixel.net/Tropical-Animal-World -Bill-Parrot-Cute-Bird-Ara-3080543





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 - And some natural language systems have none
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