Gramsci Is Not Dead: For a ‘Both/And’ Approach to Radical Geography

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Introduction

“We refuse to play ‘take it or leave it’…”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p. 117)

This paper explores the relation between anarchism/autonomia and other traditions in radical geography. It draws on and extends previous work that argues for how we might enable more productive interaction among various traditions within radical geography (Purcell 2003), economic geography (Barnes and Sheppard 2009), and geography more broadly (Sheppard and Plummer 2007). I argue here that we should aim at more inclusive relations, which is to say radical geography should try to hold together, in tension, anarchist/autonomist approaches with other radical approaches. More specifically, the paper argues that we can and should draw together both counter-hegemonic and non-hegemonic politics into productive tension. Even more specifically, I think we can create an approach to radical politics that values both 1) the post-Marxist neo-Gramscianism of Laclau and Mouffe, which embraces hegemony as a political project (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Gramsci 1971; Gramsci 2000), and 2) the relatively more anarchist/autonomist thought of Deleuze and Guattari (1977; 1987; 1986), which aims at a non-hegemonic politics. I try to flesh out what such an approach might look like by briefly elaborating the concept of “networks of equivalence.”

Before I turn to networks of equivalence and my case for more inclusive relations, however, I want to argue against another way of conceiving the relationship between anarchism/autonomia and other radical approaches. I call this an either/or approach. I do not claim that this approach represents all anarchist thinkers. Rather I contend that this line of thinking exists among some anarchist thinkers, even prominent ones, and it is a kind of thinking that works against a vibrant radical geography. In characterizing the argument of the either/or approach, I focus on the work of Richard Day and David Graeber, two leading anarchist thinkers who were among those highlighted in the original call for...
papers for the conference sessions from which the papers in this special issue are drawn. To be clear, the work of both Day and Graeber is excellent and offers a wealth of theoretical and political insight. My critique is merely of one strain of their work, this tendency to think in terms of either/or.

The either/or approach constructs a particular narrative about the relationship between anarchist/autonomist politics and other radical approaches. The narrative tells of a mainstream radical politics that is ignoring or marginalizing anarchist and autonomist perspectives. What is needed, it argues, is a valorization of anarchism/autonomia so that it is granted its full measure of respect and can participate fully in the discourse of radical politics. As David Graeber (2004, pp. 202-203) puts it,

many of those who would like to see revolutionary change might not feel entirely happy about having to accept that most of the creative energy for radical politics is now coming from anarchism—a tradition that they have hitherto mostly dismissed—and that taking the [alter-globalization] movement seriously will necessarily also mean a respectful engagement with [the anarchist tradition].

Richard Day (2005, p. 15) agrees, arguing that “the problem has been that the possibilities of social change without the state form have been marginalized by the dominance of (post)Marxist and (neo)liberal models of social change.” Day reiterates this claim often throughout his book (e.g. 2005, pp. 54, 84).

I think this narrative is unhelpful for several reasons. First, it is not in keeping with an anarchist sensibility to appeal to a dominant mainstream for inclusion in that mainstream. Second, it is very possible that the narrative is inaccurate. It ascribes a marginality to anarchism/autonomia that may very well not exist, at least in geography. If we accept that the work of Foucault and Deleuze & Guattari both have very strong strains of anarchist thought and politics, and that Antonio Negri is an important thinker in the Italian autonomist tradition, then anarchism and autonomia are probably more central today to contemporary radical geography than regulation theory or spatial Marxism or post-Marxism. I don’t wish to touch off an extended debate about, for example, whether Deleuze and Guattari are anarchists. Let me just say that, at the very least, their thought features very strong anarchist instincts. These instincts are to be found all over their work, but let me just offer a few examples. They insist that we should not confront and capture the powers that be, but flee them and construct instead our own autonomous alternatives (e.g. 1977, p. 277). More specifically, they stand radically opposed to the state form; not simply the bourgeois state, but the state-in-general (especially 1987, Chapters 12 and 13). As a result, they leave no room for a politics that would have a political party seize the state and institute a new, more progressive hegemony (see also 1987, Chapter 6). They are very much committed to a non-hegemonic politics, which is, as we will see, at the very core much contemporary anarchism. One place that non-hegemonic politics is manifested is in their insistence that there is “no becoming majoritarian.” That is, they reject any project to become the norm, to occupy the dominant center of society (1987, pp. 106, 291; see also 1986). That approach can never achieve their goal, which is to free up desiring-production such that we are able to fully realize our human potential for autonomous creation.

A last reason this narrative of marginalization is unhelpful, which is perhaps the most important one, is that this sense of marginalization and the resulting desire to boost the profile of anarchism/autonomia in radical thought tends to produce a corrosive kind of discourse in which anarchism and autonomia are rhetorically advocated over and above, rather than in addition to, other approaches. Because anarchism and autonomia are perceived to be weak and in need of a vigorous defense against the dominant mainstream, we get language like this: we need groups that operate “non-hegemonically rather than counter-hegemonically” (Day 2005, p. 8), or “a politics of minority rather
than majority, of affinity rather than hegemony” (Day 2005, p. 17). For Graeber (2004, p. 212), the alter-globalization movement “is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations….”

This either/or imagination inspires a supporting narrative, a kind of rhetorical epochalism that sees an old, outdated idea of counter-hegemony as a dead weight holding us back, and a vibrant and innovative non-hegemonic approach that is “the source of most of what’s new and hopeful about” contemporary radical politics (Graeber 2004, p. 203). In line with Graeber, the Notes from Nowhere collective (2003) wants to read the massive proliferation of alter-globalization movements around the world as basically anarchist, when the reality is much more complex. The Zapatistas, for example, are more explicitly anarchist (see Subcommandante Marcos 2003), but a group like the landless movement in Brazil is explicitly inspired by Gramsci, and even Lenin (see Stedile 2004).

Richard Day is particularly taken with the idea of this epochal shift. We should advance “the ongoing displacement of the hegemony of hegemony by an affinity for affinity” (2005, p. 9). He applauds anarchist groups that “are undoing the hegemony of hegemony that guides (neo)liberal and (post)marxist theory and practice” (2005, p. 45). Quoting Nick Crossly, he suggests the counter-hegemonic idea behind “the term new social movements is rapidly approaching its sell-by date” (2005, p. 66); hegemony, he implies, is fast becoming rotten and unusable. The best autonomists, Day says, are “the ones who have most fully left behind their leninist baggage,” who attempt to “break with the hegemony of hegemony” (2005, p. 130). He quotes Agamben approvingly: “the coming politics…will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the state” (2005, p. 181). “The logic of hegemony has been exhausted” (Day 2005, p. 203). Most spectacular is the title of his book: “Gramsci is dead.”

In Day’s case, one effect of this either/or imagination, of this quest to leave hegemonic politics behind, is a suspect and inconsistent characterization of hegemony. For example, at times hegemony appears as “a totalizing, all-knowing position” (Day 2005, p. 78). But the best-known hegemonic thinkers, like Laclau and Mouffe, are unmistakably clear on the non-totalizing nature of their concept of hegemony. There is also much lumping of ‘them’ (counter-hegemonic thinkers) in order to valorize an ‘us’ (non-hegemonic thinkers). The result is a strange amalgam he calls “(neo)liberal and (post)marxist theory and practice,” a bogeyman Day refers to often. It lumps Gramsci and neo-Gramscians in with everyone from Thomas Hobbes to Alan Greenspan, and it does injustice to the complex idea and politics of hegemony.

This dichotomist account also causes Day to miss the extensive agreement that his anarchism shares with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism. They both insist, in an ontological assertion that is absolutely critical to both their arguments, that it is not possible to eliminate antagonism and domination from human relationships (e.g. Day 2005, pp. 109, 137, 154, 157, 169; Laclau and Mouffe 2000). This idea is the very bedrock of Laclau and Mouffe’s view of hegemony, and it is the reason why theirs can never be a totalizing politics. That point of significant agreement between Day and Laclau and Mouffe strongly suggests that hegemony is a complex and quite subtle concept that may well retain much of value to contemporary radical politics, and even to contemporary anarchism. It is not an idea we can afford to bury.

The same goes for Gramsci, of course. So much of his thought was built out of his experience with the factory council movement in Turin during the biennio rosso and its incredible if temporary achievements of factory occupations and workers’ self-management. As a result of this experience, Gramsci consistently and fiercely opposed the vanguardism other members of the Italian Communist Party, particularly Amadeo Bordiga. He worked throughout his life to resist the party leadership’s
desire to impose its will on the membership. Gramsci was therefore a vital source of the tradition of thought and action to which contemporary factory occupations and autogestion experiments, e.g. in Argentina in 2001, are deeply indebted. Lamentably, it is precisely those movements that are celebrated by the Notes from Nowhere collective as part of the global wave of anarchist movements that have left behind the dead weight of thinkers like Gramsci. What a great tragedy it would be, what a world would be lost, if Gramsci really were dead.

Instead of this epochal change from counter-hegemony to non-hegemony, I want to advocate an approach that takes its cue from Deleuze and Guattari, who encourage us to develop thought and action by a method that is additive, inclusive, and polyvocal (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, pp. 76, 105; see also Foucault 1977, p. xiii). They advocate analyses that connect up multiple elements and hold them in tension, but still allow them to remain distinct. They urge us to adopt an affinity for fullness, for stuffing thought and action with as many perspectives as we can handle (1977, pp. 6-7). Of course such an approach will likely produce disagreement, drawing together arguments that conflict in significant ways. Antagonisms will emerge. But rather than try to resolve those antagonisms by excluding or moving beyond those that don’t fit, we can try to hold them together in productive tension. This is difficult, and Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge it can lead to breakdowns as well as breakthroughs. Mirroring their idea of a line of flight, we might say it is a high-wire act that can be very productive and also very destructive (1987, p. 503). It is a gamble, but one I think in the present moment radical politics is in a position to accept. The failures of actually existing socialism, the consequent extreme fragmentation and cynicism among many on the left, and the rise of neoliberal hegemony all suggest the need for innovation, for creative experimentation with thought and action. Indeed, I think this is the way we should read the multiple alter-globalization movements: not as moving beyond hegemony into anarchism, but as a profoundly diverse upwelling of experimental initiatives, many anarchist and autonomist, many not, who are producing all sorts of new ideas about a politics to come. In this particular conjuncture, Gramsci is not at all dead. We need Gramsci desperately. But no more than we need Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault, and Luxembourg, and Bakunin, and Kropotkin, and Tronti, and Butler, and Marx. “And…and…and…” as Deleuze and Guattari would say (1987, p. 98).

I devote the remainder of this paper to giving a specific and limited, but I hope useful, example of what such an inclusive approach might look like. I have been developing the idea of “networks of equivalence” as a way to imagine political practice against neoliberalization and for democratization (Purcell 2008; Purcell 2009). The concept draws principally on Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari. It is an attempt to imagine how a diverse proliferation of struggles can hold together in productive tension, to work in concert without being reduced to a single, unified movement.

Networks of Equivalence

As I say above, the left is just emerging from a period of disarray brought on by the failures of actually existing socialism and the rise of neoliberal hegemony. There have been intense debates about how (or whether) to bring about broad social change. I think the stakes of those debates have only been raised now that neoliberal hegemony has fallen into crisis as a result of the current economic crisis. The current conjuncture is thus an important opportunity: now more than ever the left needs creative new ideas about how to think and how to act. Networks of equivalence are one possible way forward.

I imagine networks of equivalence to be broad coalitions that bring together many different struggles, movements, and groups. In doing so, they seek to engage productively an eternal and irresolvable tension in politics: that between sameness/unity on the one hand, and...
difference/multiplicity on the other. Networks of equivalence reject the reductionism of the old left, in which multiple identities are reduced to a single, unifying identity (usually class). But they also reject the fragmentation of radical difference in which multiple autonomous movements seek no common cause or broader political change. They insist, instead, on relations of equivalence: simultaneous autonomy and interdependence among groups in a mobilized network. Their goal is not to replace the current hegemony with an alternative one, nor simply to flee all domination. Rather it is to relentlessly and radically democratize and equalize the social field.

**Gramsci**

Gramsci’s thought is extremely valuable for this project because of the particular way he understands hegemony. Against many of his Marxist contemporaries, Gramsci did not rely on the inevitable proletarianization of the masses to solve the problem of political mobilization. Rather he accepted that society would remain too fragmented for one group to achieve broad political control on its own (1971, pp. 52-120). For Gramsci achieving hegemony is necessarily a process of a particular social group assembling many irreducibly different groups into a coalition that can act in concert to exercise broader societal control (2000, p. 382; 1971, p. 181). Building such hegemonic coalitions, for Gramsci, is what constitutes radical politics. As a result, he thinks extensively about alliance building and the nature of the relationship between allies. He wants to go beyond the typical alliance relationship, in which one group joins another strategically and temporarily to achieve a limited common goal. Instead he imagines an enduring connection in which groups are significantly transformed by the process of joining with each other. He argues each group must partly take on board, as their own, the interests of the other groups in the coalition (1971, p. 161). Each is partly remade by its association with the others. Together, they build a wider movement in which the parts are not reduced to unity, but neither do they remain entirely self-contained and autonomous.

However, despite this notion of mutual reconstitution, Gramsci stops short of arguing for full equality among members of a coalition. Rather for him one group should take a leading role in constructing the agenda and strategy of the wider movement (1971, pp. 161, 240; 2000, p. 212). For Gramsci, in his context, that group is the working class, and it should lead because of its position in the relations of economic production (2000, pp. 211-212). Gramsci was adamant about rejecting economic reductionism, but he did retain this aspect of it, in which one element of a hegemonic formation was more important, was assigned a leading role, because of its economic function.

Despite this remaining economism, the idea of “leading” is nuanced in Gramsci. It is not the same thing as dictating or dominating. It involves, rather, a complex politics between leaders and led. The proletariat should lead, for Gramsci, by means of a political party, a permanently organized cadre of leadership. This leadership is important for him because it provides institutional organization that enables movements to act effectively when political opportunities arise (1971, p. 240; 2000, p. 240). He is convinced that radical politics often requires swift and decisive action when the right historical circumstances emerge, and so he believes disciplined party leadership is necessary. However, Gramsci clearly opposes the Leninist idea of a vanguardist relation in which wise party leaders make decisions for the masses. Instead, he argues for what he calls “democratic centralism,” which he sees as a way to maintain disciplined organization without vanguardism.

Democratic centralism [is] a continual adaptation of the [party] organization to the real movement, a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous

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3 For him the central example was the northern Italian proletariat taking on board the interests of the southern Italian peasants.
4 Gramsci typically uses the word *dirigente*, an elastic word that can connote meanings like: leading, directing, guiding, or steering.
5 It was Amadeo Bordiga who typified the vanguardist position in the Italian politics of Gramsci’s time.
insertion of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience (1971, pp. 188-189).

He sees this relation as cultivating a perpetual and lively give-and-take between the spontaneous will of the party membership and the “solid framework” of the party leadership. Democratic centralism thus imagines a political network that is organized through a central leadership, but that is not a relation of simple domination of center over periphery, of leaders over led.

My concept of equivalence, adapted from Laclau and Mouffe, leaves aside Gramsci’s notion of a leading class. It begins from an anti-essentialist assumption that the political identity of an individual or a group is never given, rather it is produced through the process of political action. It is constantly being reworked through multiple engagements with others in society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, pp. 97-105). In other words, each group’s identity and agenda is immanent to their political context; it is not defined by a transcendental logic about its essential character. As a result, no group can be considered necessarily more fundamental to the network’s project than any of the others. Each group must engage the others on an equal footing (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 87). The concept of equivalence thus operates without Gramsci’s idea of a leading group who has that status by virtue of its foundational role in the means of production. The character of a network of equivalence, its sense of itself and what it desires, emanates from multiple points; it is built up collectively by co-equal groups who have chosen to work in concert. A network of equivalence is a constantly evolving and never-finished project, made and remade both by the interrelations among its constituent groups, and by its engagement with its outside, by its specific experience in political struggles.

However, moving beyond Gramsci’s concept of a leading group does not necessarily mean rejecting his idea of democratic centralism. In Gramsci’s democratic centralism the organized leadership is occupied by a party that is the organ of a particular class. But an organized center does not have to be staffed by a workers (or any) party. It can exist, as a relatively centralized and organized node in a network, without being associated with a leading group. In other words, a network of equivalence can be substantially centralized without a leading class, and without a party organization. Moreover, and to take this idea a step farther, it is possible for such centers to be impermanent, for them to form, carry out an organizing function for a time, and then dissolve, thereby allowing other centers to form and coordinate in another parts of the network. In other words, there is a range of ways to think about centrality and organization in networked movements that complicate a stark dichotomy between hegemony and non-hegemony and so multiply our political options.

**Deleuze and Guattari**

Unlike Gramsci, Deleuze and Guattari (1977; 1987) are writing in the wake of World War II and during the era of actually existing socialism. Both experiences made abundantly clear the horrors of totalitarian political regimes. Deleuze and Guattari are concerned to prevent such catastrophes at all costs (1987, pp. 165, 230-231; 1977, p. 105; see also Foucault 1977). They offer an extremely rich and provocative politics, the core of which is a rejection of domination and a celebration of autonomy. For Gramsci, we resist the current hegemonic order to establish a new order, but for Deleuze and Guattari the project is explicitly to refuse all ruling orders. For them no hegemony is desirable. As we saw above, they signal an explicit break from a Gramscian approach when they avow that “the problem is never to acquire the majority...there is no becoming-majoritarian” (1987, pp. 106, see also 291; 1986).

They want us to flee rule and domination, to subvert control, to escape from the “apparatuses of

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6 The newspaper he is so associated with was called L’Ordine Nuovo (The New Order).
capture”—the family, the state, identity, the signifier, the party—that stifle autonomy and homogenize difference (1987, pp. 424-473). Such escapes, conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari as “lines of flight,” are unstable states of motion, always in-between fixed points. They are determined acts of running away. They can never be end states, or even stable resting conditions. Stability and rest are precisely what Deleuze and Guattari want us to question and undermine. Their political project is to pursue a relentless, unending series of flights, of escapes, of prison breaks.

However, despite this emphasis on difference and autonomy, Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of connecting lines of flight (1987, pp. 470-473; 1977, pp. 43, 318-321). They are very interested in how each flight can join up with other escaped elements into something like mutual aid networks, or what they call “minoritarian aggregates” (1987, p. 472). Here of course they overlap significantly with Gramsci’s concerns. For Deleuze and Guattari these aid networks can “augment the valence” of each element, helping it to become stronger and evade recapture (1987, p. 229). They certainly imagine a measure of commonality among the lines here—lines of flight share something that allows them to see the benefit of mutual aid. However, that commonality is primarily a shared desire to remain in flight, for each to continue the project of “becoming minoritarian.” It is not a desire to form a new and ‘better’ order, since such orders are precisely what the lines are fleeing from (1987, p. 350).

As a result, Deleuze and Guattari refuse any kind of party organization for minoritarian aggregates. They often speak instead of a living block (1987, p. 190), or a rhizome (1987, Chapter 1). A rhizome is a network that is both acentered and non-hierarchical. Each element links to all others horizontally, on an equal footing. There is no “general,” no central or more important body that commands the network (1987, p. 17). Deleuze and Guattari oppose the idea of party leadership (1987, p. 116). They leave vague how the network will be organized and rely heavily on a naturalistic logic of emergence, or self-organization. Gramsci would be frustrated with this vagueness; he insists that to be effective the movement must be able to act consciously and strategically, which for him means striking capitalist hegemony when it is weak and establishing an alternative, communist order.

**Agenda**

So there is an important overlap between Gramsci and Deleuze-Guattari on this question of connections, of mobilized groups connecting up with each other to sustain and advance their project. However, they diverge on the question of a new order. Following the additive method I advocate above, networks of equivalence aim to take both arguments seriously. With Gramsci, they pursue systemic political change through broad coalitional movements. However, they do not seek to establish a new order, a new system of domination that replaces the neoliberal one with a ‘better,’ socialist one. With Deleuze and Guattari, they insist on autonomy and hope to ward off both domination and totalization, by the state or any other entity. However, with Day and Laclau & Mouffe, they accept that structures of power and domination are ineradicable, that they will always be present in society. It is not possible to create a utopian end of history where power and domination are eliminated and liberty is total, as Proudhon sometimes imagined (1969, p. 92). But even if domination is endemic to politics, we can do more than merely flee from domination. We can link up together into coalitional entities that are capable of acting on the apparatuses of capture, the structures of domination, in order to remake them. Here I take my cue from Laclau and Mouffe to argue that this remaking should entail a relentless and radical democratization and equalization of the apparatuses of social control and domination. This process does not result in a socialist hegemony led by a communist party. It does not

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7 I think we could reasonably read the idea of a body without organs as, among other things, a vision of a (political) body without (party) organs.

8 On the point of the end of history and politics, see also Ranciere (1995; 1999) and Mouffe (1999; 2002).
result in the end of domination. But it is also much more than an ephemeral flight from control that will quickly be recaptured. It is rather a radical, sustained, and wide-ranging democratization and equalization of society.

This agenda is *radical* in the sense that it goes well beyond the highly limited popular control and formal political equality of liberal democracy. But the agenda is not *total*: it does not desire total democracy and equality. It is instead a processual agenda of democratization and equalization. It is a struggle that can never be completed, never finally won. Counter-forces (e.g. authoritarianism, capitalism, liberal democracy) will always resist movements for radical democratization. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the struggle for radical democratization must involve a contest for control, a struggle for leadership in the polity that is never final, never total, always being built up, always being contested, and always thoroughly political (see also Laclau and Mouffe 2000, p. xvii).

**Network organization**

Given that the concept of networks of equivalence seeks to take seriously both Gramsci’s agenda and that of Deleuze and Guattari, so too my way to imagine networks accepts both 1) Deleuze and Guattari’s legitimate opposition to a permanently organized and hierarchical party leadership, and, with Gramsci, 2) that a relentless movement for radical democratization and equalization requires a degree of centralization and leadership structure in order to remain relentless and effective. As in any movement, sustained action is far more likely with a division of labor where some carry out the day-to-day operations, and the many focus on other tasks. Because the goal is not merely to remain in flight, but to pursue a radical democratization of the polity, a measure of centralized leadership is needed. Naturalistic metaphors of emergence and self-organization are not enough. However, that leadership must always be limited and contested by a lively exchange between center and periphery, between the organization and the mass. It is Gramsci’s democratic centralism without the party at its center, an organized leadership that has no connection with a particular class, or with any group at all. It is a leadership that exists and acts, but that is never permanently occupied by any class of people. Networks of equivalence are complex coalitions of diverse groups who engage each other as peers, and so the leadership functions must be equally shared among all participants. This idea is not without precedent: Aristotle argued that the essence of what it means to be a citizen of the polity is to be capable of both leading and following (1962, Book III, esp. Chapter IV, p. 105). A group that engages in a network of equivalence must be capable of both directing the coalition and being guided by it. Both roles require active participation in the lively exchange between an organized yet leadership and the desire of the multitude.

**Conclusion**

Networks of equivalence are an earnest attempt to engage both counter-hegemonic and non-hegemonic approaches to radical politics. Rather than achieve consistency and resolve tension by excluding perspectives that do not fit, they instead pursue an intellectual and political agenda of both/and, which seeks to include multiple opposing perspectives and provoke productive relations among them. But both/and is not an easy solution to the problems of either/or. Rather both/and necessitates a high-wire act of holding in tension arguments and habits of thought that do not agree. It is a searching attempt to think differently from the failures of either/or: reductionist class movements that rule out difference, postmodern fragmentation that rules out commonality, traditional hegemonic approaches that marginalize anarchism, and more recent anarchist work that seeks to leave Gramsci behind.
Clearly this brief account is unlikely to produce a flawless demonstration of how a both/and method should proceed. We need more practice doing what Foucault enjoins us to do in his preface to Anti-Oedipus: to “develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchicalization” (1977, p. xiii). We spend so much time trying to replace one tradition with a new one, trying to effect the next “turn” in radical geography away from one approach and toward a newer one, that I don’t think we know yet quite how to stuff multiple, often conflicting perspectives into an inclusive intellectual project. We don’t so much need David to slay Goliath as for all of us to get on with the business of a more overstuffed radical geography: anarchism and autonomia and Gramsci and post-Marxism and feminism and regulation theory. “And…and…and….” It is probably more difficult, but it is also, almost certainly, more fertile.

References


