Kripke’s Objections to the Cluster Theory

Theses of the Cluster Theory
1. To every name or designator ‘X’, there corresponds a cluster of properties \( \varphi \) such that A believes ‘\( \varphi \ X \)’.

2. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

3. If most, or a weighted most, of the \( \varphi \)’s are satisfied by one unique object \( y \), then \( y \) is the referent of ‘\( X \)’.

4. If the vote yields no unique object, ‘\( X \)’ does not refer.

5. The statement, ‘If \( X \) exists, then \( X \) has most of the \( \varphi \)’s’ is known \textit{a priori} by the speaker.

6. The statement, ‘If \( X \) exists, then \( X \) has most of the \( \varphi \)’s’ expresses a necessary truth.

Kripke’s Objections
Kripke’s arguments against the Cluster Theory can be divided (cf. Soames, \textit{Beyond Rigidity}) into three basic groups. Suppose that \( n \) is a name and \textit{the} \( D \) is a description (or cluster thereof) that is supposed to give the semantic content of \( n \).

\textbf{Semantic:} Aim at showing that the referent of \( n \) is not linguistically determined by \textit{the} \( D \). (vs. 2, 3, 4)

\textbf{Epistemic:} Aim at showing that what is known or believed by a speaker who says ‘\( n \) is \( F \)’ is different from what is known or believed by a speaker who says ‘\textit{the} \( D \) is \( F \)’. (vs. 5)

\textbf{Modal:} Aim at showing that sentences like ‘\( n \) is \( F \)’ behave differently from sentences like ‘\textit{the} \( D \) is \( F \)’ when placed in modal contexts. (vs. 6)