

## ABMs in Philosophy: Final Project

**Instructions:** Today, you will write your first agent-based model (ABM). By the end of this problem set, you will have programmed the model that is described on pages 122-125 of Alexander’s *The Structural Evolution of Morality* and Skyrms’ *Stag Hunt* on pages 32-34. In the model, agents are located on a grid, and each agent is assigned a random strategy (i.e., “Stag” or “Hare”) on the first stage of play. On each stage, each agent plays a Stag Hunt with her nearest eight neighbors on the grid. The agent then updates her strategy using a variant of the “Imitate the best” rule described on pages 39-40 of Alexander’s *The Structural Evolution of Morality*.

On the course website, you can find a Netlogo file called, “Stag Hunt” that contains part of the model. Some of the procedures in the code, however, are missing. The first three exercises below asks you to write one of the missing procedures for the program. When you are finished, you should run the model several times (by clicking the “go” button) and convince yourself that stag-hunting emerges under a wide variety of circumstance.

### **Exercise 1:** Initializing Strategies:

In the Interface, create a slider called **Percent-Stag-Hunters**. Choose a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 1, and an increment of .01. Now move to the code tab. Fill in the program called **set-strategy** so that it does the following. The procedure **set-strategy** randomly changes each patch’s **strategy** variable to either the string “Stag” or the string “Hare”, and the probability that it is assigned “Stag” is equal to the value of the slider **Percent-Stag-Hunters**. That is, if **Percent-Stag-Hunters** is .5, then there is a 50% chance that a random patch will be a stag hunter and approximately half the patches will hunt stag. If **Percent Stag Hunters** is .1, then there is a 10% a patch will be a stag hunter, and approximately one in ten patches will hunt stag.

Click the setup button to see if your program works. If you move **Percent-Stag-Hunters** towards zero, after clicking setup, more patches ought to be white. Conversely, If you move **Percent-Stag-Hunters** towards one, after clicking setup, more patches ought to be black.

**Hint:** If you apply the **random-float** function (see Netlogo dictionary) to the number 1, it will report a random decimal number between 0 and 1.

Moreover, the probability that `random-float 1` returns a number less than  $x$  is precisely  $x$ . For instance, `random-float 1` returns a number less than `.1` with probability 10%.

**Exercise 2:** Playing the Game:

Write the procedure `play-neighbors` so that does the following. Each time the procedure is called, each patch plays the stag hunt game eight times. In particular, each patch plays the game once with each of its eight neighbors. It then stores the payoff of each of the eight games in the list `payoffs`. Use the following matrix to assign the payoffs.

	Stag	Hare
Stag	3, 3	0, 2
Hare	2, 0	2, 2


**Hint:** Recall that, for each patch, there is an agent-set called `neighbors`. So it might help to begin your code as shown below. Doing so allows you to ask each patch to play the game with its eight neighbors. Fill in the code marked with “...” so that, depending upon the strategy of the neighbor and the value of `mystrategy`, the appropriate payoff is added to the end of the list `new-payoffs`.

```
to play-neighbors
  ask patches
  [
    let mystrategy strategy
    let new-payoffs n-values 0 [?]
    ask neighbors
    [
      ...
    ]
    set payoffs new-payoffs
  ]
end
```

**Exercise 3:** Imitation:

Write a procedure `switch-strategy` that it does the following. Each patch first determines which of its neighbors received the greatest *average* payoff on the last stage, where the average is taken with respect to the eight games the agent played. It then mimics the strategy of one of its neighbors that

received the greatest payoff. For example, consider the patch marked “x” below. Stag hunters are indicated by black patches, and hare hunters by white. The payoffs list of each of the neighbors of patch  $x$  are as below. Thus, patch  $x$  has two neighbors that earned an average payoff of  $\frac{3}{8}$ , both of whom hunt stag. Its remaining neighbors have an average payoff of 2. So patch  $x$  keep its strategy set to “Hare”.



1. [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
2. [2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2]
3. [2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2]
4. [2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2]
5. [2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2]
6. [2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2]
7. [3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
8. [0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0]

**Exercise 4: Stopping the Model:**

Finish the `stop?` reporter. The reporter ought to also report true if one of the following conditions is true: (1) the number of ticks exceeds ten thousand, (2) all patches hung stag, or (3) all patches hunt hare. Then predict what will happen if the following code is removed from the `go` procedure. Remove the code and the click the go-button. What happens?

```

if stop?
[
  stop
]

```