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cording to it, quotation marks are just warnings of a shift in reference; when the context leaves it clear that the shift has taken place, it seems natural to overlook them. An analogy might be helpful. Our linguistic theory could well require syntactical correlates of differences in the semantic value of referring expressions; there should then be differences between proper names of different persons which happen to have (the names, of course) the same shape. In view of the facts, though, it seems perfectly proper here to accept contextual clues as such correlates, for this is what we actually find in our uses during the same conversation of names with the same shape to refer to different persons. The Fregean theory can naturally claim that quotations constitute a similar phenomenon; when the shift in reference is made clear by the context, we do not need to use any conventional means to indicate that. Davidson's theory is here on a flimsier basis; to accept contextual clues as the realization of the subject of a sentence, as in my first interpretation of the idea that the missing quotation marks are "implicit," seems difficult to swallow. And it must also be acknowledged that the second suggestion (to invoke a conversational implicature) leaves the Davidsonian in a worse position than the one occupied by the Fregean.

Nevertheless, and even taking into full regard such an acknowledgment, our final decision must be the result of a careful weighing of the different theories' pros and cons; and, on balance, I think our bet should be in favor of the version of the Davidsonian view I have proposed here. It can give a sensible answer to the problems discussed in this section, while maintaining the advantages pointed out in the preceding one.

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TESTIMONY, TRUST, KNOWING*

If we know much of what we think we know, then we do so through testimony. Testimony only succeeds if there is trust. But how could a right to be sure rest upon so fragile a basis as trust? Exploiting a number of such seeming paradoxes, John Hard-

* My thanks to L. Jonathan Cohen, Catherine Elgin, and Georges Rey for helpful discussion.

wig,¹ whose essays on the role of testimony in science have been influential, concludes that "the trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is the ultimate foundation for much of our knowledge" (694).²

This claim and the contrasts that it rests upon are, I argue, exaggerated. The plausibility it enjoys is largely due to a foreground/background illusion. The foreground, which is the focus of attention, highlights the information *seeker* who must rely upon the word of his informant without benefit of knowing him; whereas the background, which is out of focus, supplies an enormous, if hardly noticed, critical foundation for the seeker. Appreciation of the force of background grounding also undermines a crucial opposition in discussions of testimony. Following C.A.J. Coady's³ recent account, Leslie Stevenson⁴ summarizes the opposition between Humean and Reidian views as follows: "Reid's position is that any assertion is creditworthy until shown otherwise; whereas Hume implies that specific evidence for its reliability is needed" (*ibid.*, p. 433).

There is an ambiguity in the notion of the dependence of knowledge upon testimony. Is the dependence a claim as to the *origination* of the knowledge or as to what *sustains* it?⁵ Is trust pervasive for knowing or knowledge? In an article by Mark Owen Webb⁶ which builds upon Hardwig's, and whose only complaint is that Hardwig "does not go far enough" (260), there is a similar ambiguity: "trust is necessary if one wishes to have knowledge of anything interesting beyond one's own immediate experience" (260). Is the claim that trust is necessary for coming to know, or, additionally, for what is thereby gained to remain knowledge?

For each of these questions, the former (origination) claim has been amply demonstrated.⁷ A major source for our knowledge is testimony. In the essay ("On Miracles") from which the Humean view of testimony is alleged to derive, David Hume⁸ writes: "there is

¹ "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," this JOURNAL, LXXXVIII, 12 (December 1991): 693-708.

² Hardwig thinks of "foundation" as a metaphor.

³ *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (New York: Oxford, 1992).

⁴ "Why Believe What People Say?" *Synthese*, xciv (1993): 429-51.

⁵ See Fred I. Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (Cambridge: MIT, 1981), pp. 88-9, for an account of this familiar distinction.

⁶ "Why I Know About As Much As You: A Reply to Hardwig," this JOURNAL, xc, 5 (May 1993): 260-70.

⁷ See Hardwig's earlier "Epistemic Dependence," this JOURNAL, LXXXII, 7 (July 1985): 335-49.

⁸ *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Eric Steinberg, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991).

no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators" (*ibid.*, p. 74). It is the latter claim—that testimony sustains a good deal of our knowledge—that is implausible. Once testimony is accepted, there are many sources which come into play which supply additional grounds relevant to the warrant for the belief. Unless one believes that an item of knowledge must retain its "pedigree,"⁹ there is no reason to expect that dependence upon testimony is an enduring feature of knowledge.

I learn of a killing of a tourist in Florida from my neighbor. But quickly there is confirmation from many other sources, in particular the newspaper and television reports. While each of these constitute testimony from my point of view, their convergence constitutes, in familiar ways, significant grounds that the report is correct, over and above my grounds for accepting the testimony.

Aside from possibilities for corroboration by other sources, there are many possibilities for subsequent confirmation. If one acts upon testimony, and if the success of that act depends upon the truth of that testimony, then one is often immediately able to confirm (or disconfirm) it. Here, as elsewhere, different settings affect the opportunities for subsequent confirmation or disconfirmation. But in any institutional setting, such as science, where information is acquired purposefully, application of testimony is to be expected, so that the dependence upon trust is soon swamped by success or failure in its use.

Let us then treat the claim of the dependence of knowledge upon testimony and trust as a claim about origination. It seems sufficient for a seeker to be extending trust that the seeker is at risk, if the testimony is false,¹⁰ and that the seeker cannot control and check on an informant (as a condition on his accepting the testimony). Usually, these conditions are met, keeping in mind that informants are free, fallible, and with complex intelligences responsive to interests besides truth. Satisfying these conditions does not then exclude a seeker's having excellent reasons to believe his informant, including broad knowledge of his reliability or that of the relevant class(es) to which he belongs.¹¹ (Indeed, the seeker may both trust an informant's testimony, and, simultaneously, *know* that it is correct.)

⁹ See Isaac Levi, *The Enterprise of Knowledge* (Cambridge: MIT, 1980), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰ Annette Baier speaks of trust as involving vulnerability, in her "Trust and Anti-Trust," *Ethics*, xcvi (1986): 231–60.

¹¹ Observing the context sensitivity in judging how reliable informants are, Coady ridicules the idea of a quantified credibility ratio (pp. 210–1).

Aside from this, and less noticeable, there are powerful constraints on informants to be truthful and reliable.¹² The force of these constraints vary according to such factors as the institution or community's sensitivity to the detection of deception or error, the costs to the informant once an error is detected, and the rapidity and extent of communication about these findings. (Contrast: science, newspaper reporting, and everyday conversation.)

These constraints operate both overtly, as direct checks and reports by other investigators, and also covertly, when an informant's report is an integrated feature of broader investigations, as in science. Hardwig recognizes, of course, the tight constraints supplied by peer review or replication as a check on scientific fraud. He notes weaknesses in peer-review systems, however, and difficulties of replication due to limited interest in it and obstacles to financing.

But he fails to consider unobtrusive and low cost *implicit* replication, which simply involves the idea of new research building upon old. Once it is allowed that fraud and error are rapidly identifiable in intense areas of research,¹³ it follows that, over time, the uncovering of fraud is highly likely so long as an informant's results are, as is standard, an integrated part of a larger research project. The more integrated, the more rapid the exposure of error or fraud, without requiring either strong motivation to replicate or additional resources solely for replication purposes.¹⁴

Although constraints are not standardly viewed as evidence, they retain a crucial mark of evidence: in the presence of these constraints, it is much more reasonable to accept what the informant claims than otherwise. They guide reasonable judgments because they have a tacit role in confirmation. Were testimony in similar cases to have failed, then, to the extent that these failures would be recognized, communicated, and affect our practices, the absence of any lessened expectation of truthful reporting is indicative of the reliability of testimony. Since the confirmation is the result of the ongoing processes of communication and inquiry, it is effortless, placing no strain on the agent's resources.¹⁵

¹² This is broadly the position taken by Michael Blais in "Epistemic Tit for Tat," this JOURNAL, LXXXIV, 7 (July 1987): 363-75; and "Misunderstanding Epistemic Tit for Tat: Reply to John Woods," this JOURNAL, LXXXVII, 7 (July 1990): 369-74.

¹³ Hardwig does so allow in "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," p. 704.

¹⁴ Hardwig also neglects relatively cost-effective checks on the validity of reports through statistical analysis. See, e.g., the discussion of Cyril Burt's IQ research in Leon Kamin, *The Science and Politics of IQ* (Potomac, MD: Erlbaum, 1974).

¹⁵ See further my "Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation," *Mind*, xcix (1990): 559-70.

In chains of communication sensitive to failures of past claims to truth, the present ease of communication and reliance upon the word of others reveals the workings of a far-reaching, epistemic division of labor. This vast knowledge, which we freely borrow, is obscured by the focus on a single act of testimony. Instead, we should view any act of testimony diachronically, as a moment in an ongoing process which has shaped and guided our own participation in it, providing resources for critical judgment. This grounding, being implicit in our practices, pervades our reasons for accepting testimony. It is not necessary that these reasons be represented as the content of any specific and accessible belief.¹⁶

If our past success is a pervasive, though mainly implicit, influence on our practices involving testimony, it undermines the alleged opposition between the Humean and Reidian views. Stevenson characterizes the reductivist Humean as maintaining that "at no stage can one justify a belief merely because someone has told one so, even if one has no evidence against it or against the informant's reliability" (*op. cit.*, p. 437).

The force of my argument above is that the proposed condition is hardly ever satisfied, and so cannot represent the normal situation of testimony. It only seems to be satisfiable, and the Humean and Reidian doctrines in sharp opposition, if we construe evidence narrowly so that all evidence that *X* is reliable can only be specific evidence of the reliability of *X*. For it is only such specific evidence that we normally lack and cannot readily obtain. On the view I am defending, our situation is both Humean and Reidian. We normally have both an enormous warrant for an act of accepting testimony and we do not first investigate its credibility.

The opposition is already dubious historically. A version of the reasoning toward a reliance on trust is this:

- (1) For the most part, it is not feasible to gather specific evidence of the reliability of our informants before accepting their testimony.
- (2) So, if the testimony of others is to yield knowledge to anything like the extent that we think we have it, we must accept, without specific evidence, that our informant is reliable.
- (3) So, we must accept testimony on trust.

¹⁶ This last point is directed mainly at Webb (p. 262) who attempts to use testimony to argue for an *externalist* view. But as an objection to Hume it is problematic, since he was trying to answer the question of how we know an item of testimony is reliable, not solely what conditions must be met for it to be reliable. Webb refers to Elizabeth Fricker's article ("The Epistemology of Testimony," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. LXI (1987): 57–83) without, however, responding to her main argument that an internalist view is preferable to an externalist one for testimony.

Premise 1 figures prominently in Coady's objections to "reductivist" views (*op. cit.*, pp. 82–3). The answer to the reductivist Humean position is supposed to be something along Reidian lines, whereby testimony is *prima facie* credible until proven otherwise.

But Hume does not reject premise 1, which is blatantly inconsistent with his belief in the centrality of testimony, nor does he deny special features of inference based on testimony. What Hume affirmed is that we normally enter the setting of testimony with a large range of well-founded beliefs (derived from a similar source, "experience"), which provides a basis to test or assess any new testimony. Additionally, in the *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume¹⁷ observed a tendency we have toward credulity "a too easy faith in the testimony of others" (*ibid.*, pp. 112–3), which warrants precautions. But the resulting test remains simply one of coherence. There is no special requirement for specific evidence regarding this informant, nor, a fortiori, that we first investigate his credentials.¹⁸ When we weigh the reliability of testimony in favor of a miracle against the enormous background evidence for a law that a miraculous event would have to violate (that is, when we weigh in prior probabilities) the credibility of any *particular* such report must be seriously undermined. Hume writes: "The plain consequence is . . . 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish . . .'"¹⁹

My view of Hume's argument is very unlike that of Coady, who takes Hume to be involved in an attempt to justify testimony from the ground up.²⁰ The view I take is that Hume need only be "starting in the middle," accepting much of what we have no reason to question. In so arguing, Hume may accept that there are many instances of testimony (in particular, those to accept putative laws, not subsequently discredited) to which we can legitimately appeal. What he must deny is only that reports of miracles are among those to be currently taken for granted. But this is not a contentious premise.

Corresponding to the conflation of evidence with specific evidence is the idea that the granting of trust must be a trust in an informant's character. Hardwig writes:

¹⁷ L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed. (New York: Oxford, 1975).

¹⁸ Compare to Coady's own conclusions, pp. 169–76.

¹⁹ *Enquiry*, p. 77.

²⁰ Coady, ch. 4, esp. pp. 85, 97; so too Stevenson, p. 437, and Webb, pp. 261–2. While there is some textual support for their interpretation, none of them attempts to show how that interpretation is required for Hume's main argument in "On Miracles."

A's good reasons depend on whether *B* is truthful, or at least being honest in this situation . . .

. . . *A*'s reliance on *B*'s testimony must include reliance on *B*. The reliability of *A*'s belief depends on the reliability of *B*'s character. . . .

In short, *A* must TRUST *B*, or *A* will not believe that *B*'s testimony gives her good reasons to believe *p*. And *B* must be TRUSTWORTHY or *B*'s testimony will not in fact give *A* good reasons to believe *p*.²¹

But sometimes I may trust my informant's report without trusting my informant, and so the trust is not invested in his character. (It may, of course, be dishonored by a bad character.²²)

Consider scientist *A* who relies on the research findings of another scientist *B* in setting up an elaborate experiment. He discovers that *B* has been claiming originality for work where his contribution was rather minor. *A* becomes convinced that *B* is not trustworthy. But *A* recognizes that *B* will lack motivation to deceive so long as his success is not exposed. So *A* will continue to rely on *B*, while perhaps now lessening the credit he attributes to *B*.

What matters to *A*, so far as his research is concerned, is that *B* is correct in his pronouncements, not that they are derived from a trustworthy character. In fact, we are inclined to say not that we trust the scientists who wrote the report, but that we trust that their reports are accurate, or that they have been accepted after a thorough and fair refereeing process.

This conclusion can be reached in a different way.²³ Let us say that *B*'s untrustworthiness becomes manifest; but on one narrow subject, dear to his heart, he is intellectually scrupulous. Again then, reliance on *B* within that confine will allow the transmission of knowledge. So the trust that must be extended to transmit knowledge is not a general quality or virtue of trustworthiness. Rather, it is a trust limited to the issue at hand, narrowly characterized, and so hardly a testament to *B*'s character overall.

That the trust that we extend for testimony in science is not particularly directed at character is the more plausible when we view it as an extension of the role of trust in everyday communication. Within a Gricean framework, conversation requires a presumption of

²¹ "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," p. 700. As I bring out below, the clause 'or at least being honest in this situation. . . .' is a strikingly weaker requirement than the others.

²² But to infer from this to the conclusion that I must know that he is trustworthy would, I believe, require the assumption of a questionable closure condition.

²³ Cf. F. Dretske, "Conclusive Reasons," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, XLIV (1971): 1-22, esp. p. 9.

trust.²⁴ We expect contributors to be cooperative, not as the outcome of a statistical weighing, but as a presupposition of fruitful exchange. This expectation and the maxims it sanctions involve the basics of testimonial trust—that hearers take speakers as believing what they assert.²⁵

But belief is not enough to ground the rationality of a hearer treating a speaker's assertion that *p* as a reason to believe it himself. We trust not simply their sincerity, but also their reliability. One can reason that hearers assume that they share with speakers many beliefs and values (in particular a desire for genuine information), which provides further reason to believe a speaker's assertion (true).

Coady tries to reason along related (Davidsonian) lines to provide an a priori justification of testimony (*op. cit.*, ch. 9). But even granted the necessity of a preponderance of our beliefs being correct, it does not follow that this holds for our testimony. For the preponderance of the former—the broad set of beliefs we must share—will be in Donald Davidson's²⁶ words (which Coady quotes) "too dull, trite or familiar to stand notice" (*ibid.*, p. 199). Sharing these beliefs helps to fix principles of inference and referents for observation terms, which are starting points for interpretation.

Since what we assert purports to be informative and relevant, however, our assertions, especially in the main testimonial contexts under discussion (for example, science), will rarely be taken from this set of unremarkable beliefs. As our assertions become more interesting or informative, there is correlatively less pressure to take them as true in order to maintain intelligibility. A large degree of falsity among assertions, whether from errors, deceit, or just fooling around, is explicable. Gradually, of course, communicative practices will be weakened and, perhaps, ultimately destroyed. But, in the early stages, this will not undermine comprehensibility or attributions of rationality, which are the conditions that, for Davidson, require "charity," but also limit its role.²⁷ The liar, for one, requires us to understand him to succeed, and we, in turn, can perfectly well recognize the rationality of a lie even while deploring it.

²⁴ H. P. Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1989), esp. essays 2 and 3. See also David Lewis, "Languages and Language," in his *Philosophical Papers, Volume I* (New York: Oxford, 1983), pp. 163–88.

²⁵ See Angus Ross, "Why Do We Believe What We Are Told," *Ratio*, xxviii (1986): 69–88, esp. pp. 77–9.

²⁶ *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (New York: Oxford, 1984).

²⁷ While at some points Coady recognizes this point (e.g., p. 168), he does not appreciate its force against his argument, nor in his specific account of Davidson's view (e.g., p. 158).

If we take the diachronic view urged above, however, a purely a priori argument for reliability is unnecessary. Behind hearers' response to any present communication is a vast history of largely, though not completely, successful communication.²⁸ It is a success that is explicable for reasons cited above, as well as for reasons familiar in ethics. Cooperation is in many central cases the (enlightened) rational choice. Correlatively, we develop fairness (as regards, in this case, veracity and being trustworthy), as we benefit from voluntary participation in practices that thrive when these virtues are widely shared.²⁹ In order for us to introduce this robust history of successful communication, however, we must deny that if trust is a presumption then it is not available for empirical backing. Again, in effect, we must question the alleged opposition between Humean and Reidian views.

A presumption in Edna Ullmann-Margalit's³⁰ insightful analysis is a procedurally demanded bias (for trust, rather than either neutrality or distrust) made ahead of time. This seems fuel for the Reidian view, since the trust is extended not with specific evidence in favor but in the absence of specific evidence against. And it appears to exclude the application of the above model of confirmation to trust, since a presumption is made prior to evidence.

But these consequences only arise when we take a synchronic view, ignoring how the strength and content of presumptions can be responsive to prior outcomes, even if only loosely and indirectly. It is clear enough that we do, in fact, draw all manner of distinctions among classes of potential informants. Car salesman are not as trustworthy (within their role) as librarians; professional journals are more reliable than the popular press; *Consumer Reports* is better than your neighbor for deciding whether a particular type of car is good. Presumably, these distinctions play a role in how we respond to equally sincere testimony, yet in no case need there be a breakdown in communication.

Presumptions are not homogenous. Arguably, the most well-known presumption—that of innocence at the start of a trial—is atypical in its procedural purity. Contrast it with the presumption that a person missing for seven years is dead. The former is a pure presumption in that “failures” are not relevant to its strength. But the second one is, in part, empirically determined and modifiable.

²⁸ On a related point, see Lewis, pp. 167–8.

²⁹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971), pp. 111–4.

³⁰ “On Presumption,” this JOURNAL, LXXX, 3 (March 1983): 143–63.

Should a number of persons who were presumed dead turn out to be alive after seven years, the presumption would be altered or its force weakened (that is, made easier to rebut).

Testimony, like the latter presumption, is impure. Its strength can vary, depending upon what we learn from previous cases. We extend to the used-car salesman and to the librarian a presumption of trust. But it is weaker in the former case and easier to rebut.

The suggestion I am moving toward is that our critical resources are operative in the ordinary acceptance of testimony, and not only in rejection. The acceptance is more fine grained than it appears. Coady seems to disagree: "In our ordinary dealings with others we gather information without this concern for inferring the acceptability of communications from premisses about the honesty, reliability, etc., of our communicants" (*op. cit.*, p. 143). So too Webb: "In only the rarest instances do we reason at all before forming a belief based on what someone has told me. In the vast majority of cases we simply believe them, or else not" (262).

Coady backs his claim by an elaborate argument meant to deny that testimony is epistemically inferior to, or dependent upon, perception (*op. cit.*, pp. 145–9). But we should separate the issue of whether testimony is to be contrasted with perception in regard to being inferential or direct, with the normative question of epistemic status. My claim is only the former (naturalistic) one. It is sufficient for that claim that comprehending an utterance as testimony depends upon a hearer's beliefs about his informant. By contrast, one may hold that the information from perception directly causes a perceptual belief, without the percipient having a belief about the information registered.

Another source for denial of any complexity to the speaker/hearer relation involves a conflation between not believing someone and disbelieving him. Only the latter marks a break in the conversational exchange. But the former is enough for a lack of full acceptance. Indeed, later in his paper Webb writes: "The policy of trusting people is connected with our duties of charity. Anyone who doubts [her] neighbor's testimony without positive reason not to is treating her neighbors as means, and is so violating her duties to them. As a maxim, the principle can be formulated, 'Accept what you are told by others unless or until you have specific reasons for doubting it' " (265).³¹ The maxim Webb offers, though, is stronger

³¹ Webb is quoting from H. H. Price, *Belief* (New York: Humanities, 1969), p. 126.

than what it is supposed to capture. For I might not accept what you tell me without having specific reasons for doubting it.

One situation in which this holds is where there is enormous risk in relying on your testimony, and you claim no expertise. I am not disrespecting you, nor doubting your word, when I check on your claim that the 1994 Mustang is a great car by going to *Consumer Reports*. Nor do I yet have specific reason to doubt you. What I have is both an unusually high cost if you are wrong, and the belief, which I take to be common knowledge, that there are severe limits on individual consumers' good judgment on these matters.

The matter of costs, risks, or utilities is relevant to the perception of an overall smooth flow in the offering and accepting of testimony. From the fact that I go along with your testimony, it does not follow that I simply accept it. First, if I do not need to rely upon it at that time, there is a lack of incentive for me to question it. Second, even if I do rely on it, this still does not require (unqualified) endorsement. If on a pleasure drive in a new town, I ask someone for directions and he offers them to me, I follow them. But I need not have come to believe or accept fully what he told me. It is simply not worthwhile for me to double check, especially if I am under time pressure. So I only have to believe the native's testimony somewhat credible for it to be worthwhile to follow it, seeing as its expected value remains greater than that for relying upon my own judgment.

The assumption I am arguing for is that there is room to filter testimony through our own beliefs, short of simple acceptance or rejection. But there remains the concern, indicated by the previous quotations from both Coady and Webb, that we do not engage in the requisite reasoning. Although neither says so, I assume that they both intend that it is reasoning we cannot normally engage in because we lack the time, abilities, or resources. But they cannot rest their case on the absence of noticeable, explicit reasoning.

As far as time and other cognitive constraints on comprehension go, we already know from Grice's analysis that elaborate reasoning, sometimes involving comparison of alternative interpretations, is needed to draw implicatures that pervade conversation. We understand that reasoning, at its most basic, as inference to the best explanation. We arrive at a testimonial setting with a vast implicit knowledge of the reliability of communication in this area, supplemented sometimes by beliefs that the informant has nothing to gain and something to lose through error or deception. The best explanation for why the informant asserts that *p* is normally that, first and most relevant here, he believes it for duly responsible reasons and,

second, he intends that I shall believe it too (by virtue of recovering this intention from his assertion).

So long as our beliefs relevant to evaluating testimony are no harder to process than other contextual information readily exploited in conversation, their use cannot be objected to as an interference with the possibility of successful communication. I may have beliefs as to the adequacy of the informant's position to know or the degree of uncertainty in this area or the costs of error (to me or my informant) or the complexity of p (I may come to believe that p is basically correct, rather than believe it in all details). These beliefs need not lead me to reject, doubt, or check up upon the informant's testimony. Nevertheless, they may still influence the credibility I ascribe to the testimony, if they are not appropriately specific, or cautionary actions too costly, or time does not permit. So, again, even if I rely upon an informant's testimony, it does not follow that I fully accept it as true. To know whether I do accept it, or the degree to which I believe it, my conversationally immediate response to, or reliance upon, his testimony is inadequate evidence.

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