Plato’s Theory of Recollection

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Plato’s Nativism

Plato: Mathematical and ethical knowledge is, in a sense, innate; it is merely recollected.

Empiricism vs. Rationalism

Empiricists = All knowledge comes from the senses
Rationalists = Some knowledge is innate; some comes from “rational intuition.”

Innate what?

Exactly what is innate according to rationalists? There are at least three options:

- **Concepts** - Virtue, Equality, Justice, etc.
- **Propositional Knowledge** - That 2 + 2 = 4, that “might does not make right”, etc.
- **Abilities** - To add, to recognize equalities, to abstract, etc.
Innate what?

- Most empiricists (including Locke and Hume) grant we have innate abilities to abstract, reason, etc.
- What is controversial is that our concepts and/or propositional knowledge come from experience.
- My Interpretation: Plato’s arguments in *Meno* and *Phaedo* are best interpreted as concluding that we have innate concepts. See [Cohen, 2007].

Virtue and Mathematics?

- Plato’s dialogue *Meno* is about the question, “What is virtue?”
- To show Meno that one can answer the question “What is virtue?”, Socrates teaches a slave how to solve a geometric problem.
- Question: In what way is learning geometric truths relevant to learning about virtue?

- According to some philosophers, neither moral nor mathematical facts are experimentally verifiable.
  - Observing other students cheat does not confirm that cheating is moral. Seeing a boy scout help an old woman cross the street does not confirm to you the value of helping the elderly.
  - If you observe twenty mathematicians obtain 13 when adding 7 and 5, you would not not infer $7 + 5 = 13$.
- Neither moral nor mathematical objects (e.g., numbers, virtue, etc.) seem directly observable.
- **Upshot:** There might be a common way we learn moral, mathematical, and other non-empirical facts.
Meno presents a disconcerting argument, however, that the answer to the question “what is virtue?” is already known or incapable of being found.

**You tell me!** Summarize Meno’s argument.

According to many scholars, Meno’s argument is silly.

Sorensen [2014] reconstructs the argument as follows:

- **Premise 1:** If you know the answer to the question you are asking, then nothing can be learned by asking.
- **Premise 2:** If you do not know the answer, then you cannot recognize a correct answer even if it is given to you.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, one cannot learn anything by asking questions.
Meno’s Argument

Cohen [2007] reconstructs Meno’s argument as follows:

- **Premise 1:** If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary.
- **Premise 2:** If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible.
- **Conclusion:** Inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.

Meno’s Paradox

On either interpretation, the second premise admits of obvious counterexamples:

- Suppose you are an 18th century pirate looking for a cure for scurvy.
- You conduct a clinical trial in which several different treatments (e.g., drinking sea water, eating limes) are compared.
- You don’t know what cures scurvy, but you can recognize a cure when you find it.

Meno’s Paradox

My opinion: I think both interpretations are uncharitable.

- Remember, Plato’s question is “what is virtue?” which appears to be a question that is not easily resolved by empirical means.
- Further, many Platonic dialogues address questions like, “What is piety?”, “What is courage?”, and “What is justice?”
- The aim of these dialogues is to analyze some concept (e.g., piety, courage, justice) that is initially unclear.

Meno’s Paradox

My interpretation: If Meno’s paradox is understood to be an argument concerning conceptual questions of the form “Does $X = Y$?” (e.g., “Is knowledge true belief with an account?”), then the argument is much more plausible.
Meno’s Paradox

Premise 1: If we possess the concept of $X$ and of $Y$, it is unnecessary to inquire whether $X = Y$.

Premise 2: If we lack the concept of either $X$ or $Y$, then we won’t be able to recognize whether $X = Y$. So inquiry is impossible.

Conclusion: It is either unnecessary or impossible to inquire whether $X = Y$.

However, under my interpretation, Plato accepts P2:

- So it looks like we’re in trouble if we don’t have the concepts of virtue, justice, piety, etc.
- That’s why we need . . .

Under my interpretation, Plato denies P1 for three reasons:

- One can recognize $X \neq Y$ (e.g., that “might is not right.”)
- Recognizing what you fail to know is valuable
- The possession of concepts is not a binary attribute: concepts can be clear or vague, and inquiry may bring into focus concepts that were previously vague.
**You tell me!** What does Plato teach the slave?

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**Task:** Given a square $S$, construct a square with twice the area of $S$.

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**Learning in the Meno**

**Socrates' Claim:** The slave's ability to complete the task indicates that must have innate mathematical knowledge. Why?
- Socrates claims not to have taught the slave anything.
- Socrates only asked questions.
- Moreover, the slave knew no geometry prior to the exchange (he was a slave!).

**Objection:** Obviously, Socrates taught the slave. He asked leading questions, and he made assertions between questions (e.g., about the diagonal).

**My best response:** Socrates taught the slave boy how to construct the square, but the recognition of which intermediate areas were equal or greater than one another were elicited from the slave.
**Innate Concepts in the Meno**

Under my interpretation, Plato’s argument might be summarized as follows.

- P1. We can “learn” new conceptual truths $X = Y$ (this square is double that one).
- P2. If we did not possess innate concepts, we could not learn such conceptual truths.
- C1. We possess innate concepts.

**Recollection in the Meno**

Plato’s goal, therefore, is to explain how it’s possible for us to have innate concepts.

The theory of recollection: We “recollect” them; we acquired these concepts before birth.

- In Meno, there is no elaborate theory of recollection.
- Later dialogues (e.g., Phaedo and Republic) discuss the theory of the forms, and they argue that what we are recollecting are the forms.

That leads to the following inductive argument for recollection:

- P1. We can “learn” new conceptual truths $X = Y$.
- P2. If we did not possess innate concepts, we could not learn such conceptual truths.
- C1. We possess innate concepts.
- P3. The theory of recollection is the best theory of how we have innate concepts.
- C2. We ought ought to believe in theory of recollection.
Today’s Response Question

Response Question: In groups of five students or so, outline Socrates’ argument in Phaedo (Lines 74-75) that our concept of equality is innate.

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