Symbolic versus Blind Patriotism

Distinction without Difference?

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Patriotism is an important predictor of political attitudes and preferences. Nevertheless, the complexity of patriotism remains unresolved, especially as it pertains to blind and symbolic patriotism. Symbolic patriotism represents a relatively abstract, affective attachment to the nation and its core values. Blind patriotism, in contrast, is more concrete, indexing uncritical support for national policies and practices. While the concepts appear analytically distinct, their political consequences are often similar, leading one to question whether the distinction is real. The results offer some support for maintaining conceptual differences between blind and symbolic patriotism.

Keywords: patriotism; democratic norms; tolerance; attitude functions

Few would argue with the proposition that patriotism is an important concept in political science affecting myriad issues central to the study of politics. Patriotism, for instance, informs the political norms of the public insofar as it impacts civil liberties judgments and attitudes toward political and social tolerance (Davis 2007; Huddy and Khatib 2007; McClosky and Brill 1983; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Patriotic appeals have also proven effective in the area of politics in general, where they guide political preferences, policy preferences, and political behavior (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Hurwitz and Peffley 1990; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992).

The explanatory power of patriotism is certified, but its complexity remains open to question. For instance, one view of patriotism conceives it as a blend of affection for the country, its way of life, and its core values, with national institutions and policies responsible for sustaining it, that is, the country and its way of life (Berns 2001; Curti 1946; McIntyre 2002; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992; Viroli 1995).

Another view pushes for a conceptual distinction within patriotism, one that separates the affection that one feels for the nation’s way of life and values from support for its institutions and policies. Generally, political symbols represent one’s attachment to political and cultural values (Almond and Verba 1963; Elder and Cobb 1983). Symbolic patriotism taps one’s affective attachment to the nation and its core values through symbols. Blind patriotism, on the other hand, is aligned with a more cognitive (i.e., ideological) perspective on the relationship between the individual and the nation in which unconditional support for the nation, its institutions, and its chauvinistic policy preferences represents the norm (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; McClosky and Brill 1983; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Schatz and Staub 1997). Thus, blind and symbolic patriotism appear distinct, conforming to arguments that the meaning of patriotism is contested terrain (Dietz 2002; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992).

Which view is correct? This article aims to answer two basic questions about patriotism in the United States. First, is the blind–symbolic divide a distinction without real, tangible difference, as the first approach suggests? Second, if found, what are the political consequences associated with the empirical distinction between blind and symbolic patriotism? More specifically, how might patriotism affect the public’s support for democratic norms, especially due process and free speech? Furthermore, we will also do well to consider the impact of patriotism on social group perception. If the treatment of people of Middle Eastern descent is any indication, tolerance for Arab Americans and adherents of the Islamic religious faith is in short supply. During what some call the Global War on Terror, Arabs and Muslims have come under increased scrutiny, serving as targets for
public and institutional scorn in which they have often fallen victim to discrimination and hate crimes.\(^2\)

To put it bluntly, is either or both types of patriotism conducive to group-based antipathy?

Drawing on recently collected data, this article will test whether the presumed distinction is real and what, if any, consequences accrue to the differences. I examine competing theoretical accounts of the relationship between blind and symbolic patriotism. In what may be called political loyalty, patriotism is represented as a single dimension in which there are no conceptual differences between blind and symbolic patriotism. Another way of conceiving the relationship between blind and symbolic patriotism suggests that differences will emerge once we explore the reason(s) why people accept or reject such attachments. Perhaps it is the case that examining why people hold patriotic attitudes will supply the leverage needed to discriminate between blind and symbolic patriotism. To the extent that each addresses different psychological needs among individuals, empirical differences should emerge between the two.

This article is important for at least two reasons. First, it examines blind and symbolic patriotism with survey data collected after 9/11, a time during which it is possible that the distinction between the two may have become increasingly blurred due, in large measure, to the marriage of patriotic symbols to political conservatism mainly during periods of national crisis. Thus, the results are a possible preview to the “new normal” to which scholars sometimes refer in which Americans feel vulnerable to attack (Huddy et al. 2002; Davis 2007). Second, from a normative point of view, we should wish to know whether the symbols that represent America and its values have become associated with attitudes and behavior that run counter to the values on which the country was founded. If there is no meaningful distinction between symbolic and blind patriotism, we must reconsider what American national symbols represent, if not the freedom and equality on which the nation was founded.

In what follows, I first identify the origins of blind and symbolic patriotism, after which I undertake to distinguish them empirically. Upon confirmation of a two-dimensional model in which blind and symbolic patriotism emerge as distinct concepts, I extend the analysis to selected political consequences of each: democratic norms and social group perception. The results suggest that, for democratic norms, the relationship is relatively complex. That is, more abstract democratic norms, they seem to move in opposite directions in that blind patriotism undermines norms while symbolic patriotism does not. Both, however, undermine more concrete norms in which the rights of the accused are interrogated. The results are more straightforward for social group perception: subscription to blind patriotism dampens affection for outgroups, while symbolic patriotism leads to increasing affection toward the groups. The article, then, concludes with a few comments on the implications of the findings.

A Brief History of Blind and Symbolic Patriotism

American patriotism originates with the founding of the republic in the eighteenth century. Among the colonists, patriots differed from loyalists in that the former were committed to a set of “dissident” principles; the latter continued to favor absolutism. Indeed, critical, dissent-based patriotism enjoys a long, distinguished legacy. Since America was born of colonial dissent from British laws and social custom, American patriotism is rooted in criticism. In the beginning, to be an American patriot required a commitment to principles such as liberty, a free republic, limited government, and civic activism (Dietz 2002). Commitment to liberal principles, however, is not enough. True patriots, according to Berns (2001), are those who are both devoted to American political values and possess a critical understanding of them. However, many of the American patriots either failed to understand these liberal political values or failed to live by them because racial barriers precluded blacks from enjoying such values (Smith 1988; Takaki 1979). Nevertheless, this liberal conception of patriotism held sway well into the nineteenth century.

Eventually, this relatively liberal strand of American patriotism withered in the face of rising nationalism in the West during the nineteenth century (Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm 1990). As such, blind patriotism owes its formation to the confluence of several events occurring toward the end of the nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the sectional division between North and South was diluted, if not entirely put to rest, contributing to the rise of American nationalism in the 1880s (Schaar 1981). Nationalism, in turn, fed American imperialist ambitions, linking love of country to the projection of American power and domination of the racial Others who became subjects of the American empire (Gerstle 2001; Hansen 2001; Singh 2005; Von
American entry into the First World War coincided with the height of the anti-immigrant fever and the cresting nativist movement in which immigrants were encouraged to prove their loyalty by means of naturalization. Otherwise, their allegiance was called into question. German immigrants were the principal targets of anti-immigrant sentiment but were soon joined by southern and eastern Europeans as well as Asian immigrants as the subject of harassment and the vigorous Americanization campaigns. Nativism was also behind the drive to curb the immigration of “undesirable” immigrants (Higham 1985; King 2001).  

The success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 also made the authorities exceedingly wary of dissent of any sort. During the First World War, patriotic symbols and rituals represented national allegiance. However, in the context of the war in Europe and the wariness associated with the presence of German immigrants, allegiance summed to a simple phrase: 100 percent American (Higham 1985). For immigrants, this meant ridding themselves of their hyphenated identities. It also called for universal conformity. Therefore, any sort of social activism undertaken to interrogate the distribution of the American dream was considered radical and, thus, subversive. Under the guise of national unity, chauvinism was permitted. Those who refused to conform by either assimilating (immigrants) or squelching claims to their fair share of American democracy (blacks, women, and workers), were considered un-American. 

The origins of symbolic national attachment are located in nineteenth-century America when the Stars and Stripes, National Anthem, and the Pledge of Allegiance were first recognized as symbols and rituals of national unity. Because sectional and regional differences were so deep prior to the Civil War, attachment to the nation took a back seat to local allegiances. During battles fought during the War of 1812 and the U.S.-Mexican War (1846-1848), emotional sentiments were transferred to the regimental flags. Regiments, in turn, were drawn from state-based militias. While sectional differences were retained and the nation stood pat on local attachment, the aftermath of the U.S.-Mexican engagement stimulated the emergence of the Stars and Stripes as a symbol of national unity inasmuch as “soldiers and citizens alike began to look at [it] as the symbolic repository of their patriotic sentiment” (O’Leary 1999). 

The Civil War marks the first time in which the national ensign was carried into battle; as such, the Stars and Stripes emerged as one of the most important symbols of American nationhood (O’Leary 1999, 30). In the 1880s, the Grand Army of the Republic, among other groups, cemented the flag’s status as a symbol of “abstract nationalism” through promoting the installation of flags for schools, salutes, and lobbying for laws against its desecration (McConnell 1996). The “Star-Spangled Banner” was penned in 1812, but decades passed prior to its recognition as the national anthem. By the early 1890s, the members of the military were required to stand as it played; civil society followed suit in the latter part of the decade (McConnell 1996; O’Leary 1999). In sum, similar to the case of British patriotism in which patriotism shifted from the political left to the political right (Cunningham 1981), so too did American patriotism shift. It began as a dissent-based movement in the eighteenth century that, under the weight of war and national ambition, eventually slid to the political right. To be sure, the left has challenged the right over the use of patriotism, seeking to reclaim its meaning and the attendant symbols (Hansen 2001). However, for reasons I touch on below, the right remains in possession of patriotism—especially if it is defined as unquestioned political loyalty, the subject to which I now turn.

Theory and Hypotheses 

One interpretation of patriotism conceives of it as a single, undifferentiated love of country. The affection associated with patriotism encompasses individuals’ loyalty and devotion to the political institutions and values that sustain the political community as well as their conationalists, even the land on which the nation rests (Curti 1946; Janowitz 1983; MacIntyre 2002; Viroli 1995). Loyalty, however, should not be confused with commitment. According to the late political philosopher Judith Shklar (1993, 184), “What distinguishes loyalty [from commitment] is that it is deeply affective and not primarily rational. . . . [L]oyalty is evoked by nations, ethnic groups . . . and by doctrines, causes [and] ideologies . . . that form and identify associations.”

If the political community includes the nation as a people, the values with which they have come to identify, and allegiance to political institutions anchored by these values, political symbols are arguably the most effective means of fashioning a durable sense of national loyalty. As Michael Walzer (1967, 194) observed, “The state . . . must be symbolized before it can be conceived. . . . When the
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state is imagined as a body politic, then a particular set of insights as to its nature are made available. The image does not so much reinforce existing political ideas as underlie them. It provides an elementary sense of the political community [emphasis added].” The flag, Fourth of July celebrations, and the Pledge of Allegiance were all markers of national loyalty.

In the mid-twentieth century, the political right successfully appropriated American patriotism and its symbols. This is not to say that liberals and moderates did not love the country. On the contrary, to them, patriotism meant that Americans—all Americans—had a right to the American dream, with the state as a primary means of securing it (Gerstle 2001, 2002). Loyalty in the 1950s meant toeing the line against communism—especially for liberals (Horton 2005). The Red Scare of the 1950s produced a political climate in which American patriots were to blindly support the American ideological battle against the Soviet Union. To retain membership in the political community or, in the case of African Americans, to gain admission, one was forced to forewear any sympathy to organizations and groups with non-Western connections (Andrews 1997; Gerstle 2001; Singh 2005; Von Eschen 1997). Thus, the political climate of the cold war, coupled with communist antipathy, militated against subscription to left-wing radicalism and promoted conformity with more mainstream, centrist values. Patriotism, at least as most Americans understood it in this period, therefore, meant adhering to mainstream American values in which individualism and the principles of capitalism were celebrated and pitted against communism (McKenna 2007).6

For much of the four decades following the 1950s, the right retained its monopoly on American patriotism. In the 1960s, the New Left pushed the popular conception of patriotism, one in which loyalty was commensurate with identification with the nation and its symbols, even further to the right. According to McKenna (2007, 308), the “virulence of their speech, the weirdness of their appearance and manner, and their willingness to stage ... violent acts to get in camera” caused New Left activists to drive much of America, including symbolic patriots, into the arms of blind patriotism. After a brief respite in the 1970s when the American masses began to question notions of national loyalty in the wake of Watergate (McKenna 2007), the right regained its hold on patriotism.

In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan’s time in office, he often used “beloved national symbols” to generate support for his administration’s policies during the cold war (Lipsitz 1996), using them to rally his base, part of which were Reagan Democrats (i.e., Catholics and southerners), who were moved by patriotic appeals (McKenna 2007, chap. 8). In the absence of a cold war to sustain appeals to patriotism, was it possible for the right to hold on to mainstream patriotism? Yes, for as Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz (1992) showed, George H. W. Bush’s campaign benefited from his appeals to patriotic symbols. Perhaps it is the case that the Catholic–evangelical coalition cobbled together by Reagan on the right bears responsibility.

Finally, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, George W. Bush’s administration and the national press combined images of American national power and values with patriotic symbols and language (Hutcheson et al. 2004). Therefore, the loyalty associated with patriotism quite possibly bleeds into the “pseudo patriotism” to which Adorno and colleagues (1950) referred in which love of country is commensurate with blind loyalty. In this case, one in which the political right merges uncritical loyalty with national symbols, blind and symbolic patriotism may become indistinguishable.

Hypothesis 1: As a single-factor model of patriotism, loyalty combines one’s uncritical attachment to American policies and practices with national symbols that represent the values and institutions that govern the nation.

It is also possible that patriotism turns not on politics and partisanship but, rather, on the attitudinal functions on which blind and symbolic patriotism may come to rest. Generally, attitudes may be assigned to one of four camps, two of which are theoretically relevant: instrumental and value expressive.7 Instrumental attitudes are those to which costs and benefits are attached to the object (Katz 1960). If there are perceived benefits associated with the object, a positive attitude should result; if costs or punishment is associated with the object, a negative attitude is produced (Herek 1986). Instrumental attitudes, in short, function as a means of regulating self-interested, goal-directed attitudes and behavior for the individual (Herek 1986; Katz 1960; Maio and Olson 2000; Prentice 1987).

Value expressive attitudes, in contrast, index affective attachment to long-standing predispositions. Through childhood socialization, people internalize predispositions such as party identification and “attachment to various symbols of the nation and
regime” to which they become affectively tethered (Sears 1993, 123). These attachments are likely to persist into adulthood, at which time issues and social groups in the current political climate can trigger them. Perhaps more important, symbolic attitudes function as a means of value expression. They fulfill the need for the individual to define herself through the expression of values and identification with groups she perceives as important (Herek 1986; Katz 1960; Maio and Olson 2000; Prentice 1987).

Blind patriotism, I argue, is more a part of the instrumental camp. It serves as a means of defense for individuals, in what some may perceive as a dangerous world, who desire security and the observation of normative convention. That is, when people feel threatened by the prospect of layoffs or other economic instability; when people feel threatened by social and political unrest; or, most obviously, when people feel threatened by the uncertainties that accompany war or international conflict, they yearn for security and domestic stability, including a sense of normalcy (Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Sales 1973; Stenner 2005). For this reason, individuals come to identify with the nation and provide uncritical support to the political system and the policies it produces when they feel vulnerable (Davis 2007). Uncritical support of America and her policies is, therefore, instrumental to the extent that it permits individuals to take refuge from threat in the perceived power of political authorities and the American political system to protect them from harm. The state and its agents can provide the security and stability to those for whom these are important goals.

Part of this protection is safety from internal threats, that is, cultural Others who threaten to undermine or dilute American culture from within (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). To the extent that individuals felt threatened after the terrorist attacks (Huddy et al. 2002), it parallels a point in American history during the rise of blind patriotism. Citizens, when threatened by the specter of divided loyalties among immigrants during wartime, and their (Russian) association with communism afterwards, sought to identify with the nation and turned to political authorities for comfort (Higham 1985).

Symbolic patriotism, in contrast, belongs to the domain governed by symbolic attitudes in which one expresses values through connection to political culture. Values are long-standing abstract beliefs that structure attitudes and behavior (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). American political culture is constituted by such values as freedom, equality, individualism, and limited government, among others (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Lipset 1996; McCloskey and Zaller 1984). Indeed, if culture is at least in part constituted by a system of symbols (Geertz 1973; Laitin 1986), we may think of political culture as a “system of political symbols” through which political culture is rendered accessible to the masses (Elder and Cobb 1983). The flag and the Constitution are good examples of this, for they represent the political community (Baas 1979; Elder and Cobb 1983). It is possible, then, that symbolic patriotism represents the values on which the American political community rests. As such, attachment to political symbols, especially those in which the political community is invoked, indexes core, diffuse values (Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992).

A functional approach to attitudes, that is, one that assesses the functions that attitudes perform for the individual, suggests that differences should emerge between blind and symbolic patriotism. Blind patriotism, as a bundle of attitudes that represent reactions to what is perceived as a dangerous world, is part of the instrumental/utilitarian domain insofar as adopting it is a reflection of individuals’ need to identify with the state and its policies. In this mode, the state and its policies may satisfy a need for protection, suggesting a benefit for those in fear to grant uncritical support to the state and its actions, which will reward the individual with security.

Symbolic patriotism differs inasmuch as it is loaded with affect and should drive people to express values that reflect their core values. Whereas blind patriotism, in this case, is geared to ensure self-preservation, that is, a biological drive, symbolic patriotism is more concerned with affirming and externalizing one’s core values. Here, the value-expressive attitude function, symbolic patriotism in this case, allows people to express values that are central to who they are and what they believe. In sum, instrumental and expressive attitudes are very different: the former, more generally, is a cost-benefit analysis designed to promote one’s welfare; the latter, on the other hand, remains focused upon higher, more discursive purposes (Maio and Olson 1995; Prentice 1987; Kinder and Sears 1981). As a consequence, blind and symbolic patriotism should differ.

Hypothesis 2: Differences in attitudinal functions will suffice to distinguish blind from symbolic patriotism, producing a two-factor solution.
**Data and Method**

I test these hypotheses with the 2002 California Patriotism Pilot Study (CPPS), conducted between October 15 and November 15, 2002, by the survey research lab at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Stratified by race and region, the CPPS used a multistage-area sampling technique to conduct a telephonic (random-digit dialing, or RDD) survey of 535 California adults. Two reasons prompted the collection of this data. First, none of the national surveys examines multidimensional patriotism in which anything beyond symbolic patriotism is measured. Second, of the data that examine more than symbolic patriotism, most are either outdated, that is, pre-9/11, or of an experimental nature.

Methodologically, I cut into the data using structural equation modeling, specifically LISREL. Testing hypotheses associated with the factor structure of patriotism requires the use of structural equation modeling for at least two reasons. First, confirmatory factor analysis allows us to impose hypothesized factor structures on the data. Second, LISREL allows us to account for measurement error.

The measurement of patriotism is fairly straightforward. The first dimension of patriotism under consideration is the one with which we are most familiar and is far and away the most studied. Since symbolic patriotism is characterized by emotional attachment to American symbols and America itself (Schatz and Staub 1997; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992), this survey replicates two items employed in the ANES from time to time. Thus, symbolic patriotism is tapped by two questions: first, “When I see the American flag flying, I feel extremely good.” Recent work conducted by Skitka (2005), in fact, suggests that the flag is especially well suited to represent attachment to American values. Thus, the other indicator is, “My love for the United States is extremely strong.” As one might suspect, then, the relationship between blind and symbolic patriotism is more oblique than orthogonal.

While these results indicate that a two-factor model of patriotism provides a better fit to the data than the alternative, the fit of the single-factor specification remains within conventional limits. It is no surprise, therefore, that blind and symbolic patriotism are tightly bound together. Of course, this raises the issue of whether blind and symbolic patriotism are truly different. Before moving on to more substantive means of distinguishing blind from symbolic patriotism, I attempt to do so in a very preliminary way. To do so, I draw upon selected political and demographic correlates of both types of patriotism, cross tabulating each with ideology, partisanship, years of education, and race.

**Results**

Are blind and symbolic patriotism distinctive? Or do they simply sum to political loyalty? I begin to settle the issue by turning to confirmatory factor analysis. If the single dimension of political loyalty prevails, there is no need to continue. As it turns out, however, a two-factor model fits the data much better than the single-factor model in which political loyalty is the conceptual target. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the results.

An initial examination of the results suggests that a single-factor model of patriotism provides an adequate fit to the data ($\chi^2/df = 2.2$; root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .05; adjusted goodness-of-fit index [AGFI] = .97; $p < .024$). In the absence of a theoretical alternative, we could plausibly stop here given the adequacy of the model. Theory, however, dictates the possibility of a two-factor solution. Figure 2 shows the results.

Immediately, we observe that the pattern of factor loadings for the two-factor model is similar to those we observed in the one-factor model. Nevertheless, as the fit index suggests, the fit of the current model to the data is far superior to that of the single-factor alternative ($\chi^2/df = .318$; RMSEA = .01; AGFI = .99; $p < .946$). With the two-factor model a better fit, we can now assess the structural relationship between the latent constructs. Theoretically, we expected a close relationship between blind and symbolic patriotism and that is precisely what we observe: $r = .64$; $p < .002$. As one might suspect, then, the relationship between blind and symbolic patriotism is more oblique than orthogonal.

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I believe U.S. policies are almost always morally correct. I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of the country. There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world and we should not criticize the U.S. When I see the American flag flying it makes me feel: very/extremely good. I would support my country right or wrong. How strong is your love for the country: very strong.

### Figure 1

**Single-Factor Model of Patriotism**

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<th>X1</th>
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<th>X3</th>
<th>X4</th>
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<tr>
<td>I would support my country right or wrong.</td>
<td>I believe U.S. policies are almost always morally correct.</td>
<td>I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of the country.</td>
<td>There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world and we should not criticize the U.S.</td>
<td>When I see the American flag flying it makes me feel: very/extremely good.</td>
<td>How strong is your love for the country: very strong.</td>
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Fit Statistics
- \( r^2 = 535 \)
- \( df = 8 \)
- \( \chi^2 = 17.64 \)
- \( \chi^2/df = 2.20 \)
- AGFI = .97
- RMSEA = .05
- \( P \)-value = .024

Note: AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

As Table 1 makes plain, regardless of the category in question—be it ideology, partisanship, or race—symbolic patriotism receives far more support than its counterpart. Beyond this finding there are few surprises: more conservatives subscribe to these types of patriotism than do liberals or moderates. A similar relationship holds true for Republicans vis-à-vis independents and Democrats. While these results suggest differences between blind and symbolic patriotism, they are far from conclusive. Thus, in the next section, I consider the relative impact of blind and symbolic patriotism upon selected attitudes, including two topics that have drawn some interest in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the ensuing war on terror: adherence to democratic norms and attitudes toward selected social groups.

### Democratic Norms

Maintaining the integrity of civil liberties and the procedural norms of democracy are essential to the survival of the American way of life. I have already cited Davis’s (2007) work indicating that some Americans are willing to cede civil liberties in favor of increased security in post-9/11 America. However, his work centers primarily upon steps taken by the government to deter future acts of terror. In this article, I wish to revisit a more classical construal of democratic norms, that is, norms associated with tolerance as it pertains to fellow citizens threatening to foreclose on the rights of each other (McClosky 1964; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Furthermore, given the sustained resurgence in national attachment (Rasinski et al. 2002), we should consider whether patriotism reinforces or undermines support for democratic norms.

To assess the issue, I use the following items, all of which are in the “strongly agree to strongly disagree” format, to tap democratic norms related to due process and free speech: (1) “If U.S. citizens are suspected of treason or another serious crime, they should be entitled to be released on bail”; (2) “If non-U.S. citizens are suspected of treason or another serious crime, they should be entitled to be released on
bail”; (3) “When the country is in great danger, we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if it violates their rights”; and (4) “Free speech ought to be allowed for all political groups even if the things they say are highly insulting and threatening to some segments of society.”

Support for the selected norms appears to split along two dimensions, roughly consistent with McClosky’s (1964) interpretation of abstract and concrete dimensions of democratic norms. I begin with the more “concrete” items, the ones that deal with the issue of bail. After collapsing “strongly agree” and “agree” response options to indicate agreement (for each item), less than one-third of the public supports the proposition that citizens should be entitled to bail if they are suspected traitors. Even fewer support bail for aliens, in that only 25 percent agree with the extension of bail to people not born in America. Perhaps, as Davis (2007) suggested, this is a reaction to events surrounding the terrorist attacks in which patriotism decreases support for bail for suspected traitors. The view shifts, however, once support for more abstract norms are examined. Approximately two-thirds (66 percent) of the public rejects the notion that people should be forced to testify against themselves—even when the country is in danger. Still more support free speech. It is likely the case that explicitly invoking rights in the third question (self-incrimination) and widespread acceptance of the right to free speech in the fourth question (McClosky and Brill 1983) resulted in individuals honoring these norms. Seven in ten favor the idea that even unpopular groups have the right to publicly express their views.

How, if at all, does patriotism affect support for democratic norms? At a general level, the goal is to gauge the extent to which patriotism underwrites or dampens support for democratic norms. However, the proposition is complicated by the close empirical
The connection between blind and symbolic patriotism that we have already observed. If McClosky and Brill’s (1983) results in which blind loyalty undercuts political tolerance are any indication, we should expect the same here.

The case for symbolic patriotism is not so easily discerned. Yet, we do know that symbolic patriots opted for security over civil liberties after 9/11 (Davis 2007). The link between symbolic patriotism and values consistent with American cultural identity, and normative expectations (Almond and Verba 1963; Delameter, Katz, and Kelman 1969; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992), on the other hand, suggest that affective attachment to the nation will cut in the opposite direction, in support of democratic norms. Three hypotheses emerge from this discussion.

**Hypothesis 3:** Blind patriotism, with its roots in fear and jingoism, will militate against support for democratic norms.

**Hypothesis 4:** Symbolic patriotism, with its roots in the expression of core values, should support democratic norms.

**Hypothesis 4a:** Alternatively, it remains plausible that, under threat, symbolic patriots will be reluctant to honor democratic norms, for doing so could ultimately damage America.

The Model

To isolate and assess the effect of patriotism upon democratic norms, we must account for several possible confounds. The first group of variables for which we must account consists of age, income, education, region, and gender. Increasing age, for instance, tends to dampen support for civil liberties (McClosky and Brill 1983; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). By virtue of its connection with civil liberties, we should anticipate that increasing age will also weaken support for democratic norms (Davis 2007; McClosky and Brill 1983). Among this group of determinants, education should carry a good portion of the explanatory weight. With education comes increased knowledge of how democracy is supposed to work, supporting democratic values (Davis 2007; McClosky and Brill 1983; Nie et al. 1996; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Gender should also matter in that women tend to embrace civil liberties less than men (Golebiowska 1999). We must also account for regional differences in California in which the political culture in the northern part of the Golden State promotes a more liberal perspective than that which is found in the southern part (Baldassare 2000; Wolfinger and Greenstein 1969). Income is the final demographic control.

Beyond sociodemographics, we must also consider race and political orientation. Based upon a history of having their civil rights violated, Davis (2007) has shown that African Americans, relative to whites, are staunch supporters of civil liberties. He also shows that Latinos are less likely than whites to support challenges to the state. In the interest of simplicity, I model race with a dummy variable where the effect of white racial group membership is assessed relative to blacks and Latinos, both of which are coded zero; white is set equal to one. Turning to political orientation, conservatives, for their part, believe that rights are earned; they are not beyond revocation. Liberals, on the other hand, believe rights are natural, unassailable (McClosky and Brill 1983). Thus, we must account for ideology. Similarly, by virtue of the interconnectedness between ideology and partisanship (Sharp and Lodge 1985), we should anticipate that many Republican partisans, similar to conservatives, will place less emphasis on rights in post-9/11 America than democrats (Davis 2007).

The results of the model are reported in Table 2.20 Beginning with free speech, the only democratic norm under investigation not directly tied to due process, we observe a discernable, if weak, distinction between

### Table 1: Percentage of Strong Patriots by Selected Political and Demographic Correlates

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>88.0**</td>
<td>56.0**</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisanship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>90.0**</td>
<td>52.0**</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College-plus</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>30.0**</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>59.0**</td>
<td>26.8**</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 California Patriotism Pilot Study (CPPS)

Note: Cell entries represent the percentage of respondents who scored “high” on the items in the respective scales. To estimate χ² statistic I simply coded all “highs” as 1, else 0.

**p < .01.**
blind and symbolic patriotism. With demographic and political controls at their respective means, the probability of supporting free speech declines by 17 percent as blind patriotism increases. On the other hand, and though ultimately insignificant, the probability for supporting it increases by 13 percent as symbolic patriotism rises. Similar results obtain as we consider support for an integral part of due process: the right to avoid incriminating oneself. The probability of supporting the Fifth Amendment decreases by 42 percent as blind patriotism increases. While the effects for symbolic patriotism are insignificant, the fact remains that symbolic patriotism fails to remain completely in lockstep with blind patriotism insofar as the signs are in the opposite direction.

As we shift to more tangible threats to liberty, the effects for blind and symbolic patriotism converge. Both, in other words, push the public to deny bail to suspected traitors. The effect, however, is more pronounced with symbolic patriotism. Again, holding the controls at their respective means, the probability of agreeing that citizens accused of treason should be eligible for bail declines by 40 percent as symbolic patriotism increases. Though the effects are difficult to discern from zero, rising blind patriotism also dampens support for bail. Similar if slightly stronger results obtain for noncitizens. Again, the more forceful resistance is supplied by symbolic versus blind patriotism, where the former is associated with a 39 percent decrease in the probability that the public will countenance bail for noncitizens accused of treason. And as blind patriotism increases, the probability that the public agrees that bail is appropriate apparently also decreases, by 13 percent, though the results are ultimately weak.

Overall, the results are a bit mixed. On two occasions, the predictions for blind and symbolic patriotism were similar: on whether alleged traitors, both citizens and noncitizens, should be allowed bail. The other two, the right to avoid self-incrimination and the right to free speech, respond to variation in blind patriotism but not symbolic patriotism. One can make sense of these results if viewed through the abstract–concrete divide McClosky (1964) illustrated in his work. Free speech and preservation of the Fifth Amendment are relatively abstract when compared to the issue of bail for suspected traitors. Theoretically, we should not be surprised at the results for blind patriotism and how it predicts security over civil liberties for both abstract and concrete issues (McClosky and Brill 1983). In fact, these results square with the historical record insofar as Americans, wary of threat during times of national crisis and seeking security from the state and its policies, tend to become less tolerant of those deemed disloyal. Of course, this would include suspected traitors.

The results for symbolic patriotism, however, require some explanation. According to theory, it should not dampen support for the extension of bail, but as we have seen, it does. Yet it is possible to reconcile these results with theoretical expectations if we consider the perceived threat posed by suspected traitors, the prospective beneficiaries of bail. To the extent that threat increases national loyalty (Davis 2007; Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski 1997), and threat was omnipresent after the attacks (Huddy et al. 2002), it offers an explanation for the similarity between blind and symbolic patriotism on the issue of bail. Ultimately, blind and symbolic patriotism are alternative expressions of love of country; as such, we should not be surprised that both resist extending bail to suspected traitors. After all, traitors are trying to destroy the country that patriots love. Whether the source of one’s attachment originates with a reaction to threat carried by blind patriots, or is a means of expressing one’s attachment to American values, in the end, traitors are trying to destroy the way of life that patriots have come to hold dear.

Turning to the more abstract items, symbolic patriotism should predict compliance with relatively abstract norms given the values they are hypothesized to evoke; and it does, albeit weakly. That is, the results support the claim that symbolic patriotism predicts support for abstract norms. Yet the results are

![Figure 3](image-url)
Table 2
Logistic Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Democratic Norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Self-Incrimination</th>
<th>Free Speech</th>
<th>Right to Bail: Citizens</th>
<th>Right to Bail: Aliens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patriotism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td>-2.49* (.592)</td>
<td>-1.12* (.597)</td>
<td>-0.009 (.581)</td>
<td>-0.764 (.613)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>0.159 (.538)</td>
<td>0.716 (.520)</td>
<td>-1.79* (.417)</td>
<td>-1.88* (.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.439 (.392)</td>
<td>-0.230 (.397)</td>
<td>0.033 (.386)</td>
<td>-0.344 (.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.161 (.330)</td>
<td>-0.565* (.330)</td>
<td>-0.120 (.312)</td>
<td>-0.594* (.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.699 (.460)</td>
<td>-0.508 (.471)</td>
<td>0.202 (.452)</td>
<td>0.538 (.487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female = 1</td>
<td>-0.344 (.323)</td>
<td>-0.529* (.226)</td>
<td>-0.803* (.216)</td>
<td>-0.592* (.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern California = 1</td>
<td>-0.459* (.231)</td>
<td>-0.441* (.229)</td>
<td>0.007 (.220)</td>
<td>0.041 (.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.529* (.257)</td>
<td>0.481* (.248)</td>
<td>0.086 (.244)</td>
<td>-0.717* (.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.16* (.454)</td>
<td>1.33* (.467)</td>
<td>0.904* (.357)</td>
<td>-0.186 (.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-0.358 (.315)</td>
<td>0.117 (.319)</td>
<td>-0.404 (.344)</td>
<td>-0.560 (.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-250.88</td>
<td>-255.47</td>
<td>-263.60</td>
<td>-236.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.17</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>58.92</td>
<td>65.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All cell entries are maximum likelihood coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Since all VIFs < 1.5, multicollinearity is not present. All variables coded 0 to 1 such that 1 = support for democratic norms.

*p < .05 (one-tailed test).

not significantly different from zero. One explanation for the relatively weak findings rests on the relationship between rights and ideology. Inasmuch as these items tap into a long-standing rights discourse with which Americans are all too familiar and to which they adhere (Conover, Crewe, and Searing 1991), it is possible that controlling for ideology interferes with the effect of symbolic patriotism. After all, they share a moderately strong empirical connection ($r = .33; p < .01$), and liberalization (as an ideology) accommodates rights-based discourse (Waldron 1993), something commensurate with the values expressed by symbolic patriots. Thus, we should not be surprised that ideology dampens the effect of symbolic patriotism on abstract, consensus-achieving civil liberties.

It is also worth noting the consistent effect of gender and race insofar as women appear less likely to support democratic norms, and whites are more likely than other racial groups to support them. Regarding the findings for gender, they square with Golebiowska (1999), who suggested that because women possess less political knowledge and are less psychologically attached to politics than men, they are less likely to support democratic norms. Turning to race, the fact that whites, more than any other racial group, appear to support abstract norms may be attributed to race-of-interviewer effects. Here, when people of color are in a high-threat environment, and perceive themselves talking to a white interviewer, they may think the best response to questions concerning, say, bail for suspected traitors, may cut against support for democratic norms (Parker 2007).

Social Group Perception

Social group perception is important to the extent that it informs the public’s political judgment. For instance, whether, say, group A supports group B may well come down to whether the former group likes the latter group (Brady and Sniderman 1985). Out-group affect may also influence whether group A supports a policy from which group B stands to benefit (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Since feeling thermometers are “intended to measure enmity or hate [as well as] ... amity and reverence” (Davis 2007, 198), I use them here to gauge the impact of patriotism upon social group perception, the latter of which the feeling thermometers are intended to tap. Beyond feeling thermometers used to gauge affect toward Islamic fundamentalists and, more generally, Middle Easterners, I also wish to consider how blind and symbolic patriotism inform attitudes toward other groups in society. As a basis for comparison, I also examine the public’s affection toward African Americans and Jewish Americans.

The theoretical expectations are clear with regard to blind patriotism. The association between blind
patriotism and the desire for cultural homogeneity, as well as nativism, suggests that antipathy may be forthcoming (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Similar to the time in American history during which blind patriotism emerged, in the early twentieth century, antipathy directed at target groups is likely generated by perceived threat (Davis 2007).

The literature is less clear on the impact of symbolic patriotism upon intergroup affect. Some scholars argue that identification with national symbols, with which the dominant group is most likely to identify, is associated with agreement with the racial status quo in which whites reside at the top and are the phenotypical model of “Americaness” (Devos and Banaji 2005; Sidanius and Pratto 1999); others suggest that, among symbolic patriots, racial tolerance is required of good Americans (Delameter, Katz, and Kelman 1969). From this we can deduce the following:

**Hypothesis 5:** Blind patriotism’s track record and rootedness in fear suggests that its adherents will treat all perceived outsiders with suspicion, resulting in low opinions of such groups.

**Hypothesis 6:** If symbolic patriotism is truly value expressive, we should observe that increasing affective attachment to the nation results in higher opinions of selected social groups.

**Hypothesis 6a:** Alternatively, attachment to national symbols may lead to out-group derogation.

Table 3 reports the results. Relative to the results we observed with democratic norms, the differences between blind and symbolic patriotism are more apparent here, though all of the differences are not significant. Subscription to the tenets of blind patriotism produces a xenophobic reaction to both Islamic fundamentalists and Arabs. Negative affect is not confined to the religious and ethnic groups with whom terrorists are believed associated, however. After removing blacks as a reference group from the fourth equation, we see that blind patriotism is also likely to drive the public to view African Americans and Jews with contempt, a finding consistent with Schatz and colleagues’ (Schatz and Staub 1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999) work in which they argue blind patriotism promotes preferences for a more homogeneous culture.

Clearly African Americans and Jews, according to blind patriotism, are beyond the bounds of who are considered part of the American cultural community. This is not the case with symbolic patriotism. Symbolic patriotism, it seems, promotes the embrace of what may be called domestic out-groups. In short, as Figures 4 through 7 graphically depict, all of which are based upon the equations in Table 3, increasing symbolic patriotism is generally commensurate with increasing warmth toward out-groups. This is more in keeping with a vision of the national community in which diversity is at least tolerated if not wholeheartedly embraced. Perhaps those who embrace symbolic patriotism consider themselves good Americans who recognize that most groups—even ones to which the 9/11 terrorists were in some way connected, have a right to membership in the political community. It should be no real surprise that the effects are stronger for African Americans and Jews, longtime minority groups, than for Islamic fundamentalists and Arabs: people are more familiar with these groups. Moreover, I would be remiss if I failed to comment on the effect of race. While whites are indistinguishable from other racial groups in how they feel about Arabs and Jews, blacks and Islamic fundamentalists are the two target groups on which they most depart from other racial groups in the sample.

**Conclusion**

This article sought to determine whether the blind–symbolic divide represented a distinction without difference. Drawing on a functional approach to patriotism, I turned first to investigate the extent to which conceptual differences withstood empirical scrutiny. It did: they are related yet remain analytically distinct concepts. This finding concurs with the literature in that blind and symbolic patriotism share a robust empirical relationship (Schatz and Staub 1997). However, the political consequences of each challenge convention in that blind and symbolic patriotism failed to always inform preferences in similar ways. As the results indicate, blind and symbolic patriotism offer different prescriptions for supporting some democratic norms for out-group affect. To the extent that some individuals adopt blind patriotism as a means of adjusting to threat and vulnerability in a dangerous world, and symbolic patriotism is a means of expressing core values, a functional approach to patriotism offers an explanation of the observed difference between the two.

As the data indicate, a two-factor model of patriotism is the best fit to the data. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that the one-dimensional model of loyalty meets the conventional goodness-of-fit criteria. Of course, it is possible that a single-factor model
Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates of the Determinants of Social Group Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Islamic Fund.</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patriotism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>3.86 (5.64)</td>
<td>–0.612 (4.58)</td>
<td>9.49* (4.34)</td>
<td>13.13* (5.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>–4.62 (4.27)</td>
<td>–1.77 (3.47)</td>
<td>0.342 (3.28)</td>
<td>0.869 (3.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>–0.161 (0.615)</td>
<td>–0.250 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.711 (0.473)</td>
<td>0.472 (0.555)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>–1.95 (4.94)</td>
<td>10.51* (4.01)</td>
<td>0.803 (3.80)</td>
<td>–0.576 (4.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female = 1</td>
<td>1.64 (2.48)</td>
<td>–2.36 (1.95)</td>
<td>0.157 (1.85)</td>
<td>0.726 (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern California = 1</td>
<td>0.781 (2.46)</td>
<td>2.04 (2.00)</td>
<td>–0.108 (1.89)</td>
<td>–0.810 (2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>–9.51* (2.66)</td>
<td>–2.61 (2.16)</td>
<td>–1.54 (2.04)</td>
<td>–4.12* (2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.07 (4.91)</td>
<td>6.40 (4.00)</td>
<td>11.01* (3.78)</td>
<td>7.48 (4.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>–2.31 (3.54)</td>
<td>0.481 (2.88)</td>
<td>0.224 (2.72)</td>
<td>–0.676 (2.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>52.43* (7.04)</td>
<td>63.38* (5.73)</td>
<td>54.57* (5.42)</td>
<td>59.71* (6.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All cell entries are OLS estimates of feeling thermometer scores that range from 0 to 100, with standard errors in parentheses. There is no danger of multicollinearity between blind and symbolic patriotism: VIFs < 1.5.

*p < .05 (one-tailed test).

Figure 4
Predicted Affect for Islamic Fundamentalists by Type of Patriotism

Figure 5
Predicted Affect for Arabs by Type of Patriotism

The data may be driven by the threat and anxiety caused by the attacks (Davis 2007; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005), both of which may have pushed some people more toward blind patriotism, creating a cleavage between it and symbolic patriotism. Yet the two-factor model fit the data better, freeing us to consider that the emergence of a two-factor model is related to the ubiquity of national symbols and the core values for which they stand (Almond and Verba 1963; Elder and Cobb 1983; Delameter, Katz, and Kelman 1969). Indeed, the number of Americans who were eager to fly the flag, and their zeal to identify with the country, are indicative of the emotional connection between
individuals and the nation through these symbols (Skitka 2005). This allows us to entertain the possibility that blind patriotism, the second factor, is driven by the need to identify with the nation more out of insecurity than identification with national values.

These distinctions were explored in subsequent analyses in which I assessed the political consequences of each. The results were mixed for democratic norms, as I have already indicated. Based upon the evidence, I think it fair to say that symbolic patriotism forecloses on the portion of due process associated with bail because it seeks to avoid an assault by suspected traitors on the American way of life. This squares with Davis’s (2007) work in which threats to society, and presumptively the American way of life, promote support for symbolic patriotism. For the blind patriots, driven to identify with nation out of anxiety, it is likely that rejecting due process is more about personal fear than concern for the integrity of the political community per se. Perhaps they are afraid of the personal harm that may be caused by suspected traitors.

These findings also agree with, and build on, McClosky and Brill’s (1983) results where they suggested that people who put too much stock in the flag and country are concerned that the freedoms provided by America will ultimately undermine her by facilitating subversive activities. More broadly, the fact that symbolic patriotism responded more positively to relatively abstract norms, as it should have, suggests the possibility that the consequences of symbolic patriotism are situational, conditional on perceived threat. Indeed, in one model, the one involving freedom of speech, it is possible that more observations could have pushed the results toward statistical significance.

The results are more conclusive as we turn to affect toward out-groups. Without fail, blind patriotism retains its connection to the conservative ethos to which it is bound. Whether the target groups are Jews, Arabs, or African Americans, blind patriotism retains the xenophobic and ethnocentric bias for which it has become known. This confirms much of what we know about jingoistic patriotism (Adorno et al. 1950; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). The results for symbolic patriotism, on the other hand, represent a significant departure from that which we observed for blind patriotism. Indeed, the ideal of what America represents and feelings about the flag evoke globally sympathetic responses. It seems likely, then, that a genuine connection exists between one’s emotional attachment to American national symbols and the values on which they rest, particularly in the absence of threat. These findings, at least as they pertain to group affect, call into question the idea that patriotism based upon loyalty and identification is always dangerous (Kateb 2006; Markell 2000). The ability to distinguish a blind, more instrumental national loyalty from one that is more value expressive should defuse at least some of the skepticism associated with patriotism.

Like all research projects, this one is not without limits. As I have alluded to, the sample size and geographical confinement to California may have

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**Figure 6**
Predicted Affect for Jews by Type of Patriotism

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**Figure 7**
Predicted Affect for Blacks by Type of Patriotism
affected some of the estimates. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with some caution. I am, however, not too alarmed with the prospect of using California as a population from which to extrapolate. While it is true that limiting data collection to a specific locale hampers generalizability, the size, diversity, and political and economic power of California makes it a reasonable social laboratory within which one may explore important questions. The issue with sample size is more difficult to deal with, for as we all know increased sample size ceteris paribus improves the precision of the estimates. In this vein, future research should seek to establish the generalizability of these findings in this article through the use of national-level data, with more observations.

Notes

1. There is evidence that patriotism is country-specific, that is, its meaning may vary by country. See Sawyer, Sidanius, and Pena (2004) for an example of how it varies in Latin America.


3. One can justifiably say that this is merely an extension of early American patriotism in that racialized Others were, again, the objects of domination.

4. These campaigns received broad support—American elites and masses—eventually placing sufficient pressure on government to act (Higham 1985; King 2001).

5. The implication is that commitment is based, at least in part, upon rationality.

6. Anticommunism, though, was not confined to the right, for New Deal liberals sought to distance themselves from communism, too (Horton 2005).

7. The remaining attitudinal functions are (1) ego defense and (2) knowledge (Katz 1960).

8. To elaborate, it should be noted that the salience and interpretation of symbols is contingent upon at least two factors: the beliefs and values carried by individuals and the group(s) to which he or she is attached. If the symbol is both well specified, that is, well understood and well liked, he or she will develop an ideological orientation to it, capable of sustaining political attitudes and behavior over time. But this characterizes a relatively small portion of society. Most, that is, 40 to 60 percent of society, are of the reactive type, those for whom symbols are charged with emotion, and for whom the meaning remains vague and unspecified, that is, without ideological interpretation (Elder and Cobb 1983).

9. The cooperation rate (COOP4) for the California Patriotism Pilot Study (CPPS, 2002) is 47 percent. African Americans are overrepresented in the sample where 18.8 percent of the sample is drawn from this group. However, only 7 percent of Californians are black. Asian Americans and whites are approximately proportionately represented. Asian Americans represent 11.5 percent of California residents; they make up 10.4 percent of the sample. Whites are 50 percent of California’s population and represent 44 percent of the sample. Latinos are underrepresented in that there is a 12 percentage point difference between their presence in California’s population (31 percent) and their representation in the sample (19 percent).

10. Both the 1996 and 2004 General Social Survey interrogate national identity, part of which does index what one can credibly call symbolic patriotism. It is true that some items may be construed as measuring blind patriotism. In truth, however, they really measure nationalism. Nationalism, for instance, is about American superiority vis-à-vis other countries; it is comparative in nature. Blind patriotism, alternatively, taps uncritical attachment to the nation and its policies—absent comparisons with other countries.

11. Until fairly recently, maximum likelihood was the estimator of choice among social scientists for the estimation of covariance structure models in LISREL. However, maximum likelihood assumes a continuous, interval, or multivariate normal data (Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999). While social scientists often analyze data of this type, measurement models typically employ ordinal-level data, which, in many cases, violate these assumptions (Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999). The present investigation is no different. Since the data under investigation are ordinal, I enlist the assistance of the weighted least squares estimator in which the distributional and scaling assumptions are relaxed (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). Using weighted least squares requires two matrices as input. As such, PRELIS computes both the polychoric correlation matrix and the asymptotic covariance matrix. For more, see Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993).

12. While it is possible that one may question whether these items are capable of indexing values, Raymond Firth’s (1973) seminal work on symbols suggests otherwise. In his estimation, symbols are “concrete” representations of values. The reliability of these items is acceptable: alpha = .74. Moreover, since there are only two items tapping symbolic patriotism, the results should be treated with the appropriate caution.

13. Alpha = .78.

14. The chi-square statistic is typically reported, but it assumes (1) distributional normality, (2) estimation of a covariance matrix, and (3) that the sample is of sufficient size. Hence, chi-square is not appropriate in all cases and needs to be supplemented by additional indices. Thus, I also employ the χ²/df ratio, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI). According to Carmines and McIver (1981), a ratio of 2:3:1 is acceptable for the χ²/df ratio; for the RMSEA, anything from .00 to .10 represents an acceptable fit; and for both the GFI and the AGFI, anything above .90 represents an acceptable fit. For more on fit indices, see Byrne (1998) and Bollen (1989).

15. Similar to the single-factor model, I allow the errors for the second and third blind items to correlate. As an alternative, I could have specified a method factor, something that would correct for nonrandom measurement error. In the end, I opted for the more parsimonious model. For applications in political science, see Green and Citrin (1994) and Weatherford (1992).

16. Beyond the interfactor correlation between blind and symbolic patriotism lies the extent to which they overlap. That is, what is the likelihood that one is both a blind and symbolic patriot? In a separate analysis, 32 percent of the sample score high on both scales. However, the constructs retain their independence: χ² = 69.41; p < .001. The marginals are available upon request.

17. In an analysis not shown, and as one might suspect, when the relationship between what is called constructive patriotism, that is, patriotism committed to more liberal principles (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999), and these correlates are considered, conservatives and Republicans are the least patriotic; liberals and
Democrats turn out to be more patriotic when patriotism taps critical attachment to the country.

18. Davis (2007) employed items tapping attitudes toward giving up civil liberties, investigating protestors, racial profiling, warrantless searches, monitoring telephones and e-mail, the indefinite detention of noncitizens, national identification cards, and so on.

19. The items are replicated from McClosky’s (1964) attempt to tap democratic principles consistent with the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.

20. Since the proportional odds/parallel regression assumption is violated (see Long 1997), I collapsed all agree items, that is, “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” into a simple “agree” category. I did the same thing for disagree items. I eliminated the “neither agree nor disagree” middle category. It also occurs to me that endogeneity may be an issue with respect to the specification that blind patriotism affects attitudes toward democratic norms; it could very well be the other way around. While I specify the relationship as recursive, it may in fact be nonrecursive. To address this concern, I conduct a Hausman test to assess the presence of endogeneity. The test indicates that endogeneity is not a problem.

21. If post-9/11 polls are any indication, citizens are feeling more attached to the nation these days. For instance, in a Gallup poll taken three days after the 9/11 attacks, 82 percent reported that they have either displayed, or plan to display, the flag. An ABC/Washington Post poll taken after the attacks reported that 73 percent of Americans feel “strongly patriotic” versus 19 percent who, two years earlier, reported feeling “extremely patriotic.” And as of June 2003, another Gallup poll identified 70 percent of the electorate who were either “proud” or “extremely proud” to be Americans versus 55 percent in January 2001.

22. Several reasons suggest why these results may apply to the nation. First, the sheer size of California—one in eight Americans reside in the state—suggests that major events affecting the state may also affect the nation (Baldassarre 2000). Second, the state represents the mainstream in that “California voters are overwhelmingly middle-class, residents of fairly modest means . . . [they] live in the suburbs, own their homes . . . worry about paying the bills . . . are concerned their quality of life, public schools, and the crimes they see on television” (Baldassarre 2000, 17). Third, the diversity of California—both regional and racial—allows the state to function as a laboratory for the nation. For instance, the growth of suburbs in California, and the “transformation of from agriculture and farmland regions to sprawling urban areas . . . occurring in the Central Valley and Inland Empire of California,” parallel similar processes in the nation (Baldassarre 2000, 18). And while California is the most ethnically diverse state, Florida, New York, and Texas are also in receipt of large numbers of immigrants (Census 2000). This is not to say that states do not have their own cultures, affecting how populations react to issues and events. Even so, the size, diversity, and demographics of California makes for a credible proxy for what happens nationwide.

References


