For a long time after the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), the tendency of the macroeconomics literature on monetary policy and central banking was to deny that monetary policy could have durable real effects on the economy, either in the aggregate or distributionally. Instead, the monetary policy literature expended enormous effort on the question of whether political control of monetary policy could be made “time consistent.” The basic problem is that political leaders facing close elections may be tempted to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy and improve their chance of re-election. Knowing this, economic actors will price in future inflation and offset any gains such policy “surprises” could generate. Political leaders would thus be better off if they could constrain themselves not to give in to monetary policy temptation – and the idea that all central banks should be independent of elected control was born (Rogoff, 1985). Driven by this idea, scholars focused attention on (1) technical issues of determining optimal monetary policies and (2) insulating policy makers from elected governments so they could get on with the business of implementing the same. While undoubtedly clever and staggeringly influential, this approach generated several blindspots with serious consequences for real world policy.

Blindspot 1: Central bankers aren’t neutral. The presumption that central bankers were neutral technocrats without interests of their own led to a preoccupation with institutional design – especially central bank independence – but little or no systematic attention to variation in the agents who assume the heightened powers of the independent central banker. For political scientists, this oversight should be doubly puzzling. It is otherwise difficult to find scholarship in political science or economics that assumes a class of political actors to be disinterested wise men whose personal motivations need not be examined. Yet if central bank independence has any effect, it is only because political autonomy enables actors to make choices according to their preferences: in-

* Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the European Central Banking Workshop held at the Institute for European Studies, University of British Columbia, February 2–3, 2017, and the conference on “Inequality in Trump’s America: Favoring Finance and the Federal Reserve,” held at Nuffield College, Oxford University, March 9–10, 2017. I thank Caitlyn Ainsley, Robert Fannion, Larry Jacobs, Desmond King, and conference participants for helpful comments; all errors are the author’s own.
stitutions matter because of the way they channel interests. If we want to know how institutions that empower central bankers shape economic performance, we must first understand how those institutions interact with the interests of the central bank agents who inhabit them (Adolph, 2013).

In reality, central bankers setting monetary policy do vary in their preferences, their behavior, and their policy outputs. They also vary in their pre-central bank careers: some – but far from all – central bankers previously worked for private financial firms; many others worked elsewhere in the bureaucracy, and still others as academic economists. In Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics (2013), I argue based on a broad dataset of central bankers from the developed and developing worlds that prior careers provide important clues to central banker preferences. Central banks whose monetary policy boards are stacked with former financiers deliver lower inflation and, in economies with weak labor movements like the United States and the United Kingdom, higher unemployment. Central banks staffed by veterans of other public agencies tend to produce higher inflation, but in places like the US and UK, lower unemployment. The reason past careers influence central bankers’ policy choices is twofold: first, past careers socialize central bankers to value the outputs of monetary policy differently, with private bankers giving much higher weight to keeping inflation low; second, central bankers often go on to hold either lucrative posts in finance or elite posts in government, but whether they succeed in doing so depends both on prior career connections to these “shadow principals” and on maintaining central bank policies that keep their shadow principals happy.

Opening up the discussion of monetary policy to include the influence of shadow principals in banking and government reveals there is no genuine way to insulate monetary policy or any other function of governance from outside influence. Central bankers with greater legal independence are more powerful agents. It follows that monetary policies selected by independent central banks are more subject to influences on monetary agents’ preferences – especially influence from shadow principals, as cross-national evidence shows (Adolph, 2013). Particularly when a central bank is “independent,” it matters for the economy who is chosen to sit on its board: different agents will make systematically distinct choices with consequences on monetary policy for citizens and for banks. And to the extent a central bank like the Federal Reserve has long operated under pressure to please a major shadow principal – the financial sector – the potential variation of central banker types under a different institutional arrangement – say, one more responsive to democratic politics – is greater still than what can
be observed in recent history. In other words, central banker preferences could matter even more than they already do if they stop being overlooked.

**Blindspot 2: Monetary policy isn’t neutral, either.** The second blindspot comes from economists’ preference for relatively stark political economy models in which monetary policy cannot be exploited to stimulate the economy in the long run. This led macroeconomists to overlook the differing consequences of conservative monetary policy on real economic performance across different kinds of economies. The point is contested, but there is evidence that even in a rational expectations framework, the negative impact of hawkish central banks on unemployment and growth is stronger in some economies than in others (Iversen, 1999; Hall and Franzese, 1998; Cukierman and Lippi, 1999). This goes some way to explaining the difficulties the European Central Bank (ECB) has faced in expanding German-style monetary policy to a Eurozone made up of economies with diverse labor institutions, industrial structures, and business cycles (Adolph, 2013).

But the real consequences of monetary policy go beyond the ill-considered design of the ECB. As Jacobs and King (2016) argue in their provocative book *Fed Power* and in their contribution to this symposium, generations of scholars have mostly ignored the distributional consequences of monetary policy implementation, and in turn, inequality researchers have ignored the role of central banks and monetary policy. Blindness about these linkages helped the Fed in 2008 to create, virtually overnight, a raft of new policy instruments for asset purchases – a decision with massive distributional consequences – without the kind of resistance and controversy that would confront any legislation to create similarly sweeping changes in the economy’s winners and losers through fiscal policy.

Bringing the Fed and other central banks back into the broader political economy conversation is long overdue. It is time to subject central bankers to the same sort of scrutiny we apply to judges and senators – and *vice versa*, as the promise of future private sector jobs from shadow principals can overwhelm the electoral connection, too. But because central banks have been peripheral to mainstream political science so long, there turn out to be overlooked political parallels to commonplace economic concepts relevant to understanding these actors. Here I sketch out three such ideas: political multiplier effects, the missing critical junctures, and systemic political risk.
Political multiplier effects and the beneficiaries of post-crisis monetary policy

Jacobs and King (2016) lay out a strong case that the mechanisms of quantitative easing specifically and the support of central banks for financialization generally represent a policy bias towards greater inequality. For example, they contrast the Fed’s efforts to protect bank assets with their lack of effort to protect the assets of homeowners facing foreclosure. To highlight the salience of this comparison for broader debates on inequality, consider the disparate racial impact of this choice: from 2007 to 2013, the median wealth of white households diminished from $192.5 thousand to $141.9 thousand, a reduction of 26 percent. But for the median black household in the US, wealth was nearly halved, falling from $19.2 thousand to $11.0 thousand (Survey of Consumer Finances data). Adding insult to injury, many of these households served as scapegoats for a financial crisis that had more to do with defaults by middle class homeowners, the systematic expansion of mortgage lending to buyers of all incomes, and especially the reckless securitization of those mortgages (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino, 2016).

But for most Americans, the banks and their lending practices were the key culprits in the financial crisis. Yet in its wake, banks became arguably more economically and politically powerful than ever. This is because – at first as a matter of exigency in the face of imminent economic doom – the Fed chose to implement its unconventional monetary policy as quantitative easing (qe), or the purchasing of assets (in this case, mostly mortgage-backed securities) from large banks. But as Friedman’s (1969) famous thought experiment about helicopter money suggests, the Fed could have chosen to counteract inequality by distributing its stimulus through new spending, rather than through financial asset purchases that reinforce economic inequality – especially as the need for additional easing persisted (Bank of England, 2012; Fontan, Claveau, and Dietsch, 2016). (The right person to carry out this “helicopter money” experiment was head of the Fed, after all.) In effect, by recapitalizing the financial sector, and not the broader economy, quantitative easing had a political multiplier effect enhancing the political influence of banks at the expense of ordinary citizens. One payoff from banks’ paradoxical political recovery: the occasional one-liner aside, neither major party candidate in the 2016 presidential election showed any eagerness to take on the political or economic power of major banks, despite the increasingly populist tone of American political debate.
Waiting for a central bank savior: The missing critical junctures

Defenders of central banks’ recent performance may consider my criticism unfair. After all, following the financial crisis few governments in North America or Europe seemed prepared to fight what promised to be a massive recession. In the United States, President Barack Obama faced fierce opposition to the kinds of fiscal stimulus that had previously been routine in the post-war period – even as recently as the second Bush administration. And if Keynesian stimulus in the United States was relatively small, it was nearly nonexistent in the European Union, where in country after country fiscal austerity carried the day. In this context, goes the argument, central banks could do nothing but step up and invent new monetary policy techniques to fill the gap. It was a minor miracle that the head of the world’s most powerful central bank was none other than economist and Great Depression-expert Ben Bernanke, who had already famously speculated about using the Fed’s printing press to pay for broad tax cuts and spending measures aimed directly at households (Bernanke, 2002). And it is surely the case that if the Fed had abdicated its de facto role as a source of economic stimulus – or if the ECB had dithered even longer in announcing in 2012 that to save the euro it would do “whatever it takes” as a lender of last resort – and if no other actors had taken stimulative action, then the economies of Europe and North America would be considerably worse off than they are today.

But imagine a historical counterfactual: suppose that in 2008–2012 central banks had either suddenly ceased to exist, or had somehow credibly committed to take no further monetary policy action once the zero-bound had been reached. Would elected governments have remained so reluctant to order fiscal stimulus if there were no hope of a central banker ex machina waiting in the wings? Or would the divided and conservative governments of the time been forced to turn, as so many did in the twentieth century, to Dr. Keynes’ usual remedy? A broad increase in spending and tax breaks would surely have reduced economic inequality, in sharp contrast to the persistent and rising inequality that followed the policy leadership of the Fed and ECB.

Does the existence of a politically-insulated central bank savior crowd out more redistributive fiscal alternatives? Could it, in fact, foreclose public debates on the role of government in a recession, because an actor with no electoral connection stands ready to staunch the bleeding? We often think of major changes in policy regimes coming only at critical junctures, and thus tend to identify the causes of those junctures as underlying conditions for change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). What then of political institutions that help smooth away crises, and the implicit biases in the status-
The missing politics of central banks

Consider the general reluctance of today’s polarized Congress to pass new laws at all. Most major legislation in the United States can now only muster a positive vote under the ticking-bomb threat of “sunset clauses” that promise to obliterate popular policies if no renewal is passed (Adler and Wilkerson, 2013). But once Congress is forced to act, a critical moment arrives in which there is a chance to reshape major policies. The question is whether central banks by their expanded monetary policy role spare elected governments from facing the rare and brief critical junctures that make significant redistribution through peacetime changes in fiscal policy possible.

Time inconsistency problem, meet systemic political risk

Are independent central banks – and the technocratic insulation they place around monetary policy debates – stable over time? There are two reasons to worry they are not, and to think Congressional pushback of the Fed, which Binder and Spindel (Binder and Spindel, 2017) document as rising when the economy sinks, may eventually change the institution or its policy regime. One of these reasons has to do with the economic consequences of the modern Fed’s approach to micromanaging inflation and economic growth, and the second pertains to the ideas which ungird elite support for the Fed’s independence.

If, as Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin famously said, the role of the central bank is “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going,” (Martin, 1955) what happens if the same people always miss out on the drinks? Following recent economic recessions, wage recovery for low- and median-wage workers has lagged behind job recovery. As bad as this is for workers during a “recovery” that seems not to merit the name, consider the cumulative effect over multiple economic cycles. High income earners tend to have more bargaining power in the labor market than low-wage workers and thus tend to get raises earlier in a recovery, especially if the labor unions that might empower those low-wage workers are weak and uncoordinated. Consider how this pattern intersects with Fed behavior, which in recent decades, has sought to tame economic booms with rising interest rates once there is sufficient upward pressure on prices and wages. If high income workers get raises in all but the initial stages of a bust, and low income workers only get raises in the hottest stages of a boom, then the Fed is pulling away the punch bowl when it’s finally time for low income workers to get their turn. If this is the case, then conventional monetary policy is, intentionally or...
not, acting to reinforce wage inequality. This holds regardless of whether that inequality was initially fed by technological change, weaker unions, or globalization, and the effect is a ratchet, accumulating with every business cycle.

Circumstantial evidence from recent business cycles is at least consistent with the idea of such a “punch bowl” ratchet. I identified the Fed’s significant recent turns to tighter monetary policy as occurring in 1977, 1983, 1987, 1999, and 2004 (a similar turn may be underway today, but is too early to assess). Using data from the March Supplements of the US Census American Community Survey, I tracked the average annual change in real household income within various high and low income quantiles before and after the year the Fed turned to a tighter policy. Figure 1 shows the emergent...
pattern: in the year before tightening, real income growth for the bottom 20% is a negligible 0.5%, and lags far behind the 2.4% and 2.8% growth enjoyed by top 20% and top 5% of income earners, respectively. But by the following year, in which the Fed decides the economy is running too hot and determines to tighten the money supply, real income growth for the bottom 20% has finally started to catch up, rising to an average of 1.7% across the five cycles studied. The compression in economic fortunes across the income spectrum is short-lived once the Fed applies the brakes: a year after tightening begins, the old divide reappears between high income groups (growing between 2.1% to 3.2% a year) and low incomes (once again barely growing at all, at just 0.6%).

These data cover just five economic cycles in a single country, so the inference that central banks are partly to blame for rising inequality is far from certain. But the possibility bears further investigation for three reasons. First, unlike many forces behind economic inequality, monetary policy is theoretically under direct control of the state. Second, just as running QE through banks provided a political multiplier in favor of banks to the Fed’s intended economic stimulus, so too does systematically holding back the recovery of low income groups diminish their political influence over time by depriving them of the resources and economic security needed for effective democratic participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Ojeda, 2015). The final reason to ask whether the Fed is unwittingly ratcheting up inequality is that the Fed’s tightening may be less necessary than commonly perceived. Many central bankers appear to asymmetrically overreact to the risk of inflation versus recession (Ainsley, 2017). What if the Fed doesn’t just take the punch bowl away from the same low income households at the end of every recovery: what if the Fed pulls that relief away, on average, too early or without cause?

Whatever its ultimate sources, rising inequality is today’s preeminent economic problem and arguably one of the key culprits behind growing discontent in established democracies. Whether the Fed has contributed to this problem or not, it may eventually reap the consequences of populist revolt. If the pitchforks come out, independent central banks may find that by failing to address a broader set of economic concerns and objectives, they have already helped dig their own political graves. Elite consensus in favor of central bank independence has given Fed officials the luxury of responding more to their shadow principals in the financial sector and White House than to threats from skeptical fringe figures in Congress. Meanwhile, public confidence in the Fed has plummeted: an institution that enjoyed very high confidence two decades ago is now held in lower esteem than Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Internal Revenue Service (Jacobs and King, 2016). In this new context, imagine
that the Fed comes under concerted attack by other elite political actors. What happens when monetary policy justifications designed for a monocultural epistemic community of financial elites makes contact with the mass media and an enraged public? Set aside whether “time inconsistency” or “quantitative easing” are sound economic concepts: would these terms and the ideas they represent sound persuasive to a broad audience that has been told by a trusted leader that the Federal Reserve is responsible for their economic decline?

Now add to the scenario three words: President Donald Trump.

The future of the Fed

Central bank politics today implicates many of the most important forces shaping modern societies: populist distrust of elites; the tug-of-war between democratic responsiveness and delegation to complex, often quasi-public agencies; and disenchantment with an economy that seems only to grow at the expense of rising inequality. Ironically, although issues of technocracy, delegation, and economic performance have been at the core of the political economy of central banking for generations, the sterile conception of central bankers as selfless philosopher kings blocked realistic consideration of the role played by the state’s most important economic agents. Reintegrating the study of central banks and political science is especially vital at a time when the future of central banking seems so politically precarious. I close by considering how the Fed might be at a turning point in terms of the people who staff it, public sentiment about its role, and the future of the institution itself.

The issue of who will run the Fed has never been more salient. Jerome Powell, Donald Trump’s pick to succeed Janet Yellen as Chair of the Federal Reserve, is similar to other financial sector veterans a Republican president might be expected to nominate, but his selection means the rest of the Board of Governors faces near complete turnover. Filling these vacancies could remake the institution and send monetary policy in a new direction, regardless of who occupies the chair itself. Who will Trump appoint, and who will their shadow principals be – an emboldened financial sector, or a loyalty-obsessed White House?

Beyond the immediate question of filling seats on the Fed Board of Governors, the Fed’s policies seem likely to face greater political scrutiny. Until recently, central banks largely ignored – or brusquely denied – the possibility that their actions and non-actions could have distributive consequences. At the same time, central banks justified their vast new powers with a mix of intellectual rationales for central bank indepen-
dence aimed at elites, combined with the cultivation of a mystique of economic success for the general public. This set of communication strategies left a critical void filled only by the gold-standard-supporting fringe, but as economic success – and with it, Fed legitimacy – has fallen away, the long term costs of the Fed’s silence on inequality is coming into focus. Intellectually and rhetorically, the Fed and other central banks are poorly situated to defend the legal powers of their institutions or the process by which they develop policy. The Fed may soon regret encouraging an aloof technocratic mystique instead of nurturing an informed debate, while those of us who seek such a debate grounded in the real effects of monetary and fiscal policy may rue the way that discussion will unfold in today’s populist times.

Declining Fed legitimacy could also expose the institution to successful Congressional measures limiting its power, with unknown consequences for monetary and fiscal policy in future crises. But perhaps the support of major financial firms – bolstered by their recapitalization under QE – will help the Fed preserve their independence in the face of growing public skepticism. Members of Congress increasingly follow the lead of shadow principals instead of voters when considering unpopular legislation – if you might lose an election, it’s good to have a more comfortable and lucrative job lined up, and the financial sector has often provided soft landings to loyal former Congresspeople (Egerod, 2017). The Fed is especially likely to muddle through if Congress decides it’s worth preserving the ability to pass the buck on economic stimulus.

Recent events suggest it may be wiser for political scientists to lay out elements of possible futures than to announce what will actually happen, so I will not venture to guess which way these scenarios will unfold. Yet it seems likely that the era of political consensus over central bank independence is nearing its end. For political scientists, this means the task of incorporating the study of central banks and monetary policy into broader discussions of the political process is just beginning.

CHRISTOPHER ADOLPH
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
12 MARCH 2018
References


