PHIL 550: Suggested Term Paper Topics

The following are suggested topics. You are not limited to these topics, but if you choose another topic, you will need to discuss it with me and obtain approval before the end of class on Wed., Nov. 19. If you choose one of these topics, just send me an email message to let me know which topic you have chosen.

1. Is there a special kind of testimonial justification/warrant/knowledge? Consider the problem of hybrids. Is everything a hybrid? This requires you to make the best case that you can for Lackey's view that her positive reasons condition is compatible with their being some non-hybrid cases of testimonial justification/warrant/knowledge.

2. Positive reasons: We have to ask this question in a way that does not presuppose an answer to the previous question: Do cases of what is regarded as testimonial justification/warrant/knowledge depend on the hearer having positive reasons to believe what the speaker says? In this paper, you would consider whether social structures or practices with appropriate properties can produce justification/warrant/knowledge for some participants without those participants having positive reasons to believe what the speaker says.

3. Circularity Problem: If testimonial justification/warrant/knowledge depend on the hearer having positive reasons that are grounded in non-testimonial justification/warrant/knowledge? In this paper, you would consider which sources of justification/warrant/knowledge are basic, in the sense that there can be no justification/warrant/knowledge of their reliability that does not depend on them, at least in part, as a source.

4. The Infant/Child Question. Consider Lackey's objection to the ICO as a framework for considering what is necessary for children to obtain justification/warrant/knowledge through testimony. Consider especially whether it is enough for children to be responsive to defeaters or whether they have to have a positive reason. Consider, also, Goldberg's idea of epistemic guardians. In addition, consider whether Lackey's "not irrational" interpretation of her positive reasons condition turns it into a no defeater condition for children.

5. Trust. Is there a kind of trust in testimony that can have epistemic value? There are two variations on this topic:

(a) Trust in personal relationships. Consider especially the views of Fricker, Faulkner, and Goldberg, and Lackey's replies to them.

(b) Trust in science. Can science as a social practice provide justification/warrant/knowledge to individual scientists to trust the reports of other scientists?

6. How social is epistemology? There are at least three viewpoints to be critically evaluated in this paper:

(a) the extreme individualistic view: All justification/warrant/knowledge is that of an individual and it is traceable to the justification/warrant/knowledge grounded in the individual's own perception, memory, and reason.

(b) the individualistic/social hybrid: All justification/warrant/knowledge is that of an individual, but it can be produced by social institutions or practices that go beyond the justification/warrant/knowledge that is grounded in the justification/warrant/knowledge grounded in the individual's own perception, memory, and reason.

(c) the extreme social view: At least some justification/warrant/knowledge is possessed by the group as a whole rather than by the individuals in the group. Consider whether Kitcher's argument for diversity can be used to make an argument that the rationality of group beliefs can be enhanced by irrationality in the beliefs of individuals.

7. An Epistemic Defense of Democracy? Consider whether democracy can be defended as a reliable way of determining relevant truths. In your discussion, consider three different epistemic defenses of democracy that correspond to the three alternatives listed in the previous question.