Motivational Facets of the Self

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Self-evaluation is a potent energizer of human activity. Behavior can be variably directed at pleasing other people, pleasing oneself, or satisfying the goals, norms, and expectations of important reference groups. In this chapter, we focus on this important, persisting task of achieving a significant audience's favorable evaluation. Central to this treatment is an approach called *ego-task analysis*, which offers a general framework for analyzing the interaction of situation and personality in determining behavior. A review of the literature on ego-involvement leads to the identification of three significant evaluative audiences: public, private, and collective. The associated motivational facets of the self are then related to research and theory on social influence, self-awareness/self-consciousness, self-presentation, and self-esteem.

EGO-TASK ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION

Greenwald (1982a) introduced ego-task analysis to integrate the large literature on ego-involvement (Allport, 1943; Sherif & Cantril, 1947; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965) with more recent work on self-awareness theory (Buss, 1980; Duval & Wickland, 1972; Scheier & Carver, 1983). The difficulty of that task became apparent when the review led to the identification of three distinct meanings of ego-involvement, each deriving from a different theoretical tradition. The three meanings of ego-involvement nevertheless share a common theme—self-evaluation. They differ primarily in the source identified for the standard of evaluation—other people, oneself, or one's reference groups.

Three Conceptions of Ego-Involvement

In one sense, ego-involvement refers to a concern about one's public impression, or evaluation by others. This sense of ego-involvement is similar to evaluation

apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969) and approval motivation (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). It is the type of ego-involvement that becomes engaged when subjects in a psychology experiment are instructed that performance in the experimental task reflects a valued, socially desirable skill (e.g., intelligence).

In a second sense, ego-involvement refers to a concern about one's self-evaluation, or private self-image. This second sense is similar to self-esteem maintenance and achievement motivation (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). This type of ego-involvement occurs when a subject compares task performance to a personal standard of achievement. In this second sense of ego-involvement, the evaluator is oneself rather than others.

A third usage of ego-involvement originated in the work of Sherif and Cantril (1947), who wrote that "all attitudes that define a person's status or that give him some relative role with respect to other individuals, groups, or institutions are ego-involved" (p. 96). Those other individuals and groups are reference groups, which include "those groups to which the individual relates himself as a part or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically" (Sherif, 1956, p. 175).

The Concept of Ego Task

In day-to-day activity, people are faced with a variety of tasks to accomplish. These can range from the relatively mundane tasks of mailing a letter or opening a door to relatively important tasks, such as giving a public presentation or taking an exam. Among the most important tasks are the ones that become engaged under the various conditions of ego-involvement. These are the tasks of establishing one's self-worth by achieving a significant audience's favorable evaluation. We shall call these very important tasks *ego tasks*. Ego-task goals—that is, achieving favorable self-evaluations—take precedence over the goals of most other tasks. Unlike most other tasks, however, obtaining the goal does not end an ego task; the goal continues to be important.

Ego-Task Analysis

Ego tasks, like most tasks, have two components. One is a cognitive representation of what is to be accomplished—the task goal. The other includes strategies for achieving the goal. The goal component is determined jointly by incentives in the situation and by the person's goal preferences. Similarly, the strategy component is influenced both by the situation and by personal preferences among strategies. Thus, ego-task analysis offers a general framework for analyzing the interaction of situation and personality in determining behavior (Greenwald, 1982a; see also Magnusson & Endler, 1977).

Ego-task analysis can be illustrated by considering the task of achieving parental approval. Two goals may satisfy this task—gaining verbal praise or receiving a monetary reward. One *situational* determinant of the goal is the presence of another. For example, verbal praise may be the desired goal when a sibling has just been similarly complemented. Alternatively, one may have a *personal* preference for monetary rewards. Strategies can likewise be determined by situational influences, such as by modeling a sibling's successful approach.

TABLE 6.1   Interrelationships of Facets of the Self, Ego Tasks, Personality Measures, Experimental Procedures, and Performance Strategies

| | Facets of the Self | | | |
	Diffuse Self	Public Self	Private Self	Collective Self
Ego-task designation	Hedonic satisfaction	Social accreditation, self-definition	Individual achievement	Collective achievement
Basis for self-evaluation	Attainment of positive affect	Approval of others (outer audience)	Internal standards (inner audience)	Internalized goals of reference group
Individual-difference measures of task orientation		Public self-consciousness, need for approval, high self-monitoring	Private self-consciousness, need for achievement, low self-monitoring	
Situational inducers of task orientation	Anonymity in group; drug intoxication	Minority status in groups, solo before audience, camera, public failure	Privacy, exposure to performance replay, mirror, private failure	Reference group salience, cohestive group, superordinate goals
Strategies in service of task	Norm violation	Conformity, obedience, opinion moderation, basking in reflected glory	Independence, defiance, opinion resistance	Cooperation in group endeavors

Strategies can also be determined by personal preferences among the available alternatives (for example, getting praise by doing a favor rather than by asking for it).

FOUR MOTIVATIONAL FACETS OF THE SELF

The three ego tasks, as identified in the three meanings of ego-involvement, can be placed within a larger context that considers four motivational *facets* of the self (cf. Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). Table 6.1 summarizes these facets of the self—the diffuse, public, private, and collective facets—within the ego-task analysis framework. The second, third, and fourth facets of the self each correspond to one of the meanings of ego-involvement described earlier. The first facet represents a more primitive aspect of the self.

The Diffuse Self

The diffuse facet of the self is a very primitive self. It is a condition of not distinguishing sharply between self and others. Behavior is simply guided toward

positive affective states. The task of the diffuse self can be called hedonic satisfaction, which is not properly an ego task because it does not presuppose a sense of self. Identification of the diffuse self proves useful, however, in considering past analyses of ego development and in resolving a paradox in treatments of deindividuation (see later discussion).

The Public Self

The public facet of the self can be associated with the first of the three meanings of ego-involvement. The public self is sensitive to the evaluations of significant others (e.g., parents and authorities) and seeks to win their approval. The ego task of the public self can be described, in part, as social accreditation—that is, earning credit in exchange relationships with others. This facet of the self is the one most commonly identified in treatments of self-presentation (e.g., Goffman, 1959) and impression management (Schlenker, 1980). The public self was recognized by James (1890) in his description of the social self, which includes "an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind" (p. 293).

The Private Self

The private facet of the self can be identified with the second meaning of ego-involvement. The private self's ego task is individual achievement. The term "achievement" is used, in the sense of McClelland *et al.* (1953), to indicate guidance by internal standards. By providing an inner audience for behavior, the private self permits self-evaluation to be effected in the absence of others.

The Collective Self

The collective self is the *we* facet of the self; it can be identified with the third meaning of ego-involvement. Its ego task is collective achievement—that is, achieving the goals of and fulfilling one's role in a reference group. Typical reference groups include co-workers, religious organizations, clubs, athletic teams, and family.

The relationship between the self and the other people who provide the basis for self-evaluation is central to the distinction between the public and collective facets of the self. The public self seeks to win the approval of specific others, especially those who control rewards and other reinforcements (e.g., parents or teachers). In satisfying this ego task, however, the public self cannot be assumed to adopt the values, norms, or attitudes of those others. The collective self, in contrast, does adopt the values of others; it seeks to achieve the goals of reference groups, as internalized by the person (cf. Sherif & Sherif, 1964).

Facets of the Self in Ego Development

The four motivational facets of the self are assumed to develop in the left-to-right order of Table 6.1. The diffuse self is best thought of as a preself. The public self

depends on development of a cognitive discrimination between self and others and an ability to attend to those aspects of one's behavior that are also noticed by others. An important aspect of the public self's ego task is to internalize the evaluative standards of others, which leads to development of the private self. The collective self represents a further developmental step in which the goals of reference groups have become internalized. This proposed developmental sequence has support in several analyses by developmental theorists, which we review here very briefly.

The Diffuse Self

In summarizing the mental development of the child, Piaget (1964/1967) noted that "at the outset of mental evolution there is no definite differentiation between the self and the external world" (p. 12). The neonate's behavior is guided largely toward the satisfaction of certain hedonic impulses (e.g., to eat and to sleep). Loevinger (1976) similarly identified the initial stage of ego development (the "presocial" stage) as one in which the infant is unable to differentiate self from the outer world.

The Public Self

The first real sense of self begins to emerge when the child is able to distinguish self from others. As Piaget (1964/1967) noted, "the young child must cope not only with the physical universe . . . but also with two new and closely allied worlds: the social world and the world of inner representations" (p. 18). The public self also has a correspondence in what Loevinger (1976) has identified as the "conformist" stage in ego development. As the label implies, the conformist stage is marked by conformity to external rules, with conscious preoccupations centering on appearance and social acceptability.

The Private Self

As the self develops, an internalization of the evaluative standards of others begins to occur. Piaget (1964/1967) articulated this internalization process as "the general rule that one always ends by applying to oneself behavior acquired from others" (pp. 40–41). The private self is also seen in the "conscientious" stage of ego development (Loevinger, 1976). At this stage, "the major elements of an adult conscience are present [including] long-term, self-evaluated goals and ideals, differentiated self-criticism, and a sense of responsibility" (p. 20). The individual achievement orientation of the private self is especially evident at this stage, where "achievement . . . is measured primarily by [one's] own standards, rather than mainly by recognition or by competitive advantage, as at lower levels" (p. 21).

The Collective Self

Primarily the product of socialization experiences, the collective self represents an internalization of the goals, norms, and expectations of important reference groups. In discussing the socialization of behavior, Piaget (1964/1967) noted that "among the older children there is progress in two directions: individual concentration when the subject is working by himself and effective collaboration in the group" (p. 39). The former direction of progress reflects the developing

private self, whereas the latter represents the emergence of a collective self. In Piaget's treatment, however, it is not until the further developmental stages that mark adolescence that the collective facet of the self fully develops (see also Piaget, 1932/1965). Analyses of altruism (a form of collective behavior) also support the proposition that the collective self represents a relatively mature stage of ego development (Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Froming, Allen, & Jensen, in press).

Facets of the Self in Social Influence

Three facets of the self (the public, private, and collective facets) have a direct correspondence to Kelman's (1961) analysis of social influence. Kelman identified three processes of social influence: compliance, internalization, and identification. *Compliance* occurs when another's influence is accepted "to achieve a favorable reaction from the other" (p. 62). *Internalization* occurs "because the induced behavior is congruent with [one's] value system" (p. 65). Finally, *identification* reflects behavior that is adopted because it satisfies "a role relationship that forms a part of the person's self-image" (p. 63).

The correspondence between Kelman's analysis and the present ego-task formulation is shown in Table 6.2, where parallels are drawn between compliance and the public facet, between internalization and the private facet, and between identification and the collective facet of self. It can be seen from Table 6.2 that the primary concern of the person being influenced corresponds directly to an ego task's basis for self-evaluation (see Table 6.1). Two important points follow from the Table 6.2 summary. First, it implies that no one of the three methods of social influence is generally most effective; rather, each can be effective with the appropriate combination of situation and influence target. Second, it suggests a

basis for describing individual differences in susceptibility to the three types of influence. For example, compliance may be most effective when one's primary concern is to win favorable evaluations from other persons. However, internalization may be the more effective type of social influence for those who dispositionally strive toward achieving private goals and standards.

The Paradox of Deindividuation

"Deindividuation" refers to a condition in which one's individual identifiability is decreased and internal constraints against various types of action are reduced. In summarizing previous reviews (Diener, 1977, 1980; Dipboye, 1977), Greenwald (1982b) noted the following paradoxical aspects of deindividuation:

> Deindividuation is sometimes associated with loss of identity but other times with acquisition of identity via a distinctive group (of which one is an indistinguishable member); it is sometimes sought but other times avoided; and it is sometimes associated with chaotic, norm-violating behavior but other times with conforming, uniform behavior. (p. 172)

The distinction between the diffuse and collective facets of the self can help resolve this paradox. All deindividuating conditions reduce the salience of internal standards. These conditions include anonymity in a group, alcohol or drug intoxication, and strong, unstructured stimulation. However, some situations can make the subject's participation in a reference group salient—for example, being amidst a shouting crowd of home-team supporters at a football game or wearing a uniform that hides one's individual features while making one's group affiliation apparent. Deindividuating procedures that make a reference group salient can engage the collective self, leading to coordinated or norm-adhering behavior. This is to be contrasted to nonsocial conditions that fail to engage any of the developed, or socialized, facets of the self and that can lead to social chaos or norm-violating behavior. Greenwald (1982b) suggested that the term "sociation" be applied to the former effects of social situations that elicit coordinated, norm-adhering behavior—ones that (in present terms) invoke the collective self. The term "deindividuation" should be restricted to the effects of nonsocial procedures that elicit norm-violating behavior—ones that, by suppressing the public, private, and collective selves, effectively invoke the diffuse self.

ACHIEVING EGO-TASK GOALS

Different strategies are specially suited for achieving the goals of different ego tasks. The goal of the public self's ego task is to win the approval of other persons. This is most often accomplished by conforming to the expectations, requests, or actions of high-status others or by affiliating with another's success. The goal of the private self's ego task is to meet one's personal standards of achievement. This can be done, for example, by acting on the basis of one's own perceptions rather than on the basis of what others desire. Finally, achieving the internalized goals of a reference group (the collective self's ego task) can be accomplished by

TABLE 6.2   Facets of the Self in Social Influence

	Compliance	Internalization	Identification
Facet of the self	Public	Private	Collective
Type of effective influencer	Powerful, uses rewards and punishments	Expert, trustworthy	Attractive, members of a reference group
Conditions under which influence is lost	Influencer is absent or loses power	Exposure to more expert influence	Influencer loses attractiveness or changes influence
Primary concern of influencee	Obtaining reward or approval, avoiding punishment	Justifying belief or action in terms of internalized principles, being correct	Maintaining identification with reference group (or person)

Note: This table is an application of the facets-of-the-self analysis to the theorization of Kelman (1961).

cooperating in group endeavors or by behaving in accordance with a reference group's norms and expectations.

Of course, many everyday achievements serve two or more ego tasks simultaneously. For example, winning a job promotion, earning a college degree, and raising children are achievements that simultaneously earn the approval of others, achieve success by personal standards, and fulfill a reference group's goals. Indeed, these may be such strongly satisfying experiences precisely because they serve the interests of a public self, a private self, and a collective self, all at the same time.

An Illustration of Ego-Task Strategies: The Conformity Experiment

Asch's (1951, 1956) classic conformity experiment can help illustrate the various strategies used to achieve ego-task goals. The subject's explicit task in the conformity experiment is to judge line lengths. However, there are also some implicit tasks, such as completing requirements for a psychology course, learning about laboratory research in psychology, or trying to achieve a favorable evaluation by the experimenter.

Neither the explicit task nor any of the implicit tasks of the conformity experiment poses a problem to the subject until the first critical trial. It is at that point that each of the experimenter's confederates gives a blatantly incorrect response. It then becomes the subject's turn to respond. There are three important audiences present, and the subject cannot choose a strategy that will please all three. One audience is the experimenter. A second audience is the group of which the subject is a part; to achieve the goal of this group, there should be consensus among all group members. The remaining audience is the inner audience, which can be pleased only by independence (i.e., by the subject's rejecting the obviously incorrect majority judgment).

The power of the conformity experiment, in ego-task analysis terms, is its simultaneous evocation of at least two different ego tasks. That is, the ego task of pleasing other people is in direct conflict with the individual-achievement ego task of pleasing oneself. Deciding whether to conform or to act independently in the face of this conflict is left to the subject's relative predispositions to please one or another audience.

The Concept of Ego-Task Orientation

Almost every adolescent or adult should have some tendency to perform each of the four ego tasks. Nevertheless, for any given person or situation, some ego tasks may be more important than others. The relative importance of an ego task can be referred to as the strength of *orientation* toward that task. Consistent with the framework of ego-task analysis, ego-task orientations can vary as a function of both situational influences and personality differences.

Results from Asch's (1951, 1956) conformity experiment can help illustrate

the concept of ego-task orientation. The conformity effect—that is, agreeing with an incorrect unanimous majority—is sensitive to several situational variables. The conformity effect depends, importantly, on the presence of incorrect and unanimous others. Control subjects, who make their judgments in the absence of others, are correct on virtually every trial. Asch also found that allowing subjects to record their judgments privately (compared to the public announcement of judgments in the original experiment) substantially increases independence (Asch, 1956). These effects demonstrate the extent to which subjects' judgments can be made to please different evaluative audiences under different situational constraints.

Asch (1956) also observed systematic individual differences in the conformity experiment: "There were completely independent subjects, and there were others who went over to the majority without exception" (p. 11). It is interesting to examine subjects' explanations for their behavior. One subject was "concerned over what his judgments might do to the experimenter's results" (p. 39). This subject said, "I wanted to conform. Was picturing in my mind the graph of results with a big dip in it—I wanted to make your results better" (p. 40). This subject appears to have been oriented toward the social-accreditation ego task of the public self. Independent subjects (those who yielded on two or fewer trials) seemed very much aware that they were going against a majority, but they also recognized "the importance of thinking for oneself and being an individual" (p. 36). Thus, independent subjects can be identified as those who were oriented toward the individual-achievement ego task of the private self. Finally, many yielders were characterized as "trying desperately to merge in the group in order not to appear peculiar" (p. 45). This strategy is consistent with the ego tasks of the public self and of the collective self.

Asch's (1956) qualitative analyses emphasize the point that people differ considerably in their orientations toward engaging in the ego tasks of the public, private, and collective selves as a function of both situational influences and personality differences. We now consider, in more detail, research demonstrating situational and dispositional sources of influence, especially for the ego-task orientations of the public and private selves.

Situational Determinants of Ego-Task Orientation

Situations vary in the opportunity they provide to evoke the various ego-task orientations. The diffuse self can be engaged by drug intoxication, by isolation, or by anonymity in a group. Concern over one's public self is likely to be engaged when admired or socially powerful others are present. The individual-achievement task (private self) may be engaged most readily when the subject is alone. In contrast, collective achievement should be engaged by the (actual or symbolic) presence of an important reference group, such as by suggesting to subjects that their performances will be compared with those of other racial, religious, or ethnic groups or with students from rival schools.

Mirrors and Cameras

Two general procedures for inducing the ego tasks of the public and private selves correspond to procedures suggested by Buss (1980) for inducing public and private self-awareness, respectively. A camera implies the existence of an audience of others and is therefore assumed to engage the public self's ego task. Consistent with this interpretation, the presence of a camera has been shown to increase susceptibility to conformity pressure (Duval, 1976), a strategy in the service of the public self's ego task. The presence of a mirror—especially a small one, according to Buss (1980)—calls one's actions to the attention of the inner audience, thereby evoking the private self's individual-achievement ego task. In support of this prediction, the presence of a small mirror has been shown to increase resistance to persuasion (Carver, 1977), which reflects an ego-task strategy of the private self.

Public and Private Responding

When an experimental task requires that a subject make public responses, the ego task of the public self is made salient. In contrast, private and anonymous reporting conditions should evoke the private self's ego task. A study of the effects of public versus private responding on anticipatory attitude change supports the ego-task analysis predictions (McFarland, Ross, & Conway, 1984). An anticipatory change in attitude occurs when an individual's attitude shifts in the direction of an anticipated, but not yet received, persuasive appeal. One explanation for this effect is that the change reflects a self-presentational effort to avoid appearing gullible or easily persuaded. Indeed, when subjects are informed that they will not be receiving the anticipated message, their attitudes "snap back" to the original position (Cialdini, Herman, Levy, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976). McFarland et al. (1984) demonstrated, however, that this self-presentational tactic (an ego-task strategy of the public self) occurs only under *public* reporting conditions. Under *private* reporting conditions, anticipatory changes in attitude persist, suggesting some kind of self-persuasion process.

Personal Importance

Experimental tasks can be manipulated so that they are more or less personally relevant to a subject. For example, evaluating a proposal that advocates the adoption of senior comprehensive exams can be very "involving" if the exams are being proposed for immediate adoption at the subject's own school, but less involving if they are proposed for another school or for a later date. Brickner, Harkins, and Ostrom (in press) used this manipulation to study effort expenditure on a group task. Earlier research (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979) had shown that subjects generally work harder at group tasks when their individual efforts are identifiable than when they are not. One interpretation of this "social loafing" effect is that the public self's ego task becomes engaged only when one's output can be identified. By making the task personally important, however, Brickner et al. (in press) were able to eliminate the social loafing effect (see also Harkins & Petty, 1982). The involvement manipulation presumably invoked the private self's ego task, effectively making private standards more salient than social ones.

Individual Differences in Ego-Task Orientation

Just as situations vary in their ability to evoke the various ego tasks, people vary in their relative predispositions to engage in each of the four ego tasks. Although no measures have yet been developed to assess individual differences in the four ego-task orientations, various existing measures may be useful for this purpose, at least in regard to the ego-task orientations of the public and private facets of the self. These existing, related measures are public and private self-consciousness, self-monitoring, achievement motivation, and approval motivation.

Public and Private Self-Consciousness

Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) developed scales that measure consciousness of the public and private facets of the self. They define the public self as consisting of observable self-produced stimuli, such as physique, clothing, grooming, facial expression, and speech. The private self consists of self-produced stimuli that are not publicly observable, such as internal bodily sensations, feelings, thoughts, and self-evaluations (see also Buss, 1980). Fenigstein et al. (1975) interpreted public and private self-consciousness as a difference in *focus of attention*, which can be directed toward the public or private self. In contrast, ego-task analysis makes *evaluative orientation* toward outer versus inner audiences central to the public versus private distinction. Nevertheless, these two analyses overlap substantially in their empirical implications, because people concerned about evaluations of others should be attentive to the signals they transmit to those others. Likewise, people guided by internalized evaluative standards should be relatively attentive to their private thoughts and feelings.

Opinion moderation in anticipation of a discussion (i.e., anticipatory change in the direction of possible opposition) can be regarded as a self-presentational strategy of the public self's ego task. Consistent with this interpretation, Scheier (1980) found that such anticipatory change was greater for subjects high in public self-consciousness than for those low in public self-consciousness. Likewise, expression of opinion change in front of an experimenter who has just administered a counterattitudinal role-playing procedure can be interpreted as an impression-management strategy of maintaining consistency. It follows that such opinion change should be associated with high scores on public self-consciousness, as was found by Scheier and Carver (1980).

The private self should resist the opinion-change effects of a public counterattitudinal role-playing induction. In support of this prediction, opinion resistance to counterattitudinal role playing was associated with high scores on private self-consciousness (Scheier & Carver, 1980). Similarly, subjects high in private self-consciousness are more likely to resist group pressure than are those low in private self-consciousness (Froming & Carver, 1981).

Self-Monitoring

Snyder's (1974) self-monitoring scale provides a measure that relates to the motivational orientations of the public and private facets of the self. The person high in self-monitoring is one who is particularly sensitive to cues transmitted in

social interaction, and who uses these cues to guide self-presentations (Snyder, 1979). This description is suggestive of the outer-audience orientation of the public self. In contrast, Snyder and Campbell (1982) describe the low self-monitor as a "principled self." The self-presentations of low self-monitors are "controlled from within by their affective states and attitudes . . . rather than molded and tailored to fit the situation" (Snyder, 1974, p. 89). This suggests that the low self-monitor's concern is primarily with the private facet of the self.

Achievement Motivation

The concept of achievement motivation was developed by McClelland *et al.* (1953) to describe individual variations in motivation to succeed in intellectual and social endeavors. Success in such endeavors was defined as the surpassing of *internal* standards of excellence. The concept of achievement motivation is therefore similar to the individual-achievement ego task of the private self. (Indeed, the ego task of the private self was given the "achievement" label in consideration of McClelland *et al.*'s definition of achievement motivation.) If achievement motivation is indicative of a general orientation toward an inner audience, then subjects high in achievement motivation should, like those high in private self-consciousness, be resistant to group pressure. McClelland *et al.* (1953) reanalyzed the data from a subset of subjects in Asch's (1956) conformity experiment. Of the subjects classified as high in achievement motivation, 87% were "independents." In contrast, 87% of the subjects low in achievement motivation were "yielders." McClelland *et al.* concluded that subjects who are high in achievement motivation "show courageous independence when under social pressure to conform" (p. 287).

Approval Motivation

The Social Desirability Scale was developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1964) as a measure of approval motivation, which was defined as concern about evaluation by others. This suggests that the Social Desirability Scale might serve as a measure of the ego-task orientation of the public self. Consistent with this interpretation, Strickland and Crowne (1962) reported that subjects scoring high on the Social Desirability Scale (that is, those classified as high in approval motivation) were most responsive to a social influence attempt.

FACETS OF THE SELF AND SELF-PRESENTATIONS

Identifying the public self's ego task with such concepts as approval motivation and social accreditation suggests that it is this facet of the self that is involved in self-presentation (Goffman, 1959) or impression-management (Schlenker, 1980) processes. Several theoretical treatments confirm that an outer audience is conceived as the target for self-presentations or managed impressions. For example, Goffman (1959) noted that "when an individual appears in the presence of others, there will usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that

it will convey an impression to others which it is in his interests to convey" (p. 4). Similarly, Jones and Pittman (1982) defined strategic self-presentation as "those features of behavior . . . designed to elicit or shape others' attributions of the actor's dispositions" (p. 233). Baumeister (1982) considered self-presentations to be "aimed at establishing . . . an image of the individual in the minds of others" (p. 3), and Arkin (1980) stated that "people often behave in ways that will create a certain impression on others; social psychologists refer to this phenomenon as *self-presentation*" (p. 158).

To Whom Is the Self Presented?

As the foregoing quotations indicate, the prevalent answer to this question has been that self-presentations are targeted at an audience of other persons. Ego-task analysis offers the alternative view, however, that the self can be presented to *multiple audiences*. These audiences include, in addition to the outer audience, an inner audience (oneself) and a reference group audience. Thus, one can "play to the audience within" just as one can "play to the audience without" (Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983; see also Schlenker, 1980; Weary & Arkin, 1981).

Are Favorable Self-Presentations Genuinely Believed?

Terms such as "self-presentation" and "impression management" carry with them at least an implicit assumption that people typically harbor, inwardly, a less worthy being that they hope to prevent others from discovering. The self-presenter is an actor whose part is to create the most favorable impression possible. In his dramaturgical approach, Goffman (1959) states that the presenter "must offer a show of intellectual and emotional involvement in the activity he is presenting, but must keep himself from actually being carried away by his own show" (p. 216). It would seem, then, that the self-presenter is really a *mis*presenter.

Even though the self may often be presented in ways that appear too good to be true, several lines of research evidence indicate that these favorable self-presentations are genuinely believed by their presenters. First, people *ordinarily* perceive themselves as being successful in achieving personal goals, including those of ego tasks (Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Second, self-enhancement occurs under private reporting conditions in which subjects should have little reason to mispresent themselves (Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Frey, 1978; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982; Schlenker, Hallam, & McCown, 1983; Weary, Harvey, Schwieger, Olson, Perloff, & Pritchard, 1982). Third, subjects make self-enhancing judgments even when they are convinced that dishonest judgments can be detected (Riess, Rosenfeld, Melburg, & Tedeschi, 1981; Stults, Messé, & Kerr, 1984). Finally, favorable self-judgments are often made more quickly than unfavorable ones (Breckler & Greenwald, 1981), suggesting that favorable self-relevant judgments are faithful reports from self-knowledge (cf. Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1981).

SELF-ESTEEM: VARIATIONS IN EXPECTED SUCCESS AT EGO TASKS

A person may strongly wish to impress others but may nevertheless expect to make a poor impression. This person can be described as being oriented toward the social-accreditation ego task of the public self but as having a low expectation of success. Likewise, a person may expect to fall short in achieving reference group goals and expectations. Variations in expected success at the ego tasks of the public, private, and collective selves constitute important individual differences in the level of, and basis for, a sense of self-worth, or self-esteem.

Public Self-Esteem Versus Private Self-Esteem

Ego-task analysis indicates the desirability of having separate measures for public self-esteem (expected success at social accreditation) and private self-esteem (expected success at individual achievement). A recent analysis of socially desirable responding supports the utility of distinguishing between these two varieties of self-esteem. Paulhus (1984) has identified two components associated with favorable self-descriptions. One component reflects favorable self-evaluations that are genuinely believed (a "self-deception" factor), and the other component corresponds to favorable self-evaluations intended to impress others (an "impression-management" factor). It is interesting that scores on the self-deception factor (private self-esteem) do not vary under public and private reporting conditions, whereas scores on the impression-management factor (public self-esteem) do (Paulhus, 1984). These results are consistent with the expectations of ego-task analysis (see also Tesser & Paulhus, 1983).

Ambiguity of Self-Esteem Measures

There are many measures of self-esteem (see Wylie, 1974). Examination of the items in most self-esteem scales, however, suggests that they measure a global self-esteem that mixes expected success at the ego tasks of both the public self and the private self. Among these global measures is the Janis-Field scale (Hovland & Janis, 1959), which includes several items that refer to expected evaluation by outer audiences (e.g., "How often are you troubled with shyness?" and "Do you find it hard to make talk when you meet new people?") as well as items that refer to evaluation by the inner audience (e.g., "Do you ever feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder whether anything is worthwhile?"). Among existing measures, Rosenberg's (1965) scale is one that appears to include almost exclusively items that measure private self-esteem (e.g., "I feel I have a number of good qualities"), and Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) measure of social anxiety appears to focus well on public self-esteem (e.g., "I don't find it hard to talk to strangers"). No existing measures of which we are aware focus on expected success in achieving reference group goals; that is, there are no measures of what might be called collective self-esteem.

CONCLUSION: REMAINING TASKS

The results reviewed in this chapter provide substantial support for the classification of ego tasks in Table 6.1. However, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which our review has focused selectively on supportive evidence. Accordingly, the claim that ego-task analysis provides a successful framework for analyzing person–situation interactions must depend on its success in stimulating and explaining further research, which we can foresee in the following problems.

Motivating Subjects in Psychology Experiments

In her research on memory for finished and unfinished tasks, Zeigarnik (1938) provided a clear, if controversial, illustration of how ego-task analysis principles can be used to motivate subjects in psychology experiments:

> Three "types" of subjects could be distinguished. The first were those who sought to perform as instructed because they wished to please the experimenter. Another, the ambitious type, strove to excel as if in competition with others. The third type was interested in the task for its own sake and sought to solve each problem in the way the problem itself demanded. In keeping with these differences the experimenter did not preserve a fixed mien and method with all subjects. Those of the first type were allowed to see the experimenter's pleasure when a task was well done. Work done by the second group was inspected with the air of an examiner, while the third group was allowed to work unmolested, the experimenter in this case remaining passive. (p. 303)

Contemporary students of experimental social psychology are taught, of course, to avoid the techniques used by Zeigarnik to motivate her subjects. Nevertheless, it is generally desirable to get subjects "involved" in experimental tasks. Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson (1976) refer to this as *experimental realism*. Similarly, Weber and Cook (1972) suggest that treatments "should have enough impact that subjects become absorbed in them" (p. 292). If the goal of experimental realism is to motivate as many subjects as possible, then procedures that evoke multiple ego tasks should be used. Doing so will not ordinarily pose a threat to validity so long as the evoked ego task is not one that is postulated as mediating the effect (Weber & Cook, 1972).

Applications to Research on Persuasion and Social Influence

Three facets of the self were related (in Table 6.2) to the social-influence processes of compliance, internalization, and identification (Kelman, 1961). One implication of that analysis was its suggestion of individual differences in susceptibility to the three types of influence. Thus, social pressure (compliance) techniques may be most effective for people who have a relatively strong predisposition to engage in the social-accreditation ego task of the public self; rationally based (internalization)

appeals may work best for those who are oriented toward the individual-achievement ego task; and modeling by an admired other or appeals based on reference group values (identification) may be optimal for collectively oriented persons. Likewise, as Kelman has already observed, situations should vary in supporting the three processes of social influence. For example, compliance will be effective only so long as socially powerful others are present. Influence that must persist during the absence of others, however, would better be achieved through internalization or identification.

Research on Collective-Achievement Ego Tasks

There is no doubt that collective efforts are important in political, industrial, scientific, and even recreational endeavors. It is therefore disheartening to observe that little recent effort has been directed to the study of collective performance. Social psychologists have largely failed to follow the lead of early reference group theorists (e.g., Merton, 1957; Newcomb, 1943; Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Sumner, 1906; Whyte, 1981) or of Sherif and Cantril (1947), who *defined* ego-involvement as concern with the goals of reference groups. One explanation for this recent lack of effort may be that few persons attach importance to collective endeavors (cf. Latané *et al.*, 1979). It may also be, as suggested by Sampson (1977), that concerns of the psychological establishment reflect an individualistic orientation of our contemporary culture.

Nevertheless, past research indicates the important role of the collective self in determining behavior. For example, the attitudes of the women at Bennington College (Newcomb, 1943) were influenced in no small way by reference groups, and that influence appears to have had a lasting impact (Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks, & Warwick, 1967). And the Robbers' Cave experiment (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) demonstrated how superordinate, collective goals can be used in overcoming intergroup hostility.

Self-Esteem Theory and Measurement

There is generally a lack of standardization among self-esteem measures—or what we have called expected success at ego tasks. There are many measures of self-esteem (Wylie, 1974), but it is apparent that these measures assess mixtures of expected favorable evaluation from outer and inner audiences, and none measures expected success at meeting reference group goals. Self-esteem has been identified as a possible mediator in a variety of psychological processes, including persuasion (Hovland & Janis, 1959), task persistence (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1982; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977), and prejudice (Allport, 1954; Wills, 1981). Because different facets of the self can be invoked, by both situational and personality variables, in processes like persuasion, persistence, and prejudice, it should prove useful to have separate measures of individual differences in the level and importance of public, private, and collective esteem in studying these phenomena.

Other Audiences, Other Objects of Evaluation

The present ego-task analysis identifies three evaluative audiences (public, private, and collective), all of which take the single person as the evaluated object. A possible extension of this analysis would be to include other classes of evaluative audiences. For example, the goal of being evaluated favorably by a sexual partner may be sufficiently different from the other goals in Table 6.1 to be worthy of separate treatment. Another extension would be to go beyond the single person to a collective entity as the evaluated object. Such an extension might help explain intentional acts of risk taking or self-sacrifice. It may also be useful to distinguish among the various groups of others toward whom social accreditation efforts are directed, or among different reference groups. These additional distinctions could be valuable to the extent that the favorable regards of different categories of others require different strategic approaches.

Acknowledgments

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