1. AN UNCONTROVERSIAL EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLE IN INDIVIDUAL RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: An individually rational agent A would not intentionally
choose an act a, if there were an alternative act a' available
to A that had better expected consequences (as evaluated by A).
Therefore, the following is a VALID EXPLANATION of an agent
A's choosing act a over act a': The expected consequences (as
evaluated by A) of choosing act a were better than the expected
consequences of act a', and A is individually rational.
2. THE ANALOGOUS SOCIAL CHOICE EXPLANATION IS FALLACIOUS! By
analogy with the case of individually rational choice, it is natural,
BUT FALLACIOUS, to suppose: A group G of individually rational
agents A1, . . . , An would not intentionally choose acts a1 (chosen
by A1), . . , an (chosen by An), if there were an alternative
set of acts a'1, . . . , a'n, that would make everyone in the
group better off (in their own estimation). This fallacious
analogy, leads to the following INVALID EXPLANATION of A1, . .
. , An's choice of a1, . . . , an over a'1, . . . , a'n: The expected
consequences (as evaluated by A1, . . . , An) of choosing acts
a1, . . . , an were better for every member of the group than
the expected consequences (as evaluated by A1, . . . , An) of
choosing acts a'1, . . . , a'n, and all members of the group are
individually rational. Collective action problems illustrate