Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order

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The right to the city is like a cry and a demand . . . a transformed and renewed right to urban life (Henri Lefebvre, 1996: 158).

Introduction

Over the past five years or so, in the streets of places like Seattle, Washington DC, Genoa, Goteborg and Montreal, an extraordinary and diverse protest movement has been critiquing and resisting the dominant political-economic order. That order is characterized by (1) the increasing control of large corporations over material life and the persistent extension of capitalist social relations; and (2) an enduring Westphalian geopolitical order paired with a liberal-democratic model of citizenship. Demonstrators argue that this order has threatened democracy because it has increased the power of international corporations and decreased the power of ordinary citizens. Inside the academy, a similar critique has decried the increasingly authoritarian, uneven, and unjust nature of an ever more ‘neoliberalized’ global political economy (e.g. Held, 1995; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Murphy, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2000). This article joins in that critique of the contemporary order. It argues that the traditional Westphalian geopolitical order and its liberal-democratic citizenship form (never very democratic to begin with) is too limiting a structure through which to resist the increasing power of capital over material life.

The article’s first main argument, then, is that in order to resist the growing dominance of capital in the global political economy, one critical project is to develop new notions of citizenship that extend the limits of politics and expand the decision-making control of citizens. Current research in social science reveals that such a project is already underway. New forms and practices of citizenship have proliferated in recent years (Baubock, 1994; Axtman, 1996; Isin and Wood, 1999; Ong, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1999). Many of these new forms undermine the hegemony of the current model of citizenship, helping to loosen the traditional ties between citizenship and the nation-state, the national scale, and the nation. At the same time, the restructuring of the global political economy has itself also destabilized traditional forms of citizenship. This destabilization has opened greater political opportunity to imagine and realize new citizenships that offer alternatives to the current citizenship order.

The article’s second main argument is that Henri Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the city’ is one particularly fertile set of principles on which to base such alternative citizenship forms (Lefebvre, 1968; 1973; 1996). Lefebvre’s concept poses a radical challenge not only to the current citizenship order, but also to capitalist social relations
and their increasing control over social life. The promise of Lefebvre’s ideas in this context has not been extensively explored in the literature on new citizenships. The right to the city has been evoked frequently but indiscriminately with respect to citizenship, both within and outside academia (City and Shelter et al., n.d.; Soja, 2000; Rights to the city, 1998; 2002; Worldwide Conference, 2002). Very little of this work has fully appreciated the profoundly revolutionary principles of Lefebvre’s idea or the extent to which citizenship based on the right to the city radically challenges and reimagines the capitalist world order.

The first part of the article outlines the context in which Lefebvre’s ideas might be pursued. It examines the destabilizing influence both global political-economic restructuring and the rise of new citizenship forms have had on traditional citizenship. It thus sketches the outlines of the current political opportunity in which new citizenships might emerge. The second part of the article considers why a Lefebvrian citizenship is valuable for both reimagining traditional citizenship and resisting capitalist social relations. To develop Lefebvre’s potential, I first present a detailed exposition of the right to the city based on a close reading of Lefebvre. I then use Lefebvre’s more general idea to articulate a specific form of citizenship, what I call ‘the right to the global city.’ This articulation is not designed as an empirical report of an emerging citizenship or as a policy recommendation for immediate implementation. Nor is it designed to exhaust all possible forms Lefebvrian citizenship might take. Rather, it is offered as a theoretical exploration of a particularly promising citizenship idea. It is an exercise to imagine and articulate one new form of citizenship based on Lefebvre that has the potential to radically challenge and transform current global political and economic relations. The right to the global city is not presented as a comprehensive and fully formed alternative that should be installed whole-cloth in place of the current order. Rather it is presented as an imaginative opening, as a break in and challenge to the current structure that points toward a new politics — a politics in which Lefebvre’s concept of inhabitance, rather than capitalist social relations and Westphalian state relations, forms the foundation of political membership and the logic of material production.

Defining citizenship

In exploring citizenship restructuring and new citizenship forms, it is, of course, important to be clear about what is meant by the term ‘citizenship’ (MacKian, 1995; Smith, 1995). A comprehensive definition of citizenship is not a simple task because one of the main aspects of contemporary citizenship change is that accepted definitions of citizenship are being undermined and rethought. In its broadest sense, citizenship involves rights, duties and membership in a political community of some kind (Brown, 1994). The predominant conception of citizenship in the core of the contemporary capitalist world system is more specific; it is what I will call liberal-democratic/Westphalian (LDW) citizenship. Liberal-democratic citizenship imagines that individual political actors agree to a ‘social contract’ with the state in which they consent to be ruled in exchange for certain privileges and protections (Rousseau, 1987; Locke, 1988; Kant, 1991; Rawls, 1971; 1993). Chief among these privileges is an institutionalized say in the decisions of the state, usually manifested in some form of electoral system. The Westphalian aspect imagines one’s primary political community to be a nation-state that is embedded in an international system of nation-states, each of which is sovereign within its territory (Harding and Lim, 1999; Linklater, 1999; Caporaso, 2000; Krasner, 2000). Because each state is sovereign, a citizen’s ultimate political loyalty must be to her nation-state. She might be a member of other sorts of political community, but they must all be subordinated to her membership in the nation-state. Clearly, this concept is laden with assumptions that are not necessary to the broader definition of citizenship offered above. For example, the state need not be the political community to which citizenship is attached, and one need not be loyal to only one...
political community. Much recent work has explored the extent to which new ideas about citizenship and belonging are being forged outside of and against LDW citizenship (e.g. Staeheli, 1994; Trend, 1995; Brown, 1997; Benhabib, 1999; Soysal, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1999). These forms have explored group rather than individual identity, and membership in multiple communities outside the state, ones based on geography, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, the environment, and so on. The exploration of these new forms often grows out of a larger argument that the state does not contain all things political, that politics and political communities exist outside of the formal state apparatus (Mouffe, 1988a; 1988b; 1992; Magnusson, 1996; Brown, 1997). The article is part of this exploration of new citizenship forms. In my discussion of the right to the global city below, I develop the argument that there is a need to go beyond LDW citizenship because it serves to constrain and limit politics in a way that makes it difficult to effectively resist the increasing control of capital. In examining citizenship change, therefore, the article adopts a broad definition of citizenship: rights and responsibilities that are associated with membership in a political community. It defines ‘political community’ widely to include a range of groups that share a political interest of some kind. These broad definitions are used to encompass the full range of citizenship forms: both the formal, state-based structure and the emerging alternatives to that structure.

Operating with that wider definition, the article suggests that there are three principal aspects that characterize the contemporary changes in citizenship:

- Citizenship is being rescaled, such that the former hegemony of the national-scale political community is being weakened by the creation of communities at other scales;
- Citizenship is being reterritorialized, such that the tight link between the nation-state’s territorial sovereignty and political loyalty have been increasingly thrown open to question;
- Citizenship is being reoriented, away from the nation as the predominant political community.

Across those three changes, citizenship is beginning to become unhinged from its formerly dominant tie to the nation-state. Taken together, these changes have begun to destabilize the LDW regime of citizenship and have opened the door to the emergence of new forms. These new forms, in turn, further destabilize the dominant citizenship form (see Figure 1). It is in this context that the article imagines the right to the global city as a potential citizenship that can both be enabled by the destabilization of LDW citizenship and contribute to that destabilization by helping to ‘unthink’ LDW assumptions. The article develops why the right to the global city has particular potential among new citizenship forms to challenge both the restrictive limits of LDW citizenship and the neoliberalization of the capitalist world economy. It points toward a new politics in which inhabitance, not nationality, forms the basis for political community and decision-making authority.

**Background: political-economic restructuring**

This section outlines the recent restructuring of the global political economy as an important context in which citizenship change is taking place.\(^3\) It draws on a range of work that suggests that in the last 30 years both the world economy and the nation-state

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\(^3\) This section is not meant to offer a comprehensive account of citizenship restructuring. It does not, for example, offer a detailed analysis of the role that post-second world war political-military relations play in the reconfiguration of citizenship. It adopts a rather more Marxist than Weberian view of the state to focus on one factor – the restructuring of the global political economy – as an important influence on citizenship change.
have been undergoing a process of marked rescaling and reterritorialization. What is transpiring, many argue, is a redefinition of the scales at which political and economic coordination are organized as well as a reorganization of the relationships among those scales. During the Fordist era (up to roughly 1970), political and economic coordination were marked by a strongly national character. The national scale was constructed as coterminous with the scale of the nation-state, and that scale took on a leading role in organizing political and economic life. Of course, other scales of organization were also important during this period, but the national scale rose to prominence for an extended period as the hegemonic scale for coordination. The present era is marked by an erosion of the hegemony of the national scale. To a greater degree than in the past, other scales are being constructed and advanced to challenge the hegemony of the national scale. These new scales are both larger than the national (such as the European Union) and smaller than the national (such as regional entities within national states).

Neither the national scale nor these new scales are pre-given; they do not exist as unchanging containers, each with a characteristic set of social processes. Instead the scales and the relationships among them are produced through political struggle. Geographers writing on the ‘politics of scale’ have argued that scale is inherently fluid.

Figure 1 Citizenship restructuring and the right to the global city
and undetermined. Scales and scalar arrangements can become fixed, but that fixity is always ultimately temporary, and it is always the result of a political project (Swyngedouw, 1992; 1997; Smith, 1993; 1995; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Marston, 2000; Brenner, 2001). Since scales are socially produced through negotiation and conflict, the form and content of each scale, as well as its relationship to other scales, is the result of particular political interests producing a configuration that best suits their agenda. For a certain period of time, particular scales can take a dominant role within a set of scalar relationships and play a particularly prominent role in shaping processes at other scales. Many scholars argue that the national scale played just such a hegemonic role in the Fordist era. The current reorganization of scalar arrangements has meant a weakening of the national scale as the privileged scale at which economic and political activity are organized. This ‘de-hegemonizing’ of the national scale within the overall scalar arrangement has created a political-economic context of relative scalar and territorial fluidity (compared to the Fordist era) in which organization at new scales and territories can emerge more easily. It is in this context of new scalar and territorial openness that the tripartate de-nationalization of citizenship mentioned above can be fruitfully understood.

The economy

Recent shifts in the organization of capital accumulation have involved a scalar and territorial shift that has deprivileged the national scale as the primary scale of organization. More and more, economic activity is being organized at range of scales, both larger and smaller than the national. Some have referred to this process as the ‘glocalization’ of economic activity (Swyngedouw, 1992; Courchene, 1995; Robertson, 1995). During the period of Fordist organization, global economic space was more markedly divided into national-scale units that traded with each other at arm’s length (Dicken, 1998). The rise of the transnational corporation (TNC) and the increasing transnationalization of production and finance since 1970 have constituted a strategy on the part of capital to significantly expand the scale at which investment, production and information flows are functionally integrated. New territories are being incorporated into the capitalist relation as capital seeks out new spaces for investment that offer greater returns (Hardt and Negri, 2000). In short, capital investment has ‘jumped scales’ as part of a strategy to overcome the limitations and contradictions of the predominantly national-scale regime of the Fordist era (Smith, 1993).

The other aspect of the process of economic glocalization has been an increasing tendency for economic coordination to be shifted to local and regional scales. The leading theorists in this vein have highlighted the rising importance of regional economies as important functional nodes in the world’s economic geography (Scott, 1996; 1998; Storper, 1997). The idea is that the world economy is being reorganized into an international system of regional economic agglomerations, replacing the waning international system based on national-scale economies. This reorganization is associated with the move toward a mode of industrial production based on flexible specialization, whereby firms have become increasingly vertically disintegrated (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1994; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1988; 1998; Christopherson and Storper, 1989; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). As more industries move toward vertical disintegration and flexibility, interfirm cooperation (external economies) becomes increasingly crucial to economic production. Although the costs of covering distance have been greatly reduced by advances in transportation and communication technology and the progressive elimination of restrictions on international commerce, nevertheless transcending geographical distance still involves significant costs. The combination of still-significant spatial transactions costs and the rising importance of external economies encourages firms to cluster geographically in a given region and to consolidate a regional-scale organization that allows (usually urbanized) regions to function as nodes in the global economy (Scott, 1996).

Those who study global cities have argued that they represent one of the principle spatial manifestations of this newly glocalized economic organization. In order to
most efficiently organize the internationalization of production, finance and information, transnational corporations agglomerate their command and control functions in specific places (Friedman, 1986; Sassen, 1991; 1999; Knox and Taylor, 1995; Abu-Lughod, 1999). Firms involved in coordination functions take advantage of external economies by concentrating in certain cities; these global cities have become the primary sites for coordinating transnational economic operations. Global cities embody the dual rescaling of the world economy: production has expanded beyond the national scale, and so TNCs have concentrated coordination at the sub-national scale, at the scale of the global city-region (Scott, 2001). Networks have been established among global cities involved in similar coordination functions. These networks do not nest neatly in national networks of cities. Los Angeles, for example, plays a key role in a transnational network of global cities that is not contained within or primarily defined by the national network of US cities. To be sure, Los Angeles still plays a role in a national network, but that role is no longer the only or even predominant factor that defines the social and spatial structure of the city. Global cities thus embody the ‘glocalization’ of economic activity and are key sites in which the destabilization of national-scale economic coordination is expressed.

Overall, this scalar reorganization has meant the decline of the old Fordist model in which economic activity was coordinated and contained primarily at the national scale. The argument is by no means that the rescaling process is total such that economic coordination now occurs only at local and global scales (or that it ever occurred entirely at the national scale). Rather, there has been a reorganization of the relationships among various scales such that the hegemony of the national scale as the privileged scale for economic coordination has shown clear signs of deterioration. The deterioration of this hegemony has led to the proliferation of economic coordination structures and institutions at scales other than the national. What is occurring, many argue, is a scalar opening up such that economic activity is more likely than in the past to be coordinated at scales other than the national. Because they are shaped by both aspects of economic glocalization, global cities form a crucial geographical location in which this economic rescaling is unfolding.

The state

A similar process of rescaling and restructuring has affected the territorial state and its organization at the national scale. As has been the case with economic coordination, there has been a destabilization of the national scale as the dominant scale of state power (Jessop, 2000). This destabilization is associated with the shift of some state functions and authority to other scales, both supranational and sub-national. In some cases, shifts to larger scales have involved merely international coordination of specific policies whereby each nation-state operates as a unit within an agreement among nation-states. The UN, NAFTA, ASEAN, and the WTO are examples of such international institutions to which some state and regulatory functions have been assigned. In addition to such international forms, there have been some moves towards truly trans- or supra-national agreements, under which national states partly coalesce into a larger ‘superstate’. Such moves have been extremely limited, and the European Union is perhaps the only current example of an institution in which state sovereignties have the potential to dissolve into a truly supra-national state form (Leitner, 1997; Balibar, 1999). However, even the EU should still be read as primarily an international organization that has taken some steps toward full consolidation, steps such as a common currency and, to a lesser extent, common citizenship.

There has also been a move toward increasing the authority of sub-national scales of state power with respect to the national state (Jessop, 1994a; 1994b; Mayer, 1994; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Kearns, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1996; Staeheli et al., 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Ward, 2000). This process has involved the transfer of functions, obligations, and expectations to local states at various scales, from province/state to
Perhaps the most robust account of such changes is that of Eric Swyngedouw (1996). His analysis of closing the Belgian mines and the subsequent urban and regional redevelopment project shows how a nexus of new local-state (and quasi-state) institutions were created to assume responsibility for functions such as unemployment, education, economic development and finance. The goal of the devolution, he argues, was to ‘produce competitive regional spaces’ through institutional state forms that fit more closely the scalar structure of the changing economic geography in the area (1996: 1499). According to Swyngedouw, the political project was to rescale the duties of the state toward a new complex of sub-national state forms in order to more effectively pursue a neoliberal development agenda for the region.

As with other processes of rescaling, the process of state rescaling has by no means been total. On the contrary, it has been markedly partial and uneven. The argument is not that the governing and coordination has been diminished; rather governing power has been partly ‘displaced’ from its hegemonic placement in the national-scale state and ‘replaced’ in new institutional and scalar forms, both state and non-state (Jessop, 1994a: 24). In short, state power has been partly glocalized, and the national-scale state no longer holds as dominant a position as it once did (Amin, 1994; Jones and Keating, 1995; Brenner, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). As with economic rescaling, state rescaling has partly destabilized the hegemony of the national scale as the privileged repository of state power. It is now increasingly possible for political actors and movements to imagine and invent other scales and scalar relationships for organizing state power.

Reterritorialization and sovereignty

A word needs to be said here about the restructuring of territory. To a significant degree, the process of rescaling implies a process of reterritorialization, since constructions of geographical scale generally involve some delimiting of territory. The twin processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization have been an important characteristic of global restructuring in general (Brenner, 1999). In the case of the state, however, de- and reterritorialization vibrates with potential upheaval in a way the reterritorialization of the economy does not. State reterritorialization constitutes more than just the spatial reorganization of policy coordination, because of the long-standing ideological link between state sovereignty and national-scale territory. This link means that state reterritorialization must involve some restructuring of the present regime of state territorial sovereignty.

Since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the ideology of state sovereignty has formed the basis of a powerful geopolitical narrative in which the world is divided up into national-scale sovereign units, each the ultimate authority within its territory (Spruyt, 1994; Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995; Philpott, 1999). This extraordinary vision has never been fully realized in practice, of course, but it has nevertheless served as a foundational normative principle for state institutions and interstate relations. In many ways, the principle of national sovereignty is being undermined by the reterritorialization of state functions. To be sure, the idea of national-scale sovereignty remains the most important guiding principle of geopolitical relations. Nevertheless, as the process of state rescaling and reterritorialization unfolds, it directly challenges the notion of...
national-scale sovereignty. This challenge has made it more possible to imagine new scales and new territories at which state sovereignty might be fixed, and to imagine state authority arrayed at multiple scales, instead of being controlled by a single sovereign scale (Kofman, 1995; Sassen, 1996). This challenge does not mean that national-scale sovereignty is destined to disintegrate completely as an organizing principle; those whose interests it serves will defend its hegemony. My argument is that the opportunity is now greater than in the past for new configurations, new claims and new movements that do not conform to the Westphalian system of sovereign national-scale states. This opportunity has been seized by the new citizenship forms that have proliferated over the last several years. These new forms benefit from the destabilization of Westphalian sovereignty associated with political-economic restructuring, and they also contribute to it by advancing citizenships that do not conform to Westphalian principles. In a similar way, because the right to the global city would discard the primacy of nation-state citizenship in favor of inhabitation as an independent basis for political membership, it would both benefit from and contribute to the destabilization of the principle of national-state sovereignty.

The context: restructuring citizenship

The rescaling and reterritorialization of the global political economy create a context in which citizenship is being rethought and restructured. The overall thrust of contemporary political-economic restructuring has been to decenter the national scale as the dominant scale at which political-economic coordination and power are fixed (Jessop, 1994b; Swyngedouw, 1997). Presently, the dominant form of citizenship (LDW) is hinged to the national scale and to the sovereign nation-state. The principle of nation-state sovereignty has led to a hierarchical and nested structure in which national-scale citizenship is the hegemonic form. In most cases, one must be a citizen of the national state in order to be a citizen at all other scales. A person who is a formal citizen of Paris or the EU, for example, must first be a citizen of France. If state power is being displaced ‘upward, downward and outward’, as Jessop suggests, and the national-scale state is losing its status as the dominant center of political authority and political sovereignty, then a citizenship regime in which all citizenships flow from legal membership in a national-scale state is more open to reconfiguration. Other forms of citizenship — ones not based on the national-scale state, or not based on the state at all — are more possible in a global political economy where the hegemony of the national-scale state is slipping. Thus political-economic shifts have destabilized LDW citizenship and widened the opportunity for new citizenship forms. At the same time, however, the development of those forms further undermines LDW citizenship and creates even more opportunity for new forms to emerge. Much of the recent work on citizenship has focused on this process. It examines new forms of citizenship that are being forged as a result of the opportunity created by the declining hegemony of national-scale coordination (Pincetl, 1994; Pulido, 1994; Spybey, 1996; Behnke, 1997; Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Isin and Wood, 1999; Shafir, 1999; Brodie, 2000; Falk, 2000).

In the discussion that follows, I focus on three main aspects to citizenship change in the contemporary era: (1) citizenship is undergoing a process of partial rescaling similar to the rescaling of both capital accumulation and the nation-state; (2) citizenship is undergoing a process of reterritorialization, such that many new forms of citizenship do not assume as given either an association with national-scale territory or the sovereignty of national-state citizenship; (3) citizenship is undergoing a process of reorientation, such that the nation is no longer necessarily the primary community that defines political identity and political loyalty. Other, non-national political identities (based on geography, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or human being) are being advanced as potential bases for citizenship. In short, global political-economic restructuring has
created a context in which the ‘iron triangle’ of the national scale, nation-state territory, and the nation has been partly decentered as the dominant basis for the organization of citizenship (Painter and Philo, 1995). This decentering is both the opportunity for and consequence of the emergence of new forms of citizenship (Figure 1). They are arising through active political projects designed to destabilize the current order, and to imagine and establish new bases for political relationships.

**Rescaling**

There is evidence that citizenship is being partly ‘glocalized’ in a way similar to the glocalization of the economy and the state. There has been a shift away from citizenship defined at the national scale and toward citizenship at a range of other scales (Urry, 2000). Such emergent rescaling should come as little surprise if we take seriously Behnke’s (1997) argument that national-scale citizenship has never been ontologically fixed; he argues it has always been the result of a successful political project on the part of the nation-state and its associated interests to fix citizenship at the national scale. This argument is echoed by Spybey (1996), and it resonates clearly with the politics of scale literature. According to this line of thinking, we should expect the political project of a hegemonic national-scale citizenship to eventually come unfixed in favor of other scalar arrangements. What is presently occurring may represent the start of that process.

Perhaps the greater share of the scholarship on the rescaling of citizenship has focused on forms of citizenship at scales larger than the national. Numerous studies of the European Union, for example, have debated an emerging form of international citizenship at the scale of the European continent (Balibar, 1995; 1999; Habermas, 1995; Smith and Blanc, 1996; Soysal, 1996; Behnke, 1997; Binnie, 1997; Bhabha, 1999). Currently EU citizenship remains hierarchically subordinate to nation-state citizenship in that one must be a citizen of an EU member state before one can be a full citizen of the EU. EU citizenship is clearly something new, and it clearly exists at a supra-national scale, but as it develops the degree to which EU citizenship will truly challenge the hegemony of national-scale citizenship remains an open question. Other observers have focused on forms of supra-national and transnational citizenship in contexts other than the EU. Pulido (1994) explores emerging notions of environmental citizenship that cross the US-Mexico border in the Southwest. Others have discussed the notion of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ and explored the possibility of global democracy (Gould, 1988; Held, 1995; Dauenhauer, 1996; Archibugi et al., 1998; Linklater, 1998; Hutchings and Dannreuther, 1999). They argue there is a need for forms of citizenship that are based not on membership in a particular nation but on the universality of human existence (United Nations General Assembly, 1949; Mayerfeld, 1998). Unlike what is currently a nationally dependent citizenship for the EU, the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship points toward a supra-national citizenship that is largely independent from nation-state citizenship. Rescaling citizenship, in this circumstance, would mean a true scalar pluralization that is not subject to the sovereignty of national-state citizenship. Of course, cosmopolitan citizenship remains more notional than actual, but the discourse is becoming increasingly well developed.

Others have mobilized ideas similar to cosmopolitan citizenship to suggest the possibility of a ‘post-national’ phase with respect to citizenship (Bhabha, 1999; and see Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Jacobson, 1996; King, 2000; Morris, 1997; Soysal, 1994; 1996; 1999). These studies focus on the growing role of human rights and other transnational notions of rights and responsibilities to argue that the nation-state is becoming increasingly less relevant as the basis for citizenship. Some have examined post-national citizenship in the context of European Union (Benhabib, 1999; Hetne, 2000); others have addressed the possibility of environmental citizenship (Pulido, 1994; Van Steenberg, 1994; Newby, 1996; Jelin, 2000). Perhaps the most well known strain of explanation has concentrated on the growing incidence of transnational migrants — people who do not permanently settle in a single nation-state (Baubock, 1994; Rouse, 1995; Schiller et al., 1995; Kofman and Englang, 1997; Laguerre, 1998; Mitchell, 1998;
Ong, 1999; Roberts et al., 1999; Mahler, 2000). Such migration has created a growing number of people who exhibit plural political loyalties and identities that cross national-state boundaries (Faist and Haubermann, 1996). These transnational migrants present an ongoing challenge to the notion that citizenship can be fully contained within national boundaries, as LDW citizenship requires (Hannerz, 1996). It is true that the idea of a post-national era with respect to citizenship is clearly more prescriptive than descriptive. Nevertheless, unlike the merely international citizenship of the EU, cosmopolitan, post-national and transnational citizenship are notions of rescaling that present fundamental challenges to the principle of national sovereignty, in which all citizenships must be subordinate to national-scale citizenship.

The other aspect of citizenship rescaling involves shifts in citizenship to subnational scales. This work has examined an array of scales, such as neighborhoods, districts, municipalities, urban regions, counties, provinces/states, and so on. (Pincetl, 1994; Staeheli, 1994; Kearns, 1995; Sheller and Urry, 2000). One important component of this downscaling involves citizenships at the scale of the urbanized region, specifically that of global cities. As I have suggested, global cities concentrate the coordination functions of international production, and they are therefore important geographical expressions of the complex rescaling of the global economy (Isin, 1996; 2000a; 2000b; Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; Isin and Wood, 1999; Sassen, 1999; Beauregnard and Bounds, 2000; Brodie, 2000). Global cities do not nest neatly in a national-scale network of cities, and so ideas of citizenship attached in some way to the global city undermine the principle of urban citizenship nested in a sovereign nation-state. Moreover, because global cities contain large concentrations of transnational migrants, the contradictions that such migrants pose for national-scale citizenship are most keenly felt in global cities. Thus, the destabilization of national citizenship and the opportunity for the emergence of new forms are particularly concentrated in global cities. A new citizenship form linked to the global city would thus challenge and rethink established citizenship structures in a variety of ways.5

Many argue that such new citizenship forms are currently being pursued by social movements that emerge out of the poorer half of the global city (Isin, 1996; Keil, 1998; Soja, 2000). The movements are often rooted in the new politics of identity and of difference; they are based on political identities such as ethnicity, class, sexuality, gender, age, disability, homelessness, and the like. The movements have begun to advance claims to new rights that involve environmental, social and spatial justice (Pulido, 1996; 2000; Rocco, 1996; Flores and Benmayor, 1997; Geron, 1997; Gillett, 1997; Platt, 1997; Cranford, 1998; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Candaele and Dreier, 2000; Salmon, 2001). Movements in Los Angeles, for example, have mobilized to prevent plant closings, to force a more equitable air quality management plan, to have local government and some private firms pay a ‘living wage’ to workers, to block waste incinerators in low-income neighborhoods, and to redistribute transportation spending away from rail and toward buses. These claims are often made to address the inequalities of political and economic globalization, which are particularly acute in the global city. They argue that people have the right to environmental justice, to a living wage, or to efficient public transportation. These rights claims are being advanced mostly at subnational scales within the global city, such as the neighborhood, the city and the urban region. In addition, they are claiming rights that are not necessarily based on formal citizenship in the state; they therefore further undermine the national-scale/nation-state model of citizenship.

Overall, then, the rescaling of citizenship has involved a process of glocalization: there has been a move away from national-scale citizenship and toward new citizenship forms at a range of other scales, both above and below the national. Though the actual

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5 This particular salience, joined with my experience with global cities (Purcell, 1997; 2000; 2002), is why I develop Lefebvrian citizenship in the context of the global city. The global city is not an essential aspect of Lefebvrian citizenship; it merely presents a particularly evocative setting in which to articulate the principles of the right to the city.
establishment of citizenship at other scales has been partial and uneven, the important result of citizenship rescaling has been to call into question the hegemony of national-scale citizenship and open up, to varying degrees, the opportunity for new citizenships at other scales.

**Reterritorialization**

As with the shifts in the global political economy, the rescaling of citizenship involves reterritorialization as well. However, reterritorializing citizenship is complicated by the continuing link between formal citizenship and the territorial state. As Turner (2000: 130) puts it, the idea that ‘citizenship has to correspond to some definite form of sovereignty’ is a powerful normative principle that underlies LDW citizenship. The idea is that citizenship involves political loyalty — being a citizen means giving one’s allegiance to a specific political community. For LDW citizenship, this loyalty is reserved for the nation-state. Because the national state claims sovereignty, it claims to be the ultimate object of its citizens’ political loyalty. One can hold formal citizenships at many scales (i.e. municipal, county, province/state, nation-state), but if the principle of the state’s territorial sovereignty is to be upheld, those citizenships must be nested in a territorial hierarchy with a single sovereign power at the national scale. According to the present concept of state sovereignty, no scale of citizenship can operate independently from the others. As Hettne (2000: 36) notes, it is difficult to see how multiple citizenships not based on the national-scale state can be built ‘as long as the nation-state retains its monopoly over territorial sovereignty’. Because it would violate the hegemony of the LDW notion of sovereign state power, the proliferation of citizenship forms can only be achieved through sustained political struggle against concerted resistance.

Given the contradiction between sovereignty and multiple independent citizenships, the continued emergence of new citizenship forms would have to be linked to a progressive dissolution of Westphalian sovereignty as an organizing principle. The ongoing process of state rescaling and reterritorialization may mean that the enduring narrative of nation-state sovereignty is weakening. As I discussed above, the territorial nation-state is undergoing a process of partial deterritorialization at the national scale and reterritorialization at other scales. As a result, the assumption of sovereignty fixed in national-scale territory is more open to question. In the case of reterritorialization of state functions at supra-national scales, such territorial upscaling requires some transfer of sovereignty upward to the new state institution (Sassen, 1996). Indeed, among the debates involved in creating European Union, issues of sovereignty have been at center stage, especially among the resistance to unification (Newman, 1996; Twaddle, 1997; Benhabib, 1999; Wallace, 1999). In the case of reterritorialization of state functions at subnational scales, the process of devolving authority and responsibility to subnational state bodies would similarly imply some redistribution of authority to the local scale. The very idea of devolving authority implies that the national state is washing its hands of some everyday control of decision-making authority and ceding it to subnational scales. Thus, if we take the process of state reterritorialization seriously, we must recognize that the notion of sovereignty may be losing its position of dominance (Sassen, 1996).

To the extent that the notion of sovereignty at the national scale is destabilized, the opportunity is opened for people to adopt multiple political memberships and loyalties. These political identities can be in communities other than the nation-state and in communities at non-national scales. This opening makes it more possible to forge multiple and at least partly independent citizenships at non-national scales (Isin and Wood, 1999: 119). Moreover, the articulation of these new forms itself destabilizes the sovereignty component of LDW citizenship. It is worth remembering, however, that to whatever extent sovereignty remains a normative principle, its defenders will resist the emergence of multiple, independent citizenships. For example, the recent opposition of US conservatives to joining the World Court is based on their reluctance to cede
national sovereignty to a non-US body, subjecting US citizens to its authority. This resistance would oppose the right to the global city, since, as I will argue, the Lefebvrian notion of inhabitance can only be realized if the right to the city is not nested in and subordinate to citizenship in a national-scale territorial state.

Reorientation

The pluralization of citizenships has been a main theme in the work of scholars who focus on the relationship between citizenship and identity. Central to this discourse have been arguments about the politics of difference, a perspective that emphasizes the value of social difference among people against modernism’s stress on the value of sameness (Hall, 1997; Parkin, 1998; West, 1990; Wilmsen and McAllister, 1996). Writers in this vein have argued that the identity of each member of a political community should not be reduced to what all members share in common. Rather, political identity, citizenship, and loyalty can and should embrace social difference among the members of a political community, emphasizing that the community is variegated rather than uniform. Therefore, laws, rights and obligations need not be uniform and universal; each need not apply in the same way to all members of the political community (Young, 1989; 1997). Young (1999: 264) advocates what she calls ‘differentiated citizenship’ in place of the present model of universal citizenship that is in particular a feature of the liberal component of LDW citizenship. She argues, ‘in a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege’ (ibid.: 281). Therefore, different identity groups in society can and should enjoy unique (or at least not universal) rights and obligations, depending on the history of oppression or privilege that characterize the group. These groups can be defined by gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, homelessness, and so on.

Along the lines of Young’s differentiated citizenship, scholars have been imagining a model of citizenship that discards the old model of unitary LDW citizenship based on the nation as the overriding political identity. This new model holds that a person can have multiple political identities, and the nation need not be the sole or even the primary political identity (Hannerz, 1996; Holston, 1999). Therefore, a person can be a ‘multi-layered citizen’ in that her citizenship can have multiple referents, each based in a particular identity (nation, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, homelessness, and so on) (Sandef, 1996; Fincher, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1997; 1999). Just as the national scale and the nation-state have both become decentered as privileged reference points for citizenship, so too has the nation become decentered as the hegemonic community to which one’s political identity must be oriented.

Proponents argue that this reorientation of citizenship leads to a proliferation of identities and loyalties to multiple political communities (Mouffe, 1988b). This proliferation, they go on, can better address the new politics of identity, especially in global cities. Many scholars in this tradition have drawn explicitly on new social movements as a source of ideas and inspiration (Hall and Held, 1990; Rosaldo and Flores, 1998). This work is in part a speculative and normative vision of what new citizenship should look like, but it is also inductive in that it learns from and builds on empirical research into the new forms of citizenship that are actually being invented and advocated by social movements in global cities, most often among immigrants, women, non-white groups, and gay men and lesbians (Bell, 1995; Brown, 1997; Holston, 1998; Rocco, 1998). On the one hand the project is to imagine new citizenships that challenge LDW’s insistence on the nation as the principal referent. On the other hand the project is to observe and understand the ways in which new citizenships are already challenging and destabilizing the nation as the dominant form of political community and political identity.

In sum, there is a recursive relationship between new citizenship forms and the destabilization of LDW citizenship. On the one hand the restructuring of the global
political economy and the subsequent destabilization of the hegemonic national assumptions of LDW citizenship has opened the opportunity for new citizenship forms to emerge. On the other hand the emergence of the new citizenship forms itself undermines the dominance of LDW citizenship. In that context, we can imagine the right to the global city as similarly engaged in this recursive relationship. It can both benefit from the opportunity offered by the destabilization of LDW citizenship and contribute to that destabilization. As I argue below, the right to the global city as a citizenship form has particular potential as a means to resist the neoliberalization of the world economy. Not only does the right to the global city transcend the limits LDW citizenship places on citizen control, it also challenges the bases of capitalist social relations and the dominant power of capital to make the decisions that shape material life.

The focus: the right to the global city

Although nearly all of the emerging citizenship forms undermine LDW citizenship in some way, not all represent challenges to the neoliberal world order. In fact, some could be interpreted as reinforcing a neoliberal agenda (EU citizenship, perhaps), while some directly challenge it (such as Pulido’s cross-border environmental justice movements in the Southwest USA). This section argues that citizenship based on Lefebvre’s right to the city is one particularly promising example of a citizenship that poses a direct challenge to capital and its increasing control over the global economy.

Lefebvre’s idea is not unknown in the citizenship discourse. ‘The right to the city’ is often evoked, usually with an implied (and occasionally explicit) reference to Lefebvre’s work (Smith, 1993; Pincetl, 1994; Isin, 1996; 2000b; Soja, 1996; Rights to the city, 1998; 2002; Sandercock, 1998b; Isin and Wood, 1999; Holston, 1999; Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Sassen, 2000; Soja, 2000; Wekerle, 2000). However, few have engaged in a close reading of Lefebvre’s work (though see Dikec, 2001), or seriously examined the implications of Lefebvre’s idea and how it might provide the basis for a new form of citizenship that challenges the neoliberal world view. For example, Isin’s (2000b) introduction promises extensive engagement with the right to the city, but the authors in his volume fail to deliver it. The lack of a critical engagement with Lefebvre’s idea has led to an overstretching of the concept. Fully realized, the right to the city would necessitate a profound reorganization of current social relations. The loose usage in the literature underestimates the revolutionary implications of Lefebvre’s idea; the right to the city becomes diluted as it is attached to a variety of movements, few of which are claiming a right to the city as Lefebvre presented it. The current literature, therefore, has yet to reveal how the right to the global city might serve as a guiding principle for reimagining the global political order. There remains a need to think through specifically how Lefebvrian citizenship can extend the decision-making control of citizens and challenge the hegemony of capitalist social relations. The remainder of the article is an attempt to engage that project.

The right to the city

In examining Lefebvre’s idea, I draw primarily on The Right to the City, in which he most fully develops the concept; however, I also draw on other of Lefebvre’s works, especially Space and Politics and The Production of Space (Lefebvre, 1968; 1973; 1991a; 1991b; 1996). Although The Production of Space does not discuss the right to the city in detail, it does explore more general themes that underlie the concept, particularly Lefebvre’s ideas about space.

The right to the city constitutes a radical rethinking of the purpose, definition, and content of political community. In Lefebvre’s concept, membership in the political community is not defined by formal citizenship status. Unlike in the Westphalian,
liberal democratic model, in which nation-state membership is the basis for citizenship, the right to the city bases membership on *inhabitance*. Those who inhabit the city have a right to the city. The right to the city is designed to further the interests ‘of the whole society and firstly of all those who inhabit’ (Lefebvre, 1996: 158). Elsewhere (1991a: 2342, translated in Kofman and Lebas, 1996: 34) Lefebvre argues that:

> the right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to information, should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (*citadin*) and user of multiple services. It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’).

Kofman and Lebas (1996: 34) argue that Lefebvre’s position is that ‘we must reformulate the framework of citizenship such that the right to the city brings together the urban dweller (*citadin*) and the citizen’. Thus, the right to the city is earned by *living in* the city. Everyday life (Lefebvre’s ‘*la vie quotidienne*’) is the central pivot of the right to the city: those who go about their daily routines in the city, both living in and creating urban space, are those who possess a legitimate right to the city (Lefebvre, 1991a).

The right to the city also reconceptualizes the range of decisions that are subject to citizen control. In the liberal-democratic model, citizen participation is primarily contained within the affairs of the state. The decisions that they may participate in are limited to the decisions taken by the state. The right to the city reorients this focus. Instead of revolving around state decisions, the right to the city is oriented instead toward the decisions that *produce urban space*. All decisions that affect the production of space in the city are subject to citizen control. In order to make sense of this changed focus, a word about Lefebvre’s notion of space is needed. He refers not simply to the production of concrete space, but rather to a much more expansive idea of space that takes into account what he calls perceived space, conceived space, and lived space (Lefebvre, 1991b; Soja, 1996). Perceived space refers to relatively objective and concrete space that a person reacts to in her daily environment. Conceived space refers to ideas about space, creative mental constructions and representations of space. Lived space is the complex amalgamation of perceived and lived space. It is ‘the space of inhabitants and users’; it is fully imbricated in a person’s everyday life such that it is not just a stage on which social life plays out but represents a constituent element of social life (Lefebvre, 1991b: 39). For Lefebvre, social relations and lived space are inescapably blended together in everyday life. Therefore, the process of *producing* space necessarily involves constructing the rhythms of everyday life and producing and reproducing the social relations that frame it. Control over the production of urban space involves much more than just determining the material spatial structures of the city. It also involves control over urban social and spatial relations more generally. In the right to the city inhabitants have a say in decisions both within and outside the formal state, decisions such as where capital will be invested, where new jobs will be created, where new public transportation lines will run, or where new housing will be built — and a range of other processes at a range of scales — any decision that contributes significantly to producing space in the city they inhabit. Because of Lefebvre’s expansive view of space, the number of decisions subject to inhabitant control under the right to the city is much greater than the decisions citizens can control under LDW citizenship.

The right to the city imagines inhabitants to have two main rights: (1) the right to *appropriate* urban space; and (2) the right to *participate* centrally in the production of urban space. In advocating the right to *appropriate* urban space, Lefebvre is not referring to private ownership so much as he is referring to the right of inhabitants to ‘full and complete usage’ of the urban space in the course of their everyday lives (Lefebvre, 1968; 1996: 179). The right to appropriate urban space involves the right to
live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize, and occupy urban space in a particular city. These are rights of use rather than rights of exchange, and Marx’s use value/exchange value distinction is central to the idea of appropriation. The right to appropriation is the right to define and produce urban space primarily to maximize its use value over and above its exchange value. The notion of urban space as property, as a commodity to be exchanged on the market, is antithetical to the right to appropriation. An arrangement whereby urban space is valued primarily for its exchange value, Lefebvre argues, suppresses what he calls ‘the city as oeuvre’ (Lefebvre, 1996: 172–3). The city as oeuvre refers to the city and urban space as a creative product of and context for the everyday life of its inhabitants. The city, for Lefebvre, should be thought of as a work of art. The artist is the collective daily life routines of urban dwellers. Therefore, urban space should not be valued as a commodity for exchange; it should be valued as an oeuvre that is created and recreated every day by the quotidian practices of urban inhabitants. The right to appropriation implies the right to configure urban space to value the city as oeuvre — to maximize use value for residents rather than to maximize exchange value for capital.

The second component of the right to the city is the right to participation. This aspect gives inhabitants the right to take a central role in decision-making surrounding the production of urban space. The right to participation grants the right to participate centrally in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space. The decision could be under the auspices of the state (such as a policy decision), of capital (an investment decision), or any other entity that affects the production of space in a particular city. Moreover, the decision could be made at a range of scales; it could involve any level of the state (national, provincial, local), or corporations that operate at any scale (global, national, local). For example, those who have a right to Los Angeles would have the right to participate centrally in a corporate board decision of a transnational corporation headquartered in Chicago that would affect urban space in Los Angeles. The right to centrality in decision-making confers the right to a key voice in defining urban lived space. Defining urban lived space, for Lefebvre, involves formulating a way of living in urban space, a process he calls habiter (Kofman and Lebas, 1996). The right to define urban lived space, therefore, confers an institutionalized control over urban life. On the one hand, Lefebvre’s notion of centrality is metaphorical in that inhabitants are central to decision-making. On the other hand, it is bound up with spatial centrality in a more literal sense. Lefebvre formulated the right to the city in the context of the removal of the working classes from central Paris to clear the way for redevelopment. The right to centrality thus involves both a right to take a leading role in decision-making as well as the right to physically occupy, live in, and shape the central areas of the city.

Thus we can think about the right to the city as a specific form of citizenship, or what might be better termed ‘citadinship.’ It confers a specific set of rights, to appropriation and participation. These rights are earned through meeting particular responsibilities: one must make contributions to the city as oeuvre by performing one’s everyday life in urban space. Each person who helps create the city as oeuvre (obligation) is entitled to appropriation and participation (rights). In addition, the right to the city confers membership in a political community, in this case the community of urban inhabitants. It defines the inside and outside of that political community. It is a citizenship form that radically rethinks LDW citizenship on several fronts. Inhabitance replaces national citizenship as the basis for membership, which unhinges the right to the city from the national scale, from the sovereignty of the nation-state, and from the nation as the primary political community. Moreover, under the right to the city citadins participate in decisions both within and outside of the state apparatus. Their decision-making reach is no longer contained within the powers and duties of the formal state. The right to the city also challenges capitalist social relations. In capitalism over the past two centuries (1) the valorization of urban space has been a key accumulation strategy for capital (Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1981) and (2) property rights have given capitalist firms relatively free rein during that time to produce urban space for its exchange value. The
right to appropriation confronts capital’s ability to valorize urban space, establishing a clear priority for the use value of urban space over its exchange value potential. The right to participation reworks the property rights regime that underlies the valorization of urban space. If inhabitants hold a central role in the decisions that produce urban space, property ownership can no longer confer a dominant voice in decisions about what to do with urban land.

The right to the global city

Having presented Lefebvre’s more general principles, this section elaborates one particular citizenship form, the right to the global city, in order to develop more specifically (though not empirically) what citizenship based on Lefebvre would look like and what its implications would be. Again, the purpose of this exercise is to articulate an alternative citizenship outside the Westphalian order, one that can be particularly useful in imagining a new politics through which to resist the current neoliberalization of the global political economy. My argument is that forms of citizenship based on Lefebvre, such as the right to the global city, radically expand and extend the scope of citizens’ control over the decisions that affect their material opportunity. Moreover, the principles of Lefebvrian citizenship offer a direct challenge to the assumptions of capitalist social relations. Thus, Lefebvrian citizenships like the right to the global city point to both the instrumental and normative rethinking of citizenship necessary to more effectively challenge the neoliberalization of the global political economy.

Following Lefebvre, the right to the global city would go to those who inhabit the global city. The right would be earned through everyday inhabitance, through each inhabitant’s contribution to the lived space of the global city. The political focus of this citizenship — the decisions that fall within its ambit — are the decisions that produce the space of the global city. With respect to these decisions, global-city inhabitants have two main rights. They would have the right to appropriation, which confers the right to fully and completely use, live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize, and occupy the space of the global city. They would also have the right to participation: to play a central role in the decisions that produce global-city space. The right to participation would empower global city citizens to advocate for the importance of use value as a primary consideration in the production of urban space.

Expanding the limits of LDW citizenship

The right to the global city radically rethinks the limitations of LDW citizenship. Whereas the latter limits the decision-making authority of citizens primarily to decisions made by the state, the right to the global city gives inhabitants a say in all decisions that produce space in the global city. Many such decisions are made within the state, but more are made outside it. Therefore, LDW citizenship prevents citizen control over a range of decisions that are made outside the state but that nevertheless produce space in the global city, and therefore significantly impact the material fortunes of inhabitants. For example, investment decisions of large corporations are made largely outside the state apparatus. In Los Angeles in the mid-1980s a wave of plant closures profoundly reworked the employment geography of the city. Part of a classic process of deindustrialization, manufacturers of products such as steel, cars, tires, airplane parts, etc. began leaving the region. The state was able to nibble around the edges of these disinvestment and reinvestment decisions (through tax incentives, subsidies, regulatory exemptions, etc.), but they were made largely in the boardrooms of the large corporations concerned with maximizing profit margins. LDW citizenship afforded Angelenos control over these decisions only to the limited extent the state was able to influence the corporate calculus. Local workers were therefore unable to effectively challenge the disinvestment by means of their LDW citizenship rights. They were forced into direct action and protest tactics, which, despite admirable success in building local social movements that continue into the present, were unable to prevent the massive loss of high-wage manufacturing jobs in the region (Keil, 1998).
Alternatively, the right to the global city would have required that Angelenos play a central role in the decision-making process because such disinvestment decisions had a profound impact on the employment geography of the city. The voice of inhabitants would not have been constrained by the limits to state authority; rather the disinvestment decisions would have fallen squarely within the scope of their authority as inhabitants with a right to the global city. It is not possible to know what results would have been achieved, but it is clear that inhabitants and their agenda would have played a much more central role in the decision-making process.

Even when urban space is produced more directly by state decisions, the right to the global city would provide inhabitants with a much more direct role in decision-making than would LDW citizenship. For example, in Los Angeles presently a group called the Bus Riders Union (BRU) is struggling to shift transportation investment from trains, which serve wealthier, largely white riders, to buses, which serve poorer, largely non-white riders. Billions of dollars in federal grant money have been used to build a train system rather than to improve the bus service. Angelenos who are US citizens had some indirect say in these decisions. They had the ability to use their status as voters to pressure their elected representatives (at the local and federal levels) who were involved in the decisions. However, this arrangement does not give inhabitants the right to participate centrally in the decision-making process but rather a diffuse and indirect influence over the people who do participate centrally. In contrast, the right to the global city would mean that inhabitants have a right to participate centrally, because these decisions impact the transportation geography of the city significantly. They might use this centrality to argue for more investment in buses that would better meet the everyday transportation needs of the majority of local inhabitants.

But what of those inhabitants who are not citizens of the nation-state in which their city is located? Because international migrants are increasingly concentrated in global cities, they contain a growing number of inhabitants who are not formal citizens (Sassen, 1999). Non-citizen migrants are therefore excluded from even the limited and indirect participation open to formal citizens. In the BRU case this distinction is particularly salient, since bus riders are disproportionately non-citizens and train riders are disproportionately citizens. More than just limiting inhabitants to an indirect role in decisions about public transportation, in this case LDW citizenship tends to systematically include in decision-making one segment of transport riders (train riders) and exclude another (bus riders). The right to the global city eliminates this exclusion because it defines citizenship on the basis of inhabitance rather than nationality. Since train riders and bus riders are both inhabitants of the city, both would participate centrally in the decision-making process.

Moreover, beyond eliminating such arbitrary exclusion of some inhabitants, the inhabitance criterion offers a direct challenge to the sovereignty assumptions of the LDW order. The principle of inhabitance necessitates that the right to the global city be independent from nation-state citizenship. Unlike current municipal, county, or state citizenship, inhabitance must grant citizenship rights regardless of one’s nationality, since citizens of Mexico, Iran, Vietnam, Ireland, the USA, etc. all inhabit Los Angeles and so all have the same right to the global city. This independence means that the right to the global city explodes the nested scalar hierarchies of political membership in the Westphalian order. An Angeleno inhabitant could be simultaneously a formal citizen of Mexico, a citadin-inhabitant of Los Angeles, and not a formal citizen of the United States. The Westphalian notion of a nested scalar hierarchy of membership — in which each citizenship scale is subordinate to the scales above it with ultimate loyalty at the national scale — is therefore opened up and reconfigured by the right to the global city.

The scalar diversity of the processes that produce space in the global city also jumbles the nested scalar hierarchy that defines citizen control in LDW citizenship. Under LDW citizenship, an inhabitant of Los Angeles can vote on governmental issues in the City of Los Angeles, and she can vote on issues in any larger jurisdiction in which Los Angeles is nested. She cannot vote on issues in cities other than Los Angeles, states other than California, or nation-states other than the USA, even if those decisions might
profoundly affect the space of the city where she lives. The right to the global city encompasses all decisions that produce space in the global city, and that space is produced by processes at many different scales. Therefore, the decision-making ‘reach’ of global city inhabitants is not nested in and confined to a rigid scalar hierarchy. Under the right to the global city, all processes that produce space in an inhabitant’s city, at whatever scale and in whatever location, are subject to her right to participation. For example, if the government of Mexico were considering a land reform decision in Oaxaca that would influence international migration streams to Los Angeles, the right to participation would give Angeleno inhabitants a say in that decision. Clearly, the participation of Angeleno inhabitants in such a decision would violate Mexico’s territorial sovereignty as well as the scalar nesting whereby a nation-state has absolute authority within its territory. To take an example of decisions outside the state, now that Boeing (headquartered in Chicago) owns Hughes Electronics’ satellite communications operations (in the Los Angeles region), Los Angeles inhabitants would have the right to participate in any decision Boeing might make to shift satellite investment from Los Angeles to Korea or elsewhere, since such a move would affect employment opportunity in Los Angeles. Since the geography of employment is a key component of inhabitants’ lived space, the right to participation would allow Angeleno inhabitants a seat at the table in Chicago. Because processes at all scales produce space in the global city, the right to the global city extends beyond urban and national borders and reshuffles and breaks open the limitations of the nested hierarchy of LDW citizenship.

Rethinking capitalist social relations
The right to the global city not only transcends the limitations of LDW citizenship, it couples this expanded scope and authority with an agenda that specifically undermines and rethinks important premises in capitalist social relations. It therefore contains the potential for resisting the increasing scope and authority of capitalist firms over the global economy. First, the right to appropriation stands in direct opposition to the private property relation of owners vs. trespassers. Under the property relation the owners of urban space may use and control access to their parcels as they see fit. They have extensive rights as property owners, rights that are fundamental to class relations in capitalism. Appropriation is the right of everyday users: it denies the right of ownership and emphasizes the right of inhabitants to use the space of their city. In the most concrete sense, this would mean that an owner could not prevent inhabitants from using the owner’s property. An owner of a downtown hotel, for example, would not be able to prevent an inhabitant from stopping in to rest and eat lunch in the hotel’s well-appointed lobby. In perhaps a more politically charged sense, the owner of a factory would not be able to prevent workers from accessing the factory floor and its machines. The right to appropriation, therefore, would destabilize foundational assumptions of capitalist social relations and could severely disrupt the process of capitalist accumulation.

Moreover, because the right to appropriation is a right of use, it undermines a second important principle in capitalist relations: that the primary value for urban land is its exchange value. The right to appropriation involves more than just the right to physically occupy urban space, it also means that inhabitants have a right to an urban geography that best meets their use-value needs. Since the use value and exchange value of land are often in direct conflict, appropriation would trump exchange value as a guiding principle in the decisions that produce the geography of the city. Urban space might still be owned, and owners might still seek to valorize it (or to valorize

6 Of course, the right to the city would work both ways. For example, residents of Ciudad Juarez would have a say in the investment decisions of American TNCs wanting to locate in the city. They might use their right to participation to prevent the relocation of a chemical company that would dump benzene into the Rio Grande.

7 I recognize that the interests of use and exchange (or ownership) are not mutually exclusive categories (I have engaged this debate at length in Purcell, 2001). However, it is clear that Marx’s categories overlap far less than they differ, and thus the distinction would set the interests of appropriation/use against those of property rights/exchange in the vast majority of cases.
commodities on it), but those exchange-value interests would tend to run counter to the right to appropriation. In order to avoid violating the right to appropriation, land would have to be developed in ways that best met the use-value needs of inhabitants, ways which would often stifle the exchange-value potential of land. For example, while razing a residential hotel to build an office tower in downtown Los Angeles would increase a property’s exchange value and thereby also increase tax revenue for the state, it would violate the right to appropriation of the low-income residents who live in the hotel and most fully use its space. Such redevelopment is widespread in global cities (Smith, 1996). Currently the property rights and exchange value interests of the owner (mitigated somewhat by state policies such as zoning and safety) are the primary logic that governs the development of urban space. If the owner can valorize the property within local codes, she is welcome to do so. The right to the global city would offer a set of developed counter-logics to this process that would challenge the rights of capital by emphasizing the rights of hotel inhabitants. It would develop an alternative citizenship beyond the current model (in which formal citizens may lobby their representatives and unelected planners, even if they routinely and eagerly approve such redevelopment). The right to appropriation suggests an alternative politics of the production of urban space in which the use-value needs of inhabitants sit squarely in the center of the debate.

The right to the global city would operationalize the right to appropriation through the right to participation. Inhabitants would be able to pursue appropriation by participating centrally in the decisions that produce urban space. In the case of the residential hotel, the right to the global city does not imagine a politics in which capital and the state still make the decisions, but now must consider inhabitants’ right to appropriation. Instead, it points to a politics in which inhabitants’ right to participation gives them a central role in the decision-making process; they can use that central role to pursue an urban geography that upholds their right to appropriation. Capital and the state are thereby decentered (though likely not eliminated) in the decision-making process. As I suggest above, the urbanization of capital and the valorization of (or commodity valorization on) urban land have been central accumulation strategies in capitalism for at least the past two centuries. Therefore, control of the production of urban space is critical for capitalist accumulation. It is no great surprise that throughout the twentieth century the decisions that produce urban space have been made primarily by capital interests in concert with state interests, while urban inhabitants have been left largely out of the process (Judd, 1984; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Cox and Mair, 1988). The right to participation, therefore, imagines a new politics that reorganizes control over urban space and destabilizes a politics that has been an important prerequisite for capital accumulation in the modern era.

My example of a residential hotel gives the misleading impression that the right to the global city is confined to local land-use politics. On the contrary, the right to participation extends beyond the urban scale to affect supra-local processes that produce space in the global city. Global city inhabitants would have a central role in decisions about the geography of international capital flows, the investment decisions of transnational corporations, national and international policies on trade, and a variety of other processes, all of which contribute significantly to producing space in the global city. The right to the global city would insinuate inhabitant participation into a particularly broad set of decisions because of the unusual importance of multi-scalar processes in producing space in the global city. Because it would emphasize the use value of inhabitants in these decisions, the right to the global city would decenter the profit motive as the core logic of investment decisions. Moreover, because the command and control functions that are increasingly important for the coordination of the global economy are so spatially concentrated in global cities, and because the right to the global city reimagines who should control the production of global-city space, this specific form of Lefebvrian citizenship poses a particular challenge to the decision-making assumptions of the globalized neoliberal economy. The rise of global cities has helped capital to coordinate the increasingly complex
system of global flows, but it also increases capital’s dependence on a very specific set of spaces around the world (Sassen, 2000). If the space of global cities cannot be efficiently produced to coordinate international production and investment, the architecture of neoliberal globalization becomes more unstable. The right to the global city directly challenges for control of those spaces; it can therefore be a particularly effective means to undermine and rethink the politics and geography of the neoliberal global economy.

In sum, the right to the global city imagines a specific but radical democratization of the decisions that shape the flows of material wealth in the capitalist world system (Bowles and Gintis, 1986).

Conclusion

As numerous activists and scholars have stressed, there is an urgent need to resist and create alternatives to the expansion of capitalist social relations and the intensification of capital’s control over global restructuring. This article has highlighted the extent to which such resistance requires new forms and practices of citizenship that rethink and expand the limits of the current LDW forms. The contemporary era has been characterized by a proliferation of citizenship forms that simultaneously destabilize the current structure and create opportunities for new forms to emerge. While the emergence of most of these new forms tends to destabilize the current LDW structure, not all forms present a specific challenge to the increasing control of capital in the world economy. In that context, the article has begun the process of imagining a new citizenship based on Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city that challenges and rethinks both LDW citizenship and capitalist control of the global economy. To date, the scattered engagement with Lefebvre’s idea both inside and outside academia has failed to develop the full potential of his idea. When engaged in depth, the right to the city opens the door to a new politics in which capital and the state are displaced and the voice and agenda of urban inhabitants occupy center stage.

In order to offer a more specific articulation of citizenship based on the right to the city, the article has limited its focus to how Lefebvre might inform citizenship in the global city. However, it is important to move the discussion in the other direction as well: to extrapolate the notion of Lefebvrian citizenship beyond the context of the city. Although Lefebvre (and many urbanists) might recoil at such a claim, it is not unreasonable to argue that the city is almost incidental to Lefebvre’s idea. Fundamentally, Lefebvre conceives of a politics in which inhabitants (instead of capital and the state) take a central role in the decisions that produce the space where they live. Because of Lefebvre’s expansive notion of space, control over the production of space confers control over the production of all aspects of life, both material and non-material. For Lefebvre, the production of space encompasses the most fundamental processes of social life: the transformation of nature, the production of material goods, and the experience and representation of place (Lefebvre, 1991b). The right to the city can thus be extended beyond the urban to be conceived of more generally as the right to inhabit — the right to participate centrally in the decisions that shape one’s everyday life. In this context, we might recast the quote from Lefebvre at the beginning of the article to make a more general claim: the right to inhabit is like a cry and a demand . . . a transformed and renewed right to life. The idea that inhabitants have a right to control their everyday life extends beyond the city and can be applied to inhabitants in all geographical contexts. It opens the door to a new citizenship and a new politics in which the decisions that produce space are made through deliberation among inhabitants, rather than through negotiation between capital and the state. Such a politics doesn’t necessarily guarantee a more just political economy. It does, however, point to a more democratic politics in which the current control of capital is undone, and a vibrant debate among inhabitants
engages fundamental questions about the structure and purpose of global political economy.

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