On reflection, some degree of instability may not even be such a bad thing, especially if people care intensely about foreign policy. In standard theories of democratic politics, shifting coalitions and crosscutting alliances (across different preference dimensions, with for example isolationists and hardliners allied today, but hardliners and internationalists tomorrow) are thought to be desirable. By preventing any major group from always being in control, shifting coalitions avoid the tyranny of a majority and the polarization, against the system, of permanent losing minorities. Substantial stability is desirable, especially in foreign policy, so a shift of coalitions that empowered extremes would be pernicious. But some change of alignments, still more or less around the center, would be consistent with a prominent model of democratic theory. Here again is an instance of the ability of a leader to put together specific policies from within some range of acceptable options which a majority is prepared to tolerate. Selection of the specific option is an exercise of political leadership, and statesmanship.

If All the World Were Democratic

In this Moscow spring, this May 1988, we may be allowed to hope that freedom . . . will blossom forth at last in the rich soil of your people and culture. We may be allowed to hope that the marvelous sound of a new openness will keep rising through, ringing through, leading to a new world of reconciliation, friendship, and peace.

Ronald Reagan, address in Moscow

We will do the worst thing to you—we will deprive you of your enemy.

Georgi Arbatov, to Council on Foreign Relations

Two apparent facts about contemporary international patterns of war and peace stare us in the face. The first is that some states expect, prepare for, and fight wars against other states. The second is that some states do not expect, prepare for, or fight wars at least against each other. The first is obvious to everyone. The second is widely ignored, yet it is now true on a historically unprecedented scale, encompassing wide areas of the earth. In a real if still partial sense, peace is already among us. We need only recognize it, and try to learn from it.

An understanding of why some states do not engage in hostility may lead us to an attainable basis for an alternative system of security, one that does not depend on acceptance of a world state to enforce peace or on a particular configuration of strategy and weaponry to provide a peace of sorts through some form of stable deterrence. Accordingly, this chapter will explore the causes, limitations, and implications of this political anomaly of limited peace already among us.

Peace among Democracies

I refer to the peace among the industrialized and democratically governed states, primarily in the northern hemisphere. These
states—members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD: Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), plus a few scattered less-industrialized democratic states—constitute a vast zone of peace, with more than three quarters of a billion people. Not only has there been no war among them for 45 years [see Table 5.1], there has been little expectation of or preparation for war among them either. By war I mean large-scale organized international violence with, by a conventional social science definition, at least 1,000 battle deaths. In fact, even much smaller-scale violence between these countries has been virtually absent. The nearest exception is Greece and Turkey, with their brief and limited violent clashes over Cyprus; they are, however, among the poorest countries of this group, and only sporadically democratic.

In the years before 1945 many of these states fought often and bitterly—but always when at least one of the states in any warring pair was ruled by an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Despite that past, war among them is now virtually unthinkable. What had been seemingly the most permanent enmities—for instance, between France and Germany—have for the past two or three decades appeared well buried. Individual citizens may not love each other across national boundaries, but neither do they expect the other’s state to attack, or wish to mount an attack on it. Expectations of peace are thus equally important; these peoples make few preparations for violence between them; peace for them means more than just the prevention of war through threat and deterrence. This condition has been characterized as

Table 5.1. Distribution of international wars, 1945–1989.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fought by</th>
<th>OECD countries</th>
<th>Communist countries</th>
<th>LDCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Small and Singer, 1982, updated to 1989. Includes all interstate and colonial wars [not civil wars] with more than 1000 battle deaths.

a “security community,” or as “stable peace” (Deutsch et al., 1957; Boulding, 1979). In duration and expectation it differs from the simple absence of war that may prevail between some other states, including nondemocratic ones in the third world. By the standards of world history this is an extraordinary achievement.

It is not easy to explain just why this peace has occurred. Partly it is due to the network of *international law and institutions* deliberately put into place in order to make a repetition of the previous world wars both unthinkable and impossible. But that network is strongest in Western Europe, often excluding the countries in North America and the Far East; even in the strongest instance the institutions typically lack full powers to police and coerce would-be breakers of the peace; and, as we shall see below, even powerful institutions cannot guarantee peace if the underlying preconditions of peace are lacking.

In part it is due to favorable *economic conditions* associated with advanced capitalism. Fairly steady economic growth, a high absolute level of prosperity, relative equality of incomes within and across the industrial states, and a dense network of trade and investment across national borders all make the resort to violence dubious on cost-benefit grounds; a potential aggressor who already is wealthy risks much from the large-scale destructiveness of modern war, for only moderate gain [Mueller, 1989]. But the condition of peace among these rich states has not been endangered by such periods of postwar recession and stagnation as have occurred, and in other parts of the world, especially Latin America, there are democratic states that are not wealthy but are still at peace with one another.

Partly, too, peace is the result of a perceived “external” threat faced by the industrialized democracies; they maintain peace among themselves in order not to invite intervention by the communist powers. Where peace among them is threatened, it may be enforced by the dominant “hegemonic” power of the United States [Weede, 1984]. But the external threat also has waxed and waned without affecting the peace among these states; indeed, their peace became even more stable during the very time, over the past two decades, when the cold war abated and Europeans, especially, ceased to have much fear of Soviet attack. All these explanations, therefore, are at best only partial ones, and we are driven back to observing that the period of
peace among the highly industrialized states essentially coincides with the period when they all have been under democratic rule.

Conceptually and empirically the competing explanations overlap somewhat and reinforce one another, especially for the post–World War II era. International law has served to legitimate widely many of the domestic legal principles of human rights associated with liberal democracy; all advanced capitalist industrial states have been, since World War II, democratic (though not all democratic states are economically advanced), most of them have also been part of the American “hegemonic” alliance system (which has also included nondemocratic and economically less-developed countries). While this overlap prevents a definitive test, all the alternative hypotheses find their predictions falsified by at least one warring pair: the British-Argentine war in 1982, between two capitalist (Argentina only moderately advanced) states allied with the United States. World Wars I and II of course included many industrial capitalist countries as warring pairs. Analysts as different as Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Kautsky predicted peace among advanced capitalist states; Lenin did not. Nor is it simply part of a general statement that politically or culturally similar countries do not fight one another (Russett, 1968, ch. 12; Wilkinson, 1980, ch. 9). An empirical correlation between cultural similarity and relative absence of war exists, but it is a weak one. There are several examples of wars or threats of war within Eastern Europe and Latin America in recent decades; by contrast, a reduction in regional enmities is associated with parallel democratization (for example, Argentina and Brazil).

Another reason to doubt explanations relying chiefly on international institutions, economic conditions, or external threat is that the experience of peace among democratic countries goes back (among fewer countries, to be sure) at least to the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Previous records are less precise,

but also less relevant, since democracy as we know it in this era was at best a rarity before then. In ancient Greece, Athens and Sparta typically allied with democracies and oligarchies respectively. They often intervened to change the domestic constitution of allies to their preferred mode; similarly, a change in domestic constitution among the smaller city-states often produced switches in alliances. Athens did, however, occasionally attack democratic cities, as in Sicily [Fliess, 1966, p. 131].

With only very marginal exceptions, democratic states have not fought one another in the modern era. This is one of the strongest nontrivial or nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations. The nearest exception is Lebanon’s peripheral involvement in Israel’s war of independence in 1948. [Israel had not yet held an election, so Small and Singer, 1976, do not count it as a democracy at that time.] Other exceptions are truly marginal: war in 1849 between two states both briefly democratic (France and the Papal States) and Finland against the Allies in World War II [nominally only; Finland’s real quarrel was with the USSR]. In the war of 1812 with the United States, Britain’s franchise was sharply restricted, as was the Boer Republic’s in its attempt to preserve its independence against Britain in 1898.

By a democratic state I mean one with the conditions of public contestation and participation, essentially as identified by Robert Dahl (1971), with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of male citizens (in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wider thereafter), contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature. While scholars who have found this pattern differ slightly in their definitions, agreement on the condition of virtual absence of war among democracies (“liberal,” “libertarian,” or “polyarchic” states) is now overwhelming [Wallensteen, 1973; Small and Singer, 1976; Rummel, 1983, 1985; Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984; Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989]. This simple fact cries

1. These attempts explanations are considered at greater length in Russett and Starr, 1989, ch. 14. For the European states, Duroselle, 1988, credits democracy and also the demise of colonialism and therefore the end of colonial rivalries. Small and Singer, 1976, p. 67, noted that in their data ending in 1965—relatively few democracies were contiguous and therefore had much opportunity to fight. Many more contiguous democracies have emerged since then—but no wars.

2. In classical and medieval times the state, even in a democracy, was seen as actively shaping society rather than as impartial arbiter. Hence such states, in addition to sharply restricting the franchise, lacked the modern concept of citizens’ natural rights. Thus their behavior provides but an imperfect test of the theory here. See Mansfield, 1983.
out for explanation: What is there about democratic govern-
ments that so inhibits their people from fighting one another?

In exploring that question we should be clear about what is
not implied. The condition of peace between democratic states
does not mean that democratic states are ipso facto peaceful
with all countries. As noted in Chapter 2, they are not. In their
relations with nondemocratic states—whether great powers,
weak states, or non-Western peoples essentially outside the state
system and hence “available” as targets for imperial expansion—
they have often fought, more or less as frequently as nondem-
ocratic states have fought or prepared to fight.

**Internal Peace and International Peace**

There are powerful norms against the use of lethal force both
within democratic states and between them. Within them is of
course the basic norm of liberal democratic theory—that dis-
putes can be resolved without force through democratic political
processes which in some balance are to ensure both majority
rule and minority rights. A norm of equality operates both as
voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity.
Democratic government rests on the consent of the governed,
but justice demands that consent not be abused. Resort to organ-
ized lethal violence, or the threat of it, is considered illegiti-
mate, and unnecessary to secure one’s “legitimate” rights. Dis-
sent within broad limits by a loyal opposition is expected and
even needed for enlightened policymaking, and the opposition’s
basic loyalty to the system is to be assumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

All participants in the political process are expected to share
these norms. In practice the norms do sometimes break down,
but the normative restraints on violent behavior—by state and
citizens—are fully as important as the state’s monopoly on the
legitimate use of force in keeping incidents of the organized use
of force rare. Democracy is a set of institutions and norms for
peaceful resolution of conflict. The norms are probably more
important than any particular institutional characteristic (two-
party/multiparty, republican/parliamentary) or formal constitu-
tional provision. Institutions may precede the development of
norms. If they do, the basis for restraint is likely to be less secure.

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Democracy did not suddenly emerge full-blown in the West,
nor by any linear progression. Only over time did it come to
mean the extension of a universal voting franchise, formal pro-
tection for the rights of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities,
and the rights of groups to organize for economic and social
action. The rights to organize came to imply the right to carry
on conflict—but nonviolently, as by strikes, under the principle
that each side in the conflict had to recognize the right of the
other to struggle, so long as that struggle was constrained by
law, mutual self-interest, and mutual respect. The implicit or
explicit contract in the extension of such rights was that the
beneficiaries of those rights would in turn extend them to their
adversaries.

To observe this is not to accept democratic theory uncritically,
or to deny that it is part of a belief structure that, in Gramsci’s
view of cultural hegemony, may serve to legitimate domi-
nant-class interests and provide subordinate classes with a spurious
sense of their own political efficacy. As such, it may exaggerate
belief in the “reasonableness” of both the demands of one’s own
state in international politics and those of other democratic
states. But it is precisely beliefs and perceptions that are pri-
marily at issue here; insofar as the other state’s demands are
considered ipso facto reasonable according to a view of one’s
own system that extends to theirs, popular sentiment for war or
resistance to compromise is undermined.

Politics within a democracy is seen as a largely nonzero-sum
enterprise: by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do
not gain equally, and the winners today are restrained from
crushing the losers; indeed, the winners may, with shifting coal-
tions, wish tomorrow to ally with today’s losers. If the conflicts
degenerate to physical violence, either by those in control of the
state or by insurgents, all can lose. In international politics—the
anarchy of a self-help system with no superordinate governing
authority—these norms are not the same. “Realists” remind us
of the powerful norms of legitimate self-defense and the accept-
ability of military deterrence, norms much more extensive inter-

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3. If one or both governments is not broadly representative despite the cultural
belief that it is, the possibility of irreconcilable conflicts of interest between them
is increased.
nationally than within democratic states. Politics between nations takes on a more zero-sum hue. True, we know we all can lose in nuclear war or in a collapse of international commerce, but we worry much more about comparative gains and losses. The essence of “realist” politics is that even when two states both become more wealthy, if one gains much more wealth than the other it also gains more power, more potential to coerce the other; thus the one which is lagging economically only in relative terms may be an absolute loser in the power contest.

The principles of anarchy and self-help in a zero-sum world are seen most acutely in “structural realist” theories of international relations. Specifically, a bipolar system of two great states or alliances, each much more powerful than any others in the international system, is seen as inherently antagonistic. The nature of the great powers’ internal systems of government is irrelevant, whatever they may work out with or impose on some of their smaller allies, their overall behavior with other great powers is basically determined by the structure of the international system and their position in that structure. Athens and Sparta, or the United States and the Soviet Union, are doomed to compete and to resist any substantial accretion to the other’s power. To fail to compete is to risk the death of sovereignty, or death itself. Through prudence and self-interest they may avoid a full-scale war that might destroy or cripple both of them [the metaphor of two scorpions in a bottle], but the threat of war is never absent, and can never be absent. “Peace,” such as it is, can come only from deterrence, eternal vigilance, and probably violent competition between their “proxies” elsewhere in the world. By this structural realist understanding, the kind of stable peace that exists between the democratic countries can never exist on a global scale [Waltz, 1979].

Efforts to establish norms against the use of lethal violence internationally have been effective only to a limited degree. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to outlaw war was a failure from the outset, as have been efforts to outlaw “aggressive” war. Despite its expression of norms and some procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes, the United Nations Charter fully acknowledges “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs” (Article 51). It could hardly

do otherwise in the absence of superordinate authority. The norm of national self-defense—including collective self-defense on behalf of allies, and defense of broadly conceived “vital” interests even when national survival is not at stake—remains fully legitimate to all but tiny pacifist minorities. While there is some cross-cultural variation in the readiness of different peoples to use lethal force in different modes of self-defense, these differences are not strongly linked to form of government. Citizens of small democracies who perceive themselves as beleaguered [such as Israel], or citizens of large powerful democracies with imperial histories or a sense of global responsibilities for the welfare of others [such as Britain or the United States] are apt to interpret national or collective interest quite broadly. Especially across international cultural barriers, perversions of the “right” of self-defense come easily.

Yet democratic peoples exercise that right within a sense that somehow they and other peoples ought to be able to satisfy common interests and work out compromise solutions to their problems, without recourse to violence or threat of it. After all, that is the norm for behavior to which they aspire within democratic systems. Since other people living in democratic states are presumed to share those norms of live and let live, they can be presumed to moderate their behavior in international affairs as well. That is, they can be respected as self-governing peoples, and expected to offer the same respect to other democratic countries in turn. The habits and predispositions they show in their behavior in internal politics can be presumed to apply when they deal with like-minded outsiders. If one claims the principle of self-determination for oneself, normatively one must accord it to others perceived as self-governing. Norms do matter. Within a transnational democratic culture, as within a democratic nation, others are seen as possessing rights and exercising those rights in a spirit of enlightened self-interest. Acknowledgment of those rights both prevents us from wishing to dominate them and allows us to mitigate our fears that they will try to dominate us.

Realism has no explanation for the fact that certain kinds of states—namely, democratic ones—do not fight or prepare to fight one another. One must look instead to the liberal idealist vision of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, embodied also in Woodrow
Wilson's vision of a peaceful world of democratic states. This same vision inspired American determination to root out fascism and establish the basis for democratic governments in West Germany and Japan after World War II (and partly also explains and was used to justify interventions in Vietnam, Grenada, Nicaragua, and so on).

Democratic states, with their wide variety of active interest groups in shifting coalitions, also present the opportunity for the formation of transnational coalitions in alliance with groups in other democracies. This may seem a form of "meddling"; it also provides another channel for resolution of international conflict. International anarchy is not supplanted by institutions of common government, but conflicts of interest within the anarchy can be moderated fairly peacefully on the principle of self-determination within an international society.

How much importance should we attribute to perceptions among the public in general, and how much to those of the elites including, in particular, the leaders of the state? Decisions for war, and indeed most major decisions in national security matters, are taken by the leaders and debated largely among the elites. They have some ability to mold mass opinion. Nevertheless, the elites in a democracy know that the expenditure of blood and treasure in any extended or costly international conflict will not be popular, and can be sustained only with the support of the general public. Whereas there may be leads and lags either way, we saw in Chapter 4 that long-term serious differences between public opinion and official foreign policy are rare. Hence the elites will be somewhat constrained by popular views of the reasonableness of engaging in violent conflict with a particular foreign country.

In some ways the principle of self-determination may actually work better in the absence of a common government. If there were a set of central institutions for common government, different groups and peoples would by necessity compete to control them, with the risk that control (majority rule) would be abused at the expense of minority rights. A common government would have the legal right and powers to tax, to coerce, to reallocate wealth and benefits. For the institutions to work peaceably the norms must be strong and widely shared. In the absence of broad agreement on politics and culture, it is best that the institutions,

and the possibility for their abuse, also be absent. Hence some peoples can live with one another peaceably under separate governments but not under a common one. (Contrast, for example, relations between Protestant Britain and Catholic Ireland with those between Protestants and Catholics within Northern Ireland, or the American North and South where the issues had to be settled with a terrible civil war.) The formal institutions of democratic government might be in place under a common state, but the degree of sharing in the norms of self-restraint, and confidence that others share those norms, would be inadequate to insure peace. Hence also comes the common fear of a world Leviathan containing very diverse peoples, even under some form of direct election and representation. The norms might well be insufficient to restrain action, especially given the extreme economic inequalities of the contemporary global community.

Relations with Nondemocratic States

When we look within the construct of democratic ideology, it is apparent that the restraints on behavior that operate between separately governed democratic peoples do not apply to their relations with nondemocratic states. If other self-governing [democratic] peoples can be presumed to be worthy of being treated in a spirit of compromise and as in turn acting in that spirit, the same presumption does not apply to authoritarian states. According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on the proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly represent the will of their peoples—if they did, they would not need to rule through undemocratic, authoritarian institutions. Rulers who control their own people by such means, who do not behave in a just way that respects their own people's right to self-determination, cannot be expected to behave better toward peoples outside their states. "Because non-liberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity" (Doyle, 1986, p. 1161). Authoritarian governments are expected to aggress against others if given the power and the opportunity. By this reasoning, democracies must be eternally vigilant against
them, and may even sometimes feel the need to engage in preemptive or preventive [defensively motivated] war against them.

Whereas wars against other democratic states are neither expected nor considered legitimate, wars against authoritarian states may often be expected and "legitimated" by the principles outlined above. Thus an international system composed of both democratic and authoritarian states will include both zones of peace [actual and expected, among the democracies] and zones of war or at best deterrence between democratic states and authoritarian ones and, of course, between authoritarian states.

Two states may avoid war even if one of them is not a democracy, but chiefly because of the power of one or both states to deter the other from the use of lethal force: the one-sided deterrence of dominance, or mutual deterrence between those more or less equally powerful. If the democratic state is strong, its "forbearance" may permit war to be avoided.

Of course, democracies have not fought wars only out of motivations of self-defense, however broadly one may define self-defense to include "extended deterrence" for the defense of allies and other interests or to include anticipation of others' aggression. Many of them have also fought imperialist wars to acquire or hold colonies [like the French in Vietnam] or, since World War II, to retain control of states formally independent but within their spheres of influence [like the Americans in Vietnam]. In these cases they have fought against people who on one ground or another could be identified as not self-governing. 4

In the nineteenth-century days of colonial expansion, the colonized peoples were in most instances outside the European state system. They were in most instances not people with white skins. And they were in virtually every instance people whose institutions of government did not conform to the Western democratic institutional forms of their democratic colonizers. Europeans' ethnocentric views of those peoples carried the assumption that they did not have institutions of self-government, that their governments or tribal leaders were not just or consensual.

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4. There also have been cases of covert intervention [rather than overt attack] against some radical but elected Third World governments [Guatemala, Chile] justified by a cold war ideology and public belief that the government in question was allying itself with the major nondemocratic adversary.

If All the World Were Democratic

They were not merely available as candidates for imperial aggrandizement, they could also be considered candidates for betterment and even "liberation"—the white man's burden, or mission civilatrice. Post-Darwinian ideology even regarded them as at a lower stage of physical evolution and intellectual capacity than whites [and especially white males: Arendt, 1952; Vincent, 1984; C. Russett, 1989]. They could be brought the benefits not only of modern material civilization, but of Western principles of self-government and, after proper tutelage, of the institutions of self-government. If they did not have such institutions already, then by definition they were already being exploited and repressed. Their governments or tribal leaders could not, in this ethnocentric view, be presumed to be just or consensual, and thus one need have few compunctions about conquering them. They were legitimate candidates for "liberal" imperialism.

Later, Western forms of self-government did begin to take root at least on a local basis in the colonies; the extremes of pseudo-Darwinian racism lost their legitimacy. As these things happened, the legitimacy of the colonial powers in controlling those peoples was eroded. Indeed, indigenous leaders vigorously turned back onto their colonial rulers their very own principles (for example, independence leaders in the Philippines, or Gandhi and the Congress Party in India, who were especially effective normatively against a British Labour government deeply committed to providing equality at home). Decolonization came about not only because the colonial governments had lost the power to retain their colonies but also because in many cases they lost confidence in their normative right to rule. The evolution of the colonies themselves—and of the understandings about colonial peoples that were held in the imperial states—eroded the legitimacy of the colonial rulers in their own eyes. The imperial peoples' liberal principles were turned back on them. In a further round, those principles are now being turned against Third World authoritarian rulers. 5

Another important caution must take account of scapegoating, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is an old trick to blame outsiders—

5. Aid to the Nicaraguan contras was never really popular in the United States, not just because of realpolitik fears of "another Vietnam," but because of a general perception that the contras were no more legitimate or representative of their people than were the Sandinistas.
either socially marginal groups within a country or external adversaries—when things go wrong. It is often popular to attribute troubles to foreigners, or to try to turn people’s frustrations against external enemies, whether or not those outside can plausibly be blamed for the troubles. This kind of behavior has long been attributed to dictatorships, with examples including Nazi persecution of Germany’s Jews and the Argentine junta’s decision, in 1982, to stoke popular nationalism over the Falkland/Malvinas islands at a time of economic stagnation and political unrest. Ironically, however, certain forms of scapegoating behavior—notably the rally ‘round the flag effect—may be equally prevalent in democracies. The tendency to scapegoat may be strengthened by the very virtue of democracy in giving to the mass public a degree of control over their fate: mass opinion is typically less informed, and in some real sense more ethnocentric and less cosmopolitan, than elite opinion. That ethnocentrism may be magnified when confronted by conflicts with other peoples who are not governed “like us.”

A Shift Toward Democracy

The end of World War II brought in its wake the demise of colonial empires; it brought a degree of self-determination to the formerly colonized peoples. Unfortunately, that self-determination was often highly restricted, limited in part by ties of economic and military “neocolonialism.” Self-determination also was often limited to the elites of the new states, as the governments installed were frequently authoritarian and repressive, anything but democratic. Yet there has been, over the period of about the last decade and a half, some evolution toward greater frequency of democracy in large parts of what is called the Third World. In late 1973 only two Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking states in South America were governed by democratic regimes (Colombia and Venezuela); now only two are ruled by military dictatorships (Chile and Paraguay, both now in transition). “Democracy” remains fragile and imperfect in many of them, but the relative shift away from authoritarian rule is palpable.

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6. O’Donnell, 1988, for example, characterizes Brazil as in danger of becoming a

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<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gastil, 1989. Gastil has rated the same states over time, not adding new ones except for the European Community as a whole [I count only the member states] and Transkei [I exclude as not independent], and splitting Cyprus into Greek and Turkish halves after 1982 [I still count as one unit, since he codes them the same].

This shift shows up statistically on a worldwide basis. A longtime observer of political rights and civil liberties has carried on, over this period, a project of rating countries according to their degree of “political freedom” (Gastil, 1989, and previous editions). His rating is not meant to reflect a broad definition of human rights that includes, for example, the “second generation” economic rights to employment or the satisfaction of basic physical needs. Rather, it addresses “first generation” rights: electoral practices, the accountability of the executive and the legislature, judicial procedures, and freedom of expression and association—in short, dimensions of the traditional political definition of democracy. For some of his purposes he uses two scales of seven points each; for others he collapses these complex judgments into three categories of states: free, partly free, and not free. The distribution of states in these three categories has varied over time, as shown in Table 5.2.

By Gastil’s evaluation, there has been a substantial decline in the number of strongly authoritarian (not free) states and a similarly substantial increase in the number of partly free states. There has also been a clear though smaller increase in the number of free states, especially if 1973 is used as the base year.

“democradura,” that is, “a civilian government controlled by military and authoritarian elements.”

7. In the most recent edition the author abandons his earlier three-part rating and relies solely on the 14-point scale. For our purposes, however, it is appropriate to maintain his previous equation of scores 2–5 with “free,” 6–11 with “partly free,” and 12–14 with “not free.” Overall, one can argue with elements of his ranking
These trends can be seen in many parts of the world: the demise of dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain; his recent characterization of Hungary, Poland, and even the Soviet Union with scores in the "partly free" range; improvements in China (as of 1988, and still basically "not free"); and shifts in several large, important countries elsewhere—Argentina, Brazil, India (since 1976 and its "emergency rule"), Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Uganda.

The degree of democratization should not be exaggerated, and the most substantial increase is only in the "partly free" category. The first shifts—to popular access to alternative sources of information and relative freedom of expression—are the easiest, and costly for governments to suppress. Pressure to cross further thresholds of democratization—the development of alternative political organizations, and of free, fair elections—represents a greater threat to governmental power; these steps may seem to follow inexorably and yet may meet with stiffer resistance from the state [Dahl, 1988]. Whatever the ultimate outcome, recent developments may indicate more than just a cyclical alternation of democracy and dictatorship in an extension of the fluctuations of the 1930s and early 1970s. Rather, they may be an extension of a very long-term trend of global norms produced by the succession, since the seventeenth century, of powerful nations with increasingly democratic internal political systems (the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States; see Modelski, 1988). Some influences operating in the Philippines case of 1986 may suggest similar conditions which can reinforce movements toward democracy elsewhere:

1. The "demonstration" or "contagion" effect of the restoration of democracy in a number of states, especially in Latin America, sharing important cultural characteristics with the Philippines.

2. Related but still effective political intervention by the United States against continuation of the Marcos regime.

3. The role of national and international television—cleverly exploited by the revolutionaries, who made seizure of the television station a prime objective—which brought the full glare of publicity onto any violent government supression of the demonstrators. Globally observed bloodshed would have further undermined Marcos’s already fading legitimacy; yet his failure to order violent suppression of the demonstrators permitted their success.

4. The role of international organizations in protecting, deliberately or otherwise, key centers of opposition to the regime. Cardinal Sin’s position was especially critical [Hanson, 1987].

5. The role of expatriates (especially Filipinos in Hawaii and the mainland United States) in providing experience and financial support to the opposition.

Obviously these influences do not apply equally to all cases, but one can observe them in lesser degree in places as different as East Germany and South Korea. All these illustrate instruments by which developing international norms about political rights can be made effective.

Arguably the shift to democracy is substantially a result of the manifest economic as well as political failures of dictatorships: authoritarian regimes instituted in the name of economic growth and national development which were unable to deliver on their promises. Perhaps after a spurt of economic growth, they all too often brought stagnation, greater economic inequality, and a loss of true national autonomy, in addition to the suppression of political liberties. It is no wonder that they lost favor with their peoples. Democratic governments also may ultimately lose favor if they are unable to revive stagnant economies—an especially severe danger in Latin America, though many peoples have so far shown a good deal of tolerance for their governments’ predicament. Economic failures, in communist as well as capitalist states, might ultimately increase support for nationalist, fundamentalist, or fascist ideologies rather than for democracy. For now we can perhaps be permitted a degree of helpfulness, and even an assertion that authoritarian rule is out
of favor in the global culture, with effects in communist countries and in the Third World.

It can always be a cause for rejoicing when people gain more power over their own fate, with a widening and deepening of the institutions and practices of democratic government. Does this analysis imply something more, that if the shift toward democracy does continue we will move toward an era of international peace? If all states were democratic could we all live in perpetual peace? Does a solution to international violence lie in creating a world in which all countries are governed by democratic practices? In principle, this would both rid the world of the aggressive behavior of some kinds of autocratic regimes and deprive democratically governed peoples of a normatively legitimate target for jingoism.

A serious reservation, however, must concern interpretation of the word “creating.” The argument here does not imply that the route to ultimate perpetual peace is through wars, or threats of war, to make other countries democratic. World War II may in that sense have been a success with Japan and West Germany, but who would want to repeat the experience against a contemporary great power? External threats all too commonly become means to reinforce, not relax, the repressive power of the state. Wars are corrupting to those who fight them, serving to legitimize violence within as well as between countries (Stein, 1980). The self-righteous temptation to blame the adversary and dehumanize the enemy is too strong to give any encouragement to a crusading “holy war” mentality. The degrading experience of western imperialism, alone, should be enough to discourage efforts to force other peoples to be free. Such efforts are likely to be neither just nor successful.

A second temptation, related to the first, may be to define “democracy” too narrowly and ethnocentrically, equating it too readily with all the particular norms and institutions of the Western parliamentary tradition. True, the norms and institutions of democracy as Westerners know it have provided powerful restraints on absolutism. They can be treated as an effective model for others to adopt. But it is better for other countries to adapt those norms and institutions to the conditions of their own histories and cultures than to adopt them as copied from a Western template. If the goal is a world in which all peoples experience a high degree of self-determination and consent of the governed, norms and institutions that flow out of non-Western peoples’ histories may succeed where particular Western forms would not. For this line of thinking we should relax the rigorous (and consciously ethnocentric) operational definition of democracy used early in this chapter.

It is inexcusably ethnocentric to imagine that other peoples are inherently incapable of autonomy and self-government, to declare them unsuited for democracy. While it is myopic to overlook or idealize the ways in which many Third World governments, for instance, oppress their own peoples, it is equally ethnocentric to imagine that their ways of ensuring autonomy and self-determination will be exactly like ours, or to require the full panoply of western forms. In terms of the vision here, what is important is to support democratic governments where they exist and to recognize and reinforce a worldwide movement toward greater popular control over governments, rather than to specify the endpoint in detail for each case.

**Human Rights and Information**

Whatever the faults of Western liberal (bourgeois) democracy, a world of spreading democratic ideology and practice offers some significant possibilities also for spreading peace. Those possibilities can be enhanced by attention to implementing a broad definition of human rights and institutionalizing a freer flow of information. Human rights and information are elements both of greater global democratization and of direct and indirect contributions to international peace. In a world of imperfect democratization, such elements can help reduce those imperfections, and can compensate for some of them in the avoidance of war.

1. Recent American governments have tended, in different ways, to emphasize a commitment to human rights. In the Carter administration this began with an emphasis on political

8. Any discussion of human rights, as of democracy, is inevitably colored by one’s historical context, including mine as a privileged member of society in a powerful capitalist country, governed by democratic procedures as understood in the Western liberal tradition. My perspective on these matters is nevertheless one of moderate historicism: that whereas all are in some sense conventions, they can be substantially grounded across ages and cultures. See Bernstein, 1983, and Haskell, 1987.
rights and civil liberties throughout the world; American standards were applied both to communist countries and to Third World states. Those governments found wanting did not appreciate the criticism. American attention to human rights in the Soviet Union reflected and perhaps hastened the decline of détente; despite some successes in the Third World American pressures often angered allies thought to be strategically important, and the pressures were lessened. During the early years of the Reagan administration, official policy on human rights seemed to be turned most critically toward the Soviet Union and its allies, with abuses by American allies typically overlooked, tolerated, or even abetted. American allies were said to be merely authoritarian states, not totalitarian ones. The frequent ineffectiveness or hypocrisy of American policy on human rights has given the whole concept a bad name to some otherwise sympathetic and liberal-minded people. But the forces strengthening human rights can at least be assisted by low-key persuasion and good example.

Efforts to promote human rights internationally have not been uniformly ineffective or hypocritical. Third world states sometimes do relax the worst of their oppression in response to external pressures, whether those pressures come from governments, international organizations, or private transnational organizations like Amnesty International and Americas Watch. External pressures can contribute to the legitimacy of internal opposition. Some of the rhetoric and liberalizing action of Gorbachev owes a great debt to the power and attractiveness of Western concepts of human rights. Western efforts to reiterate those concepts and their implications—for Eastern Europe as well as for the Soviet Union itself—can hardly be abandoned. An image of the Soviet government as willing to grant a fairly high degree of autonomy to its own citizens but not to its neighbors would hardly fit the image of a state with the “liberal,” “live-and-let-live” policy essential to the basis of international peace being discussed in these pages.

Yet political concessions in the form of domestic human rights policies cannot be demanded of another great power. The principle of noninterference in the internal governance of other states (in international law, statist and positivist norms), dating from the end of the Thirty Years War, does help to defuse one major source of interstate conflict and cannot lightly be cast aside. Hectoring or badgering the leaders of another great power is likely to poison political relations and exacerbate other conflicts; linkage of human rights concessions to important arms control measures is likely to hobble efforts to reduce real dangers of inadvertent escalation of conflict. The failure to reach human rights goals should not become a reason to forgo arms control agreements or, worse, used as an excuse to prevent arms control agreements.

International discussions on human rights are properly a dialogue, wherein the normatively persuasive elements are not solely those of Western advocates. A broad conception of human rights most certainly requires great emphasis on the kind of political rights stressed in American statements. Movement toward a more democratic world requires continued repetition of that message. It also requires a recognition of the legitimacy of some of the rights stressed by others: economic rights, to employment, housing, and some basic standard of material life (Beitz, 1979; Kim, 1984.) Justice demands political liberty, and it also demands a decent level of economic well-being. Political and social peace within democratic countries has been bought in part by this recognition, severe dismantlement of the welfare state would inflame class and ethnic conflict, and most elected political leaders know it. Internationally, recognition of the multifaceted nature of human rights is essential if the dialogue is to be one of mutual comprehension and persuasion. This is a way in which political rights, economic rights, and international peace are bound inextricably together.

Increasing worldwide adherence to democratic political norms and practices cannot alone bear all the weight of sustaining peace. Greater prosperity and economic justice, especially in the Third World, must also bear a major part. This conviction has often been expressed (for example, Brandt, 1980; Shue, 1980; cynics often dismiss it. But it is unlikely to be merely a coincidence that, as noted earlier, the industrial democracies are rich as well as democratic. The distribution of material rewards within them, while hardly ideal, is nevertheless far more egalitarian than that within many Third World countries, or between
First and Third World peoples. That relatively just distribution does affect the cost-benefit analysis of those who would drastically alter it by violence; both rich and poor know they could lose badly. Some such calculation, including but not limited to the normative demands of justice, must apply to cement peace between nations. The broader human rights dialogue, incorporating political, cultural, and economic rights, constitutes a key element of global democratization where the domestic institutions of democracy are imperfect.

2. Another aspect of a stable international peace—reinforcing but not fully contained in concepts of political democracy and human rights—concerns practices and institutions for international communication and cooperation. This has several elements.

One is economic: a freer flow of goods and services between communist and capitalist countries, especially including the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger’s détente policy envisaged such a network of interdependence, giving the Soviet Union a greater material stake in peaceful relations with the capitalist world, and increased Soviet interest in Western products and markets makes the vision all the more plausible. The vision is consistent with traditional liberal prescriptions for trade and international cooperation [Rosencranz, 1986]. While it is not a sufficient condition for peace, and possibly not even a necessary one, it certainly can make an important contribution.

Economic exchange is also a medium and an occasion for the exchange of information. Facilitation of a freer flow of information is a second major element. Without a free flow of information outward there can be no confidence in the outside world that democratic practices are really being followed within a country, and sharp restrictions on the flow of information into one’s own country are incompatible with the full democratic competition of ideas inside it. Cultural exchanges and free travel across state boundaries can help ease misunderstandings of the other’s reasoning, goals, and intent. Across the spectrum from academic game theory to concrete social experience, we know that the prospects for cooperation are much enhanced if the relevant actors can communicate their preferences and actions clearly. This too is not a sufficient condition, and it is easy to trivialize or ridicule the idea by imagining that communication alone can solve international problems. But without the dependable exchange of information, meaningful cooperation is virtually impossible in a world of complex problems and complex national governing systems. 9

It is in this sense that institutions—especially what Keohane (1984) calls “information rich” institutions—are valuable as a means to discover and help achieve shared and complementary interests. Global organizations such as UN agencies are important purveyors of relevant information. Regional organizations, especially among culturally similar countries, may be much less important as instruments of coercion or enforcement than as a means of spotlighting major human rights violations and upholding the moral force of higher norms. The European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have done this effectively, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to a lesser degree [Weston et al., 1987]. Transnational and populist legal norms serve to counter statist ones, and principles of democratic rights become incorporated, often through treaties, into international law and thereby into other states’ domestic law [see MacDougall et al., 1980; Falk, 1981; Boyle, 1985].

The element of information exchange relates directly to progress on security issues. Arms control and disarmament agreements require confidence that compliance with the agreements can be verified. Arrangements for ensuring verification must be established on a long-term, reliable basis. Without verification the agreements are continually hostage both to real fears that the agreements are being violated and to pernicious charges by those who are opposed to the agreements whether or not they are being violated. An authoritarian government can more easily, if it wishes, pursue long-term strategies of aggressive expansion than can a pluralistic democracy with many power centers and voices. Democratic governments can also have their military buildups, of course, but cannot mask them because a public atmosphere of fear or hostility will have to be created to justify the sacrifices; they can threaten other countries, but only after

their action has been justified in the open." (Luttwak, 1987, p. 235). Liberalization of the Soviet Union allows its external partners and adversaries to feel less apprehensive, and to feel more confident that they will have early warning of any newly aggressive policy.

A dense, informal network of information exchange which extends across a wide range of issues and is beyond the control of any government will help, as will some formal institutions for information-sharing. Just as substantial freedom of information is essential to democratic processes within a country, it is essential to peaceful collaboration between autonomous, self-determining peoples organized as nation-states.

Certain specific kinds of multilateral institutions can be important in controlling crises. One possibility is to create crisis management centers, of the kind already established by the United States and the Soviet Union but extended to include other nuclear powers whose actions might cascade a crisis. Another is to strengthen the information and communications base—now sadly inadequate—of the United Nations, and especially of the Secretary General, so that in some future event like the Cuban missile crisis he could act as an informed and timely mediator. Yet another possibility is to have observation satellites operated by third parties (other countries, or international organizations) to monitor military activities and arms control compliance by a variety of electronic means (Boudreau, 1984; Florini, 1988). As long as nuclear weapons exist, even in a world of substantial political liberalization, reliable means of information exchange will be essential.

The Coming Test?

Democracies, as well as other political systems, do have their dark side of externalizing popular frustrations, and some degree of xenophobia is virtually universal. The United States and the Soviet Union, as multi-ethnic societies, are perhaps especially prone to defining patriotism in terms of loyalty more to the political system than to a set of cultural principles. Democracy and socialism thus become defining principles for identifying friends and foes. A shift away from seeing the other as the enemy will not come easily (Shaw and Wong, 1988), though it may be assisted by change within the Soviet system which blurs the existing differences of political practice.

The winds of democracy are blowing in the world, even if in gusts of variable strength and direction. Recently they have become especially evident in the communist countries, and dramatically so with glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union. The current depth and long-term prospects for this movement are highly uncertain. Here too, the twin dangers of wishful thinking and willful ignorance about these events are unavoidably present. The Soviet Union may not soon become a liberal democracy as people in the West understand that term. The bureaucratic, cultural, and historical constraints are powerful. But democratization as a process is (as of late 1989) surely occurring.

There is greater freedom of expression and dissent within the Soviet Union now, and more competition for political control. There is greater openness across the Soviet Union's international borders, for the transmission of ideas and information into as well as out from the country. Prospects for increased trade and cultural exchange can help solidify this openness. Mikhail Gorbachev is explicitly asking his country to adopt some Western norms, as desirable in themselves and as legitimating economic and political modernization. This is an exhilarating and uncertain process, perhaps subject to some reversal but not easily controllable by any leader or group. "Before behavioral revolutions come conceptual revolutions," and the ideological structure of class warfare, centralized Soviet power, and inevitable communist triumph is now shattered beyond reconstruction (Legvold, 1988/89, p. 83).

An article of faith of the dominant ideologies in both the United States and the Soviet Union has always been that neither has any fundamental quarrel with the people of the other country. American differences allegedly have been not with the Soviet people, but with the atheistic communist elites that repress the people; alternatively, Soviet differences have been not with the American people but with the greedy capitalist elites who exploit them. Insofar as the Soviet system of government operated under principles so manifestly different from those of Western democracy, the American claim had a prima facie validity.  

10. Almost 90 percent of Americans believe that the Russian people are not as
And insofar as the Soviet leadership explicitly rejected the legitimacy of Western democracy as representing the interests of its peoples, their claim also seemed valid to their people. Now, as Soviet ideology and practice begin to shift, the distinction between ruling elites and their people loses some of its force. If both sides see each other as in some sense truly reflecting the rule of law and the consent of the governed, the transformation of international relations begins. A high official in the Soviet foreign ministry has said:

Nor can there be any trust in dictatorial, anti-popular regimes which are all but inevitably spreading methods of violence beyond their national borders as well ... And why were our partners frightened by Stalinism? There are many reasons, but one is perfectly clear, i.e. it is difficult to have confidence in a society which is mired in all-out suspicion, it is hard to trust a regime that has no faith in its own people [Kozyrev, 1988, p. 3].

Realist theories about the inherently antagonistic structure of international relations have never been tested in a world where all the major states were governed more or less democratically. Thus we never have had a proper test of some realist propositions against liberal idealist ones. Perhaps we are about to see one. Even if liberal idealist theories are correct, it is not clear whether some threshold of democratic norms and practices must be crossed to achieve peace, or whether (Rummel, 1983, 1985) it is merely a matter of greater degree of democratization bringing a greater likelihood of peace between states. It is also not clear what ancillary conditions must be met, or whether sufficient
democratization in the Soviet Union can in fact be reached by anything that can evolve from its domestic history and the cold war. A hint, however, is that among characteristics deemed "absolutely necessary" for cooperative relations in mid-1988, only 29 percent of Americans insisted that the other country be "a democracy," but 53 percent required that it be one where "citizens enjoy basic human rights" [Yankelovich and Smoke, 1988, p. 16].

Perhaps two or more great powers can exist in the same international system where, governed by self-interest and some sense of broader interest but not ruled by any superordinate authority, they can build conditions for the avoidance of war that do not depend primarily on nuclear deterrence and military threat. In such a situation, nuclear weapons might continue to exist, but crises would occur less often and, when they did, would carry less weighty ideological baggage. From the perspective of the cold warriors on both sides of what was called the Iron Curtain, the really subversive nature of glasnost may be that it will make the Soviet Union no longer eligible for "the presumption of enmity."

hostile to the United States as are their leaders, and that the Russians could be our friends if the attitude of their leaders were different. Yankelovich and Harman, 1988, p. 64, citing a December 1983 survey. Evarts, 1989, reports that large majorities in all major West European states but France agreed that "real and positive changes have taken place in the Soviet Union."

11 Neither realist nor liberal idealist theories are fully adequate, but the dominance of realist thinking in contemporary academic as well as government circles has tended to diminish attention to realism's analytical and empirical weaknesses. See Nye, 1988; Vasquez, 1988. Note that the theoretical perspective of this chapter attends neither to the international system level of analysis nor to the individual nation-state, but rather to the nature of relations between two states. For the distinction, see Russett and Starr, 1989, ch. I. The whole analysis of this book, that domestic politics importantly influence foreign policy, is outside the mainstream of realist thinking.
Controlling the Sword

The Democratic Governance of National Security

Bruce Russett

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